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To the memory of my parents. 
Abstract 
Concern over the costs of energy production and use has led to persistent demands for 
greater policy emphasis on energy conservation. Many researchers have supported 
these calls and a considerable amount of technical and social research has been undertaken 
with the intention of advancing this option. Despite this research effort, reliance on 
energy conservation has remained low and intermittent in many countries and regions. 
This study explores the reasons for this limited impact of technical and social energy 
conservation research on energy policy and planning. 
Terms and concepts central to the energy debate are defined and discussed. The 
rejection of demands to reduce energy use is explained in terms of policy constraints 
and the contradictions in policy goals contained in the arguments upon which these 
demands are based. The demand for interventionary strategies aimed at increasing the 
efficiency of energy use are explained separately in terms of political resistance to 
demand reduction policies and the nature of energy policy making and planning. 
The empirical heart of the study is made up of three case studies which are used to 
illustrate the arguments developed in the theoretical discussion. The history and 
ongoing debate over electricity planning in Tasmania is first examined. The underlying 
reasons behind the rapid expansion of electricity supply, and the rejection of energy 
conservation as a means of reducing the pace of the state's electricity supply construction 
programme are analysed. The recent history of electricity planning in the state is then 
used to explain continued low reliance on energy conservation in the aftermath of 
electricity planning reform. The effectiveness of two household sector energy conservation 
strategies are then assessed. An experiment involving the monitoring of the impacts of 
an information campaign on household energy use, and laboratory testing of the 
performance and energy consumption of refrigerators, are described. The results of 
these experiments are discussed in terms of the support they lend to the theoretical 
arguments and their policy relevance. 
It is argued that those who demand energy conservation as a social imperative are 
frustrated and perplexed due to their failure to understand the complexities of energy 
issues and what these demands run up against, on the one hand, and to a clash 
between what is socially and instrumentally rational, on the other. The frustration and 
perplexity of scientific researchers is explained in terms of differences in disciplinary 
modes of thinking, to the dominance of scientists in debate over energy policy and 
energy conservation, and to a schism within the literature on energy policy whereby 
political explanations tend to be omitted from the mainstream debate. 
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Using a distinction between high, moderate and low energy conservation strategies, 
and the idea of threshold effects between these different levels of energy conservation, 
the reasons for the rejection of energy conservation as a policy option are summarised. 
The limited impact of technical and social energy conservation research is then explained 
in terms of these arguments. The overall conclusion reached is that although it is 
theoretically possible to use scientific research to persuade energy planners to adopt 
rational demand reduction strategies, in practice, the substantial resources required 
render it very difficult to do so. Serious planning commitment to energy conservation 
therefore requires a priori change at the political level, the resources necessary for useful 
scientific research being made available only after policy makers decide to increase 
emphasis on energy conservation. Contemporary energy policy reform, however, has 
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"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?" 
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to", said the Cat. 
"I don't much care where ... ", said Alice. 
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go", said the Cat. 
" ... so long as I get somewhere", Alice added as an explanation. 
"Oh, you're sure to do that," said the Cat, "if only you walk long enough". 
— Lewis Carroll (1896) Alice in Wonderland. 
Another book on energy requires apology more than introduction. 
— W.D. Nordhaus (1979) The Efficient Use of Energy 
Resources. Yale University Press, London: p. xv. 
1.1 Setting a Course 
This study asks why energy conservation is not adopted as a policy option at a rate 
many consider to be more socially and economically rational, and why there exist such 
large disparities, in both place and time, in this regard. For the reader to understand 
why this study chose to ask the above questions and the subsequent line of argument 
taken in answering them, it is necessary to begin in an unorthodox manner by telling it 
the way it happened: how the initial problem that prompted the thesis was the perceived 
low policy priority assigned to energy conservation; the subsequent divergence of opinion 
over the capacity of social and technical scientific research to alter this state of affairs; 
and how the 'real' problem came to be seen as an inadequate understanding of the 
underlying reasons behind the low policy emphasis on energy conservation. In this 
case, the dead-ends themselves came to be the subject of the thesis. Through this 
account of the processes behind the study's evolution and the reasons for the change in 
tack along the way, the reader will be more able to understand the approach taken by, 
and the arguments developed in, the study. The introductory section of this chapter is 
therefore used to set the course for the study by briefly relating the story of its origin 
before discussing at greater length its aims, explaining the methodological approach, 
and outlining its structure. 
1.2 The Origins of the Study 
The study's genesis in 1990 coincided with the sexagenary of Tasmania's (for a brief 
description of Tasmania see Box 1 on the following page) public electricity authority, 
the Hydro-Electric Commission (HEC). The Commission had just traded-in its traditional 
1 
crest, encircled with the proud motto, Vis abundans nec unquam deficiens i , for a more 
modern and stylized logo, sans motto. This change turned out to be timely as the 
Commission's anniversary was marked by the firing of the State's second 120 MW 2 
stand-by3 oil-fired generating unit and a reliance on non-hydro sources to meet 11% 
of the State's electricity requirements. An extended period of low rainfall had severely 
reduced the hydro-electric system's ability to meet demand and for the first time in the 
its history, a substantial portion of the State's electricity needs were generated from a 
source other than hydro-electricity (HEC 1990a: 41, HEC 1991: 45). Debate on energy 
policy was coloured by the common perception of a serious electricity deficiens! 
This graphic demonstration of the vulnerability of the State's predominantly hydro 
system to the vagaries of the weather, moreover, occurred at a time that lent the 
occasion amplified significance and more than a touch of irony. After two decades of 
being mothballed, the State's back-up oil-fired power plant was fired not only the in 
midst of major economic downturn in the State but also renewed outbreak of war in the 
BOX 1 
The fact that this study began in Tasmania is not critical to the point being made 
here. The State is used, however, as one of the three case studies presented to 
support the arguments subsequently developed. The characteristics of the State are 
therefore given in greater detail in the introduction to that case study in Section 5.1. 
Tasmania is the smallest and southernmost Australian state. In the words of Mikes 
(1968: 138), it 'seceded' geographically from the mainland over 40,000 years ago 
and is the only island state in the federation. Roughly heart-shaped, its area 
(63,325 square kilometers) is very close to that of Sri Lanka or the Republic of 
Ireland. Tasmania is dwarfed by the Australian mainland, its land area being 
about one third that of the next smallest state, Victoria. Situated between the 
latitudes of 42 °S and 43 °30'S, the island lies in the path of the northern tip of the 
'Roaring Forties', the westerly airstream over the Southern Ocean. Annual average 
rainfall on the west coast ranges from 1500 to 3000 mm. There is a strong 
gradation in rainfall from west to east with annual average rainfall in areas east of 
the Central Plateau as low as 500 mm. The elevation of the Central Plateau and 
western ranges is between 1000 and 1200 m above sea level and this relatively high 
rainfall and tropical relief provides natural potential for hydro-electric 
development. 
A dual Westminster system exists in Australia, with political responsibility shared 
between the Commonwealth and states. The latter are responsible for, among other 
things, planning and development of their own energy resources. 
The latin motto translates as Abundant energy without deficiency. 
2 A list of energy units and their symbols is provided at the end of the study. 
3 A wide variety of terms are used in this study. A small number of important terms are 
defined in Chapter Two. All other terms which the reader may not be familiar with are 
defined in the glossary provided at the end of the thesis. Terms included in the glossary 
are underlined the first time that they appear in the text of the thesis. 
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Middle East and a rapid, albeit brief, price rise of oil on the world market. While the 
temporary rise in the price of oil significantly inflated the Commission's fuel bill, it was 
the coincidence of this need for back-up thermal power with the demise of a long-standing 
policy of hydro-industrialization in the State that lent the firing of the back-up power 
station its real poignancy. 
For over three decades the largest portion of the State's capital works programme had 
been committed to a continuous series of hydro-electric projects of ever increasing 
magnitude to the extent that the word 'power' in Tasmania had eventually come to be 
regarded by some as synonymous with the name of the State's public electricity authority 
(Turnbull 1981, Thompson 1981, McQueen 1982, Lowe 1984). Administration of the 
State and that of 'the Hydro came to be seen by many as 'virtually indistinguishable' 
(Orchison 1994). The goal of the hydro-industrialization policy was simple enough - 
the promotion of industrial development and presumed concomitant generation of 
employment within the State underpinned by the provision of cheap hydro-electric 
power to industry. Absorbing as it did, however, so much of the State's scarce capital 
resources, the appeal of the policy began to atrophy around the late 1960s. Conflict 
between hydro-electric development and demand for preservation of natural areas had 
become the greatest source of public questioning of the policy by the early 1970s. 
Continued State government adherence to the policy in the face of this criticism led 
ultimately to political upheaval and community division on a grand scale with a finale 
that saw a Premier deposed, a State government toppled and a political spill-over into 
the national political arena (Thompson 1981, Lowe 1984, Selwell 1987, Rosenthal & 
Russ 1988, O'Riordan 1989, Smith & Handmer 1991, Tighe 1992). The Federal government 
intervened by using its constitutional powers in the area of External Affairs to halt 
construction of a highly contentious hydro-electric project involving the flooding of the 
Franklin River. The Tasmanian government mounted an unsuccessful legal challenge 
and on the 1st July 1983 a full bench of the High Court ruled by a single vote in favour 
of the Federal government (Coper 1983, Sornarajah 1983, Wilcox 1983). With that 
ruling, the options for exploiting the most of the remaining large scale hydro-electric 
potential in the State were foreclosed and a colourful chapter in Tasmania's socio-political 
history was brought to an end. Thus by 1990, as the last of its hydro-electric projects 
was nearing completion, the State was witnessing the twilight of an energy era that had 
spanned over three quarters of a century and Tasmania's energy planners were left 
wondering, like Alice in Wonderland, which way to go from here. 
This hiatus in energy policy in the early 1990s acted as a fillip for the State's newly 
formed Department of Resources and Energy to bring forward the process of weighing 
up the pros and cons of its various options. The three options vying for ultimate 
sanction as the State's next energy source, in order of apparent Departmental preference, 
were (i) a submarine cable (Basslink) connecting the State's electricity grid with those of 
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the south eastern Australian states which were fed, predominantly, by coal-fired power 
stations, (ii) the development of a natural gas field in the strait between the mainland 
and Tasmania with a view to constructing a gas-fired thermal generating plant in the 
State, and (iii) the construction of a coal-fired thermal generating plant supplied by the 
State's limited indigenous coal resources. The resort to the oil-fired stand-by thermal 
plant at Bell Bay in Tasmania therefore provided a preview of what was being proposed 
as a new era in the State, the generation of electricity from the combustion of fossil 
fuels. It was an energy strategy, however, that collided with increasing international 
concern over the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Concern over the enhanced greenhouse effect the possibility that increasing atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases would lead to climate 
change, was catapulted from a long-term position in policy limbo to being an issue at 
the centre of the international policy arena in the latter half of the late 1980s. It was, in 
fact, the third in a series of environmental issues truly global in scope that surfaced 
around that period, the other two being the potential of even a limited nuclear exchange 
to result in catastrophic cooling of the Earth's surface (Ehrlich et al. 1984) and the 
scientific evidence of significant depletion of tropospheric ozone (Roan 1989). While 
the greenhouse problem was a scientifically complex one, with feedback effects such as 
the impact of warming on cloud formation not fully understood, scientific consensus 
that the problem was real and that something needed to be done appeared to be 
steadily growing. Even Britain's archconservative Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, 
had described it as 'an experiment too great to risk', leading one major newspaper 
editor in that country to declare that there would be much rejoicing in the stratosphere 
for this one repentant sinner (Olstead 1993: 12). 
A series of attempts to reach multilateral agreements to drastically curb greenhouse gas 
emissions, particularly between the more developed nations, had therefore been set in 
train. The Toronto Protocol of 1988 had called on developed nations to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions to 20% below 1988 levels by the year 2005. Although key players 
had initially demurred on the uncertainties surrounding the extent, regional differences 
and ultimate consequences of climatic change, by 1991 twenty nations, including 
Australia, had entered a voluntary pact to meet the Toronto target despite the absence 
of any international treaty (Sinclair 1991). 
The implications of this 'mother of environmental scares' (Wildavsky 1992: xv) for 
future levels of fossil fuel use were profound. Carbon dioxide was considered the most 
significant of the greenhouse gases, accounting for approximately 55% of anthropogenic 
global greenhouse radiative forcing (Cline 1991: 906) and the combustion of fossil fuels 
accounted for approximately 85% of these global carbon dioxide emissions (ANZEC 
1990: 34). Furthermore, the two sectors that accounted for the greatest part of the 
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fossil fuel combustion were the transport and electricity generation sectors. In Australia, 
for example, carbon dioxide had been identified as accounting for 45% of total national 
greenhouse gas emissions. Of the various sectors of the economy, the energy sector was 
identified as the largest contributor to total greenhouse gas emissions, accounting for 
43% of total emissions, 44.7% of which was produced from the combustion of coal. 
Nearly all of this coal was used to generate electricity (ANZEC 1990: 33-34). Energy 
was therefore seen to be the key to the solution of the greenhouse problem (Benarde 
1992: viii) and electricity generation the major target of any attempt to meet international 
commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Tasmania's intention to embark on a course of increased generation of electricity from 
fossil fuels at this juncture in time was therefore discordant with both international 
attempts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and a national commitment. As such it 
had about it a disconcerting ring of Hardin's (1968) Tragedy of the Commons as it was 
premised on the belief that its contribution would go unnoticed. Herein lay an irony. 
By the late 1980s there were two popular views prevalent in the environmental literature. 
The first was that the global community was in need of crossing a perceptual threshold 
in order to avert eco-catastrophe (McKibben 1989, Brown et al. 1989, Lovins 1989a, 
1991, Eden 1993). The second was that there were clear signs that such a rapid shift in 
attitude in this direction was occurring. The burgeoning social phenomenon, the modern 
environment movement was, to its proponents at least, of such a scale that it was 
variously ascribed the status of revolution (Nicholson 1970, Reich 1970, Lewis 1973, 
Damman 1984, Brown 1988, Merchant 1989, Harrison 1992), a turning point (Mesarovic 
& Pestel 1974; Inglehart 1977; Capra 1983), a U-turn (Goldsmith 1988), a green shift 
(Pearce et al. 1989) and a historical discontinuity (Caldwell 1990). To more neutral 
observers it represented one of the most important social movements of our time' 
(Tester 1994: 1320, Nisbet 1982: 101-7). 
The irony in Tasmania's contemplated launch into a fossil fuel electricity generation era 
had to do with the State's reputation as a leader of beneficial environmental change. 
Controversy over a proposal to flood Lake Pedder in Tasmania's rugged southwest 
wilderness for hydro-electric storage in the late 1960s was broadly credited with having 
seeded the modern Antipodean environmental movement (Dunphy 1972, Knoppes 
1987, Smith & Handmer 1991) and to have given rise to the world's first environmental 
political party, the United Tasmania Group in 1972 (Flanagan 1990). This reputation 
of being at the vanguard of environmental politics was enhanced a decade later with 
the re-eruption of this dams versus wilderness controversy which developed into 
Australia's environmental cause celebre (Tighe 1992: 124). Since that time, environmental 
issues had remained firmly on the boil in the State (Hay 1987: 4). In 1989, 
environmentalists won the balance of power in the State's House of Assembly (Larmour 
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1990, Hay & Eckersley 1993) and the Tasmanian environmental movement gained the 
reputation as being, in the tactical, organisational and philosophical senses, at the 
vanguard of world environmental politics (Hay 1988). Tasmania was described by 
some writers as 'one of the few places in the world' where environmental issues had 
been 'successfully politicised' (Grosvenor et al. 1993: 4) and as a green socio-political 
laboratory (Hay & Haward 1988: 439). The local green movement considered itself to 
be at the centre of world attention (Pybus & Flanagan 1990) and the State to be 'at the 
leading edge' of not just green politics but also sustainable economics (Lowe 1990a: 
87). This portrait of the State as an environmental leader was therefore out of kilter 
with its plans to begin generating electricity from fossil fuels at this point in time. 
The response of the environmental lobby to the convergence of the above issues was 
predictable. Todd (1991) argued that Tasmania was strategically located in place and 
time to embark on an ecologically sustainable energy course which would establish it as 
an 'energy role model'. Similarly, Mills (1991a) injected into the debate an argued 
proposal for Tasmania to become the nation's first 'solar state'. Wind energy proposals, 
had previously been advanced as an economically viable and particularly suitable 
energy option for Tasmania given its favourable wind patterns and the compatibility of 
the wind option with its hydro-electric generating system (Blakers & Outhred 1983, 
Blakers 1987). These wind energy proposals were now dusted off and re-advanced 
(Diesendorf 1990, Lowe 1990a). 
Central to the above sustainable energy proposals was the notion that the State's 
requirements for energy could be reduced to the point that they could be met with 
renewable energy technologies (RET5) 4 alone. This followed a long tradition within 
the general energy debate in which renewable energy and energy conservation were 
advanced in tandem as two components of the one strategy (Blackburn 1987, National 
Institute of Economic and Industry Research 1990, Brower 1990, Boyle 1992, Pears & 
Versluis 1993) that tended to be 'riveted' together (Gibbs 1991: 10). Along with this 
revival of interest in renewable energy throughout the world, therefore, was a parallel 
revival of interest in energy conservation. 
This new wave of interest in energy conservation sweeping the globe had come in 
revamped form. Gone were the admonitions for leaving lights on in empty rooms and 
the avuncular chidings for use of the clothes drier instead of the clothes line: In their 
stead came an appeal more exculpating to the ego: energy was still being wasted, but 
the culprit was now projected as the inefficient energy-using appliance rather than the 
apathetic individual. Geriatric hot water systems and antiquated TV sets were now 
4 A list of abbreviations used in the study is provided at the end of the thesis in which the 
terms they represent are given. 
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portrayed as the energy gluttons rather than those who used them. Pogo the Clown's 
'We have met the enemy and it is us', oft used as a rubric in texts on energy conservation, 
was applicable no more. The enemy was now the appliance and the remedy more 
palatable, requiring neither a change in lifestyle nor a reduction in comfort but a simple 
replacement of the offending appliance. Just as the traditional incandescent globe had 
established itself as a hieroglyph of bright new ideas, the compact fluorescent lamp 
(CFL) was now adopted as the symbol of energy efficiency. To the most ardent 
preachers of this new gospel of energy efficiency, the rate at which the theoretical 
potential for increasing the efficiency of energy use was increasing represented a change 
of epochal significance (Lovins 1987, Flavin & Duming 1988). 
All research starts by choosing an entry point into a specific subject area (Resnick & 
Wolff 1987: 25). In this case it was the convergence of these ideas and events — the gap 
in Tasmania's energy policy, the contradiction between the energy strategies being 
contemplated by the State's energy policy decision makers and the increasing concern 
over the greenhouse issue, the rift between these conventional energy supply expansion 
strategies and the local environmental movements's argument that the State was 
strategically placed to serve as a sustainable energy role model, and the revival of 
interest in energy conservation — that combined to give rise to the simple suggestion 
from which this thesis grew. This was that it was timely in place and time to 'do 
something on energy conservation' and that the most logical focus of this effort was the 
household sector. The entry point was the ideas that energy conservation was a socially 
and ecologically desirable policy option and that research on household energy 
conservation could play a useful role in advancing this option in Tasmania. The 
research was unabashedly mission-orientated, its ultimate goal being to inform policy 
on the questions of the scope for household sector energy conservation and how this 
could be achieved. The author, however, entered this subject area tabula rasa and the 
first step was to begin searching the voluminous literature on household energy 
conservation as a means of developing a more specific proposal. 
Rather than firming up a thesis proposal, however, this reading had the effect of 
sabotaging it. Instead of producing a clear idea of what would actually constitute a 
useful contribution to the debate, this preliminary reading distilled serious reservations 
over the policy relevance of much of this orthodox technical and social household 
sector energy conservation research. The attempt to find a research topic also involved 
discussions with a number of individuals with an academic or professional interest in 
energy conservation5 . The initial suggestion was that the statement that there existed 
significant scope for reducing household sector requirements for reticulated energy in 
Tasmania could be adopted as a working hypothesis. The idea was to test this 
hypothesis by using literature on energy efficient equipment together with local data on 
energy use to construct an assessment of the extent to which household energy requirements 
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for reticulated electricity in Tasmania could be reduced. A further suggestion was that 
it would be useful to develop an environmentally optimal energy strategy for Tasmania. 
Yet another was that a survey could be used together with field inspections to compare 
reported with actual levels of thermal insulation in Tasmanian households. That these 
suggestions had merit was demonstrated by the fact that numerous researchers had 
followed such lines of inquiry over the years. Nonetheless, all of these suggestions met 
with reservations that could be neither articulated nor dispelled. Like annoying blowflies, 
they buzzed around overhead, refusing to either land or go away. 
As an aside to mulling over ideas for a thesis, the author began to work on two 
independent projects. One was a demonstration programme of energy efficient equipment 
which aimed to show that the potential for reducing energy use through increasing the 
efficiency of energy use was not theoretical but real. The work involved the measurement 
of the energy consumption of an efficient refrigerator and comparing this to the energy 
consumption of conventional models. The second of these asides was a research 
project in which the author was invited to assist and which involved the monitoring of 
the effectiveness of a household energy conservation information programme. 
Both reading and discussions on further ideas for a research project were continued. 
The author's rejection of proposals involving the construction of energy proposals 
based on technical energy efficiency assessments saw these discussions turn toward the 
idea of undertaking a household survey as a means of determining why households did 
not adopt energy conservation measures available to them or to assess the scope for 
household sector energy conservation. Again the author demurred, checked by 
reservations. While deliberating over these, however, Tasmania's energy situation began 
to change. 
The drought eased and the State's thermal power station was mothballed once again, 
removing the sense of urgency over energy issues. The imminent conunissioning of the 
latest of the State's hydro-electric projects further diluted the intensity of debate over 
energy policy in the State and further weakened the appeal of doing something on 
energy conservation. Then came the coup de grace for the research proposal to do 
something on household sector energy conservation in Tasmania. Comalco Bell Bay 
5 The author consulted a number of individuals during this early stage of the thesis. Initial 
discussions were held with his supervisor, Associate Professor John Todd. Subsequent 
discussions were held with Dr Peter Wilde and Professor Kirkpatrick , both from the 
Department of Geography and Environmental Studies at the University of Tasmania, Dr 
Mark Diesendorf with the Australian Conservation Foundation, Dr David Crossley from 
the Demand Management Unit of the Electricity Commission of New South Wales 
(ELCOM), Dr Hugh Outhred from the Engineering Department of the University of New 
South Wales, Graeme Wathen from the Department of Industry, Manufacturing and 
Technology in Melbourne, and Mr Alan Pears, an energy efficiency consultant from 
Melbourne. 
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Ltd, an aluminium smelting company located at Bell Bay adjacent to the stand-by 
thermal power station and the State's largest single electricity consumer had been 
locked into protracted in camera re-negotiation with the Tasmanian Government and 
the HEC over future electricity prices and security. The heavily indebted HEC argued 
that the price the company paid for its electricity had to be increased. The company 
countered with the argument that aluminium smelting was highly competitive and that 
the price the company paid for electricity greatly affected its international 
competitiveness. The company therefore demanded that new arrangements be found 
which would provide it with a guarantee of low electricity prices over the longer term. 
An acceptable arrangement could not be reached and the company announced that it 
intended to wind down its Tasmanian operations over the period of the remainder of 
its existing electricity contract which expired in 2001. To add credence to its threat the 
company permanently closed down its number one potline, immediately reducing its 
need for electricity by 60 MW. As the company accounted for approximately 27% of 
the total electricity consumed in the State, its departure would increase the idle capacity 
to one third of total generating capacity. It therefore represented a potentially 
embarrassing crisis for the HEC. For research on electricity conservation in Tasmania, 
however, it represented a crisis of irrelevance. 
The initial problem that had given rise to the suggestions for the thesis, the shortage of 
electricity in that state, was now a totally inverted one. The case for accelerating the 
adoption of household sector energy conservation in Tasmania was weakened further 
by the fact that the price Australian householders paid for electricity was reported to 
be low in comparison to those paid by householders in many other industrialised 
countries (Electricity Council [UK] 1988) 6 while Tasmanian householders reportedly 
paid a lower price for electricity than did their mainland counterparts (The Mercury 5 
July 1993: 9). The threat of considerable overcapacity had therefore made Tasmania 
something of a topsy-turvy land in which seeking to explain why householders did 
take-up energy conservation appeared a more logical question the usual research question 
of why they did not. All in all, Tasmania looked to be barren territory for research into 
energy conservation and this situation looked set to last for some time to come. I 
Tasmania, electricity conservation had become a non-issue and since few researchers 
who demand social usefulness as a criteria for their work deliberately venture into the 
nether world of non-issues (Crenson 1971: 4), it was now the author rather than the 
State's energy planners who appeared to be wondering where to go from here. 
6 The Electricity Council [UK] comparison of the price of domestic electricity based on 1988 
prices estimated that Australia ranked fifth lowest of twenty selected industrialised 
countries. This comparison was made using the cost of 3300 kWh of electricity on the 
standard domestic tariff and included local taxes and VATs. 
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Perhaps the logical thing to have done at that point would have been to either abandon 
the topic of energy conservation altogether or to look elsewhere to focus on energy 
conservation research. Paradoxically, however, it was only once the immediate need 
for conserving reticulated electricity in the State had been temporarily removed that a 
potentially useful line of inquiry began to emerge. The reason for this apparent 
contradiction was that as the momentum of the perceived need for reducing energy 
dissipated, the reservations held by the author over the various research suggestions 
began to precipitate out of the confusion and settle, and it was by thinking more deeply 
about those reservations that ideas began to form as to what research was actually 
viable and socially useful. 
The first of those reservations was an overpowering sense of déjà vu. Concern over 
energy issues and interest in energy conservation appeared to be episodic and we 
appeared to be asking the same questions as we had been asking on previous occasions. 
A second reservation related to the large, and increasing, volume of literature on energy 
and energy conservation, and the repetitive nature of much of that literature. Not only 
had the volume of literature on energy conservation increased dramatically since the 
early 1970s, but it appeared to be characterised, furthermore, by much confusion, on 
the one hand, and by a readily detectable sense of frustration over the continued low 
priority assigned to energy conservation in energy policy and planning, on the other. 
The third reservation was that it appeared that in attempting to seek the reasons why 
energy conservation does not happen, much scientific research had focused on the 
personal level by surveying individuals and householders as the means of searching for 
potentially fruitful ways to accelerate the adoption of energy conservation measures. 
The author was unconvinced, however, that the main cause of the rejection of energy 
conservation as a policy option was located at the individual level. 
A final and most important reservation related to the assumptions underlying the 
research. It has been forcefully argued that the usefulness of much research in general 
that has been undertaken with the intention of informing policy but has been seriously 
undermined by the failure on the part of researchers to examine the assumptions 
underlying their research (Hanson 1993). Hanson's criticism appeared highly applicable 
to much scientific energy conservation research'. Although much scientific energy 
conservation research had been undertaken as a means of supporting this demand for 
energy conservation by informing policy makers about the scope for saving energy, 
policy reliance on energy conservation had remained low and intermittent in many 
7 The term 'scientific energy conservation research' is used in this study as a generic term for 
technical and social energy conservation research. 
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countries and regions. It was clear that in many situations, this research had little 
tangible impact on actual energy policy decision making. At the heart of this scientific 
research, and the suggestions which prompted this study, were implicit assumptions 
about how much energy conservation was desirable or necessary, why policy makers 
did not employ various energy policy instruments to accelerate the rate of take-up of 
energy conservation, and, therefore, what research would be useful in persuading policy 
makers to place a greater emphasis on energy conservation. To the author, it was the 
failure to question these assumptions and appreciate the complexities of the issues 
involved that lay behind the limited policy impact of this research. 
Consideration of these four reservations led to a revision of the direction and aims of 
the study. It appeared that more technical or social energy conservation research was 
less needed than to pause and reflect on the causes of this repetition and frustration 
within the literature and on the apparent failure of scientific research to impact on 
energy policy and decision making. In this way, the present study was transformed 
from research on energy conservation, to a study about the debate over the need for 
energy conservation and the contribution that scientific energy conservation research 
makes to that debate. 
1.3 Aims and Arguments 
The purpose of this study is to offer a critique of scientific energy conservation research 
a la Maslow's (1966) critique of orthodox science by examining the arguments upon 
which the demands for energy conservation are based and the policy and planning 
processes. It does not begin with clearly formulated hypotheses that could be objectively 
tested but merely with a few hunches as to reasons for the particularly low policy 
emphasis on energy conservation in many countries such as Australia, for the rejection 
of environmentalist demands for intervention to reduce the demand for energy, and for 
the limited impact of technical and social energy conservation research on energy policy 
decision making in such situations. The author therefore decided to begin with these 
hunches and, borrowing from Dahl & Lindblom (1953: 28), to develop the argument of 
the thesis as the study proceeded. 
The first hunch was that the repetitive nature of technical and social energy conservation 
research was a direct consequence of the lack of tangible impact this research has often 
had on policy and decision making. This limited impact on policy, moreover, was 
considered likely to be itself directly attributable to the fact that this research has been 
based on an inadequate understanding of why energy conservation has not been adopted 
as a policy option to a greater degree than it has, or of the reasons for the differences in 
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the degree to which energy conservation has been encouraged over time and between 
places. One reason for this is that very little is written about those places where energy 
conservation is given a very low priority in energy policy and planning and this omission 
means that the low emphasis on energy conservation in such places remains largely 
unexplained (Gadgil & Sastry 1994: 151). 
The second hunch was that those who demand greater reliance on energy conservation 
and advance energy conservation proposals as alternatives to conventional policy 
emphasis of expanding the supply of energy, frequently fail to adequately understand 
the contexts in which their proposals would be implemented, the complexities and 
many contradictions contained in their demands for reductions in energy use, and the 
source and nature of the resistance to those demands. It was suspected that it was 
this failure that led to much of the confusion within the debate over energy conservation. 
The aim of the study thus became to explain the rejection of demands for increased 
emphasis on energy conservation policies, the reasons for the variation in policy emphasis 
on energy conservation between places and over time, and the particularly low emphasis 
on energy conservation in some situations. In this way, it was hoped to explain the 
frustration and repetition that characterised both the environmentalist demand for 
energy conservation and the scientific energy conservation research literature. It was 
clear from the outset, however, that any attempt to explain the rejection of demands 
for greater emphasis on energy conservation would not be straightforward as the debate 
over energy conservation appeared to be highly confused. The causes for this confusion 
appeared to be twofold. The first cause appeared to be imprecision in the meaning of 
terms and concepts employed in the debate. The second cause of this confusion 
appeared to be the difficulty of agreeing on the answers to three important subquestions 
central to energy conservation: why energy should be conserved?; how energy could be 
conserved?; and, how much energy ought to be conserved? The reason that there was 
little agreement on the answers to these questions, furthermore, is that the issues that 
they touch on tend to be highly complex. 
In embarking on the task of explaining why energy conservation was dismissed as a 
policy option, the author followed one final hunch: that the adoption or nonadoption 
of energy conservation as a policy option could not be treated in isolation from the 
question of the rate of growth of demand for energy and the factors driving that rate of 
increase in demand. The two issues, the scope for energy conservation and the rate of 
growth in demand for energy, were felt by the author to be complementary and two 
sides of the same coin. It was the author's strong suspicion that the dismissal of energy 
conservation as a policy option had to be understood, not in terms of the absolute 
number of megajoules or kilowatt hours of energy that could potentially be saved, but 
in terms of the scope for saving energy relative to the projected rate of increase in the 
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demand for energy. The ability to persuade policy makers to adopt energy conservation 
as a planning option was seen by the author to be closely linked to the rate of growth 
in energy demand and the capacity to reduce the rate of growth in demand for energy. 
Explaining the rate of growth in the demand for energy, therefore, became quintessential 
to the study's aim of attempting to explain the rejection of energy conservation as a 
policy option. Because of this, a secondary aim of this study was to explain the 
factors behind the rapid rates of increase in demand for energy. 
1.4 Methodology 
A complete attempt to explain why energy conservation is not relied on to a greater 
degree than it is would need to incorporate many fields of knowledge that included the 
technical, behavioural, social, environmental, economic, political, and institutional areas. 
While an number of writers advocate such an holistic approach as the only means of 
adequately addressing the complexities of such issues, and environmental issues in 
particular, to do so would place an unmanageable burden on the research student 
(Walker 1992: 14). This study therefore makes no pretence of holism but elected 
instead to adopt an eclectic approach. 
This eclectic approach covered a wide range and large amount of literature. This 
literature was searched using different means and tools which evolved during the 
course of the study as a consequence of rapid changes in information technology. The 
initial search was on household energy conservation and Smith et al. (1987), in reviewing 
the literature, had noted its extensive nature and provided a useful summary of the 
various search devices available, including lists of energy data bases, abstracts and the 
more important journals. The University of Tasmania Library carried out an initial 
literature search on household energy use, household energy conservation and household 
energy efficiency using the Energyline and NTIS on-line data bases. The author carried 
out separate literature searches using Energy Information Abstracts, Energy Index, Renewable 
Energy Index and Energy Abstracts. 
Once these had been completed, the literature was updated at regular intervals by 
perusal of the more important journals where these were locally available. A problem 
with researching in the area of energy conservation and energy policy in Tasmania was 
that few of the important energy journals were locally available. The University of 
Tasmania's relatively small library subscribed to very few of the relevant journals, and 
most of the locally available journals relevant to this study were housed in the Hydro-
Electric Commission's library. Accessing these journals was difficult, however, as 
members of the public have no borrowing rights or access to photocopying equipment 
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at that HEC's library. While visiting the other Australian states, the libraries of several 
universities and electricity authorities were used by the author to ascertain which 
journals were important. Current Contents was then used to regularly check articles 
appearing in those journals. The vast majority of material used in this research was 
obtained through the University of Tasmania Library's inter-library loan service. 
The literature on general environmentalism and the environmental debate over energy 
was obtained in a number of ways. The Centre for Environmental Studies possesses its 
own resource collection on environmental literature and this information was 
supplemented by discussions with colleagues researching specific aspects of 
environmentalism such as environmental philosophy and sustainable development. 
Searches of the catalogues of major libraries using the internet provided many useful 
sources of information. 
Political scientists working at the University of Tasmania were approached and asked 
to provided useful initial sources of literature on policy decision making and political 
theory. The University of Tasmania Library catalogue was then used to extend this 
reading material. Dr Peter Wilde and Dr Shirley Grosvenor provided useful reference 
material on social research methodology and realist philosophy of science. Information 
on theoretical aspects of energy planning, and electricity planning in particular, was 
more difficult to find. On-line literature searches for the subjects of energy policy and 
energy planning provided useful references. The main source of this information, however, 
came from the search for literature on electricity planning in a specific location. Associate 
Professor Bruce Davis had written widely on the topic and supplied the author with a 
larp number of useful references. Methodologies employed in the research involving 
the case studies of the effectiveness of behavioural and technical energy conservation 
measures are described separately in the relevant chapters of this study. 
1.5 Plan of the Thesis 
This thesis is presented in two parts. To assist the reader, structure of this thesis is 
outlined graphically in the flow chart in Figure 1.1 This flow chart is used to thread of 
the argument and how this is connected by the various chapters. PART I covers the 
conceptual and theoretical components. Before exploring the reasons for the low policy 
emphasis on energy conservation it is necessary to be clear about what is meant by 
energy conservation, energy efficiency and so on. The need to do so arises from the 
observation that we tend to think with our concepts, not about them (Sayer 1992: 35) 
and this failure has led to much confusion. Chapter 2 is therefore used to look more 
closely at the important terms and concepts around which the debate rotates and some 
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Figure 1.1 Flow chart indicating the structure of the thesis. 
of the problems associated with those terms. In the light of those concepts, and using 
a distinction between different levels of energy conservation, the argument of the thesis 
is then stated. 
Attention turns in Chapters 3 and 4 to explanations for low policy reliance on energy 
conservation. A two-pronged approach is taken. The ideas and arguments behind 
environmental demands for energy conservation as an environmental objective are 
explored. The history of these demands and how they have fluctuated in strength and 
shifted in nature over time are explored in Chapter 3. The many complexities of the 
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issues and the contradictions associated with the demand for substantial reductions in 
energy use are discussed. This historical approach is used to show that there has been 
a lack of consensus over how much energy conservation is needed, to describe the 
nature of the resistance to demands, and to explain the preference for technical 
solutions to energy-related problems. 
Chapter 4 explores the reasons behind the rejection of proposals to reduce energy use 
by increasing the technical efficiency of energy use. The history of the debate over 
energy efficiency is traced to first explain the rejection of radical proposals. Attention 
then turns to energy planning and to explain the reasons behind the dismissal of more 
modest proposals for demand reduction proposals. Models of energy and electricity 
planning used by various authors to explain the outcome of planning decisions in terms 
of rational planning are described and discussed. The theory of policy decision making 
is then used to further explain why energy conservation has tended to be assigned a 
low priority and why planners tend to rely on energy conservation only during certain 
periods. Finally, this discussion is extended by inclusion of political explanations for 
policy reliance on continuous and rapid energy supply expansion. 
In PART II, three separate case studies are used to support the general and theoretical 
discussion presented in Part 1. The first of these, presented in Chapters 5 and 6, is an 
historical account of electricity planning in Tasmania and is used to explain the rejection 
of energy conservation and the reasons behind the rapid growth in electricity supply in 
that state. The history of electricity planning in Tasmania is divided into three phases. 
The early period prior to the debate over energy conservation as a serious energy option 
provides the historic background to the discussion of planning in subsequent phases 
and is presented in Appendix 1. Chapter 5 is then used to explain the rejection of 
energy conservation provides the historic background to the discussion of planning in 
subsequent phases from the early 1970s to the early 1980s when public criticism of 
electricity planning escalated. The strategies used to balance supply with demand for 
electricity during this period of rapid expansion of generating capacity and the way in 
which this rapid supply construction programme was defended in the face of massive 
public criticism are described. Chapter 6 provides an account of electricity planning in 
Tasmania from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, a period that represented the end of 
the era of rapid supply expansion and the initiation of electricity planning reform. The 
more recent debate is followed in order to show that these reforms did not automatically 
lead to increased reliance on demand reduction strategies but how increased reliance on 
energy conservation was checked by the legacy of past planning and continued political 
attempts to maintain control of electricity planning. 
The other case studies involve empirical testing of the effectiveness of two energy 
conservation programmes. These were initially undertaken as asides to this study but 
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were ultimately incorporated into the study because it was realised that they served 
the dual function of supporting the arguments put forward in the study, and providing 
a useful bridge in the discussion from the past to the future. The case study presented 
in Chapter 7 describes a project undertaken to gauge the effectiveness of a household 
energy conservation information campaign in the city of Brunswick, Victoria, by the 
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) in Victoria and the Centre for 
Environmental Studies at the University of Tasmania. The project compared the 
impact of two different motivational prompts (saving money and saving the environment) 
and the results are discussed in terms of their policy relevance and the support that 
they lend to the theoretical discussion presented in the earlier chapters. The case 
study in Chapter 8 examines the potential to reduce household sector energy use by 
increasing the efficiency of energy-using. A laboratory experimental programme designed 
to test the performance and energy consumption of three refrigerators is described. The 
results of these tests are discussed in terms of the theoretical discussions about why 
energy conservation is often rejected as a planning option, resistance to proposals for 
intervention to rapidly increase the efficiency of energy-using equipment, and the role of 
mandated energy performance standards (MEPS) as a means of reducing household 
sector energy use. The implications of these tests are also discussed in terms of the 
current standard refrigerator test methodology employed in Australia. 
The study concludes by returning to the initial questions of why energy conservation 
proposals have tended to be dismissed and why scientific energy conservation research 
has been relatively impotent in its attempt to alter this state of affairs. The fundamental 
causes of the frustration and perplexity of environmentalists and scientists over continued 
low policy emphasis on energy conservation is discussed in terms of both the way 
members of these groups think and in terms of their inability, to comprehend the 
complexities of energy issues. The reasons for policy rejection of high, moderate and 
low energy conservation proposals are reviewed in order to explain why technical and 
social research have failed to influence policy making. The study concludes with a 
discussion of the type of scientific energy conservation research that is capable of 
influencing energy policy making and of the likelihood that this type of research effort 




CONCEPTUAL & THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
If man will begin with certainties, he shall end with doubts; But if he 
will be content to begin with doubts, he will end with certainties. 
— Francis Bacon (1608) The Advancement of Learning. 
Chapter Two 
Definitions and Concepts 
'Then you should say what you mean', the March Hare went on. 
'1 do', Alice hastily replied, 
'at least I mean what I say - that's the same thing you know.' 
— Lewis Carroll (1896) Alice in Wonderland. 
No matter what language one employs ... real life 
is too complex for the simplicities of language. 
— Dahl & Lindblom (1953: 26) 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss some of the more important terms, concepts, 
principles and ideas around which debate on the role of energy conservation in energy 
policy rotates. It is important to begin this way not only because the eclectic approach 
adopted in this study requires the use of many terms from a diverse range of areas, but 
because it serves the useful function of permitting an initial skirmish into some of the 
considerable confusion that surrounds that debate. And much of that confusion is 
rooted at the primitive level of definitions. A small number of writers have suggested 
that it begins with the very fact that energy itself is an elusive concept for which 
physicists cannot provide a precise definition (Pittas 1979: 5, Sarre 1991: 7). Conceptual 
fogginess over what energy is, however, would appear in reality to have less to do with 
this confusion than looseness in the use of terminology. As many of the terms used in 
the debate are borrowed by disciplines from everyday language, and vice versa, they 
often posses simultaneously a precise disciplinary meaning and looser common meaning. 
Energy and energy conservation, moreover, are subjects which span many disciplines, 
and the terms frequently obtain different nuances in meaning within the various disciplines. 
Terms such as fuel, pozver, electricity and energy are therefore often used interchangeably, 
as are energy conservation, energy efficiency and demand management. Siddayao (1986: 4) 
has argued that the vagueness with which the term energy is used has important 
ramifications for energy policy debate. Even within debate between professional analysts, 
the result has been described as one afflicted by the curse of Babel (Hayes 1977: 9) and 
so ambiguous that it often confounds even the most aware company (Brown et al. 1991: 
151). This problem is compounded by the occasional attempt to appropriate terms to 
suit a preferred energy policy option, such as the recent attempt to exclude hydro-
electricity as a renewable energy source on the basis of its unacceptably high environmental 
impacts (Gilchrist 1994: 11). While a glossary of terms is provided at the end of this 
study, terms more central to this study are discussed at greater length in the following 
sections. 
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2.2 Energy Conservation 
The term most central to this study, energy conservation, means different things to 
different people. Traditionally, it has been defined as the wise use of energy while 
environmentalists have often described it loosely as a good idea whose time has come. 
A more technically precise definition that avoids the issues of why we should conserve 
energy is that energy conservation is 'the deliberate reduction of energy use from that 
which it otherwise would have been' (Munasinghe & Schamm 1983: 176) and is taken 
as the definition of energy conservation for the purposes of this study. The use of the 
word deliberate is important because it distinguishes between those reductions in demand 
which occur without intervention from those which occur as a consequence of intervention. 
The level of energy use that 'otherwise would have been' is frequently referred to as the 
business as usual [bau] level of energy use. A problem that arises, however, is that it is 
often difficult to determine precisely the level of energy use that would have happened 
without deliberate effort to reduce energy. 
A second problem has been the confusion between the two terms energy efficiency and 
energy conservation. Both terms are often used interchangeably and without definition 
(Saddler 1994: 54). One reason for this is that many of those who advocate a 
reduction in energy use consider the term energy conservation to be popularly associated 
with curtailment, going without and hardship. Because of this, prominent energy 
analysts see the term to have 'un-American' connotations and insist on using energy 
efficiency instead (Webb 1995: 34). More recently, a third term, demand management, 
has come into use and is now frequently used synonymously with energy conservation 
(Kohl 1993: 3). It is important to note, however, that energy conservation, energy 
efficiency and demand management have important differences in meaning. For this 
reason, the these terms are discussed at length below. 
It is necessary to begin by distinguishing the various ways by which energy use can be 
reduced or conserved. To do so, the classification system below was developed by the 
author as existing classification systems were considered inadequate. To discuss this 
classification system and describe these various means of reducing energy use, the 
reader is referred to the model of the simple energy using system, S 1 , as shown in Figure 
2.1. Energy is conserved when the input energy, E IN, is reduced. This can be achieved 
in the following six ways: 
(i) Reducing the demand for energy services (doing less with less): this approach, often 
referred to as belt-tightening, does not tinker with energy using system, S 1 , but merely 
reduces the level of output, Acur, in order to reduce the level of input energy, E. It is 
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[Unuseful energy output] 
Figure 2.1 A basic input-output energy transforming system. 
the simplest way of reducing energy input. A factory, for example, can deliberately 
reduce its energy input by reducing the amount of goods produced. More plausible 
examples are the deliberate decisions to reduce the use of a car by riding a bicycle, 
walking or using public transport, or the lowering of thermostats. 
Avoiding unnecessary use of energy (doing the same with less): it is almost trivial 
that the portion of output energy, Aour, that is not used to provide a useful service is 
equivalent to waste. An example of such waste is lights left on in empty rooms such as 
lecture theatres or offices not in use. Switches controlled by movement detectors are 
now commonly used to turn lights off in such situations to avoid waste. 
(iii) Finding a useful purpose for the waste energy to reduce the energy input of another 
system, S2 (using waste): the waste energy, W, from one system, usually heat, can be 
transferred to where this is needed. The heat expelled from the evaporator of a 
refrigerator, for example, can be used to reduce the input energy needed to heat the 
water in a storage tank. Similarly, the waste heat from an industrial process can be 
either piped to provide central heating in nearby dwellings or can be used to produce 
steam in order to run a steam turbine to generate electricity. 
(iv) Maintaining the energy using system, S 1 , in good working order (doing the same 
with less): this approach attempts to reduce waste output, W, in order to reduce the 
input energy without altering the level of useful output and without altering the energy 
using system. Fixing dripping hot water taps, tuning car engines, or repairing broken 
windows fit into this category. 
(v) Fuel switching (doing the same with a different source of energy): the input energy, 
EN , can be supplied by another source of energy. This may not save energy per se, and 
may even increase the amount of energy used to provide a service, but it is a means of 
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reducing the use of a specific fuel. An example is the installation of equipment to 
allow an engine to run on liquefied petroleum gas [LPG] instead of petrol. 
(vi) Increasing the technical efficiency of the energy using system (doing the same with 
less): this can be achieved by either replacing the system with a more efficient one or 
retrofitting the existing system to increase its energy efficiency. An example of the first 
is the replacement of an incandescent globe with a compact fluorescent tube. An 
example of the latter is the installation of loft insulation to increase the thermal 
performance of a dwelling. 
While the above classification system suffers from the usual problem of blurred 
boundaries, as there are always measures difficult to place into any one category, it is 
a more comprehensive classification system then those in common use. Energy efficiency 
is often used rather than energy conservation because it is considered to have a 'better 
ring to it' (Patterson 1992: 186) and used in this way is loosely taken to mean all of the 
above means of reducing energy use except (i), reductions in energy services. Using the 
term energy efficiency in this way, however, is not without problems, the more important 
of which are discussed below. In this study, energy efficiency is used in the more 
restricted sense as given in (vi) above ,while energy conservation is used as the generic 
term for all means of reducing energy use. 
2.3 Energy Efficiency 
2.3.1 First Law Energy Efficiency 
As used in the classification system above, energy efficiency means the 'first law 
efficiency'. The first law, known as the law of conservation and attributed to Epicarus 
of the 3rd century BC (Hardin 1991: 50), states simply that nothing can be created out 
of what does not already exist. The more modern statement of the law of conservation 
of energy is that in any non-relativistic process occurring within a closed system, the 
amount of energy remains constant. In terms of Figure 2.2, this means that the sum of 
the useful work (A our) and the waste energy (W) is equal to the input energy OW and 
the [first law] efficiency, ii, with which energy is converted into useful work is defined 
as the ratio of the output of useful work to the input energy (ri = A 0 /I). An 
oil-fired space heater, for example, has a first law efficiency of about 0.65, a typical 
domestic refrigerator about 0.60, an incandescent light globe 0.05, and a modern coal-
fired-power station approximately 0.40 (Ross & Williams 1982: 530). A heat pump 
has a first law efficiency of 2 or more. (when lpi it is called the coefficient of performance 
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service, several interconnected systems are often involved. Energy sources (coal, 
petroleum oil, wood, water in elevated areas) are transformed via a series of energy 
conversion systems (power station, car, refrigerator, light globe) into a the final form of 
energy that we desire such as light, motion (kinetic energy), mechanical energy or heat. 
The first law efficiency of the total energy conversion system shown in Figure 2.2 is the 
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Figure 2.2 An energy conversion chain [Adapted from Kahane 1991: 199]. 
High first law efficiencies can lead to the false impression that there is little room for 
improving efficiencies. The calculation of first law efficiencies of complex task where 
the output is a combination of heat and work, can also be very difficult (Kreider 1978: 
224). The maximum value of II, furthermore, is in many cases temperature dependent 
(Ford et al. 1975: 26). For these reasons, first law efficiencies are considered inadequate. 
2.3.2 Second Law Efficiency 
The second law of thermodynamics is one of the most powerul generalizations made to 
date (Campbell 1970: 41). It is a deduction concerning heat engines that involves 
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subtle concepts said to be fully understood by very few, including most physical 
scientists and engineers (Zernike 1973: 2). Non-expert use of the second law to justify 
policy options or arguments can therefore be dangerous. Such non-expert use, however, 
is now common as the distinction between the first and second laws is popularly seen 
as 'crucial' to debate on energy policy (Robinson 1982a: 341). A brief discussion of the 
second law at this point is therefore necessary. As the author is not an expert on the 
subject, the reader is referred to authoritative texts for more rigorous discussion of the 
second law (Holman 1988, Wark 1989, Simonson 1993) or its implications for energy 
conservation (Berg 1973, Ford et al. 1975, Ross & Williams 1982). 
The second law states that to convert a quantity of heat into mechanical work, another 
quantity of heat must undergo a corresponding and compensating change 1 . This 
means that there is an upper limit to the amount of ordered work than can be produced 
from disordered thermal energy. The thermodynamic parameter, available work (B), is 
defined as the maximum useful work that can be provided by a system (or fuel) as it 
proceeds to a specified final state in thermodynamic equilibrium with the surrounding 
environment. Expressed algebraically, if a quantity of heat, Q 1 , is extracted from a 
resevoir at temperature T l , at an ambient temperature of T o , then 
B = 	Q 1 [1-(T0 /T 1 )] 
The greater the absolute difference between T 1 and T 0, the greater the amount of 
available work, B. Energy therefore has a 'quality'. While the amount of energy in a 
closed system remains constant over time, the 'quality' of the energy degrades until an 
equilibrium state is reached in which there is zero 'available energy' [i.e. energy available 
to do work] remaining. Without an external source of energy to 'pump' the energy back 
to high quality form, the usefulness of this energy is irreversibly depleted. 
The second law is task-oriented and can be used to define 'minimum task energy' (Gibbs 
1948). This is one of the most significant implications of the law as it provides an 
indication of the minimum available work that must be used to perform a given task. 
The second law efficiency, E, is the ratio of the least available energy that could have 
been used theoretically to perform a task to the actual available work used to do so: 
E 	= B theoretical minimum/ Bactual 
First and second law efficiencies for various types of devices are shown in Table 2.1. 
1 For the many other ways of stating the second law, see Campbell (1970: 1088-89). 
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Table 2.1 First and Second Law Efficiencies for Various Energy Input Source-Work 
Ouput Combinations [From: Ford et al. 1975:Table 2.3, P. 30]. 
Source 
End use 	 Work Wt., 
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The second law also provides an indication of the theoretical potential for increasing 
the efficiency with which a specific task is performed and implications for the 
thermodynamic appropriateness of energy forms for given tasks. Energy conversion 
processes which use high quality energy (such as fossil fuels or electricity) to produce 
low quality energy (such as heat below 100°C) have low second law efficiencies. An 
oil-fired space heater, for example, burns with a flame temperature of about 2027 °C 
(2300 K) and has a first law efficiency of approximately 0.65 (Munasinghe & Schamm 
1983: 182). This suggests that there is some, but not tremendous, scope for improving 
the efficiency of space heating equipment. However, the second law efficiency of an oil 
heater used to maintain a temperature of 20 °C (293 K) when the outside temperature 
is 5 °C (278 K), is: 
= 11 (1-T0 rr1 )/(1- Ti /TO 
= 0.65(1-278/293)/(1-278/2273) 
= 0.04 
The low second law efficiency is the result of a thermodynamic mismatch between the 
high quality of the energy source (oil) and the low energy quality of the task (low 
temperature heat). If solar energy at 30°C (303 K) were used as the source of space 
heating, then E would be approximately 0.75. A very low second law efficiency implies 
that there exists tremendous scope for improving the efficiency with which the task is 
performed. The second law efficiency of an electric compression-cycle refrigerator, for 
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there is limited scope for improving the efficiency of the motor, the efficiency of 
refrigeration could be vastly improved by other means, such as increasing the 
insulation, altering the layout of the components, or using a totally different technology. 
2.3.3 Non-Technical Meanings of Energy Efficiency 
2.3.3.1 The Efficiency of Delivering Energy Services 
The usefulness of technical efficiency with which energy is converted into useful work 
as a guide for energy planning is weakened when the boundaries of the energy-using 
system under consideration are extended to include the end-user as shown in Figure 
2.3. The concept of efficiency then becomes increasingly subjective and unquantifiable 
as energy is converted into desired ends. 
Figure 2.3 The chain of concepts involved in the conversion of delivered energy 
human satisfaction [Adapted from Norgard & Christensen 1987: 2]. 
Delivered energy, precisely measured in kilowatt-hours, is used to produce a service 
which can also be quantified, although with less precision. For a refrigerator, the 
convenient measure of the service is the volume of refrigerated space kept below a set 
temperature, measurable with relatively high degree of accuracy. This is used to provide 
a physical service, fresh food, which is even less quantifiable. Finally, the fresh food is 
used to provide satisfaction of human wants, which are not quantifiable in physical 
terms. While the level of energy services can usually be derived from the stock of 
appliances and patterns of behaviour determining the use of the appliances, the 
satisfaction of human needs through the delivery of a service is often difficult to define 
quantitatively. Consequently, the true efficiency of a technology is hard to define or 
quantify precisely. The definition of efficiency becomes blurred once we recognise that 
what we are really rating is the efficiency of providing a service (Norgard 1989: 6). 
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2.3.3.2 Economic Efficiency 
It has been argued out that the closeness in sound of the two terms energy efficiency and 
economic efficiency has led to much confusion in the debate over energy policy (Sutherland 
1994: 267). Productive economic efficiency, or productivity, is maximised when a given 
output is produced at the cheapest possible cost, where the input costs are defined by 
quantity and price (Bannock et al. 1972: 131-32). These input costs are capital, labour 
and energy (Commoner 1971: 252, Tapp & Watkins 1990: 73), although others would 
add materials. In the economic sense, overall efficiency can be increased by increasing 
the efficiency of labour, capital, materials or energy. Economically efficient use of 
energy, then, is the use of energy that results, in combination with other inputs, in the 
lowest unit cost of production and in the optimal allocation of resources, assuming 
efficient pricing of all inputs (TEA 1991a: 44). This economic notion of efficient energy 
use therefore may result in an increase rather than a decrease in energy use if the price of 
energy decreases relative to other inputs into production. 
2.4 Demand Side Management 
Demand side management (DSM), is defined as manipulation of the way in which 
customers use their energy (Gellings et al. 1992: 2). It involves matching supply-demand 
of a particular energy source by manipulation of the demand side, as opposed to the 
supply side, of the equation. It therefore refers to planning decisions made by an 
energy supply organisation rather than an energy policy adopted by governments. Six 
generic demand side management strategies available to energy planners have been 
distinguished (Clinton et al. 1986: 127) as described in Figures 2.4 (i) to (vi) below. 
Figure 2.4 Demand Side Management Strategies. 
[Note: the scale of the horizontal axes in the sketch graphs are not 
critical and could be diurnal (12 am to 12 am) or over a year] 
(i) Valley filling: a common types of demand side 
management and consists of building up off-peak loads by 
offering low priced off-peak tariffs to attract users that 
would otherwise use other fuels and sources of energy. 
Offering cheap off-peak electricity for storage space heating 
or water heating, for example, attracts new customers who 








Figure 2.4 (ii) 
0 
Time 
Figure 2.4 (vi) 
(ii) Peak clipping: the reduction of system peak loads using 
direct load control. This is usually used where the supplier 
has direct control over load and is able to switch off and 
on energy-using equipment. It tends to be used only when 
peak loads become critical and is rarely used as a demand 
side management device in the Australian context. 
(iii) Load shifting: involves shifting loads from on-peak to 
off-peak periods. Popular applications include use of 
storage water heating, storage space heating, coolness 
storage and customer load shifts. This does not involve 
attracting new users but consists simply of shifting the use 
of existing customers to off-peak times the use of appliances 
that would have been used during peak periods. 
Time 
Figure 2.4 (iii) 
(iv) Strategic conservation: the reduction in total sales of 
energy through the use of energy conservation programmes 
initiated by the energy supplier. Examples include increased 
thermal insulation to decrease the demand for space heating 
or cooling energy and the promotion of energy efficiency 





Figure 2.4 (iv) 
(v) Strategic load growth: the encouragement of increased 
sales of energy beyond valley filling. It involves the attempt 
to capture increased market share of loads that can be, or 
are, served by competing fuels or energy sources as well as 
area development, creation of new markets by electrification ,c5 
of tasks traditionally provided by other fuels such as private 
vehicles. Time 
Figure 2.4 (v) 
(vi) Flexible load shape: adjustment of the shape of the 
load curve by offering lower energy prices or other incentives 
to energy users willing to trade-off reduced reliability of 
supply. These strategies include interruptible or curtailable 
loads and individual customer load control devices. 
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Demand side management options are planning tools which can be used by an energy 
supplier to manipulate its load curve to suit its strategic interests. These strategies can 
either decrease or increase energy use.. Demand management (DM), on the other hand, 
refers to the broader energy planning strategy of meeting society's future requirements 
for energy by adjusting the demand for energy, rather than increasing the supply of 
energy, and is therefore more closely related to a policy goal of conserving energy. 
2.5 How Much Energy Conservation? 
Discussion about energy conservation as a policy option is bedevilled by the problem 
of how much energy conservation is desired. For the purposes of this study, a distinction 
between four broad levels of energy conservation, defined in terms of the reduction in 
the growth of energy, are defined as follows: 
(i) Business-as-usual level of energy use: the level of energy use determined by the 
'natural rate' at which the efficiency of energy use increases without public 
policy intervention. It is a 'zero energy conservation' option as it involves no 
deliberate attempt on the part of policy makers to reduce energy use. It is the 
option preferred by adherents of the free market approach in which the 
appropriate level of energy conservation is determined by market forces alone. 
(ii) Low energy conservation: marginal reductions in the rate of growth of energy 
use below the business-as-usual level. These strategies tend to rely on,behavioural 
instruments which focus on and involve the use of prompts or the provision of 
information. The household sector is often the main target of these strategies. 
(iii) Moderate energy conservation: a reduction in the rate of growth of energy use 
which does not manage to halt increase in energy use, but is nonetheless significant. 
(iv)High energy conservation or aggressive energy conservation: policies and strategies 
which stabilise the level of energy use (zero energy growth) or reduce levels of 
energy use in absolute terms. These strategies are seen as the means of achieving 
the environmentalist preferred energy strategy of a low energy society. 
High, moderate and low energy conservation proposals require implementation of the 
appropriate policies to achieve these reductions and the available policy instruments 
are discussed below. 
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2.6 	Policy Instruments for Reducing Energy Use 
Walker & Large (1975) have classified the various policy approaches to reducing 
energy use according to whether they rely on psycho-sociological, economic or 
technological strategies. Lowe (1989: 97), on the other hand, has distinguished between 
types of policy instruments based on the 'four Es': exhortation, education, enticement 
and enforcement. Table 2.2 is a matrix which amalgamates these two ways of classifying 








mild promp ts 
• Education re energrrelated 
problems and individuals 
role in their resolution 
• Provision of information on 
how to conserve energy 
 • Mandated energy 
performance labels 
Economic 
•Provision of information on 
potential monetary savings of 
energy conservation measures 
• Modest increases in energy 
prices 
• Incentives such as rebates 
• Penalties such as taxes 
• Substantial increases in 
energy prices 
Technical 
• Voluntary agreements with 
manufacturers to increase the 
efficiency of products 
•Government assistance with 
research and development of 
energy conservation 
equipment 
• Regulations such as mandated 
energy performance standards 
and building codes 
Table 2.2 	Classification of approaches and policy 
instruments designed to reduce energy use. 
Where some measures fit into Table 2.1 is a matter of degree. Relatively small increases 
in energy prices, for example, fall within the ambit of voluntary changes of behaviour 
for most. Larger increments in price increases represent a shift to virtual enforcement 
of behaviour change for those without access to capital to reduce energy use without 
simultaneously curtailing their level of energy services. Environmentalists often advocate 
the use of aggressive energy conservation policies such as a hefty increase in the price of 
energy to achieve their demands for reductions in energy use. Anderson (1993: 69), for 
example, has argued that global levels of energy use need to be significantly reduced 
and has suggested that this can be achieved by massively increasing the efficiency of 
energy use. These increases in the efficiency of energy use, he has argued, could be 
simply achieved by significantly increasing the price of energy. Labelling such a policy 
an energy efficiency policy, however, is clearly misleading as large increases in energy 
prices would result not only in increased efficiency of energy use but also reductions in 
output and levels of energy services. This is but one instance of the confusion between 
the terms energy conservation and energy efficiency. 
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2.7 Summary and Restatement of Thesis 
Using the concepts of high, moderate and low energy conservation the argument can be 
stated in the following way. Environmentalists demand high energy conservation policies 
as a means of reducing the social costs associated with increasing levels of energy use, 
but these demands meet with widespread resistance. As a retreat to a more achievable 
objective, environmentalists support the demands for aggressive efficiency of energy 
efficiency policies, including economic restructuring towards less energy-intensive 
activities. These demands , however, are also resisted by influential groups with 
vested private interests in retaining current patterns of economic activity. 
Environmentalists therefore make a further retreat to more moderate demands for 
energy conservation based on the economic benefits of demand reduction as a planning 
option. The rejection of these demands adds to the frustration and perplexity of those 
who advocate them as they appear to be rational from both the social and the energy 
supply institution's perspectives, often being referred to as 'win-win solutions. Technical 
and social researchers who support the energy conservation option therefore assume 
that these proposals are rejected for logical reasons and engage in research which 
attempts to show that moderate energy conservation is a feasible and practical option. 
This research, however, has had little influence on policy or planning because it fails to 
understand the reasons why these 'rational' planning options are dismissed by planners 
and resisted by those with a vested interest in the continued expansion of energy 
supply. As a last resort, environmentalists and researchers therefore advocate low 
energy conservation strategies based on the notion that it should at least be possible to 
implement those low cost and easily achieved reductions in energy use which focus on 
altering individual behaviour with low intervention strategies such as prompts and the 
provision of information. These strategies are relied on, however, only intermittently. 
The above argument is developed in the following two chapters. Cox & Mair (1989) 
have argued that explaining what happens in a particular place is difficult as the local 
and global, necessary and contingent, social and spatial, all merge into one another. 
The only way to explain decisions in a particular location, they maintained, was to 
work backwards and forwards between these various levels of abstraction. Rather 
than working through the above argument in order from high to low energy conservation, 
the approach taken follows the advice of Cox & Mair. These arguments, furthermore, 
are linked as the dismissal of demands for high energy conservation serve as a partial 
explanation of the dismissal of more moderate energy conservation proposals. Similarly, 
the rejection of the demand for low energy conservation policies can be explained in 
terms of the rejection of moderate energy conservation proposals. 
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Chapter Three 
Why Conserve Energy? 
Some said, 'It might do good'; Others said, 'No!'. 
— John Bunyan (1605) Pilgrim's Progress. 
3.1 Introduction 
It has been said that the arguments for energy conservation are so strong (Ester 1985: 
9), irrefutable (Seligman 1985: 135) and well documented that it now suffices to treat 
these in a perfunctory manner (Dovers 1994a: ix). It is commonly assumed, furthermore, 
that energy conservation is a logical (Socolow 1977, Schipper & Darmstadter 1978) 
and uncontroversial energy policy option (Crossley 1980b: 130, Frieden & Baker 1983: 
23) and that few are willing to challenge these assertions (Cook 1980: 16). Such 
uncritical acceptance of the case for energy conservation increases, furthermore, during 
periods in which energy-related problems acquire the status of a 'crisis': understandably, 
when it is remembered that the hottest place in Dante's hell was reserved for those who 
remained neutral in times of crisis. The argument of this chapter, however, is that to 
begin explaining why energy conservation has tended to be rejected as a policy option 
it is important to risk Dante's inferno by adopting a more agnostic position by critically 
analysing the arguments and ideas that lie behind the demand for energy conservation. 
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to show that there is a common view amongst 
energy conservation advocates and researchers that energy conservation is an 
uncontentious policy goal, but that when these energy issues are examined more closely 
they turn out to be complex, messy and confused and that at the deeper level actual 
debate over these issues is characterised by disagreement rather than consensus. This 
disagreement is over whether reductions in energy use are desirable or necessary, the 
extent to which energy use needs to be reduced in one place compared to another, how 
energy use can be reduced, at what costs, and for benefit to whom. A second argument 
of this chapter is that advocates of energy conservation frequently fail to fully comprehend 
the social implications of their reform proposals, on the one hand, and what they are 
up against in terms of why policy makers stubbornly resist the demand for substantial 
efforts aimed at reducing energy use, on the other. 
This chapter examines the arguments behind the demand for high energy conservation. 
The quarter from which such demands have been most persistent and insistent has 
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been environmentalism. The arguments upon which environmental demand for high 
energy conservation are based have been many and varied. To unravel these arguments 
in a logical manner, the discussion is structured by making use of the four modal 
propositions of Scholastic Logic: apodictic (that energy conservation is a good thing can 
be readily demonstrated), imperative (energy use must be reduced), obligatory (energy 
use ought to be reduced) and expedient (reductions in energy use can benefit non-
environmental primary policy objectives). 
Structuring the discussion in this way conveniently fits in with a distinction between 
demands for energy conservation based on social and ecological reasons and the demand 
for reductions in energy use based cost-effective technical improvements in the efficiency 
of energy use. The former demands are taken as the subject of this chapter and are 
concerned with the arguments for reductions in energy use irrespective of the means by 
which these reductions are achieved. The first three types of logical argument (apodictic, 
imperative and obligatory) are included within this discussion. The expedient arguments 
are taken as those which accord with the concept of technically feasible and cost-effective 
energy efficiency and are discussed in the following chapter. In a crude manner, this 
distinction also follows the historical evolution of environmentalist demands for 
reductions in energy use. 
The arguments, ideas and values discussed in this and the following chapters have 
been used to support demands for both large and small reductions in energy use, and 
to justify much research on energy conservation. The sentiment that household sector 
energy conservation research is important because it contributes toward the resolution 
of serious global energy-related problems and is an important part of the transition 
towards the ultimate goal of a low energy society, for example, has been expressed by 
many researchers in the field (Crossley 1980a: 480, Ester 1985: 5, Foster & Holmes 
1991: 1, Foster & Holmes 1994: 123). A central argument of this study is that although 
these are the fundamental reasons underlying our concerns and our demands for 
reductions in energy use, and the reason that many engage in research that can contribute 
to this goal, proponents of energy conservation are forced to rely on other arguments to 
support these demands and to justify their research. But a point missed by many is 
that a large part of the explanation of why energy conservation does not happen arises 
precisely from the fact that they are forced to make this retreat to more modest 
demands based on other arguments. 
A final point that needs to be made is that the demands for high conservation discussed 
in this chapter are loosely referred to here as environmentalist demands. Environmentalism, 
however, is as yet neither a unified philosophy nor a coherent ideology but a truncated 
ideology based a loose bundle of issues (Paehlke 1989: 6). While numerous authors 
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have attempted to classify environmentalists' according to their ideologies, 
philosophies, the nature of their concerns, and so on, there are various problems 
associated with the attempt to pigeon-hole environmentalists in this manner. The 
approach adopted in this study follows Sandbach (1980: 22-6) who distinguished 
between two streams of environmentalism. His first type included scientifically informed 
individuals who attempted to influence policy making by presenting 'a valid, scientifically 
argued case based upon ecology and systems analysis' (Sandbach 1980: 22). Others 
have made the further distinguished between the technocentric and ecocentric strands 
within this first stream of environmentalism (O'Riordan 1981). Sandbach's second 
stream of environmentalist was less concerned about the environment and more concerned 
about social issues and about the compatibility of science and technology with humanistic 
principles (p. 26). 
3.2 Apodictic-Fundamentalist Arguments for Reductions in Energy Use 
3.2.1 The Apodictic Status of Energy Conservation 
There appear to be two separate ideas behind the notion that energy conservation is a 
good thing. One is based on the argument that as the production and use of energy is 
associated with costs or 'bads', lower levels of energy use reduce these bads and is 
therefore desirable. The other is based on the cultural value that inefficiency is bad. 
As an aid to discussing the first of these it is useful to refer to the model of the 
inter-related economic and the environmental systems as shown in Figure 3.1. 
Much of the debate over energy conservation has to do with the divergent perspectives 
on the economic and environmental systems as shown in Figure 3.1. Many environmental 
theorists consider the environmental system to have non-economic value in its own 
right or that the economic subsystem is subordinate in importance to the environmental 
system, as an intact environmental system is a prerequisite for an economic system. 
Utilitarian economic writers, on the other hand, focus on the economic system and 
consider the environment to be a subsystem with three economic functions: the provision 
of resources, the provision of amenity and the absorption of wastes from production 
and consumption. These three functions are seen to be interconnected since excess 
wastes (pollution) can result in the loss of both amenity and production. All economic 
activity, furthermore, impacts to some degree on one or more of these functions. It 
results in the depletion of natural resources, and the disposal of wastes which have 
damaging effects on the environment and which reduce amenity. The conservation of 
I See Doyle & Kellow (1995: 57) for a discussion of these various typologies. 
34 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
Capital stock 14 	  
_ _ 	_ _ 








eeeeee 	• ................ 
Non- ._ 
,//9/9//19 ...... 9 ............ ee. 
• --eeeeeeeeeeeeeee ............ 
-••-eeeeee  
//erne 
. 	 Waste assimilation ;4_ 
resources 	----eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeelee eeeee en 	 • 	 Y///////,,,,,,,/,,,,////e/e/e/e eeeeeeeeee eeeeeeeeee, 
 vf/999/1999/9999 eeeeeee 	eeeee 
-------------------re eeeeeeeee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 
--------------------- 
1.11.5.1.1.1.1.0„1 









Figure 3.1 A model of the interlinked economic and environmental systems 
[Adapted from Common (1994: 173)]. 
resources, including energy, is therefore a good idea from the ecological perspective 
because a reduction in the rate of resource use leads to a reduction in the impact on 
these three economic functions. The debate about energy conservation revolves around 
the importance of energy production and use in the economic system and its role in 
resource depletion, pollution and loss of amenity. At this level, energy conservation is 
a means to an end - the reduction of the impacts of energy production and use on these 
three economic functions. 
The first question that needs to be asked is why energy use is seen to be of such 
importance relative to the consumption of other resources. It is a common assertion in 
environmental literature that while the conservation of all resources is important, the 
conservation of energy is of critical importance and most books on environmental 
issues therefore devote a separate section or chapter to the topic of energy. Examination 
of this literature suggests that this contention is based on one or more of four arguments 
and these are briefly discussed below together with comments on the degree to which 
they provide valid arguments as the basis for policy prescription. 
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The first argument used to support the notion that energy conservation is of more 
critical importance relative to other resource and environmental concerns is that energy 
is a substantively different input resource. This is based on the argument that while 
other material inputs into the economic system are intersubstitutable - wood can be 
replaced with steel, steel with aluminium, aluminium with plastic, and so on - there is 
no substitute for energy (Jacobs 1991: 114). This perception of energy contrasts, 
however, with the standard economic view in which energy is regarded as just another 
economic input. To such economists, since energy inputs can be substituted with 
labour, technology or materials, energy is no different from these other resource inputs 
(Porter 1982: 89-90). As Common (1994: 174) has pointed out, this incongruence of 
views cannot be resolved scientifically as it is not a technical question and the debate 
over energy is thus immediately thrown into the realm of opinions rather than facts. 
The second reason given by environmental writers in support of the contention that 
energy is substantively different from other resources is that the first law of 
thermodynamics tells us that energy cannot be consumed but only used (Dovers 1994b: 
6). The flaw in this argument is that it overlooks the fact that the first and second 
laws of thermodynamics pertain not only to energy but to all resources. All input 
materials are degraded rather than consumed. Iron molecules are not consumed but 
used when iron ore (high entropy) is processed into products such as steel (low entropy) 
and then used to manufacture cars. As the car rusts, the iron is gradually converted 
back into a high entropy state. Both energy and materials are therefore degraded 
rather than consumed. 
The third reason given for the greater level of concern over energy use than that of other 
resources is that energy is a key input resource to all economic activity (Oliver et al. 
1983; 140), and hence the 'lowest common denominator activity driving environmental 
deterioration (Prins & Stamp 1991: 108). As the input resource that props up the 
'whole unwieldy edifice' of the modern industrial economic system (Tapp & Watkins 
1990: 24), energy use is seen to be at the very heart of environmental problems. What 
drives the economy must, by definition also be the engine of environmental degradation. 
The logic of this thinking is that because the industrial economic system has led to 
much environmental degradation, and because energy is the critical input into the 
industrial economic system, energy use is therefore one of the most significant 
environmental problems, if not the greatest problem. The level of energy use, and of 
fossil fuel use in particular, is therefore taken as an indicator of the scale of 'the 
environmental problem' confronting society (Walker 1991: 22) and as the degree to 
which the relationship between humanity and nature is dysfunctional (Clarke 1991: 
413). The problem with this argument is that while there is a relationship between the 
level of energy use and the scale of environmental problems caused by energy production 
and use, it is neither a fixed nor linear relationship. It can lead to the thinking that 
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energy use per se is bad rather than the social and ecological impacts of energy use. A 
variant of this argument, but one that is more specific, is that energy use is not only 
symptomatic of the level of industrial society's assault on the environment but is in fact 
the single greatest direct cause of that environmental degradation, along with procreation 
(Cocks 1992: 127, Cairncross 1993: 111). According to Paehlke (1989: 76) some 
advocates of aggressive energy conservation premise their demands on the belief that 
environmental problems are predominantly problems related to energy production and 
use and that if we solve our energy problems, most other environmental problems will 
disappear. While it is true that no commercially available form of energy comes free of 
environmental problems and that many environmental problems are caused by expanding 
the supply of energy, where energy ranks among serious environmental problems is 
controversial and varies enormously between places. It has been argued by others, for 
example, that the real causes of environmental problems are population growth and 
farming practices and that energy-related problems have been grossly exaggerated 
(Gray 1993: 156). 
The fourth and last argument used to support the contention that energy is substantively 
different from other resources is theoretically incontestable. It is that energy is different 
from other inputs because, unlike other inputs, energy cannot be recycled. This argument 
is thermodynamically irrefutable and the unavoidable consequence of it is that society 
will ultimately have no option but to rely on renewable (income) energy for all economic 
activity. But while the argument is irrefutable, its relevance to current policy is very 
much open to debate. 
It can be seen from the outset that behind the environmentalist demand for energy 
conservation lie very general concepts and ideas which charge the debate but which are 
not absolutely solid and which are weak in terms of their capacity to influence policy. 
Two are immediately contestable while the other two are theoretically correct or generally 
true, but do not necessarily provide a powerful case for energy conservation specific to 
all locations and at all times. 
A second and related question is why environmentalists and energy conservation 
advocates have tended to place inordinate focus on conserving electricity compared to 
the conservation of other forms of energy. After the conservation of oil, the conservation 
of electricity has received greater attention than the conservation of any other form of 
energy (Harris 1982: 54). With the decline in the price of oil and in concern over oil 
shortages, the conservation of electricity appears to now receive even greater attention 
relative to the conservation of other forms of energy. 
A number of reasons can be put forward for this emphasis on electricity. First, the 
production of electricity from fossil fuels involves both conversion and transmission 
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losses. Secondly, electricity is high quality form and therefore involves substantial 
second law losses when used to perform work that could be achieved with lower 
quality forms of energy such as low temperature heat. Lovins (1976: 40) estimated 
that less than 10% of total energy use in the USA required electricity and electricity 
alone. It is because of these low first and second law efficiencies that electricity has 
been identified as the energy source with the greatest scope for conservation (Jochem & 
Gruber 1990: 340, Rosenfeld 1991: 459). 
A third reason for focusing on electricity is that fossil fuel-fired power stations are 
considered significant point sources of pollution and are described by proponents of 
alternative energy strategies as 'dirty' (Gilchrist 1994: 2). It has been argued, however, 
that this focus on fossil-fuelled power stations is weakened by the fact that the 
transport sector has been a far greater source of urban pollution than have coal-fired 
power stations (Starr 1973: 15). The intractable nature of the latter problem, it has 
long been asserted, has caused it to be a relatively ignored issue by the environmental 
movement (Adler 1973: 273, Mittra et al. 1995: 46). It is possible that the high 
visibility of electricity generating power stations lies in part behind the concern over 
electricity use. Environmentalists have been advised, for example, to exploit this 
feature as a means of mounting a campaign against the neglected 'coal problem' - the 
raft of environmental problems surrounding the mining, transport, storage and combustion 
of coal - on the basis that the neglect of these problems has been due directly to the 
fact that they lack a convenient symbolic entry point. Power stations, it has been 
argued, are the most potent symbolic entry points for such a campaign (Martin 1987: 
183-4). 
Martin's advice was timely as it came just as the greenhouse issue was being elevated 
as a major political concern at the international level and which saw fossil fuelled 
power stations identified as the focus for attempts to reduce emissions of these gases. 
The argument here is that the demand for energy conservation, and electricity conservation 
in particular, is multilayered and at one level it is informed by general arguments, some 
of which are of immediate policy relevance whilst others are more theoretical, generalised 
or symbolic. This is of importance to this discussion because in certain situations these 
fundamental arguments may be the dominant arguments for energy conservation and 
the rejection of energy conservation as an option has to be interpreted in that light. 
3.2.2 The Apodictic Status of Energy Efficiency 
The second fundamental idea behind the notion that energy conservation is a good 
thing is summed up by the statement made by a character in G.B. Shaw's play John 
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Bull's Other Island. Annoyed by the Irish ways, Broadbent angrily declared that there 
are only two qualities in this world, efficiency and inefficiency (Shaw 1912: 109). It is 
a statement that encapsulates the extent to which efficiency enjoys apodictic status in 
modern society. A number of reasons underlie this status of efficiency as a social 
value. The first of these is that efficiency is part and parcel of instrumental rationality 
which has increasingly come to be the driving principle of Western culture since the 
Enlightenment (Dryzek 1987: 3-4, 1990: 1). It has since come to be the dominant 
requirement, in theory, of all facets of society, including private business and public 
administration (Spann 1979: 508). 
The second reason is that the elimination of waste quickly came to be seen as a means 
of maximizing the welfare of the present generation. By eliminating wastage of input 
resources in the economic process a 'huge deduction from goods and services' could be 
avoided (Hoover 1921: ix). Efficiency therefore came to be defined by economists as 
making the best use of resources to ensure that community well-being was maximised 
(Moran et al. 1991: 18). Thirdly, efficiency rapidly became narrowly defined as economic 
efficiency. The notion behind Fordist assembly line production and Frederich Taylor's 
time-and-motion studies was that wasted time was wasted money. The economically 
efficient use of resources thus became an economic imperative so that the efficient 
conversion and use of energy in production was considered 'scarcely less important' 
than the development of new resources (Pounds 1954: 122). To sum up, in modern 
society to be inefficient is to be fundamentally flawed and most individuals like to 
think of themselves as efficient (Yergin 1979: 136). 
It is worth using an example at this point to indicate the extent to which this cultural 
phenomenon is not (yet) universal. This was demonstrated by a recent study which 
posited that it ought to be feasible to replace the traditional energy systems of Pacific 
Island communities with alternative energy systems, thereby allowing these communities 
to conserve energy by using energy more efficiently and increasing reliance on renewable 
sources of energy (Norimarna 1992: 276). To the researcher's surprise, however, it was 
found that this hypothesis had to be rejected, the reason being that unlike Western 
society where 'no one questioned why efficiency was better than inefficiency', these 
cultures deliberately chose to subordinate efficiency to other cultural and social goals 
(Norimarna 1992: 136). 
There is a fourth reason why efficiency has come to be regarded as inherently good. 
The Progressive Conservation Movement in the early twentieth century saw the primary 
problem associated with resource use to be the degree to which each generation 
impoverished the natural resource base for following generations. Conservation was 
therefore seen to be a moral issue and defined as extending the availability of natural 
resources for use as far into the future as possible. To this end, it preached the gospel 
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of efficiency (Hays 1959: 69). This moral dimension is discussed in relation to aggressive 
energy conservation in Section 3.5. 
The discussion so far has been used to support the case that there is evidence that 
energy conservation is unchallenged as an environmental goal while energy efficiency is 
unchallenged as a goal within Western society. 
It is important to point out that this apodictic status of energy conservation is not 
confined to a small group of radical environmentalists or energy conservation enthusiasts 
but is widely spread throughout the community. A survey designed to unravel the 
motives behind the take-up of energy conservation measures by Australian householders 
found that although a significant proportion reported taking up these measures to save 
money (28%) and to increase comfort (23.4%), 38.7% gave their primary reason as 
either their belief that saving energy was a good thing, for personal satisfaction or 
because it represented good housekeeping practices. Only 0.3% reported that they 
adopted energy conservation for the public good (Crossley et al. 1986: 39). While 
reported motives for taking up energy conservation measures are likely to shift over 
time as the energy or environmental situation changes, the above survey demonstrated 
the degree to which energy conservation is accepted as a good thing by a significant 
number, although still a minority, of individuals. 
The following section looks at the evidence that this apodictic status of energy 
conservation and energy efficiency is transformed within some sections of the community 
into a fundamentalist belief that aggressive energy conservation is also a good idea. 
3.2.3 Energy Conservation Fundamentalism 
Cummine (1980:2) admitted to having begun his study of household energy conservation 
in Australia as an 'energy conservation fundamentalist', a term he defined as someone 
who believed that energy conservation was a good idea and therefore something we 
cannot have enough of. Energy conservation fundamentalism has also been defined as 
the belief that a reduction in energy use has the capacity to solve all social and 
economic problems (Saddler 1981: 166) and that energy conservation has value in its 
own right (Harris 1982: 56). Proponents of aggressive energy conservation policies 
have been accused of operating from such premises (Maddox 1975: 135, Ingram 1979: 
157), as have those who advocated national energy self-sufficiency policies based on 
grandiose renewable energy, urban redesign or coal liquifaction proposals (Taylor 1982: 
122). Similarly, radical environmentalists have been accused of basing their demands 
for radical environmental policies on a belief that because pollution is bad and cleanliness 
is good, all pollution must be eliminated irrespective of costs (Wildavsky 1979: 253). 
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The extension of this argument is that when forced into rational debate, those operating 
from such a fundamentalist position selectively search for arguments that can be used 
to support it (Hall 1990: 82). In some instances, environmentalists have been accused 
of deliberately linking these demands to well known problems in order to facilitate the 
adoption of their proposed policies. The early attempt to link all cancers to pollution 
has been cited as a case in point (Maugh 1979: 1364). 
The fact that some radical environmentalists or energy conservation enthusiasts hold 
fundamentalist or quasi-fundamentalist views is not in itself important other than to 
note that it is likely to result in the demands for energy conservation in some instances 
which are unsupported by rational argument. It is common to find such evangelistic 
and uncritical views creeping into attempts at more rational debate on energy issues. 
In his angry polemic against the Australian electricity supply industry, for example, 
Gilchrist (1994: 2) stated that fossil fuels ought to be conserved because they are 
depletable and are therefore 'precious and referred to energy efficiency engineers as the 
'high priests of technology' (Gilchrist 1994: 259). Similarly, solar energy enthusiasts 
have described their favoured option as 'noble' energy source (Halacy 1973: ) and their 
work as preaching the 'solar energy gospel' (Szokolay 1984: 22). A recent Australian 
quest for an energy efficient refrigerator explicitly became to some a Holy Grail (Sonneborn 
1994: 6), whilst high levels of energy use is compared to the apple that led to prelapsarian 
Adam's fall from grace (Malpas 1990: 132) and the fact that recycling and pollution 
reduction equipment requires energy has been interpreted as a Catch-22 so pernicious 
as to suggest a divine conspiracy to be at work (Jackson 1991: 5, 6). 
The maximisation of energy efficiency is an especially strong theme in the literature, 
and is rooted in the status of the second law of thermodynamics. The eminent physicist, 
Eddington, once described this Second Law — capitalised to denote the reverence — as 
holding a special position amongst the laws of nature to the extent that exultation of 
the Law was not unreasonable (Hardin 1991: 49). In a statement reminiscent of 
Frederich Taylor's animation when confronted by the inefficient use of time in the work 
place (Ritzer 1993: 27), energy efficiency expert, Walter Patterson (1991: 118), admits 
that as a physicist he is 'deeply offended' by thermodynamically inefficient use of 
energy. Physicist cum energy efficiency guru, Amory Lovins, on the other hand is said 
to be driven by the panacea of an energy efficient society, while placing little importance 
on how such a transition is affected (Webb 1995: 35). A number of economists charge 
that such pursuit of energy efficiency is an end in itself, is rampant, and has had a 
substantial, negative, influence on policy (Brookes 1990: 390, Sutherland 1994: 257). 
At this point, it needs to be stated that while there is much evidence that aggressive 
energy conservation is advanced at least in part from a fundamentalist perspective, 
modern environmentalism has no monopoly on fundamentalism within the energy debate. 
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Its predecessor, the early resource (Progressive) conservation movement, was pervaded 
by a similarly fundamentalist view which valued resources in a narrowly utilitarian 
manner so that unused resources were defined as wasted. Under this logic, rivers were 
harnessed to produce electricity on the grounds that to allow water to flow unused to 
the sea amounted to a crime (Martinez-Alier 1987: 163). Engineers were eulogised as 
the practical revolutionaries destined to manage society and were seen to be motivated 
by a shared dream, a vision of a just and humane society (Nye 1990: 161). 
There also exists an opposite, but equally fundamentalist perspective which holds that 
because energy efficiency enjoys such apodictic status, there is no benefit gained from 
intervening in the market to accelerate the rate at which the efficiency of energy use 
increases. Economists base this argument on a model of the economic system which 
was borrowed directly from classical mechanics (Mirowski 1989). In this model, profit 
maximising producers are considered to interact with atomistic economic persons 
(formerly economic men), each acting selfishly to maximise their utility. The result, it is 
posited, is an optimally efficient outcome in the economic sense. As resources become 
more scarce, a negative feedback loop between producers and consumers automatically 
ensures that the market switches to less scarce resources and is therefore self-regulating. 
To these economists, therefore, not only is there nothing new in the notion that it is 
often cheaper to save a barrel of oil than to produce one, but using energy efficiently 
has long been an accepted economic objective of both private industry and government 
(Pounds 1955: 122). Because of this, such economists argue, the efficiency with which 
energy is used increases automatically and advocates of aggressive energy conservation 
are therefore advised to stop worrying and to be patient (Maddox 1975: 36). This 
debate between neoclassical economists and advocates of energy efficiency is taken up 
at further length in Chapter Four. 
This section has shown that the demand for aggressive energy conservation is to some 
degree premised on the view that aggressive energy conservation is inherently good and 
that energy conservation is therefore capable of becoming a solution in search of a 
problem. Committed environmentalists are therefore seen by sceptics to actually desire, 
perhaps unconsciously, energy problems in order to legitimise their preferred policy 
options such as mandated solar energy hot water systems (Wildavsky 1979: 396). But 
while it is unnecessary to ask why policy rejects fundamentalist demands for energy 
conservation, advocates of energy conservation are frustrated by the apparent willingness 
of policy to be swayed by the alternative fundamentalist view, that of economic 
rationalism. It is not possible to state whether demands for aggressive energy conservation 
are based on fundamentalism or not and the discussion is left at this point. It has been 
used as a possible explanation of why the issue of energy conservation is so often 
confused and to point to the possibility that policy rejects the demands for aggressive 
energy conservation because it is interpreted as fundamentalist rather than rational. 
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The issue of fundamentalism is briefly revisited at the end of this chapter where 
alternative explanations are advanced in the light of further discussion. The discussion 
now turns, however, to demands for energy conservation based on the reasoned arguments 
for reducing energy use and begin by looking at energy conservation as an imperative. 
These imperatives can be divided into those which pertain to the local level and those 
which relate to the global level (Goodin 1976: 149, Blowers 1984: 304) and the discussion 
below begins by looking at the local imperatives associated with energy production and 
use. 
3.3 Local Imperatives for Aggressive Energy Conservation 
It was argued in Section 3.2.1 that any level of energy use results in both 'goods' and 
'bads'. The quintessential question is whether the benefits derived from the use of 
energy outweigh the costs. Holdren (1992) has argued that since the early 1970s it has 
been possible to postulate that the costs of energy use have been rising and may now 
exceed the benefits. He depicted costs and benefits of energy use to be related to the 
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Figure 3.2 The total costs and total benefits of energy use as functions of 
the total level of energy use as proposed by Holdren (1992: 4). 
Holdren assumed that the marginal benefits derived from the use of energy fall with 
increasing levels of energy use in an exponential fashion (Line A). The relationship 
between the costs of energy and the level of energy use, on the other hand, he assumed 
to be sigmoid, with the marginal costs of energy use declining as the level of energy use 
increased, and to then begin increasing after a certain level of energy use is reached 
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(Line B). At some level of energy use the slopes of the two lines are the same and the 
net benefits (total benefits-total costs) is at a maximum. This point Holdren took as 
the socially optimal level of energy use and the attempt to improve welfare by increasing 
the supply of energy after this point confronts the law of diminishing returns. 
While the sketch graph used by Holdren provides a useful conceptual device around 
which discussion of energy issues can be rotated, it is nonetheless highly generalised 
with little empirical support that the relationship between energy use and the costs and 
benefits are as Holdren assumed. It therefore remains a theoretical tool rather than a 
practical guide for policy debate. Furthermore, there has long existed a 'rough consensus' 
within the energy policy debate that at the broadest level energy policy consists of 
balancing the two conflicting objectives of providing sufficient and reliable low-cost 
energy to sustain economic growth and maintain standards of living on the one hand, 
whilst ensuring that the non-economic costs of meeting this energy are kept at acceptably 
low levels on the other. Energy is not a public issue unless there is a perceived failure 
to meet one or the other of these broad objectives. But it has also long been recognised 
that 'this rough consensus ends with a bang' when the debate turns to the selection of 
criteria for assessing the effectiveness of policy in achieving these two goals (Katz 
1971: 131). 
The discussion therefore needs to begin by asking what the benefits of energy, and the 
imperatives behind increasing levels of energy use, are. The benefits derived from 
energy use can be divided into those which are derived from the personal energy use 
(such as convenient and rapid personal mobility, warmth, lighting, cold beer in the 
fridge, and so on) and those derived as a consequence of energy as an input into 
production (such as the generation of employment, manufactured goods the provision 
of public infrastructure and services). Increased energy use therefore contributes directly 
to increased material standard of living and to economic growth. Any demand for a 
policy of zero energy growth or a reduction in total energy use therefore confronts one 
or both of these two imperatives. 
A halt or reduction in the material standard of living, to be politically acceptable, 
requires a change in social values and a change from below. Economic growth, on the 
other hand, is necessary if employment levels are to keep pace with the rise in the 
labour force and the increase in labour productivity. Any level of economic growth 
above that will contribute towards an increased standard of living, depending on how 
it is distributed. Low growth rates produce low interest rates and high unemployment. 
A growing economy, furthermore, reduces social tensions by permitting income 
redistribution through welfare, health and education without decreasing the wealth of 
the rich (Paine & McLean 1991: 10). 
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The question of economic growth is discussed at greater length in Section 3.4.2 where 
the debate over whether or not there is a need to end economic growth is taken up. At 
this point, however, the discussion turns to the costs associated with the production 
and use of energy. 
Support for the argument that the costs of increased energy use outweigh the benefits 
involves first of all finding an agreed upon means of measuring these costs and benefits. 
These local costs of energy use can be divided into pollution and loss of amenity and 
these are discussed separately below. 
3.3.1 Local Pollution 
Concern over local pollution is not a recent phenomenon but has a long history (Thomas 
1983, Pepper 1984, Grove 1995). Air pollution is said to have been the first major 
environmental issue to capture public attention and a number of theories have been 
advanced to explain the increased concern at the local level over air pollution in the 
period immediately after the second world war. The simplest is that the increase in 
public concern was concomitant with increased levels of air pollution and its impacts 
on human psychological and physical health. The effects of pollution on the respiratory 
system were considered to have been particularly pronounced and concerns over these 
effects were raised throughout industrialised countries during the 1950s and early 
1960s (Herber 1965). The inadequacy of this explanation, it has been pointed out, is 
that in many instances the rise in public concern over pollution was in fact associated 
with improved air quality (Crenson 1971: 21). It has been argued that this increase in 
public concern therefore needs to be explained in terms of increased institutional 
encouragement of such concern and greater political freedom to express their concerns. 
This accords with the view of more recent social theorists who suggest that the protest 
generation of the 1960s which saw the rise of the antiwar and modern environmental 
movements, was a spontaneous occurrence sparked by the sudden perception by ordinary 
people that they had the ability to contest the power of the large organisations that 
had towered over them like granite monoliths, and that they had the capacity to shape 
public affairs (Flacks 1988). The perception dwindled and public protest over 
environmental issues subsided during the 1970s, according to this thesis, as those large 
organisations reasserted their authority. 
A more complete picture involves a combination of the two views as pollution did 
increase and become more visible in many urban centres in the post-war period. Smog 
appeared for the first time in Los Angeles in the late 1940s and major air pollution 
episodes occurred elsewhere in the following years. In Donara, Pennsylvania, half the 
town's population of 14,000 became ill in 1948 as a result of air pollution, with 20 
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fatalities (Freeman et al. 1974: 179). It has been postulated these major pollution 
episodes resulted in a wave of policy reforms in the USA: the Clean Air Act of 1963 
(amended in 1970), and the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) in 1969. 
Similarly, the London killer smogs 1952 led to the deaths of 4000 and provided the 
British Clean Air Society with the weapon to achieve its long-term goal in the form of 
the Air Act in 1954 (Kellow & Moon 1993: 238). This thesis emphasises the role of the 
media in drawing the public's attention to pollution incidents such as mercury poisoning 
in Minimata Bay in 1959, the Torrey Canyon oil spill in the English Channel in 1967, 
the Santa Barbara oil spill in 1968, and cadmium poisoning in Toyama in 1968. 
It is well recognised that the extraction, transport, production and use of energy all 
result in a large number of local pollution problems. Expanding the supply of energy 
increases these problems and environmentalists have long held that aggressive energy 
conservation is a preferable alternative (Swatek 1970, Beckmann 1976, Saddler 1981). 
It is possible to quantify in dollar terms many of these social costs caused by local 
pollution and where this has been attempted it has been shown that these can be very 
substantial. In the United States, for example, it has been estimated that the social 
and environmental costs of energy production and use are of the order of US $50 
billion (Hubbard 1991), costs which have not been included in the price of energy. 
These more measurable costs include accelerated corrosion of capital stock such as 
buildings, the loss of production caused by illness and the loss of agricultural produce 
caused by impaired soil fertility. 
Other costs are more difficult to measure. Illness is often caused by a variety of causes 
so that apportioning the degree to which any single source of pollution is responsible is 
often very difficult to determine (Holdren 1992: 32). It is even more difficult, if not 
impossible, to put a dollar value on other costs such as the loss of human life. Although 
economists have developed various means of attempting to do so, the contentious 
nature of such an exercise was recently demonstrated by international reaction to a 
report on the costs and benefits of global warming commissioned by the International 
Panel for Climate Change (IPCC). The authors of the report, a team of environmental 
economists, had based their calculations using estimates of the value of human life 
ranging from $1.5 million per life in the wealthiest countries to $100,000 per life in the 
poorest countries (Pearce 1995: 19). The authors subsequently refused to alter the 
report, maintaining that their methodology was scientifically correct and the attempt to 
have it altered was based on political correctness. While attempts to value human life 
at the local level are perhaps less contentious, they nonetheless remain thorny. The 
argument for aggressive energy conservation as a means of reducing the local costs of 
pollution therefore confronts an initial question of how to measure these costs. 
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A further problem associated with the demand that energy use be reduced in order to 
decrease localised impacts of pollution is that it assumes that there is a high level of 
public and political concern over these costs. There is, however, no transmission belt 
that automatically turns social issues into political issues within the public arena, or 
which automatically places issues of public concerns onto the political agenda (Jones 
1984: 57-9, Davis et al. 1988: 102). While there is a popular view that problems are 
translated into political issues if the number of individuals affected is sufficiently large 
to make it difficult for politicians to ignore (Dubnick & Bardes 1983: 6), this view 
confuses problems with issues. Problems are factual phenomena unrelated to human 
detection. Issues, on the other hand, are expressed demands for government action 
where present government action or inaction is questioned and may be unrelated to the 
existence of an actual problem. Far from being politically impelled to respond to 
problems, however, problems associated with energy use may remain undetected, or 
may attract little public interest once detected. Not all social problems are acted upon 
and it often seems to take disasters to prod the political process into corrective action 
(Anderson et al. 1984: 7, Self 1993: 265). Issues which bear little relationship to 
genuine problems, on the other hand, may suddenly flare up and even if they do attract 
significant public attention, may not provoke a political response. This, according to 
Schattschneider (1960: 12), is because the policy universe is finite and issues have to 
compete for space within it. A model most commonly used to explain whether an 
issue makes it onto the political agenda or not is the pluralist model of decision 
making. 
The most commonly cited pluralist model of the process of conversion of public issues 
to political problems is probably that advanced by Downes (1972). To Downes, 
issues do not get onto the political agenda unless they generate sufficient public support 
and, furthermore, should they make it onto the political agenda, require prompt attention 
before they are forced off the agenda again by the arrival of new issues. In Downes' 
model, many social issues have half-lives and go through a conveyor-belt like issue-
attention cycle in which they are pushed onto the agenda by public concern, but once 
there, are soon eclipsed as public attention shifts to new issues. Policy interest in the 
original issue gradually fades as public attention to the issue declines, and the issue 
eventually slips off the policy agenda and into limbo. Public interest in the issue, 
nonetheless, may remain at a higher level than it was before the initial problem was 
identified. If this decline in public interest occurred before the problem was adequately 
dealt with at the policy level, the issue may drop off the policy agenda without being 
adequately resolved. 
An example of such an issue that has had trouble attracting public attention, according 
to Kellow (1990: 173), has been soil degradation. Although identified as perhaps 
Australia's most serious environmental problem, soil degradation's low 'sex appeal' as 
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an issue, Kellow argued, rendered it difficult to attract political support for policies 
aimed at addressing it. Many writers have suggested that the failure to attract public 
interest to energy-related issues is a consequence of the pedestrian nature of these 
issues. Even during the second oil crisis in the USA, energy was said to be a subject 
that put people to sleep (Anonymous 1979: 14). Two anecdotes provide useful means 
of illustrating that the same is true in contemporary Australia. 
The first incident involved the compere of the ABC Radio National's Drive programme 
(Radio National, 3 Nov. 1994) introducing a debate between Dr Mark Diesendorf and 
Professor Peter Forsyth on the restructuring of the electricity supply industry in Australia, 
with the comment that although it was an issue guaranteed to leave most listeners 
glassy-eyed and reaching for their radio dials within minutes, a small number of 
individuals actually followed the debate. The second anecdote involved a similar 
comment by the compere of the ABC's Late Night Live, Phillip Adams (ABC Radio 
National, 30 Aug. 1994). Introducing a debate on the Australian government's policy 
response to greenhouse gas emissions between Dr. Mark Diesendorf (from the Australian 
National University and Vice President of the Sustainable Energy Industries Council of 
Australia), Dr Tony Beck (Business Council of Australia) and Gavin Gilchrist 
(environmental and science journalist with Sydney Morning Herald), Adams apologised 
to the listener for devoting time to such a boring subject, but quickly added that 
accusations of a conspiracy on the part of government and industry to undermine 
Australia's international commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Gilchrist 
1995: 1, 4) had given what was an otherwise mundane topic an interesting twist. 
These anecdotes support the argument that some issues fail to find their way onto the 
political agenda because of low public interest despite the assertion by environmentalists 
and others that energy-related problems are many and serious. In this regard, energy 
conservation is a doubly incapacitated option as not only do people find energy issues 
inherently stuffy, but as a solution to energy-related problems, energy conservation 
appears to be perceived as jejune. As one writer on the topic bluntly put it, the 
concrete details of energy conservation are worse than inconvenient: they are boring 
(Nivola 1986: 6). 
The implication is that while environmentalists have consistently advanced aggressive 
energy conservation as a means of reducing local problems associated with energy use, 
these problems often fail to be translated into issues and attract low public support. 
Concern over damage to public health or loss of amenity caused by energy supply 
expansion, moreover, is likely to reflect the way in which these 'bads' are distributed 
and on which members of society they impact most heavily. Those whose health is 
directly at risk from such pollution or whose amenity is impaired by supply expansion 
programmes are likely to exhibit the greatest levels of concern (Blowers 1984: 305) as 
48 
people are most concerned with that which immediately effects them. It is maintained 
by some writers that governments do not respond to pollution problems unless they 
impact directly on human health (Hall 1992: 82). 
There is, however, a long history of such public concern over local pollution (Paehlke 
1989: 35-7, Adams 1990: 30-3, Switzer 1994: 3-7) and they are not routinely ignored. 
Policy makers have taken action to reduce pollution, including the banning of the use of 
coal within city boundaries, regulation of permissible levels of emissions, the imposition 
of pollution taxes and the mandating of pollution control equipment. Pollution abatement, 
however, has tended to rely predominantly on technological and other solutions rather 
than reducing the level of energy use. Why policy makers rely on these technological 
solutions, given the derogatory term 'technical fixes' by critics of these solutions, is 
therefore important as much of the environmentalist demand for aggressive energy 
conservation is based on dissatisfaction with this approach to resolving energy-related 
problems. Four different types of technological solutions are described below. 
(i) Taller chimney stacks or relocation of energy supply plant 
The most simple strategy of reducing the local impacts of pollution caused by the 
production or conversion of energy is to spread them more diffusely or further afield, 
thereby removing the 'political problem' but not the emissions. This can be done by 
re-siting the source of the pollution away from urban areas or building taller chimney 
stacks. While it may result in damage to the non-urban environments such as wetland 
ecosystems, or lead to transboundary problems such as reduced soil fertility and forest 
destruction as in the case of acid rain, these costs have often failed to become political 
issues unless new and significant problems begin to emerge. Where these problems are 
transboundary in nature, their resolution, furthermore, has had to rely on the often 
tortuous process of multilateral negotiations. 
(ii) End-of-pipe fixes 
End-of-pipe technical fixes such as flue scrubbers and electrostatic precipitators that 
remove particles and certain gases from emissions from fossil fuel in order to reduce 
the levels of pollution are a popular technical fix strategy. It is said to have been to 
date the most favoured response of policy to pollution problems (Janike 1990: 55). It 
is also a multi-billion dollar industry dominated at the international level by the German 
engineering and energy production firm, Siemens (van Lersner 1995: 153). 
(iii) Technological innovation which improves existing technology 
A third strategy involves technological innovation to render existing technology less 
polluting. Cleaner coal burning technologies such as pressurised fluidised bed combustion 
(Pillai 1989) and coke filters (Coghlan 1991), for example, reduce the emissions of 
sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and particulates. While it is possible to remove 
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carbon dioxide from emissions, it is a costly process and does not overcome the 
problem of what to do with the carbon dioxide once it is removed. 
(iv) Technological innovation which produces new technologies 
Technological innovation to produce and commercialise less polluting energy conversion 
and supply technology continues to be a major strategy used to reduce the impacts of 
local pollution from energy production and use and are often spin-offs from other 
areas. The use of nuclear-fission as a means of producing electricity, for example, 
evolved from military use of the technology, while solar photovoltaic cells were 
commercialised from the space program. Fuel cells are the most recent attempt at such 
commercialisation and have been predicted to become the basis of a (AUS1994)$150 
to $200 million industry in Australia by soon after the turn of the century (Kestigan 
1994). It has been suggested that foremost amongst technical innovations leading to an 
improved environment in the coming decades will be those in the field of energy 
generation and conversion (van Lersner 1995: 153). 
The reduction of energy use as a means of reducing the impacts of use therefore 
competes with these four technical fix strategies. To understand why technical fixes 
are preferred as a means of resolving energy-related problems, they need to be compared 
with political, economic and social solutions to these problems. 
The first of these, the political approach, involves obtaining independent policy advice 
and increased public participation in decision making which could see energy conservation 
mandated as an alternative to supply expansion. The demand for such political 
solutions tends to be driven by public mistrust of organisational decision making 
procedures and the perceived insensitivity of bureaucracies, technical elites and profit 
making firms to public needs. It is an approach that is resisted by those who control 
energy policy and energy decision making and by those who benefit from present 
arrangements. Governments, moreover, are often reluctant to base public policy on 
irrational and uninformed public opinion, considering that the issues are too complex 
and important to be left to nonexpert decision making bodies. 
The social approach to resolving energy-related problems, on the other hand, involves 
the attempt to alter behaviour by changing beliefs and attitudes. This can be achieved 
using prompts, moral suasion or the provision of information about the nature of 
energy-related problems and what the individual can do to reduce energy use. While 
these approaches are politically palatable, their capacity to result in substantial changes 
in energy use is limited. 
Economic strategies involve the use of penalties, incentives and increased energy prices 
to increase the efficiency of energy production, distribution and use. The problem with 
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this approach, from the political perspective, is that neither energy producers, business 
or the public will accept this approach if it involves significant increases in the costs of 
energy or taxes. The attempt by the Conservative government in the U.K. to increase 
the price of electricity in the U.K. in July 1992 through the introduction of a 17% value 
added tax (VAT), to be phased in over two years, encountered massive public opposition. 
The bill was defeated and the government embarrassed when several Conservative 
politicians crossed the floor and voted against it. The strategy of reducing energy use 
by increasing prices can also be socially regressive if the price increase is not accompanied 
with increased transfer payments to those who can least afford to pay more for their 
energy. Although welfare economists maintain that increasing the price of energy 
whilst increasing welfare payments to the needy is a far more efficient means of 
allocating energy than the strategy of providing all users with cheap energy, the risk for 
low income earners is that these welfare transfers will be reduced over time with the 
inevitable budget cut backs (Nivola 1986: 13). Incentives to increase the efficiency of 
energy use, on the other hand, may amount to cross-subsidisation of these high income 
groups with the financial capacity to take advantages of the incentive programmes. 
Technological solutions, on the other hand, rely on engineering expertise to solve energy-
related problems and represent a well-established and a politically favoured response 
to such problems because research and development of technological innovations are 
strategies with low impacts on individual groups (Hughes et al. 1985: 65). They are 
considered unlikely to arouse emotional commitment one way or the other and therefore 
enjoy widespread support. The technological strategy therefore tends to be favoured 
over other strategies which involve exhorting, encouraging, enticing or enforcing reductions 
in energy use. The other strategies tend to be relied on only when such technical fixes 
are unavailable or unacceptable. 
The environmentalist critique of the 'technical fix' approach, however, is that many 
technical fixes do not solve the problem at hand but merely shift it elsewhere, or worse, 
result in the creation of unanticipated problems which can be greater than the initial 
problem it was intended to resolve. The Aswan Dam has traditionally been cited as 
the classic case of a technological solution that went wrong and which resulted in 
massive social, economic and environmental problems (Sandbach 1980: 161). The 
production of CFCs has become another example of a technological solution with 
inadvertent consequences. The technology which has become environmentalists bete 
noir, however, is nuclear fission (Goodin 1992: 161). Not only have environmentalists 
seen it as the technical fix par excellence (Ehrlich & Holdren 1971: 1212) but as the most 
blatant example of 'reverse adoption' - the deployment of a technology on a commercial 
scale before the problems associated with it have been resolved. Rather than 
unanticipated, nuclear power is considered by environmental writers to amount to 
certain risks in abeyance (Sandbach 1980: 154, Beck 1992: 26). The debate over the 
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risks to public health from nuclear power stations is highly germane to the attempt to 
explain why policy makers have tended to favour the expansion of supply over the 
reduction of demand and it is therefore worth concluding this section on local pollution 
and risks to public health by briefly looking at why policy has relied on this technology 
and the extent to which it is likely to do so in the future. 
The debate over the impacts of nuclear power on human safety and health 
Ironically, commercialisation of nuclear fission was motivated in part by the need to 
overcome public concern associated with pollution created by fossil-fuelled power 
stations (Spinrad 1973: 183). 
Debate over the risks of nuclear energy on human safety and health is characterised by 
extreme polarisation with various claims and counter-claims so conflicting that it has 
become a dialectical engagement in which environmentalists attempt to maximise the 
risks associated with nuclear power while the nuclear lobby attempts to minimise those 
risks. Environmentalists are accused of using statistics that do not stand up to serious 
investigation (Petro11 1990: 36), while the industry and governments are accused of 
being secretive and failing to disclose information on the full impacts of nuclear leakages 
and accidents. Environmentalists maximise the risks by making holistic assessments 
which include the risks associated with mining, short and long-term waste storage, 
terrorist attacks, nuclear proliferation, increased nuclear capacity of rogue nations, and 
routine radiation leakages as well as major reactor accidents. They are also based on 
lay assessments of risks which rely on crude rules of thumb and which give greater 
weight to low probability events with large impacts - such as a nuclear accident - than 
to constant low level damage - such as that caused by pollution from coal-fired power 
stations. The risks of a nuclear accident are therefore consistently likened by 
environmentalists and large sections of the public to those associated with nuclear war 
(Krupnick et al. 1993: 15). The probabilistic assessments of nuclear experts, on the 
other hand, consistently rate the risks associated with nuclear energy as trivial and 
small in comparison to those associated with other energy supply technologies such as 
coal-fired power stations (Beckerman 1975: 75). Experts from the nuclear industry 
describe their own assessments to be scientific and objective while lay assessments are 
described as subjective and ill-informed. Such experts consider environmentalist 
opposition to nuclear power to be even less rational than lay assessments and maintain 
that it is based on fear of large and complex technologies rather than objective science 
(Douglas & Wildavsky 1983: 53, Brenton 1994: 117). The nuclear issue is in fact said 
to be unique in that it is the only environmental issue for which the environmentalists 
do not have the majority support of the relevant scientific community (Brenton 1994: 
115). 
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Economists have recently suggested that the distinction between lay and expert risks 
can be accommodated into economic cost benefit analysis. This can be done, it has 
been argued, by calculating the social costs of nuclear energy on the basis of the 
psychological anxiety caused by the perceived rather than on objective assessments of 
physical damage resulting from a reactor accident. Since people assess the risks of 
multiple fatalities from disasters differently from individual fatalities, a multiple fatality 
factor would also have to be included in social costs. The social costs associated with 
a nuclear accident in the U.K., for example, has been estimated to be approximately 
0.000025 c /kWh if based on expert objective risk assessments, but approximately 0.5 
c/kWh if based on lay perceptions of risk with a disaster aversion factor included 
(Pearce 1995: 32). While these assessments are based on many disputable assumptions, 
including the assumption that each human life is worth $4 million, they do serve to 
indicate the large difference between expert and lay risk assessments. The usefulness 
of such attempts to quantify perceived risks of nuclear disasters, however, would only 
be credible if the perceived risks of disasters associated with gas and petrol storage 
depots, hydro-electric dams and coal mines were calculated in the same way. 
It has been pointed out, however, that lay assessments of the risks associated with 
nuclear power may not be as subjective and irrational, and expert assessments not 
quite as objective and accurate, as they at first appear. Expert assessments not only 
assume that the impacts of radiation on human health are well understood but can 
omit risks too difficult to quantify such as the probability of human error, material 
deterioration, failure at the human-mechanical interface, the variability of weather or 
unanticipated problems during evacuation (Krupnick et al. 1993: 17). Lack of consensus, 
moreover, characterises the debate between expert level with ongoing dispute over the 
comparative risks of nuclear energy and coal-fired power stations. Analysts who 
estimate the social costs associated with nuclear energy to be higher than those associated 
with the use of fossil fuels (Ottinger et al. 1990) are contradicted by those who arrive at 
the opposite conclusion (Hohmeyer 1990, 1992). It has also been found that chemical 
engineers are less willing to live near nuclear power plants than are nuclear engineers, 
while nuclear engineers are less willing to live near coal-fired power plants than are 
chemical engineers, indicating that irrationality due to lack of familiarity operates also 
at the expert level (Krupnick et al. 1993: 17). 
The actual level of public support for, or opposition to, increased reliance on nuclear 
energy is difficult to gauge as both sides of the debate have misused opinion polls to 
further their cause. Public concern over the risks associated with nuclear energy however, 
began very early. Although the fire at the Windscale nuclear station in England in 1957 
had little immediate impact on public opinion in that country, public opposition succeeded 
in blocking construction of a nuclear power station within the New York city limits in 
1962, giving the anti-nuclear movement an initial impetus (Maddox 1972: 12). Public 
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controversy over nuclear power stations subsided in the USA, however, after the 
Atomic Energy Commission tightened standards on routine low-level radiation releases 
(Freeman et al. 1974: 178-9). The debate did not pick up again until the mid to late 
1970s when the anti-nuclear movement's attention turned to the issues of reactor 
safety, terrorist theft of fissile material and scepticism over the ability of institutions to 
manage the long-term problems of reactor decommissioning and waste storage. 
The Three Mile Island incident in Pennsylvania in 1979 was pivotal and damaged 
public confidence in nuclear power in the USA (Pfaltzgraff 1980). It also led to 
moratoria on further construction of nuclear power plants in a number of countries, 
beginning with Sweden in 1980 (Lucas 1988: 56). Nonetheless, majority public opinion 
continued to support expansion of the nuclear energy in those countries with nuclear 
capacity, but was opposed to the introduction of nuclear power in those countries or 
states without nuclear generating capacity. In countries such as France and Japan, 
moreover, the industry continued to 'boom with self-confidence despite the fact that 
thousands of riot police were required to quell demonstrators at public hearings over 
proposals to construct new reactors (Anderson 1984: 357). Despite the view of sober 
writers that a nuclear catastrophe was almost certain (Sandbach 1980: 157), more 
Europeans were said to be in favour of nuclear power than were opposed to it. Even 
some strong advocates of energy conservation in the USA argued against total 
abandonment of nuclear power technology as it may be needed if the environmental 
problems associated with fossil fuels prove to be intractable. John Gibbons, co-author 
of the highly popular book Energy: the Conservation Revolution, for example, argued that 
it would be prudent to rely on nuclear energy to meet a portion of the country's energy 
needs, even if the price of this nuclear energy was 20% above that of energy produced 
from coal (Gibbons 1985: 10). 
The nuclear industry in the USA, however, was beset by many problems. No new 
reactors were ordered after 1978 and many orders were cancelled (Pfaltzgraff 1980: 
67, Ableson 1987: 73), although construction or planning of nuclear reactors continued 
with 14.8 GWav of nuclear power capacity under construction at the end of 1987 
(Ahearne 1989: Appendix 1, Table 10). A primary cause of the slowdown was the 
combination of excess generating capacity and declining demand for electricity, added 
to which were the increasing costs of construction, caused by management and operational 
problems, and which increased interest rates and led to cost over-runs (Andrews 
1990). Delays caused by public opposition to nuclear construction added further to 
costs. An abundance of coal in many areas of the USA (Ableson 1987: 73) and a shift 
to smaller gas-fired generating technology as a means of reducing the risks associated 
with supply expansion further undermined the ability of nuclear industry to compete. 
In the wake of the Chernobyl accident in 1986, furthermore, it became clear that 
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increased reliance on nuclear fission was unlikely to occur in that USA without a 
resurgence of broad public and political support (Ahearne 1989: 49). 
There is little doubt that the Chernobyl accident in 1986 led to a marked swing in 
public opinion against nuclear power (European Community 1987: 6, Nuclear Energy 
Agency 1991: 9). The relevant question now, in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, is 
to what degree aggressive energy conservation will be pursued rather than increased 
reliance on nuclear energy? Opponents of nuclear power have interpreted the accident 
as the last and most devastating in a series of incidents and disclosures about the 
health hazards of nuclear power, and as so horrendous in terms of damage to human 
life and health that the industry's credibility was unlikely to recover (Shcherbak 1996) 
and saw its future to be in serious doubt (Thomas & Berkhout 1992). Proponents of 
nuclear energy, on the other hand, have claimed that the impacts of the accident have 
been blown out of all proportion (Brenton 1994: 117). Radiation fallout from the 
Chernobyl accident on the European Community is estimated to increase the number of 
thyroid cancers in Europe by about 0.6%, and all cancers by 0.003% over the next half 
century (European Community 1987: 7). The total damage caused by the Chernobyl 
accident has been described as far less than that inflicted by other causes of death 
such as the emissions from coal-fired power stations, vehicle accidents, coal mining or 
cigarettes which amount in combination to 'thousands of Chernobyls a day' (Lovelock 
1988: 173). Nuclear fission technology's most serious problem, its proponents insist, is 
not public safety or waste disposal but a false public perception of the magnitude and 
intractability of these problems and the failure of the public to recognise it as both a 
'rational choice' and an environmentally acceptable technology (Benarde 1992: 278). 
Incidentally, the Chernobyl accident was followed closely by a significant increase in 
international concern over the ecological and social impacts of heavy reliance of fossil-fuel 
use and the risks of climatic change caused by increased concentrations of atmospheric 
greenhouse gases in particular. Proponents of nuclear fission saw in the greenhouse 
issue the potential to resurrect the industry from its crisis and factions of the environmental 
movement begrudgingly and cautiously re-examined the nuclear option (Ahearne 1989: 
12). Environmental academics abandoned caution and advocated rapid acceleration 
of nuclear construction as the means of overcoming the greenhouse problem (Benarde 
1992: 278). Proponents of nuclear energy did not dispute that unsafe nuclear reactors 
do exist, especially in Russia, Eastern Europe and most likely also in North Korea and 
China, and maintained that these reactors should be shutdown as the risk of another 
Chernobyl is high. They maintained, however, that the fact that reactors in the communist 
and former communist-bloc countries are unsafe does not amount to an argument 
against nuclear technology per se and that reactors used in the West are far safer and 
are a vast improvement on coal-fired technologies from the perspectives of both human 
safety and health and the environment (Gray 1993: 154, Hawley 1995: 96). 
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The industry's optimism has been buoyed, furthermore, by the fact that public rejection 
of nuclear power by the public has not been as complete as many environmental 
writers have contended. A number of referenda in many states in the USA, for 
example, failed to adopt moratoria on further construction of nuclear plants (Miller 
1991: 87). Opinion polls in Finland indicated that apart from the few months immediately 
after the Chernobyl accident, public support for expansion of nuclear power in that 
country remained higher than support for expansion supply produced from fossil fuel 
plants (Silvennoinen 1991: 504). 
The nuclear industry, moreover, is pushing on with the design of smaller reactors with 
passive safety features, such as the PIUS and Geyser reactors, in the hope that public 
acceptance of the technology can be regained. Although not inherently safe, these new 
reactor designs are claimed to substantially reduce the risks associated with nuclear 
fission technology (Holdren 1992b: 27). The nuclear industry's aim, therefore, is not so 
much to persuade environmentalists and the public to believe that nuclear fission 
reactors are safe but that they can be safe (Ahearne 1989: 41). In the meanwhile, the 
industry will continue to survive by selling reactors to developing countries such as 
Indonesia, despite the claims by environmentalists that such countries could meet their 
energy requirements more cheaply by increasing the efficiency of energy use (Keepin & 
Kats 1988: 541). 
The environmentalist argument used to counter the resurgence of interest in nuclear 
energy is that even if new nuclear reactor designs are safer than the older versions, 
aggressive energy conservation is an inherently less risky strategy than either fission of 
fossil fuel technologies: energy conservation cannot produce a Chernobyl-like catastrophe 
(Cairncross 1993: 111). The assumption that energy conservation is a zero risk strategy, 
however, has been challenged. The use of urea formaldehyde foam thermal insulation 
in the early 1980s, for example, resulted in increased incidence of cancers while the 
rapid shift to wood heaters led to increased deaths from house fires. Had these 
increased fatalities and illness been caused instead by a nuclear accident, it has been 
charged, there would have been a public furore (Frieden & Baker 1983b: 445). 
The point that the above discussion makes is that despite the many problems associated 
with the environmentalists most dreaded technical fix option, nuclear fission, the degree 
to which the public and policy makers are likely to rely on aggressive energy conservation 
rather than expansion of nuclear energy is not yet clear. Apart from the risks of routine 
low level radiation emissions and reactor accidents, the industry will have to convince 
its critics that the problems associated with the storage of nuclear wastes and 
decommissioning of nuclear reactors can be satisfactorily resolved. Although public 
opinion has forced governments to scale down, cancel or find alternatives to increased 
reliance on nuclear energy, this impact has been variable, the success of public opposition 
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being determined largely by the political structure. Public access to courts as a means 
of questioning the siting of nuclear facilities has been particularly instrumental in those 
countries such as the USA where governments have been forced to find alternatives to 
expansion of reliance on nuclear energy, including increased reliance on energy 
conservation (Rudig 1990). Support for the industry, furthermore, remains higher than 
many environmentalists have suggested and the assumption that aggressive energy 
conservation will automatically become a more politically likely option than supply 
expansion based on nuclear technology is one that needs to be treated with caution. It 
is probable, however, that another major reactor accident would fatally damage public 
confidence in the entire industry, and at a minimum force the closure of all nuclear 
plants of that type (Krupnick et al. 1993: 21). 
Others consider that even without another accident, the industry is likely to be phased 
out on the basis of its economic rather than its social and environmental costs : It is 
commonly maintained by critics of the industry that nowhere has a nuclear plant been 
installed and operated without substantial public subsidy (Dryzek 1987: 111). Although 
it has been vehemently denied that nuclear energy has been subsidised from the public 
purse in France (Cade 1995: 42), the commercial reforms of the U.K. electricity industry 
revealed the extent of the subsidies in that country and many now express doubts that 
the U.K. industry can recover from its economic malaise (Rossin 1990: 171). 
Health effects of Electromagnetic Radiation  
A second and more recent argument for energy conservation has been based on concern 
over perceived risks to human health from long-term exposure to low levels of 
electromagnetic radiation, and radiation associated with high voltage power lines in 
particular. 
Public concern over the health effects of long-term exposure to low levels of electromagnetic 
radiation have increased in recent years. The value of real estate close to high voltage 
power lines in Australia has dropped from between 5 and 20 percent and many buyers 
rejecting such homes outright (The Property Age 17 April 1996: 3). These concerns have 
led in some instances to proposals of aggressive energy conservation as an alternative 
to the need for construction of new power lines (Gibbs 1991), but which have met with 
limited success to date. They have been dismissed on three counts: (i) that public 
concern over the health impacts of high voltage power lines is irrational as they are as 
yet unproven (although not disproved), (ii) that even if proved to be correct the 
problems caused by such radiation are not likely to be great, and (iii) that the radiation 
exposure from household appliances and wiring is probably greater in most situations 
than those from high voltage power lines. The conflicting debate is likely to be protracted 
for two reasons. First, the epidemiological research required to prove or refute the 
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various claims encounters many problems, not the least of which is finding a suitable 
control group and knowledge of life histories of exposures to such radiation from 
various sources. The research to date has therefore tended to be inconclusive. Secondly, 
if it were established that low levels of electromagnetic radiation do pose a serious 
threat to public health, it would require fundamental changes to the way in which 
energy is supplied and delivered (Johnson & Rix 1991: 53-5). The economic implications 
of this are so substantial that resistance to the need for change without conclusive 
evidence is guaranteed. Assessment of the health impacts of electromagnetic radiation 
from high voltage power lines is therefore unlikely to be resolved for some time but until 
then it is likely that the demand for aggressive energy conservation as a means of 
reducing these unknown impacts will remain relatively weak. 
So far the arguments behind the demands for aggressive energy conservation as a 
means of addressing public concerns over pollution from energy production and supply, 
and the reasons why policy makers tend to rely on other solutions to problems, including 
technical fixes and commercialisation of new technologies, have been examined At this 
point, the discussion turns to arguments for energy conservation based on the impacts 
of energy supply infrastructure on amenity, as these issues have often proven less 
amenable to resolution through technical fixes and have frequently been at the centre of 
considerable public conflict over energy policy and planning. 
3.3.2 Amenity 
The production and use of energy frequently impacts on amenity such as the visual 
impacts on the landscape or the loss of wilderness areas. Many of the arguments 
above relating to the difficulty of advancing aggressive energy conservation as an 
energy option to avoid or reduce pollution pertain equally to the issue of amenity. 
While the debates over the loss of amenity are simplified by the absence of complex 
assessment of risks to public health, they do share with the pollution issue the problem 
of measuring the 'bads'. 
Environmentalists are often supported in their campaigns against the construction of 
infrastructure associated with increased energy supply where this impacts on amenity 
by strong local middle class support arising from a NIMBY (not-in-my-back-yard) or 
LULU (locally-unwanted-land-uses) syndrome (Blowers 1984: 305). The siting of high 
voltage power lines, for example, is now the greatest constraint on increasing energy 
supply in the USA (Grubb et al. 1992: 20) and has increasingly become an issue in the 
Australian context (Natural Resources and Environment Committee 1988: 73). It has 
recently been shown to have the potential to become the major political obstacle to 
planned interconnection of the grids of the eastern and southeastern Australian states, 
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the Eastlink proposal between New South Wales and Queensland having developed 
into a decisive election issue during the 1995 Queensland State election. Opponents of 
the Eastlink project have argued that it will encourage the use of energy and that the 
need for the interconnection could be avoided by an aggressive energy conservation 
policy. The Queensland Labor government was unconvinced and remained committed 
to the project. This played a decisive role in the government's eventual loss at the polls 
and the incoming Liberal government quickly floated the idea of a technical fix solution 
- a submarine cable - as a means of taking the heat out of the issue. It finally appeared 
as if the idea of interconnection would be jettisoned and that Queensland would build 
a new coal-fired power station as an alternative means of meeting future requirements. 
Energy supply developments which have generated the greatest public opposition, 
however, have often been those involving the construction of hydro-electric dams. The 
loss of wilderness, despoliation of areas of natural beauty, and displacement of human 
settlements caused by hydro-electric projects has often led to greater public opposition 
than that generated by proposals to construct nuclear power stations (Grubb et al. 
1992: 20, Brenton 1994: 117). The moratorium on further hydro-electric development 
in Sweden, for example, predated by a number of years a similar moratorium on 
further construction of nuclear power in that country (Cairncross 1993: 111). Notable 
preservationists have argued, further, that if given a choice between the construction of 
renewable energy systems such as wind farms in areas of scenic value on the one hand, 
or nuclear energy in non-scenic areas on the other, their preference would be for the 
latter option (Nash 1979: 26). 
Where energy supply expansion has impacted on amenity, public opposition has often 
been substantial. One reason for this is that unlike the case of pollution, policy has 
fewer means of resolving these amenity issues. Re-routing proposed power lines, for 
example, does not solve the problem as it leads to similar problems elsewhere so that 
the only real strategy available is to compensate landowners for the reduction in the 
value of their properties caused by such construction. In the USA the issue has become 
more problematical as those affected have greater ability to mount legal challenges to 
such planned development. In other situations, such as hydro-electric construction, the 
only strategies available to policy makers are to re-site the project, to abandon the 
project and resort to alternative means of expanding the supply of energy, or to adopt 
a policy of aggressive energy conservation. To succeed in halting energy development 
projects, public pressure has had to be very substantial. Despite massive public 
opposition to the construction of a hydro-electric scheme in Tasmania, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, for example, construction of the dam was not halted until the Federal 
government intervened. One of the major difficulties faced by such public campaigns is 
the failure to have many of the 'bads' factored into the project's cost-benefit appraisal. 
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While owners of land over which high voltage power lines are constructed can be 
compensated according to the reduction in the property values, the broader public is 
not compensated for the reduction in aesthetic value to the landscape. With hydro-electric 
dam construction, the costs in terms of the loss of production caused by the loss of 
land can be calculated, while the loss of wilderness, or the loss of species of fauna and 
flora, are not - and cannot - be assigned dollar values and are therefore omitted from 
the analysis. Environmentalists who oppose such developments are constrained in 
terms of the type of concerns they are able to bring to the negotiating table as the terms 
of reference for such negotiations are set not by themselves but by policy makers. 
Many of the issues most important to them are ruled out as illegitimate and are 
omitted from the debate (Socolow 1981: 152). 
This takes the present discussion back to the issue of 'fundamentalism', in that it is 
plausible that what is interpreted as a fundamentalist demand for aggressive energy 
conservation is, at least in part, a product of the inability to advance as arguments for 
such a policy many things which individuals care most about. 
3.3.3 Local Resource Depletion 
At the local level, the issue of resource depletion can collide with other issues such as 
amenity, as when the availability of potential hydro-electric sites outside of wilderness 
areas are exhausted or when the only remaining coal resources are close to urban 
settlements. Local depletion issues can also impinge on values such as species 
conservation. In the Indian province of Kutch, for example, a wildlife sanctuary was 
halved in size in 1993 to allow for mining of lignite and other minerals, followed in 
1995 by the removal of a ban on mining from 40% of the remaining reserve (Kumar 
1995). In Australia there have been persistent calls for governments to allow mining in 
National Parks and although public pressure has prevented such policies being 
implemented to date, it provides another example of the difficulty of placing values on 
some of the local costs associated with the production and use of energy. 
To conclude this section on local problems associated with energy production and use, 
it can be stated that although many such problems exist and are often substantial, in 
only a relatively small number of instances, such parts of the USA and in California in 
particular, has this led to substantial emphasis on reducing the use of energy as 
opposed to other solutions or nonsolutions. In many instances, moreover, these problems 
have not been sufficient to generate public support for aggressive energy conservation. 
Although specific projects have been halted by public concerns, policy has deployed a 
range of strategies aimed at reducing the public concern whilst maintaining a policy of 
expanding the supply of energy. Many of these strategies have displaced the problem 
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in time and place producing problems elsewhere, including transboundary and global 
problems. It is to these problems that the discussion now turns. 
3.4 Global Imperatives 
At the global perspective, the two dominant themes of environmentalism have been 
depletion and pollution (Paehlke 1989: 21). In this section, these global arguments are 
discussed using a historical perspective in order to show the way in which the themes 
behind the call for aggressive energy conservation have developed, changed and merged 
over time. Many contemporary commentators on the issue of energy suggest that 
energy was not a policy concern until the 1973 'oil shock led to a fundamental shift in 
thinking on energy (Crossley 1980a: 363, Saddler 1994: 55). This largely ahistorical 
approach ignores the overlapping themes that have fuelled the debate over energy and 
the environment over time and which continue to have a strong bearing on the current 
debate. The following discussion is developed by taking each theme separately in an 
attempt to show how the ideas behind aggressive energy conservation and the debate 
has shifted to become more complex over time. 
3.4.1 Global Resource Depletion 
At the heart of resource depletion concerns has been the simple axiom that the capacity 
of a finite planet to provide resources is limited, and secondly, on the simple calculus 
that the demand for resources is the product of population level and per capita 
resource use. As the population increases, so too does resource use, a situation which 
is logically unsustainable as it will ultimately confront these physical resource limits. 
At a general level, these arguments are intuitively and qualitatively irrefutable and the 
real debate has been over how close we are to those limits. Moreover, the combination 
of a geometrically (exponential) increasing population combined with increasing per 
capita resource use means that society approaches these limits at an accelerating rate, 
resulting in the exacerbation of concerns over resource scarcity. Such a situation 
occurred for the first time with the onset of the Industrial Revolution and sparked a 
debate between pessimists and optimists that has been with us ever since (Kennedy 
1993: 5-6). 
The first in the 'pessimistic' line of thinkers and the father of quantitative world 
modelling was the British economist, Thomas Malthus. The thesis of his occasional 
polemic aimed at his contemporary utopian writers was that food production increased 
arithmetically (linearly) while human population increased geometrically so that the 
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latter would inevitably outstrip the capacity of the land to produce the food and 
therefore result in starvation, disease, an increasingly inequitable society and social 
collapse (Malthus 1798: 70). While the evil day could be put off, the ultimate and 
unavoidable fate of society was to 'end in shallows and miseries' (Malthus 1798: 112). 
Malthus' intention was to counter the growing belief of the times in universal progress 
and prosperity. His book stimulated a ferocious debate that lasted about thirty years. 
By the end of his life, however, the Rev. Malthus began to have reservations about his 
own pessimistic thesis as anthropological evidence suggested that primitive societies 
did not increase in numbers to the point of starvation (Roberts 1987: 103). 
The British economist, Jevons (1865), a follower of Malthus, was the first to extend this 
Malthusian logic to energy when he predicted the demise of Britain as an industrial 
power once its coal resources were depleted. While other countries lived on their 
income, Britain, he warned, lived on its capital which would not yield interest because 
once turned into heat, light or power it disappeared forever into space. Jevons, however, 
did not advocate eking out coal for as long as possible but accelerated production of 
wealth (Jevons 1865: 460). Half a century later, the chemist Sir William Ramsay 
repeated this warning of imminent coal shortages, thereby triggering a search for new 
energy sources in the U.K. said to be so intensive that no suggestion for harnessing 
energy, which included wind, solar, ocean and tidal energy systems, was considered 
too wild to be rejected (Fuchs 1946: 398). 
A second idea brought to the depletion debate was that of thermodynamics. To 
nineteenth century authorities on thermodynamics such as Henry Adams, the availability 
of low entropy resources was society's critical problem. These economists with a 
background in physics or the physical sciences claimed that the neoclassical model of 
the economy as a merry-go-round between producers and consumers was deficient as 
it failed to take account of the critical thermodynamic role of energy in industrial 
economic production. They developed their own model, based on extrapolation from 
the steam engine, in which the economy was portrayed as a one-way, entropy-increasing 
engine (Martinez-Alier 1987: 127-48). The system was fuelled by a finite reservoir of 
low entropy natural resources which, once depleted, would mean that modern civilisation 
would come to an end as abruptly as 'an organ deprived of wind' (Soddy 1928: 12). 
Economic growth ad infinitum based on non-renewable resources was therefore as 
mythical as a perpetual motion machine. Furthermore, the exhaustion of low entropy 
resources and their substitution with higher entropy resources would necessarily increase 
the costs of economic production. The economic maladies of the times were cited as 
evidence that this process was well advanced (Martinez-Alier 1987: 135). 
The primary locus of this resource conservation debate shifted to the USA where the 
Progressive Conservation Movement championed the wise use of resources via efficient 
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use. While the Movement's initial concern in the late nineteenth century focused on an 
anticipated timber famine, the Movement quickly extended its concerns to other renewable 
and non-renewable resources including oil, coal and strategic minerals (Nolan 1958: 
50-1). As more deposits of these resources were found over the ensuing decades, 
anxiety over resource exhaustion gradually subsided, and by 1909 the Movement had 
temporarily gone into limbo (Rose 1965: 8). 
The issue of resource shortages re-emerged after the first world war, principally in 
relation to the declining self-sufficiency in oil and especially in the USA. The 'expert' 
consensus amongst geophysicists was that oil imports would need to rise rapidly in the 
very near term and the question over the degree of oil self-sufficiency became a national 
preoccupation, generated considerable anxiety within the automobile manufacturing 
industry, and sparked a move to nationalise the oil industry (Fuchs 1946: 228). The 
dramatic increase in US oil production in the post-war period, according to Fuchs 
(1946: 228-9), led most geophysicists to abandon their attempts to estimate how much 
oil remained undiscovered. One geophysicist who persisted in making such estimates 
was M. King Hubbert. 
The rapid rise in rates of population growth and resource use, and especially oil, in the 
period after the second world war rekindled the attempt to assess the longevity of 
fossil fuel resources. M.K. Hubbert was a geophysicist and former 'guiding light' of the 
small and short-lived Technocracy Inc. movement that emerged in the USA in the early 
1930s, and which predicted, among other things, the apocalyptic collapse of the capitalist 
economic system (Martinez-Alier 1987: 144). He turned his attention in the post-war 
era to non-renewable energy resources and, using simple bell-shaped resource depletion 
curves, attempted to estimate the portion of a resource remaining at any one stage in 
the course of its exploitation. The resultant geological perspective was that industrial 
society's emancipation from sole dependence on solar energy through the use of fossil 
fuel represented an unrepeatable "pip" or moment in the total history of time. From 
this, he concluded, industrial society's position was clearly 'precarious' (Hubbert 1949: 
108). Unlike Fuchs (1946: 243), who had enormous faith that science would 'find 
ways out of trouble' when the oil wells ran dry, Hubbert was pessimistic. Using a 
notion similar to Ogburn's (1922) notion of social and cultural lag, Hubbert wrote that 
industrial society continued to plan in an agrarian and prescientific manner and was 
therefore unlikely to adapt in time to the abrupt decline in availability of fossil fuels 
(Hubbert 1949: 109). It was, according to Paehlke (1989: 49), probably the first 
definitive attempt to predict the timing of the end of the oil era. 
After the close of the second world war, a number of other writers began to express 
concerns over resource depletion. Another geologist, Harrison Brown (1954), saw three 
possible futures for high-energy industrial society. The first, a free industrial society in 
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harmony with its environment, he considered to be an 'extremely low' probability. The 
second, a stable industrial society controlled by a collectivised, authoritarian state he 
considered to be more probable. The most likely future, however, he considered to be 
forced regression to an agrarian society by the inability to avoid war, control population 
growth or rapidly develop new energy sources before fossil fuels were depleted (Brown 
1954: 264-5). 
The conflict between natural resource limits and increasing populations led others to 
see a threatening incapacity to feed the rapidly growing human population (Osborn 
1948: 68) and to gloomy Malthusian long-term conclusions for humanity (Darwin 
1952)2 . The limits to not only food production but several other resources were 
suddenly perceived to be coming into view for the first time (Osborn 1953: 164). The 
perceived risk to society was that these resource limits would be reached abruptly and 
unexpectedly, causing great social damage (Ordway 1953: 32). Contradicting these 
pessimistic writers were optimists with a robust faith in technology such as Fuchs 
(1946) and Thompson (1957), indicating that the cornucopian versus catastrophist 
debate began well before it is commonly thought to have. 
Oil resources become the 'chips in a postwar global poker game' (Fuchs 1946: 242), and 
although the Cold War exacerbated concerns over the depletion of all resources, oil 
was once again of the greatest political and economic import, especially in the USA 
(Griffith 1968: 18). As a result, the President's Materials Policy Commission was 
established in 1952 in the USA, followed in the same year by the establishment of an 
independent organisation with an interest in resource problems, Resources for the Future. 
Japan, being totally reliant on energy imports, began to regulate energy use with the 
enactment of the 1951 Heat Energy Control Act to reduce the energy intensity of its 
economy by prescribing efficiency standards for industrial equipment used to produce 
heat (Dore 1983: 96). 
Some of those who feared that fossil fuel depletion was close at hand also believed 
that there were solutions. Both Osborn (1953) and Brown (1954) believed that either 
renewable or nuclear energy could fill the vacuum that would be left by the exhaustion 
of fossil fuels. The early to mid 1950s, therefore, became a period in which the 
proponents of both of these two options pushed their respective barrows and vied for 
research resources. Renewable energy advocates argued that the need to make the 
transition to renewable energy was clearly urgent (Halacy 1957) and managed to 
briefly re-initiate significant research effort on renewable energy (Resources for the 
Future 1954). This contrasted with the ambivalence and diversity of opinion regarding 
the technical feasibility and the costs of energy from nuclear sources. A consultant's 
2 Charles Gaton Darwin (1952), grandson of the renowned biologist Charles Darwin. 
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report to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on the maximum possible demand for 
energy to the year 2050 summed up this ambivalence by noting what was commonly 
seen to be humanity's energy predicament (Putman 1954). Putman's report did not 
give unqualified support for nuclear energy but rang of an attempt at honest appraisal. 
It began with the admission that such a forecasting exercise was fraught with dangers 
and had the capacity without care to degenerate into a parade of prophesies. There 
was great need, he cautioned, to dismiss extreme claims concerning the technical feasibility 
and costs of energy from nuclear fission and suggested that the realistic estimate of 
price of energy from nuclear sources was somewhere between twice the cost to somewhat 
less than the cost of energy produced from coal (Putman 1954: 247). He stated, 
moreover, that there was a widely held opinion within the business community that 
even if the price of energy produced from nuclear fission did turn out to be marginally 
less than the price of energy produced from coal, most business leaders of the day 
considered that to be neither terribly exciting, nor sufficient reason to develop nuclear 
technology (Putman 1954: 3). The tone of Putman's report made it clear that reliance 
on 'income' energy was the energy option preferred by most, but that society's desire to 
continue to 'live high' was incompatible with such a strategy and necessitated, with a 
sense of reluctance, turning to new sources of 'energy capital' (Putman 1954: 247). 
Putman ended his report with a prescient comment on the potential of continued 
reliance on fossil fuels to 'derange the natural carbon cycle' and alter the Earth's 
atmosphere, stating 'We do not know this. We ought to know it ... We should 
investigate until doubt is removed' (Putman 1954: 459). His final plea was or greater 
research effort into renewable energy technologies. 
The race between renewable and nuclear energy to fill the perceived void in fossil fuels 
ultimately proved to be a non-contest for another reason. Having spent (US1950)$2 
billion on nuclear research during the war, the United States Government had developed 
a major industry (Knapp 1950: 208) which it continued to foster with post-war orders 
for naval reactors. In the U.K., a public commission in 1955 called for a policy of 
energy independence based on major investment in electricity generating infrastructure, 
triggering major public investment in a commercial nuclear energy programme. 
In the USA, General Electric and Westinghouse engaged in heavy loss-leading to create 
a market for commercial reactors (Layton 1972: 131-3), while the Canadian government's 
CANDU reactor was developed around the same time as one of that country's few 
successful attempts at developing a high-value manufacturing domestic and export 
product (Schrecker 1980: 290). With this aggressive promotion of nuclear energy, 
together with the discovery of giant oil fields in the Middle East in the mid 1950s that 
pushed the world oil reserve-to-production ratio to an all time high, concern over 
energy resources began to subside and is said by some to have slipped into official 
obscurity around 1960 (Oliver et al. 1983: 16). That this was not the case for countries 
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highly reliant on imported oil was demonstrated by the fact that France set maximum 
levels energy use for household energy-using appliances in 1965 (OECD 1976: 23), 
whilst Japan put in place a comprehensive energy research policy in the same year 
(Dore 1983: 96). 
A decade later, concern over dwindling resources based on declining grades of mineral 
resources and the ever larger amounts of cheap energy that would therefore be needed 
to produce products from these low quality resources was expressed by another geologist 
(Park 1968: 18-20). World oil use had doubled in the 1950s, however, and oil continued 
to be seen as the most critical resource problem. Estimates of the amount of oil 
remaining varied by a factor of two. Hubbert's prediction that USA oil production 
would peak around 1970 and world oil production around the year 2000 represented 
the lowest estimate, while McKelvey's assessment represented the upper range in 
estimates (Park 1968: 183). World oil use doubled again in the 1960s, increasing alarm 
over its impending exhaustion. Like others before him, Park stated that humanity 
would be forever grateful to the person who found the means of supplying all of 
humanity's energy needs by harnessing energy income, but until then, other means 
would have to be used (Park 1968: 163). Gas and oil discoveries in the conterminous 
US and its adjacent offshore areas were said to be in decline (Hubbert 1967) and 
global oil production was projected to fall below expected demand by the early 1980s 
and peak in mid 1990s (Warman 1971). The most optimistic view was that the actual 
remaining oil resources were approximately double that estimate (Odell 1973). 
The early 1970s was a period in which a number of problems collided. Concern over 
local pollution from coal-fired power stations in the 1960s had caused a substantial 
shift from coal to oil-fired electricity generation in many countries (Yergin 1991: 777). 
The USA had become a net oil importer and oil supplied virtually all transport energy 
requirements, most home heating needs and much electricity generation in that country. 
Oil companies had been warning throughout the 1960s of an imminent rise in the price 
of oil on the world market. In August 1971, fixed exchange rates were abandoned and 
the US dollar was floated, destabilising oil prices and prompting oil producers, most 
notably Libya, to pressure for increased oil prices to offset the decline in the value of 
their oil exports (Hallsworth 1992: 65). This, in turn, led to greater volatility of 
currency markets and the onset of recession and inflation (Strange 1986). In this 
uncertain climate, the pessimistic view over the amount of oil remaining prevailed and 
oil importing countries began to prepare policies aimed at attaining greater self-sufficiency 
in energy resources. President Nixon, forecasting what lay ahead, announced a policy 
of national energy self-sufficiency, though actual implementation was delayed (Maddox 
1975: 11). 
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These changes occurred at a time in which the long-term decline in energy intensities of 
advanced industrialised countries had been temporarily reversed, the most significant 
causes for this reversal being increased electrification within the industrial sector, a 
lack of advancement in efficiency improvements of electricity generating systems, and 
the increased use of personal energy, such as air conditioning and private vehicle use, 
which had little or no multiplier effect on GNP (Cook 1971: 85, Fowler 1972: 77). The 
increasing demand for electricity had stretched the capacity of the supply industry to 
its limits, with blackouts common in many parts of the USA by the early 1970s, and 
warnings that this 'energy crisis' was set to deepen (Starr 1973: 15). It was also a 
period in which electricity rates began to rise after a decade of falling real costs of 
electricity, with bills more than doubling in some states of the USA over the three years 
from 1971 to 1974 (Freeman et al. 1974: 256). A shortage of heating oil in the winter of 
1972, apparently the result of US oil policies which encouraged the production of 
petrol rather than heating oil, added yet another ingredient to what had become a 
complex energy situation (Hammond et al. 1973: v). 
This debate over resources also merged with the parallel and closely related debates 
over the desirability of continued economic growth and the impacts of technologically-
induced changes on society. A small number of humanist economists and social critics 
had been questioning whether the social costs of continued economic growth made it 
worth the benefits. This cautious debate, well documented by both Arndt (1978) and 
Hueting (1980), was gradually embraced by the growing debate over environmental 
issues in which the attack on economic growth was more strident. It reached its peak, 
however, with the development of computerised world models by systems engineers. 
In 1970, the Club of Rome, a group of internationally renowned businessmen, 
commissioned a team of scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
[MIT] to prepare a report on humanity's predicament. The first attempt was qualitative 
(Forrester 1971: viii) and suggested that the economy would by necessity stabilize at 
some time in the future. It was subsequently developed in an enumerated version 
(Meadows et al. 1972) using what was claimed to be the first attempt at a perspective 
that extended 'far into the future' (p. 19). Their report, The Limits to Growth, reached 
the bleak conclusion that given the trends in population growth, industrialisation, 
resource depletion and food production, the limits to economic growth would be reached 
within a century. Continued industrial economic growth was predicted to be checked 
first by resource limits, especially energy resources, and any attempt to circumvent 
these checks was automatically doomed as it would exacerbate pollution and therefore 
fail to avoid eventual collapse of the system (p. 133). The most probable result was 
projected to be 'rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and 
industrial capacity' (p. 23). In this view, a steady state economy was no longer merely 
desirable but also necessary. Although the report had little effect on policy, it received 
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immense publicity and had a major effect in strengthening the view of impending 
resource limits. It is now history that in October of the year following the publication 
of Limits to Growth, the price of oil on the world market quadrupled as a result of 
OPEC action. 
The oil price rise greatly exacerbated the 'crisis mentality' in relation to not only oil but 
all energy resources (Paehlke 1989: 53). The immediate impact of the oil price rise on 
countries varied according to their energy situations, with countries totally dependent 
on energy imports such as Japan sent into a state of a 'national nervous breakdown' 
(Dore 1983: 93). Environmentalists have pointed out that the Chinese use a binary 
ideogram, one danger and the other opportunity, to represent the English word crisis 
(Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1974: 1). They have merely articulated what others already knew 
and reaction to the oil crisis became a pell-mell of interest groups and organisations 
who saw an opportunity to peddle their favoured solutions. One of the first to do so 
in the USA was the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC]. The AEC report, released less 
than three months after the hike in oil prices, proposed a five-fold strategy for regaining 
national energy self-sufficiency: increased efficiency of energy use, increased indigenous 
oil production, substitution of coal and natural gas on a 'massive scale', maximum 
feasible exploitation of renewable energy sources, and, most importantly, the 'validation' 
of nuclear energy on a large scale (Ray 1973: 47). Although an accelerated nuclear 
programme had been dismissed as an energy option in France during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s on the basis that fission technology was 'not quite economically or 
technically mature', by 1974 nuclear technology was suddenly assumed to be mature. 
Electricite de France framed a programme for immediate construction of 5400 MW of 
nuclear capacity and for construction of a further 6300 MW to begin in the following 
year (Frost 1991: 250). 
During the ensuing debate over energy resources, most environmental writers based 
their arguments on Hubbert's assessments of non-renewable energy resources (Martinez-
Alier 1987: 144) and interpreted the oil price rise as evidence that: (i) the world was 
entering a period of energy scarcity that promised to be 'very prolonged' (Abrahamson 
1973: 186); (ii) that 'Malthus was right in his basic analysis' (Foley 1976: 51); and (iii) 
that the world was facing an 'unfolding crisis of vast proportions' (Brown 1978: 98). 
The world's two most pressing problems came to be seen as a rapidly increasing world 
population and increasing per capita energy use (Robinson 1976). The exhaustion of 
cheap, low entropy energy was seen to place the industrialised economic system at risk 
of collapse (Brown 1978: 107). Environmentalists argued that lower-energy society 
would therefore arrive 'whether people wish it or not' and that the only real question 
was whether the transition to this low energy 'utopia' would be planned and orderly, or 
forced and chaotic (Foley 1976: 303). 
68 
Australia, being approximately two-thirds self-sufficient in oil and able to regulate the 
price of domestic oil prices, was sheltered from the rise of oil prices on the world 
market. Environmentalists nonetheless feared that declining national self-sufficiency in 
oil, coupled with depleting world oil reserves and increasing concentration of remaining 
reserves in the hands of an OPEC cartel, contained the seeds for economic chaos (Mula 
et a/. 1977, White et a/. 1978). Moreover, natural gas reserves were considered by these 
environmentalists to also be on the verge of exhaustion while the costs of coal were 
regarded to be simultaneously set to escalate abruptly as the richest and most accessible 
reserves were mined out (White etal. 1978: 11). To these writers, resorting to technological 
solutions that involved increasing the efficiency of energy use amounted to 'meddling' 
and a form of business-as-usual as it was based on continued production of energy-using 
products (p. 29). The only real solution, they insisted, was to change the way we live 
and this demanded radical urban redesign. 
The oil price shock had a major impact on policy and energy-using behaviour. Driven 
by the increase in price and fears of further increases, the shift away from oil and the 
increase in the efficiency of energy use were accelerated. Governments quickly put in 
place a battery of energy policy initiatives aimed at reducing dependence on imported 
oil, including increased domestic oil and gas exploration, accelerated development of 
alternative energy supply technologies such as nuclear power, and increased exports of 
other energy resources such as coal and gas to offset the anticipated increases in the 
costs of imported oil. Environmentalists saw all of these as 'non-solutions', arguing 
that the oil crisis was symptomatic of a much deeper crisis and that the obvious and 
only viable long-term solution was to 'turn off the energy to dull labour saving devices' 
(Brower 1975: xiv). Government's also responded by establishing a number of energy 
conservation programmes aimed primarily at reducing oil consumption in transport use 
but also more broadly at reducing energy use in all sectors, and in particular in the 
household sector. At the individual level, however, much energy conservation effort 
was driven by the inability to meet the increasing costs of energy and consisted of 
demand reduction measures, particularly amongst lower income earners. 
The second rise in world oil prices in 1979 and early 1980s briefly flamed these energy 
resource depletion concerns but generally 'failed to ignite public interest' in the USA 
(Switzer 1994: 125). The cause of the oil price rises have generally been attributed to 
action on the part of OPEC and that this tactic backfired as the increased oil prices 
contained the 'seeds of its own destruction' by accelerating fuel switching away from 
oil, the shift to greater reliance on non-OPEC oil producers, economic restructuring 
toward less energy-intensive industries, and the take-up of energy conservation (Grubb 
et al. 1992: 15). So great was this economic restructuring and energy conservation 
effort that by the early 1980s a small number of industrialised economies had increased 
their economic output while decreasing energy use (Smil 1987: 65). The result was a 
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glut of oil on the world market, a slide in the price of oil and its eventual collapse in 
1986 before stabilising around US$15 to $25 per barrel, only marginally above the real 
pre-1973 price. Further discoveries in the Middle East increased the reserves of oil, the 
production to reserve ratio increasing from 30 years in 1970 to 44 years in 1990 (Grubb 
et al. 1992: 15). It has been persuasively argued, however that the increased oil prices 
had little to do with OPEC which actually increased output to compensate for the 
reduced oil output of Iran and Iraq. The crisis, it has been suggested, was caused 
rather by the actions of oil refiners and distributors which increased their inventories of 
oil and in doing so created a false shortage and a price shock (Bohi & Toman 1992: 5). 
The crash in oil prices in 1986, moreover, was caused when OPEC members decided to 
abandon regulated oil pricing and allow the price of oil be determined instead by the 
market, while simultaneously using a new pricing structure based on the delivered costs 
of oil to the consumer (Bohi & Toman 1992: 7). 
Although energy conservation continues to be advanced as a means of extending the 
availability of depletable energy resources and maximising the long-term security of 
supply and well-being (IEA 1987: 7), in terms of an environmental imperative, the 
outlook on non-renewable energy resources, and especially oil, is now more mixed. A 
number of environmental writers continued to see depletion of oil as 'disturbing' (Geyer 
1987) and the depletion of fossil fuels in general as an acute problem (Tapp & Watkins 
1990: 26, Jacobs 1991: 55), a cause for concern (Dovers 1994b: 4) and a problem closer 
then generally acknowledged by policy makers (Gilchrist 1994: 12-4). 
More optimistic environmental writers have abandoned resource depletion as an argument 
for energy conservation. They argue that with technological and scientific advancement 
we may never run out of these fossil fuels or run out at an extremely slow rate 
(Anderson 1993: 18) and see the current levels of oil production continuing for at least 
another century (Smil 1987: 57-8, Switzer 1994: 128). The consensus of most oil 
analysts, however, is that world production of petroleum will peak around 2020 and 
eventually become almost totally reliant on five Middle Eastern countries (Woodward 
1993: 17-20). These analysts dismiss the notion that oil depletion will result in an 
energy supply crisis as a battery of alternatives to oil exist (Odell 1992, Woodward 
1993). Proven reserves of gas have almost doubled over the past decade and the 
current production-to-reserve ratio for gas now stands at about 60 years with a total 
energy content approaching that of oil reserves (Grubb et al. 1992: 16). Furthermore, 
there are known to exist vast quantities of coal, heavy oils, methane clathrates and 
renewable energy sources (Rogner 1989, Odell 1992: 294, Woodward 1993: 23). 
Further ahead, technological optimists point to the potential for deuterium-tritium 
fusion reactors. The amount of energy available from deuterium in the sea has been 
estimated to be of the order of one million times greater than that stored in the world's 
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coal, oil and gas resources before the industrial revolution (Tapp & Watkins 1990: 14) 
and proponents of this option express cautious optimism about the prospects of 
commercialisation by the time the exhaustion forces reliance on fossil fuels to be wound 
down (Furth 1995). Doubts about the likelihood of commercialisation of deuterium-
tritium technology in the face of the apparently intractable nature of the engineering 
problems associated with it, however, are now common (Holdren 1992b: 45, Hawley 
1995: 105). One formidable engineering problem associated with fusion technology is 
the neutron bombardment which renders the walls of the reactor and containment 
building brittle and radioactive (Atkinson 1989). A second problem stems from the 
very high heat fluxes. Superconducting magnets are used to create magnetic fields to 
hold the high temperature plasma in which the fusion reaction takes place. When these 
magnets are overheated, the fusion reaction is brought to an end. One rather ambitious 
solution to this problem has been to replace tritium with helium-3, as this fusion 
reaction produces protons rather than neutrons and significantly reduces both the 
irradiation and heat. The problem with the proposal, however, is that helium-3 does 
not occur naturally on earth and the small amounts produced as a by-product of 
nuclear weapons programmes would be sufficient to fuel only one full-scale deutrium-
helium-3 reactor. The technological optimists who advance this option have therefore 
suggested quarrying helium-3 from the moon where it is naturally very abundant (Mullins 
1995: 35). 
Whether or not reductions in energy use are seen as necessary due to a shortage of 
energy resources is largely determined, therefore, by one's views as to the time frame 
that is appropriate for policy, the feasibility of various energy options available once 
the oil wells run dry, and how problematical these energy options are. While there 
exist real limits to resources on a finite planet, on the available evidence, those limits 
are currently regarded by many analysts as so remote to be of no sensible policy 
concern (Brenton 1994: 240). 
Depletion of fossil fuels as an argument for reducing energy use is frequently countered 
by a pervasive technological optimism about the capacity to increase the reserves of 
fossil fuels through technological development. The dynamic nature of reserves, commonly 
demonstrated by the use of the McKelvey Box, and their uncertain ultimate size, 
creates a dilemma for policy. A policy of conserving non-renewable resources could 
prove to be unwarranted if those resources turn out to be replaceable after all. Ignoring 
the depletionist argument for aggressive energy conservation, on the other hand, amounts 
to a gamble that new technology will be developed to facilitate the discovery and 
extraction of these energy resources. An exponentially increasing scale of resource use 
is therefore based on a parallel acceleration of technological progress. To the extent 
that there is no guarantee that it will do so, the stakes of the gamble become higher and 
the global economic position more precarious (Tisdell 1990: 69). 
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The 'oil shock' of 1973, and its echo in 1979, that lent so much credence to the idea that 
humanity was reaching biophysical growth limits, has since been dismissed as events 
that were predictable, avoidable and unrelated to resource depletion (Arndt 1978: 143, 
Odell 1992: 284). Many writers concede that these shortages were not the result of the 
finitudes of natural resources but by 'a jumble of political blunders, negligence, and 
timidity' (Tapp & Watkins 1990: 58-9). There is also a tendency for contemporary 
environmentalists to argue that the limits to growth thesis erred in placing too much 
emphasis on physical resource limits, although environmentalism has not abandoned 
the depletion argument altogether and it is still common to find resource depletion 
short-listed as one of the major problems that make up the environmental crisis (Bell, 
in press: 1). The exhaustion of low entropy resources is said to continue to lurk behind 
all environmental concerns (Dryzek 1987: 29), fossil fuel depletion continues to be 
regarded as an acute concern (Jacobs 1991: 51), and energy conservation continues to 
be advanced as a means of reducing resource shortages (Grubb et al. 1992: xviii). These 
concerns have increasingly been overshadowed, however, by a growing concern over the 
possible consequences of using these energy resources. Nor are the two problems 
entirely separate. Regional scarcity of energy resources has compelled countries such 
as Armenia to rely on unsafe nuclear reactors and many Eastern European and developing 
countries to rely on polluting coal-fired power stations using low grade coal and 
minimal emission control technology. The greatest concern, however, is that as non-
renewable resources are depleted, humanity will need to rely more and more on renewable 
resources to meet its needs. As pollution has the capacity to reduce the stock of these 
renewable resources (Tisdell 1990: 69-70), it is regarded as the more serious long-term 
energy problem. 
3.4.2. Global Pollution 
Concern over global pollution was a phenomenon associated with the rise of modern 
environmentalism in the 1950s and 1960s. There has been much debate over what led 
to the movement's fundamentally global perspective. One thesis holds that the increase 
in public awareness of pollution issues led to a generalised concern over pollution 
(Brenton 1994: 23). Others have suggested that it arose from increased recognition of 
pollution problems that were truly global in scope, the first of such issues being radioactive 
fallout from nuclear tests. This view regards physicists such as Robert Oppenheimer to 
be the true founders of modern environmentalism at the end of the second world war, 
with their perception that for the first time humanity had developed the technical 
capacity to destroy itself (Maddox 1972: 12). The international campaign to ban 
nuclear testing was the first major environmental issue and according to this thesis, 
gave modern environmentalism its global view from its very inception. To this was 
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added the recognition that many pollution problems were transboundary in nature and 
that many synthetic chemicals such as DDT were very widely dispersed. Thalidomide, 
furthermore, provided the evidence to many that such synthetic chemicals could have 
unforeseen but disastrous consequences on human health (Schumacher 1973: 130). 
A third thesis used to explain the global view of environmentalism was the sudden 
appreciation of the finiteness of the Earth. This conceptual adjustment, referred to as 
the 'shrinking Earth syndrome', has been attributed to a series of events beginning with 
second world war which made distant lands not so distant (Knapp 1950: 68), increased 
globalisation of trade during the 1950s (Arndt 1978: 126) and manned space flight 
which led to popularisation of Adlai Stephenson's term, 'spaceship Earth (Roland et 
al. 1965: 210, Caldwell 1990: 35). The release of coloured photographs of the Earth 
taken during the first manned space flights around the moon, beginning with Apollo 8 
in 1968, have also been seen as particularly instrumental in raising concern over 'the 
Planet' in the late 1960s (Hoyle 1971: 97, Berry 1976: 28). 
A fourth and potent explanation, however, was that this global perspective stemmed 
directly from the pivotal role of ecologists in environmental debate (Paehlke 1989: 21). 
In the aftermath of the war, it has been argued, many scientists, and especially those 
trained in the biological sciences, were seeking a more humane and socially relevant 
application of their discipline to public affairs (Brenton 1994; 24). Ecologists saw 
pollution as the critical problem and called for a new social movement similar to the 
Progressive Conservation movement of the late 19th century, but which focused on 
outputs rather than inputs of the economic system (Commoner 1963: 125). It has since 
become commonplace to cite the publication of Rachel Carson's (1962) Silent Spring as 
the , landmark event that gave rise to the ecologically informed, modern environmental 
movement (Marcus 1986: 51). 
Ecologists brought to the environmental debate two important ideas. One was that the 
biosphere was a single, large and fragile system, delicately balanced and jeopardised 
by pollution (Commoner 1963: 118). The second was that pollution resulted in only 
'local irritations' up to a threshold level, but that once that critical point was surpassed 
the damage caused by each unit increase in pollution escalated disproportionately 
(Commoner 1971: 141). The establishment of the 'International Biological Programme' 
[IBM in 1964 and the 'Man and the Biosphere Programme' launched by the International 
Union of Concerned Scientists RUCN1 in 1968 both added to the global perspective, 
the aim of the latter programme being to initiate research to deal with the global 
environmental problems (Adams 1990: 33). Such was the strength of this view that the 
Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, was prompted in 1969 to warn that 
the world had a decade in which to find cooperative solutions to its three most serious 
problems: population, pollution and the threat of nuclear war (Adler 1973: 265). 
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The most basic of these global pollution issues was that of thermal pollution which 
arose from consideration of the second law of thermodynamics. Since all energy is 
ultimately converted to heat, the ultimate constraint to economic growth was considered 
to be the ability of the biosphere to absorb this waste heat from energy use (Caldwell 
1972: 100). Another major global pollution problem was considered to be the release 
of carbon dioxide from the combustion of fossil fuels that could lead to an enhanced 
greenhouse effect and global warming. Those observing long-term trends in global 
weather patterns, however, were more concerned by the prospect of a natural cooling 
of the earth's atmosphere that could see the return of ice age conditions (Ponte 1976). 
The most critical of these global environmental pollution problems were identified by 
the Study of Critical Environmental Problems (SCEP 1970) sponsored by the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Although the authors of the study made no 
attempt to rank these problems in order of their seriousness, Smil (1987: 208) has 
suggested that the order in which they were presented in the summary chapter can be 
taken as an indication of perceived seriousness. They were, in order, carbon dioxide 
from the combustion of fossil fuels, particulate matter in the atmosphere, cirrus cloud 
from jet aircraft, supersonic aircraft in the stratosphere, thermal pollution, DDT and 
related persistent pesticides, mercury and other toxic heavy metals, oil on the ocean, 
and excess nutrients in coastal waters. 
By 1972 the first wave of modern environmentalism in the USA was at its peak, over 
300 hundred books on environmental issues being published in the USA in that year 
(Nelkin 1977: 408). Some of these became definitive environmental texts. Small is 
Beautiful by Schumacher (1973) brought together three separate streams of thought: the 
critiques of economic growth by Knapp (1950, 1963), Galbraith (1958a, 1958b) and 
Mishan (1969, 1970); the critiques of the social impacts of technology by Mumford 
(1934), Ellul (1964), and Roszak (1969); and the concept of 'intermediate' or 'appropriate 
technology' which had been increasingly advocated and applied during the 1950s and 
1960s as a strategy for Third World development. Political theorists warned that 
resource scarcity had been omitted from the environmental debate over humanity's 
future (Falk 1971), renewable energy advocates called for an urgent transition to solar 
energy (Halacy 1973: 91), thermodynamicist economists re-emerged to advance critiques 
of the economic system based on the run down of low entropy non-renewable resources 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1971), while New-Left philosophers reworked their radical critiques 
of capitalist economic growth (Marcuse 1972). 
This rising concern over the environment culminated in two landmark events. The first 
was the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 
1972. The Conference, although focused primarily on the environmental problems of 
the industrial world, maintained a 'resolutely global' focus (Adams 1990: 36).. The 
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second was the publication of The Limits to Growth by a group of systems engineers, an 
attempt to model the prospects for future global economic growth. Although other 
writers such as Fremlin (1972) advanced global projections that lay somewhere between 
the optimism of Kahn & Weiner's (1967) and the alarmism of Meadows et al. (1972), 
these received little attention. It was the neoMalthusian qualitative global projections 
of Ehrlich & Ehrlich (1970) and the attempts at quantitative global modelling by 
Meadows et al. (1972) which galvanised popular attention and dominated the debate. 
The qualitative global models were resoundingly attacked by Enzensberger (1974). 
Writing from a neoMarxist perspective, and without denying that some environmental 
problems were perilously serious and that ocean and atmospheric pollution were by 
their very nature global in scope, Enzensberger first attacked the idea that uncontrolled 
population growth in the Third World represented a global crisis. The attempt to 
portray it as one, he insisted, served the ideological function of displacing the problems. 
of the wealthy in industrial countries onto the rest of the world by pretending that we 
are all in one boat. The real problem, he maintained, was not population but inequitable 
resource use. To avoid confronting this reality, he charged, ecologists retreated to 
'factual problems' such as ocean pollution, radioactive pollution, and climate change 
which were actually, rather than ideologically global in nature. The fact that these were 
global in nature, however, did not help as ecologists, according to Enzensberger, as 
their 'hasty global projections' amounted to surrender in the face and size and complexity 
of the problems which ecology had thrown up (p. 17). Not only were they constructed 
on the incorrect assumption that the earth was a closed global ecosystem (p. 15), but 
they were used as a means out of the dilemma ecologists faced when they left biology 
and attempted to apply their ecological ideas to the social domain despite their 'boundless 
ignorance of social matters' and ecology's inability to theorize sensibly about society (p. 
30). The result, he argued, was not holism but methodological confusion (p. 4). The 
contrast between ecologists bleak and dire conclusions and their mild admonitions and 
appeals to the rationality of their readers was so great, he contended, that one or the 
other had to be dismissed as implausible. The consequence was that their 'verbal 
excesses' were 'about as effective as a Sunday sermon' (p. 23) and concluded by 
pointing out that even the ecologists who warned of eco-catastrophe conceded that 
many of their own suggestions were 'unrealistic' (Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1970: 322). 
The quantitative efforts at global modelling by Meadows et al. (1972) were similarly 
attacked on the grounds that the assumptions upon which this was based were overly 
simplistic (Cole et al. 1975, Passell & Ross 1974). The report's most ardent critics, 
however, were neoconservative economists who rallied to the defence of continued 
economic growth (Maddox 1975, Beckerman 1975, Kahn et al. 1976, Kahn 1979, Walter 
1981). On the question of pollution these economists argued that pollution had nothing 
to do with economic growth but was a product of the misallocation of resources 
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(Beckerman 1975: 104). It was on the issue of depletion, however, that economic 
theory most vigorously differed with the 'limits to growth' thesis. The economic view 
was that science and technology had the demonstrated capacity to increase the known 
economic reserves of non-renewable energy inputs and while some resources, especially 
hydrocarbon non-renewable fuels, were scarcer than others it was always possible to 
substitute less scarce for more scare resources. As a resource became scarcer, the 
market and socio-political action provided feedback mechanisms to stabilise the system 
before a crisis was reached and so ensured that depletion was a smooth process rather 
than an abrupt and catastrophic event. 
The debate was kept alive by the publication of several other attempts at global 
modelling, the most comprehensive and interdisciplinary of which was the Global 2000 
Report (Barney 1980) produced by several US federal bureaucracies for the President 
of the USA, Jimmy Carter. The report painted a gloomy picture of the world in the 
year 2000: more crowded, more polluted and more ecologically precarious. By the year 
2000, the report predicted, the world would have suffered massive losses of agricultural 
soils, forests and species. The report re-ignited the catastrophist versus cornucopian 
debate and led to the publication of a number of pro-growth responses (Simon 1981, 
Maurice & Smithson 1984, Repetto 1986). Displaying boundless faith in markets and 
human ingenuity to overcome problems, economists refuted the Global 2000 Report, 
describing its projections as dead wrong. Generalising from a small number of trends 
in the USA they offered a highly optimistic, but equally unrealistic, global projection 
for the year 2000 in which the world would be less crowded and the quality of life 
higher (Simon & Kahn 1984). 
The primary intention of Limits to Growth, according to one member of the Club of 
Rome, was to stick pins into governments in order to prod them into action (King 1990: 
41). The extent to which it succeeded in doing so is not clear. By the time the report 
had been published, major changes in policy were already in place or in train in many 
countries. Environmental departments had been established and numerous pieces of 
environmental legislation had already been enacted. The impact of Limits to Growth on 
the public sphere, however, is indisputable. It received 'immense publicity' and many 
individuals are said to have initially taken it as prophecy (Maddox 1972: 287). Even 
this impact was attenuated by the dramatic rise in oil prices in the following year as 
environmental debate was quelled and its primary focus was shifted from pollution to 
energy issues. The increase in price of energy led to reductions in energy use or 
reductions in growth in energy demand due to stagflation and reduced economic output 
at the macrolevel, and energy conservation, often involving reductions in energy services, 
at the individual level. This inflationary period of the post-1973 oil crisis led to both 
high unemployment and a swift end to a period of unparalleled economic expansion. 
OPEC had invested its massive profits in Eurodollars, further weakening the US dollar 
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and the world's largest economy (Hallsworth 1992: 65). As someone once put it, when 
the USA catches a cold, the rest of the world gets pneumonia. With the ensuing 
stagnation, bankruptcy and unemployment, debate over the desirability of continued 
economic growth was quelled. The problem for environmentalism was that it had 
called for zero economic growth in the early 1970s and when the recession gave it to 
them, most members of society were displeased (Paehlke 1985: 31). This interpretation 
may be misleading as many economists are sceptical about the extent to which inflation 
and recession were caused by the increase in oil prices. While increased oil prices may 
have contributed to inflation, these writers maintain that energy prices actually had 
little to do with the macroeconomic problems of the 1970s and that monetary authorities 
rather than OPEC were the cause of the recession (Bohi & Toman 1992: 31). 
Many commentators state that public interest in environmental issues declined as a 
consequence of the rise in oil prices almost as fast as it had risen as pollution was 
eclipsed by the problems of recession, inflation and unemployment (Cairncross 1993: 
34, Brenton 1994: 25). However, this appears to represent an account of environmentalism 
peculiar to the USA where it was noted to have taken on a particularly virulent and 
crusading form (Sinclair 1974: 180). Even in the United States it has been suggested 
that environmental issues continued to 'run strongly', although overshadowed by energy 
affairs (Smil 1987: 216). In many other places, the decline in public interest in 
environmental issues was less marked. The antipodean environmental movement, for 
example, did not emerge as a national phenomenon until 1972 and consolidated 
throughout the 1970s. In all situations support for environmental issues remained 
higher than it had been before the 1970s. A 'strong undercurrent of public opinion' 
giving 'highest priority to environmental protection, energy conservation and restraint in 
material production and consumption' outlived any issue-attention cycle although failed 
to translate into the adoption of aggressive energy conservation or a dramatic shift to 
reliance on renewable energy systems (Striimpel 1983: 193). 
This failure to attract greater support was attributed to the non-acceptance by the 
majority that high levels of employment were possible without economic growth (Paehlke 
1985: 31). This realisation, according to Paehlke (1989: 51), saw environmentalist 
opposition to economic growth peter out in the early 1980s (Paehlke 1990: 51). It 
simultaneously moved away from 'scientific doomsdayism', re-embracing social issues 
and problems (Hay 1988: 22). By the early 1980s, many amongst the litany of problems 
that made up 'the ecological crisis' such as ozone depletion from supersonic jets and 
the effects of jet condensation trails, had been re-appraised and downgraded from 
critical global problems to difficult but manageable local or regional degradations, 
ordinary problems or non-problems (Smil 1987: 217). Smil points out that only one of 
the critical global problems cited by the SCEP in 1970, carbon dioxide build up in the 
atmosphere, remained on the list of critical environmental problems as made up by the 
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Reykjavik Conference, an international environmental meeting held in 1982. The 
environment versus development debate was described by some commentators as 
'largely dead' (Clarke & Timberlake 1982: 23) whilst others have suggested that it had 
not died but had led to schizophrenic confusion within the environmental movement 
(O'Riordan 1981). 
One branch of environmentalism took a technological and utilitarian tack that was 
packaged in a manner attractive to materialism (technocentric environmentalism) and 
which had its antecedents in the conservationist (as opposed to environmentalist) 
concept of prudent resource use (Owens 1995: 208). It was this line that was adopted 
by the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN 1980) which maintained that it was not 
development per se that was the root cause of environmental degradation, but the type 
of development. It was a philosophy subsequently adopted by the more influential 
Brundtland Report (WCED 1987) which renewed attempts to reconcile development 
and economic growth. The WCED report played down the prospects of eco-disaster 
and was firmly cornucopian rather than catastrophist in tone, whilst acknowledging 
that many environmental problems were grave. Equally grave, however, was the problem 
of poverty in developing and underdeveloped countries, the only solution to which was 
rapid economic growth. Juggling two apparently contradictory objectives, the WCED 
attempted to resolve the paradox by invoking the concept of sustainable development, a 
slippery concept which entailed placing environmental and economic objectives on an 
equal footing so that development could meet the needs of the present generation 
without compromising the needs of future generations. 
Opposed to this line of argument was a second stream of environmentalism (ecocentric 
environmentalism) which maintained an ecological emphasis, was unconvinced that 
economic growth and development were sustainable, and relied heavily on moral 
arguments as the basis for environmental reform. With renewed warnings of ecological 
catastrophe, this ecocentric view regained support and the split in the environmental 
movement widened. Pollution abatement and recycling were dismissed as non-solutions 
to the environmental crisis as both failed to check growth (Porritt 1984: 37, Irvine & 
Ponton 1988: 17). The two dominant environmental problems of depletion of 
stratospheric ozone and tropospheric carbon dioxide transformed the notion of the 
environmental crisis' from an ecological concept to a palpable phenomenon. As the 
debate increased, the events began to parallel those of the first wave of environmentalism 
two decades earlier. 
The year 1992 became a re-run of 1972. Scientists from two august scientific bodies, 
including 104 Nobel Laureates, issued statements to the effect that the environmental 
changes occurring were probably irreversible and could jeopardise the future of the 
ecosystem. The world was given at most a few decades in which to avert this irreversible 
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and potentially disastrous ecological catastrophe (Meyers 1994). These statements 
were followed in June of that year by the United Nations Summit on the Environment 
in Rio de Janeiro and by the revamping of the limits to growth thesis (Meadows et al. 
1992). In this reworked version, the critical environmental limit on economic activity 
was not the environment's ability to provide resources but the capacity of the environment 
to absorb the wastes produced by the economic system, a limit which the authors 
contended had already been exceeded. Energy was portrayed in Limits to Growth 
(Meadows et al. 1972) as the critical resource shortage. Two decades on, it was 
portrayed in Beyond the Limits (Meadows et al. 1992) as the critical cause of pollution 
and the new environmental crisis. 
With the re-emergence of the ecocentric stream of environmentalism, the strong anti-growth 
ethic was revived (Lewis 1992: 2). The greenhouse issue led to the calls for a reduction 
in energy use in the industrialised countries of about two thirds (Boyden et al. 1990) to 
nine tenths (Trainer et al. 1991: 20) from current levels. While ecologists saw an end to 
economic growth as an ecological imperative, neoMalthusian resource analysts saw 
continued economic growth as an impossible calculus and look forward to the day 
when it would be finally laid to rest as a policy objective (Tapp & Watkins 1990: 24). 
To some the root cause of environmental degradation was the dysfunctional relationship 
between humanity and nature catalysed by the development of technology and laissez-faire 
capitalism, with the exploitation of fossil fuels representing the principle symbol of this 
malignancy (Clark 1991: 402). Others perceived the problem to be industrial capitalism's 
values of competition and materialism and accordingly prepared industrialism's obituary 
(Kassiola 1990: 29). 
What ever the root cause of the environmental crisis is considered to be, there is a 
dominant view within the environmental literature that policy is failing to respond to 
this ecological crisis. The two common explanations for this are (i) scepticism over the 
existence of an environmental crisis and (ii) the constraints imposed by the imperatives 
of economic growth. These are briefly discussed below. 
(i) Scepticism over the existence of an Environmental Crisis 
While it is commonly suggested that most policy makers at the top end of strategic 
policy making remain unconvinced about the existence of a global environmental crisis 
(Gore 1993: 36, Brenton 1994: 5), many environmentalists maintain that the view that 
humanity is in trouble is broadly accepted and that the existence of the environmental 
crisis is now unequivocal. Kassiola (1990: 2), for example, expressed utter surprise 
when his use of the term 'the ecological crisis' without any attempt at substantiation 
was subsequently challenged. The important point is how two such disparate views 
can coexist? 
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The most straight forward explanation advanced is that this non-belief in the 
environmental crisis is a form of psychological denial. Using Festinger's (1957) concept 
of cognitive dissonance and Hirschman's (1982) notion of disappointment avoidance, 
Kassiola (1990: 23-4) posited that belief in both the feasibility and desirability of 
economic growth and the existence of an environmental crisis caused by industrialism 
would lead to dissonance and therefore the need to reject one or the other idea. But 
because acceptance of the latter would lead to disappointment and would necessitate 
admitting that past decision making and judgement have been seriously flawed, 
disappointment and discomfort are avoided by reconstructing reality and denying the 
latter. 
The most obvious example of a similar phenomenon that has been explained by such 
psychological denial was the response of the Western world to the rise of fascism in 
the 1930s and 1940s (Camus 1947). This has lead contemporary environmental writers 
to suggest that the current signs of ecological collapse can be likened to the krystallnacht, 
the first outbreak of public anti-Semitic violence in pre-war Germany before the holocaust 
(Gore 1993: 271). This denial thesis is supported by well-documented evidence within 
management theory which shows that a frequent reaction to critical situations is a 
refusal to accept the facts. Experienced professionals such as pilots and surgeons 
frequently fail to accept that the situation is real when confronted with a critical 
situation (Carnino et al. 1990: 82-3). 
There are two problems with this thesis, however. The first is that if it is a correct 
interpretation of reality, it does not render the task of convincing sceptics to change 
their beliefs any easier. Hirschman (1982) concluded that denial of reality continues 
until the problems increase beyond a threshold point and become clearly manifest. 
Only then is there a sudden mass conversion to belief in the problem and alarmed 
over-reaction. This leads to the pessimistic conclusion that environmentalists can do 
little but repeat themselves while waiting for the evidence of the crisis to become 
clearer. 
The second problem with the thesis is that it can easily be inverted to suggest that 
belief in an environmental crisis is itself a result of a similar psychological process of 
denial. That is, the desire for radical policy change leads to the belief in the existence 
of an environmental crisis (Wildavsky 1979: 396). To avoid dissonance between the 
belief in such a crisis and the lack of evidence in such a crisis, environmentalists 
selectively accept some pieces of evidence whilst rejecting or ignoring others. 
This introduces a second possible explanation for the refusal of policy makers to 
believe in the existence of a crisis. This is that politicians and policy makers examine 
the evidence and conclude that the existence of a crisis is unproven, or at best inconclusive. 
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At first, this appears absurd. How can environmentalists take the evidence for an 
environmental crisis to be so obvious and well documented that there is no need to go 
over the evidence (Kassiola 1990: 3-4, Dovers 1994a: xi) while others consider it to be 
inconclusive or a fabrication? Dryzek (1987), however, in his case for ecological 
rational decision making, has put forward the argument that this is precisely what 
occurs. He argued that for every indicator which can be used to show that our 
environmental situation is getting worse, there exists another that can be used to show 
that it is getting better. This point was perhaps best made by the oft-cited wager in 
1980 between super-cornucopian economist Julian Simon, and the neoMalthusian 
ecologist Paul Ehrlich, together with two physicists from the University of California. 
The bet was whether the real price of five minerals would increase or decrease over a 
ten year period. We are now often reminded by the modern contrarians that the 
combined real price of the five minerals in question declined in real terms by 50% over 
the decade and Ehrlich and his colleagues lost the bet (Mestel 1995). And so it has 
been with other indicators. Sceptics point to improvements in urban air quality, while 
environmentalists argue that this has been at the expense of pollution further afield; 
sceptics point to increased grain production levels, while environmentalists point out 
that this has been made possible by increased use of fossil fuels, water and fertilizer 
(Paehlke 1990: 37). 
Dryzek's contribution was published in 1987 before the greenhouse issue became a 
major international concern. Since that time, two things have changed. First, as has 
been shown, depletion was no longer advanced as the principle limit on economic 
activity. And secondly, it could be argued that since 1987 the evidence of environmental 
degradation has become even more compelling in the interim. Many environmentalists 
would now posit that the existence of a crisis is no longer contestable. With the 
publication of each new book or article, more bad news on the environmental front is 
revealed: the possible link of the five massive mammal marine die-off events over the 
last decade to a subtle, but lethal, effect of chlorine pollutants (Motluk 1995), the loss 
of 25 billion tonnes of fertile top soil each year (Hawken 1994: 1), a rate of species loss 
unparalleled since the Cretaceous-Devonian boundary 50 million years ago (Meyers 
1994) and the increasing degree to which our species appropriates net global 
photosynthetic product (Vitousek et al. 1986). 
Surely now, it would appear safe to suppose that the evidence of an ecological crisis 
was irrefutable. The fact that the bet between Simon and Ehrlich is being re-proposed, 
although currently stalled by dispute over the selection of appropriate indicators (Mestel 
1995: 5), points to the fact that although the onus of proof appears to be steadily 
shifting to those who would deny the existence of an environmental crisis, there is as 
yet no consensus on this point. 
81 
The net result of this debate, Dryzek argued, is that although it is clear that ecological 
problems do exist, and that some ecosystems have already been 'stressed to the point 
of destruction', at the global level 'it is difficult to gauge how close to the edge we are' 
(Dryzek 1987: 23). Sceptical or contrarian views on the existence of an environmental 
crisis, or the extent of the crisis, continue to be commonplace (Duffy 1994, Easterbrook 
1995, North 1995). Furthermore, leading environmentalists have admitted to occasional 
and deliberate over-dramatisation of seriousness of environmental problems, although 
denying damaging the truth (King 1990: 39, Goldsmith 1995: 43). The sceptics therefore 
realise what psychologists have been telling us for a very long time, that belief is 
seldom determined rationally. But what they overlook, as Bertrand Russell pointed 
out long ago, is that the same is true of disbelief (Russell 1929: 114-5). In their brilliant 
book, Douglas & Wildavsky (1983) extended this argument to show that risk is in fact 
a cultural construct. 
There are two further points which can be made regarding the failure to persuade 
politicians of the existence of an environmental crisis. The first is that there have been 
reverse situations in which policy makers have considered there to be a crisis but have 
found it difficult to persuade the public that such a crisis exists. In the 1950s, 
democratically elected governments and their experts were seen to be cognizant of the 
potential catastrophe while the public were seen to be dangerously conservative and 
strongly resisted the necessary reforms (Lippman 1954: 23). The contemporary 
environmentalist thesis reverses this argument and states that the crisis is now identified 
not by government or its agencies but by independent experts, while Leviathan is 
dangerously conservative, destructively wrong and slow to react. Brenton (1994: 6), 
however, turns the argument around again, and considers that even if there is consensus 
within the scientific community over the seriousness of regional or global environmental 
problems, and there rarely is, multilateral remedial action is slow, not purely because 
governments are unwilling, but because they are constrained by the domestic political 
acceptability of such action. In a vicious cycle, governments are checked by public 
opinion, and public opinion is driven by the economic imperative. Hence we arrive at 
the modern version in which all participants are aware of the crisis but no one is doing 
anything (Beck 1992: 25). 
The second point is that those advancing the argument that a crisis exists often argue 
that there are only two policy options available. The choice before society is portrayed 
as the equivalent of a decisive 'yes or no' decision choice. The traditional metaphor 
used to describe this situation by those advancing the urgent need for reform has been 
that of Robert Frost's traveller who is faced with two diverging roads (Lippman 1954: 
23, Carson 1962: 52, Lovins 1976). This use of the metaphor is interpreted by sceptics, 
however, as an attempt to restrict the policy options to only two, a right and a wrong, 
akin to those relating to the 'either-or' status of constitutional, religious or moral issues. 
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(ii) The constraint imposed by the imperative for economic growth 
The second and related explanation of why policy makers refuse to believe in the 
existence of an environmental crisis is because to do so would require abandoning 
dominant policy objectives of industrial capitalism. Many explanations have been put 
forward to explain policy's stubborn resistance to environmentalist demands to abandon 
economic growth. A common explanation advanced is that growth is one of the triad 
of ideologies, along with progress and development, directing modern society (Tapp & 
Watkins 1990: 24), whilst writers from the Left perceive the paramount function of 
economic growth to be alleviation of the lot of the 'have nots without wealth redistribution. 
Growth-stop would have the undesirable effect of locking in inequitable distribution of 
wealth and, therefore, producing dissent and antagonism between social groups and 
business groups which control economic resources (Siebert 1992: 233). Because of this, 
the argument goes, there is a structural need to maximise economic output which is 
defined as the production of manufactured goods - ahead of all other objectives 
(Tindale 1995: 199). Economic growth has therefore been described as 'the political 
solvent that buys off the discontent of the poor at no cost to the wealthy' (Dryzek 
1987: 72) and the main ideological weapon of industrial elites in their attempt to 
maintain the status quo (Kassiola 1990: 29). 
Describing growth as an ideology, however, is problematical not only because the term 
has come to be overburdened with meanings but because it can be used as convenient 
excuse for avoiding the need to handle more difficult and complex questions. Simeon 
(1976: 555) therefore distinguished between ideologies, paradigms, dominant ideas 
and principles and described economic growth as a 'dominant idea'. This position 
acknowledges that while economic growth is an unchallenged policy objective, this is 
dictated by a number of formidable pressures on policy makers for the retention of 
economic growth as a policy objective, including national security and status (Arndt 
1978: 151). As Hueting (1980: 15) pointed out, moreover, the cry for economic growth 
does not come from only industrialists, economists, governments and the rich but also 
from all those who demand higher incomes and ever increasing values of their investments 
such as housing. 
For these reasons, conservationists concede that economic growth remains a 'political 
imperative' and 'almost the supreme value of western societies' (Jacobs 1991: xiv, Beck 
1992: 45, Self 1993: 206). For the while, and some say for the foreseeable future 
(Brenton 1994: 239), reduced economic growth will simply not be accepted as an item 
on the debate over policy agenda and those environmentalists who persist in demanding 
it, the argument goes, will be doomed to repeating themselves. To Arndt (1978: 153), 
therefore, the debate cannot be over growth or no growth but needs to be over how 
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much growth and the quality of growth. Governments, he argued, do accept some 
reductions in economic growth in order to achieve social and environmental goals. 
One attempt to overcome the impasse in the debate over the ecological risks of pollution 
imposed by economic activity has been that decision making should be based on the 
precautionary or uncertainty principle which calls for prudence when there is a reasonable 
risk that an activity could lead to potentially irreversible damage to the environment. 
It is based on the philosophy that the prophecy of doom is to be given greater heed 
than the prophecy of bliss as progress and perfection need to be secondary to the 
primary goals of preservation and protection (Jonas 1984: 26). The problem with the 
concept is that to advance society will need to take some risks and it leaves unresolved 
the questions of what level of risks are acceptable and how agreement on what the 
risks are can be reached. These uncertainties have meant that the precautionary 
principle has been unable to displace the contemporary principle guiding policy decision 
making which holds that economic activity should not be constrained for ecological 
reasons unless there is incontrovertible scientific evidence that such activity would lead 
to substantial and irreversible damage. The counter-argument is that science is unable 
to accurately predict the impacts of human activities on the ecosystem. The outcome is 
that although the precautionary principle is an eminently sensible and uncontentious 
idea, it is as yet insufficiently well defined and matured as a concept to be of practical 
use to policy making (O'Riordan & Cameron 1994: 292). It remains as yet an embryonic 
concept and few senior policy makers have been convinced of its virtue or capacity to 
serve as the basis of decision making (Haigh 1994: 240-2). It is intimately connected 
with the moral dimension of the debate over energy conservation and it is to this 
dimension that the discussion now turns. 
3.5 Obligatory Arguments for Energy Conservation 
It has been argued that ethical issues render energy policy the most important moral 
question of our time (Daly 1978: 22), that the most important arguments for energy 
conservation are ultimately those relating to equity issues (Anderson 1993: 20), and 
that widespread acceptance of a new environmental ethic based on moral questions 
constitutes humanity's only hope of avoiding catastrophe (Gore 1993: 295). The moral 
dimension to the energy debate therefore contains a contradiction, for while it is held to 
be the most compelling argument for energy conservation, in practice moral arguments 
appear to have the least capacity to influence either individuals or governments. The 
difficulty is, however, that all claims on policy tend to dress themselves up as moral 
issues or as in 'the public interest', even if these arguments are sometimes hypocritical 
(Self 1993: 265), and many are highly sceptical of what they perceive to be 
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environmentalist attempts to convert political issues into a moral crusades (Luke 1993: 
14). This debate is further confounded by the frequent failure to define what is meant 
by 'moral' or 'the public good' and it is useful to begin with brief definitions. 
Goodin (1980) has distinguished between 'prudent morality' or 'enlightened self-interest', 
'internalised norms' and 'seriously held principles'. 'Enlightened self-interest' he defined 
as moral behaviour in anticipation of a pay-off. An appropriate example would be the 
statement made by Australia's Minister for Resources and Energy that Australia had a 
moral obligation to develop its energy resources in order to provide the energy and 
materials for the developing world (Griffiths 1990: iv). 'Internalised norms' Goodin 
(1980) defined as mere calculations and as such another element of a utility function, 
something to be satisfied. Caring for one's children would, in Goodin's schemata, 
constitute an internalised norm. It is possible, according to Dryzek (1987: 153), that 
energy conservation for the common good can become an internalised norm through 
social learning via media publicity or exhortation. Only 'seriously held principles', 
moral beliefs immune to trade-offs and corruption by ordinary self-interested behaviour, 
were considered by Goodin to constitute genuinely moral behaviour or altruism. This 
last type of morality also conforms to Hawken's (1993: 136) idea that 'an ethic is not 
an ethic, and a value is not a value, without some sacrifice for it'. The often used 
example of genuine altruism is that of patriotic duty in war time (Dryzek 1987: 151, 
Gore 1993: 269). 
A further distinction is made between the 'collective good' or 'public interest' and 
'genuinely moral' arguments. The former involve issues which impact on a group of 
which the individual is a member, while the latter ,refer to issues which impact on 
distant others. The most distant others are those in other countries (intragenerational 
issues) and those not yet born (intertemporal issues). Before looking at the degree to 
which policy is persuaded by these genuinely moral arguments, the discussion begins at 
the individual level and the degree to which individuals can be persuaded to alter their 
energy-using behaviour based on moral considerations. 
3.5.1 The Morality of Individual Decision Making 
Moral suasion has often been employed to urge its citizens to act in 'the public good', 
conserving energy being one prominent instance. The degree to which individuals 
respond to such exhortations based on the public interest has been a matter of debate. 
It has been argued on the one hand that individual efforts at conserving energy in the 
1970s were more than a reaction to higher energy prices but were partially driven by 
moral principle (Lindblom & Cohen 1979: 18). This view has been contradicted, 
however, by the many reports which found such attempts at moral suasion to have 
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little impact on behaviour (Peck & Doering 1976, Seligman 1985: 142, Condelli et al. 
1984). In general, it has been noted that policies which rely on moral suasion as a 
means of altering individual decision making have not been encouraging (Dryzek 1987: 
161), President Carter's attempt to use moral suasion to motivate his nation to conserve 
energy in 1977, likening the energy crisis to the moral equivalent of war, now held up as 
notable evidence of the failure of this approach as a means of solving future energy 
problems. It has been argued, moreover, that individuals are even less likely to be 
persuaded to conserve energy on arguments based on 'genuinely moral' concerns as 
distinct from the public interest. There are two rival explanations advanced to explain 
this, one based on beliefs about human nature, the other based on the nature of modern 
society. 
The first explanation is based on the agnostic view that lifestyle choice is a matter of 
personal opinion and the belief that humans are selfish. Economists, for example, have 
argued that the simplest explanation for the failure of individuals to take account of 
future generations is simply that individuals are unconcerned about the welfare of 
those remote in either place or time (Hueting 1980: 187). Eminent behavioural 
psychologist, B.F. Skinner, similarly argued that not even the certainty of a future 
'energy crisis' was likely to be very successful in persuading individuals to take-up 
energy conservation. These problems were not only too remote in time to be of relevance 
to people, according to Skinner, but they impacted on someone else in the next generation 
or the generation after that (Yergin 1979: 139). Most individuals, Skinner implied, are 
selfish, do not base their decisions on moral concerns and subscribe to the philosophy 
of apres moi le deluge. 
Rational theorists have used this argument to explain serious social problems, such as 
the depletion of both resources (renewable and non-renewable), traffic congestion, air 
pollution and crowding in national parks. Their thesis is that individuals confronted 
with a conflict between the short-term costs and benefits to themselves and the longer-term 
costs and benefits to society, tend to base their decisions on the former rather than the 
latter. Since this choice is made collectively, the net result is long-term serious problems. 
One of the best known arguments based on this reasoning is the Tragedy of the Commons 
thesis as advanced by biologist, Garrett Hardin (1968) in which each individual is seen 
to seek to extract more than their share from common property resources to the long-term 
detriment of the group. A similar model was also developed independently from game 
theory by Olson (1965). In explaining the (il)logic of collective action, Olson reasoned 
that the self-interested, rational individual would tend to avoid contributing voluntarily 
toward the collective production of public non-excludable goods, such as clean air or 
national defence, because such goods are not economically or physically divisible and 
individuals cannot, therefore, be excluded from their consumption. Rational and self-
interested individuals, Olson maintained, would instead elect to 'free ride' on the 
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contributions of others. This 'free-rider effect has been frequently advanced as the 
underlying mechanism behind environmental degradation and the cause of the failure 
of moral suasion to induce individuals to conserve energy (Nivola 1986: 6). Platt 
(1973) extended the argument to suggest that many problems were the result of 'social 
traps'. Once a specific social direction is set by a pattern of behaviours, Platt argued, 
there is no easy way of backing out of these situations even if they begin to prove 
unpleasant or risky because each individual 'continues to do something for his advantage 
that is collectively damaging to the group as a whole' (Platt 1973: 641). 
There is no denying that selfishness is a powerful force, that remoteness in time and 
place is likely to impact upon an individual's moral concern, and that peoples' resources 
are limited and they have many immediate demands on their time, energy and money, 
including their children's needs. That selfishness is an incomplete explanation is clearly 
demonstrated, however, by the apparent willingness of large numbers of individuals to 
volunteer substantial amounts of their personal time, money and effort to altruistic 
causes. It is therefore important to look at the alternative explanation for the failure of 
individuals to make choices which are for the collective good. 
This rival explanation focuses on the social and cultural milieu in which individual 
decisions are made and maintains that any realistic view has to recognize that these 
choices are made within a very weighty structure of social influences. The structure of 
cities, the social pressures, the demands of modern lifestyles, and the power of markets 
all effectively dictate what the individual can and cannot do. Many social commentators 
have subscribed to this theory that individual energy-using behaviour is shaped by 
structural and cultural constraints so that the amount of energy an individual uses is 
socially rather than individually determined (Monnier 1983). The outcome is that each 
is responsible and yet no one is responsible for society's energy problems (Comstock 
1974: 359), while the implication is that it is inappropriate to regard energy consumption 
and conservation behaviour as microlevel behavioural phenomena that can be influenced 
by specific behavioural changes directed at individuals and that it can only be changed 
by altering the structure and values of society as a whole (Dholakia et al. 1983: 246). 
The important corollary of this second explanation is that those energy conservation 
strategies which rely solely on altering individual attitudes and values are likely to be 
relatively ineffectual since such policy approaches ignore the root cause of the problem. 
These collectively made 'prior commitments' are so culturally grounded that few recognise 
them as choices at all and they are routinely depicted as needs rather than wants 
(Redclift 1992: 35). As the central feature of capitalism is the simultaneous production 
of commodities and the 'needs' for those commodities, the individual wage-earner is 
unable to differentiate between 'real' and 'artificial' needs so that moral appeals for 
people to reduce their needs within a system that is based on creating needs is, in this 
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view, not only absurd and useless but is also cynical (Enzensberger 1974: 29). In this 
view, even if individuals are morally motivated to reduce energy use, their ability to 
give expression to such concerns is limited. 
A philosophical critique of modern society based on a Weberian analysis, however, 
suggests that individuals are even unlikely to be morally motivated to reduce energy 
use. The argument is not that moral behaviour is limited by human nature, but because 
morality is an impotent construct within modern society. Morality, it is argued, is a 
premodern construct based on proximity and is woefully inadequate for dealing with 
today's issues (Bauman 1995: 217). Modernity's process of rationalisation and its 
encouragement of the idea of the individual as sovereign destroys social relations, 
reduces society to an externality and constructs a reality which excludes the moral 
dimension. Individuals, therefore, have no choice but to be instrumentally rational in a 
morally impotent society (Poole 1991: 143). Morality becomes a question of not 'how 
do I want to live?' but of 'what ought I do?', a restriction on life rather than a guide to it 
(Poole 1991: 141). The only vestiges of a true morality remaining in modern capitalism 
are those attached to the concept of the family and the nation. Individuals will make 
sacrifices as a parents or as Australians that they would not otherwise do as only in 
such situations are certain activities both duties as well as components of the individual's 
well-being (Poole 1991: 135). 
This debate over the degree to which individual action is based on self-interest rather 
than altruism or the public good is taken up again in Chapter 7 where the comparative 
ability of energy conservation information programmes to motivate individual 
householders to save energy on the basis of reducing energy bills and on the call to 
protect the environment are compared. At this point, however, the important point is 
that irrespective of which school of thought one is more closely aligned to, all predict 
that moral arguments will have relatively low power to alter behaviour at the individual 
level. The discussion therefore now turns to the question of the degree to which policy 
makers rather than individuals can be persuaded to act on the basis of such moral 
arguments. 
3.5.2 The Morality of Political Decision Making 
If rational decision making theory is correct in its premise that individuals are selfish 
and will not act for the common good when there is a conflict between their short-term 
individual interests and society's longer-term interests, it suggests that we ought to be 
even more pessimistic about the capacity to persuade policy makers to adopt aggressive 
energy conservation on the basis of moral arguments. The traditional view of politics is 
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a highly pragmatic one in which moral merely means that which is popular (Cicero 45 
BC) and that in politics statesmen cannot afford the luxury of acting by the standards 
of private morality as the stakes are too high (Machiavelli 1640). While such sentiments 
are likely to represent a cynical extreme, the persistent contemporary critique of green 
political theory is that decision-making within existing political structures is overly 
mechanistic and inadequately incorporates moral issues (Martinez-Alier 1991: 126, 
Weale 1992: 27). There is also good reason to believe that as a consequence of the 
globalisation of markets, governments are becoming more, rather than less, pragmatic 
as they are hobbled by the international money market. Bill Hayden, Australia's 
former Governor General, and the one time leader of the political party traditionally 
aligned with the Left, the Australian Labor Party, recently expressed the view that 
with internationalisation of the economy had come the end of ideology in politics. The 
capacity of national governments to fund social programmes, he maintained, were 
severely restricted by the market as the ambitions of liberal idealism were now tempered 
by national economic self-interest (The Australian 5 Sept. 1995: 1, 6). 
From this pessimistic note, the discussion now looks at the degree to which governments 
do in fact act on moral principle in terms of energy issues. Energy can be considered a 
(genuinely) moral issue on three accounts: (i) many energy supply construction projects 
have longer than normal planning horizons due to their long lead times and their greater 
impact on future generations than conventional planning decisions, (ii) the exhaustibility 
of fossil fuels, and (iii) the long-term environmental impacts of energy use. Each of 
these is discussed separately. 
3.5.2.1 Discount Rates and Intergenerational Issues 
The standard economic approach has long held that policy is capable of resolving the 
issue of optimal allocation of resources between generations by employing appropriate 
social discount rates in public project appraisals (Kellow 1982: 7). Because of this, 
some commentators tend to be highly sceptical about environmentalist use of moral 
arguments as the basis for demands for policy reform and alternative policy options. 
Such commentators maintain that many intergenerational issues are resolvable without 
resorting to such moral arguments and dismiss moral arguments based on notions of 
'the Planet' or 'Nature' as not only politically ineffective but as dishonest attempts to 
turn political issues into moral blacks and whites (Kellow & Moon 1993: 241). It needs 
to be remembered, however, that moral arguments are employed by all sides in policy 
debate. Free marketeers, for example, consistently oppose government intervention in 
the market on the grounds that it violates basic individual freedoms. Kellow & Moon's 
argument, however, is that intragenerational issues can be resolved by placing economic 
values on natural assets and by selection of an appropriate social discount rate in 
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cost-benefit analyses. The lower the discount rate employed, the greater weighting 
placed on the future costs and benefits. Low discount rates in the analysis of timber 
operations, for example, favour longer rotation periods between harvesting. The use of 
discount rates, can, however, present environmentalists with a dilemma. The use of 
low discount rates in electricity planning, for example, favours capital intensive energy 
options such as wind farms in which the costs are made during the initial construction 
phase, and mitigates against options with lower upfront cost but a stream of costs 
over time, such as coal-fired power stations. High discount rates are therefore seen by 
energy conservation enthusiasts to be the greatest barrier to renewable energy systems 
(Pears & Versluis 1993: Section C: 5). Low discount rates, however, also favour 
options such as hydro-electric dam construction and nuclear power over coal-fired 
power stations. Low discount rates, furthermore, contain another contradiction for 
environmentalists in that they could increase the overall demand for materials. A 
problem for environmentalists, therefore, is that there is no one discount rate that 
consistently favours their preferred options. 
Debate about the shortcomings of cost benefit analysis, moreover, is considerable. 
Whether monetary values can be placed on intangible factors such as the effects of oil 
spills on marine life or the effects of radiation on public health is contestable and 
critics of cost benefit analysis maintain that such attempts are based on arbitrary 
values and guesses as valuations placed on many costs can only be subjective or no 
more than rule of thumb guesstimates (Davis et al. 1988: 111). Placing monetary values 
on such costs therefore gives these analyses the appearance but not the substance of 
rationality. Economic analysts parry with the argument that whilst imperfect, there is 
no viable alternative to cost benefit analyses (Ableson 1979: 57) and that their use is 
likely to improve decision-making as the benefits of preservation are unlikely to be so 
high as to be above valuation (Harris 1982: 63). Whilst the attempt to place a value on 
natural assets and the use of social discount rating continues to be defended as 
capable of dealing with moral issues, there has been a growing critique of the capacity 
of standard economics to do so (Martinez-Alier 1987, Costanza 1992, Hodgson 1993). 
Traditionally conservative economists, moreover, have conceded that the view from 
within the economics profession is that there is a need for a new economics' which will 
take greater account of human values and the needs of future generations (Felmingham 
1995). The debate is ongoing but from the above it can be seen that there is a dominant 
view within policy making circles that the moral issues of equitable resource allocation 
between generations involved in energy project appraisal can be adequately resolved 
by selection of an appropriate discount rate. To this way of thinking, once the appropriate 
discount rate is used in energy project appraisal, determination of the appropriate 
level of energy conservation can be rationally determined without the need to consider 
moral issues. 
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3.5.2.2 The Exhaustibility of Non-Renewable Energy Sources 
The moral implications of the inherent exhaustibility of fossil fuels are twofold. The 
first involves the question of how such depletable resources should be shared between 
members of the current generation, while the second involves the issue of how these 
resources should be shared between current and future generations. Taking the first 
question, the gap between per capita resource use in rich and poor countries is so 
blatantly large that the moral case for a more a more equitable distribution of resources 
between countries is incontrovertible. A persistent environmentalist demand has been 
a drastic reduction in the use of energy and other resources in developed countries in 
order to make room for those in developing countries to increase theirs (Glasser 1977: 
19, Tapp & Watkins 1990: 27, Anderson 1993: 23, Goodland 1992: 3, Dovers 1994c: 
42). Such a demand strikes a resonant chord not only with environmentalists but 
everyone, for as Enzensberger (1974: 15) tersely put it, 'who wouldn't be taken in by 
such global brotherliness'. 
The environmentalist demand is based largely on the argument that if the ultimate 
objective is more or less equal per capita levels of resource use, the physical limit to the 
amount of energy available dictates that the developed world will have to reduce its 
levels of per capita energy use since if all individuals in the world used energy at a rate 
of those in the USA today, world energy use would treble. If the increased populations 
are factored in, furthermore, total world energy use would be seven times higher in 
2050 than today's levels. This impossible calculus means that without reducing per 
capita energy use in industrialised countries there is no feasible way of achieving 
equality in levels of energy use (Tapp & Watkins 1990: 23, Dovers 1994c: 42). 
In the face of this inequality, waste of energy is broadly perceived to be immoral (Ester 
1985: 5). The Australian engineering fraternity (Institute of Engineers 1977: 187), for 
example, described the inefficient use of energy in industrialised countries in the face of 
the glaring disparity in per capita energy use between rich and poor countries as 
irresponsible and gross indulgence. The problem is, however, that increasing the efficiency 
of energy use in energy-intensive countries on its own does nothing to materially assist 
those in poor countries. Radical environmental demand for reducing energy use in 
industrialised countries as a means of achieving a more equitable sharing of energy 
resources between industrialised and developing countries, furthermore, runs up against 
the disturbing reality that whilst the inequitable use of energy is indisputably a serious 
issue, energy use is not the only resource characterised by such gross disparities. 
Deficiencies of the most basic resource, food, has proved a tragic and largely unresolved 
problem. Currently, about 1 billion people in the world are starving, between 50 to 60 
million die from malnutrition each year, and five billion live below the poverty line 
(Smith 1994: 70). In the face of this inequity, those in wealthy countries are rarely 
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willing to commit more than 1% of GNP on development aid and regard themselves as 
entitled to sell commodities at the highest possible prices or keep scarce minerals in the 
ground although these are needed by less developed countries. The reality appears to 
be that international obligations usually correlate with rights rather than welfare (Miller 
1989: 723). Nor can the cause of this predicament be loaded onto governments alone, 
as their constituencies are equally unwilling to allow their governments to devote more 
than these relatively small amounts on aid and governments find it hard to attract 
majorities for self-sacrificing policies (Stretton 1976: 286). 
While intragenerational issues are real and serious, and as an argument for energy 
conservation are entirely legitimate, they are therefore problematical. Concern over 
inequitable resource use between rich and poor countries is likely to be motivated not 
purely by moral concerns but, at least in part, by concern over the international tensions 
created by these disparities. The international means of putting into effect proposals 
for more equitable sharing of resources via economic cooperation based on enlightened 
self-interest (Independent Commission on International Development Issues 1980), 
however, have been elusive due to the lack of the necessary political and economic 
structures in place (Corbridge 1986: 122). It is for this reason that the Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs) as a group have turned to other means. The 'Group of 77', a bloc of 
non-aligned LDCs, have made their willingness to cooperate with the industrialised 
world's environmental and other concerns contingent upon the commitment of the 
industrialised nations to assist them in their development objectives. Rather than being 
driven by a moral sense, industrialised countries may, therefore, be forced to act to 
reduce regional and global pollution and put into effect greater equity in resource use as 
part of a planetary bargain (Dahlberg et al. 1985: 135). The Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992 failed to extract any transfer of capital or technology to the poorer 
countries as a means of improving the lot of the poor in those countries or reducing the 
environmental impacts of their development programmes. The Malaysian Minister for 
Primary Industry was therefore provoked to declare that his country was poor and 
needed to rely on production of timber from native forests to better the lot of the 
Malaysian people. If the developed world wanted to protect those forests, he declared, 
then they would have to pay for them (North 1995: 296). Although many 
environmentalists demand that the industrialised world reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions for moral reasons, such reductions may well be driven ultimately by enlightened 
self-interest rather than genuinely moral concerns. In terms of the capacity of the moral 
arguments over the equitable distribution of resources between developed and developing 
countries, therefore, it appears that while it is a legitimate demand, it is unlikely on its 
own to be successful in altering policy. There appears, as yet, to be no evidence that 
policy makers accept that the goal of equal levels of per capita energy use at a global 
level constitutes the basis of decision making at the local level. 
92 
The second argument for energy conservation based on the exhaustibility of fossil fuels 
is that of intertemporal equity of resource use. Contemporary advocates of aggressive 
energy conservation continue to define conservation in the tradition of the resource 
conservation movement as 'essentially an ethic involving the long-term management of 
resources for the benefit of mankind' (Tapp & Watkins 1990: 74). During the 1970s, 
environmentalist argued that scarce energy resources, and particularly oil, should be 
left in the ground for future generations. It was quickly noted, however, that sharing 
resources with future generations bumped into the problem of how many generations 
the resource was to be shared with. To divide a resource equally between all future 
generations reduces each generation's share to virtually zero, and although this was 
said to be no more absurd an idea than that one or two generations have a right to 
deplete an entire resource (Daly 1978: 22), it left an awkward question unanswered. It 
was argued, furthermore, that the hard political reality was that governments were 
unlikely to elect to leave scarce resources such as oil in the ground for future generations 
when it was a cheaper source of energy than alternatives and that any policy designed 
to do so would be highly unpopular (Stretton 1976: 286). Many economists argued, 
furthermore, that it is by no means certain that such sacrifices made by the members of 
the current generation in the interests of their descendants would be appreciated by the 
intended beneficiaries since technological advancement could render the conserved 
fuels plentiful relative to demand and, therefore, relatively lowly valued (Edwards & 
Thorpe 1978: 34). 
Basing the case for energy conservation on the moral need to share resources between 
generations strikes yet another awkward question. Georgescu-Roegen (1976: xviii) 
stated quite emphatically that a steady state economy at even present levels would be 
unsustainable and insisted that world population levels would have to be reduced to 
levels that could be sustained on organic agricultural practices. But as Tisdell (1990: 
61-2) points out, this raises a major philosophical issue as it leaves humanity with a 
choice of three general paths of development: (i) exponential growth, collapse and 
possible extinction, (ii) a steady state at existing population levels which puts off 
eventual collapse and may not avoid eventual resource exhaustion, or (iii) a steady 
reduction of population levels and economic activity so as to tremendously extend the 
survival period of the human race. The argument about sustainable resource use 
therefore effectively comes down to a debate involving the distribution of human 
population over time. 
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3.5.2.3 Long-term Environmental Impacts of Energy Use 
There is a commonplace view that environmental concern is primarily a concern about 
the consequences of present actions on future generations and that in the absence of 
concern for future generations, the environmental movement would lose much of its 
drive (Cameron 1989: 57). The 'new energy crisis', it is maintained, is substantively 
different from the 'old energy crisis' precisely because the intragenerational impacts of 
energy use can no longer be shrugged off lightly (Schipper & Meyers 1992: 54). The 
issue, like that of intragenerational equity discussed above, is based on a widespread 
intuitive judgment that future generations have moral standing of some sort. At a 
philosophical level, this equivalence is apparent as there is very little difference in our 
obligations to future generations and our obligations of those in need in other countries 
as distance and time and distance in place are equivalent (Attfield 1991: 90). 
The difficult question in attempting to base decision making on the future is how far 
into the future needs to be considered. The further into the future, the more uncertain 
the impacts associated with present actions become. It has been argued that it is 
difficult enough to care about those in the present in distant countries, let alone to 
concern ourselves with those not yet born so that consideration of the impacts of our 
present actions should be limited to the foreseeable future only, this being defined as 
the lifetimes of our children and grandchildren (Passmore 1974: 54). It is nonetheless 
clear that even very distant generations will require as a minimum a functional biosphere 
in order to meet certain basic needs (Attfield 1991: 91). 
The issue of the long-term environmental impacts of our activities has become more 
critical in recent years as the signs of irreversible global environmental change become 
more visible and worrisome, on the one hand, and have the potential to deepen as 
economic activity is accelerated in the attempt to raise the well-being of those in 
developing countries, on the other. The concept advanced as the means of balancing 
these inherently conflicting goals and steering a path that avoids a clash between inter 
and intragenerational issues is sustainable development and it is a pertinent point at 
which to end this discussion on the arguments for energy conservation as it encapsulates 
many of the problems discussed in this chapter and leads directly into the discussion 
of energy efficiency in the following chapter. 
3.5.2.4 Sustainable Development 
Sustainable development is a concept that has been around in various forms for some 
time and like energy conservation is uncontentious in principle, a 'good thing'. Definition 
of the term, and the means of how to put it into practice, however, have been elusive 
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(Adams 1990: 24). Many consider that the word development was tricky enough, a 
Trojan horse of a term into which one can pack anything one likes (Frank 1987: 232). 
These writers consider that its juxtaposition with sustainable has merely produced a 
term that is useful precisely because it is imprecise (Redclift 1992: 40). 
Many questions hover uncomfortably over the question of sustainable development, the 
primary one being whether it is possible. James Lovelock once stated that he gave more 
credence to the notion that a goat could become a gardener than to the notion that 
humans could become stewards of the planet. Optimists place their faith in international 
treaties and technology. One of the few areas of relative agreement is that it will 
involve very substantial increases in the efficiency of energy use and shifts in the 
technologies used to produce this energy. But achieving that will require mechanisms 
such as regulation and pricing, the political acceptance for which remains uncertain. 
Moreover, it is not yet clear whether these devices will be adequate or whether substantial 
changes in our material standards of living and behaviour, such as giving up driving 
cars, will be also be necessary. 
The more difficult question is whether sustainable development will be a truly global 
strategy. The greenhouse issue represents an acid test to such commitment and present 
indications are not promising with an impasse over how to convince developing countries 
to agree to reduce their emissions. While industrialised countries have historically 
contributed most to increased concentrations of these gases and remain the major 
emitters today, the rate at which developing countries and newly industrialising countries 
are increasing their emissions means that any effort on the part of industrialised 
countries to reduce their own emissions will be swamped by the increase in the those 
from the developing world. Without agreement from the developing countries, 
stabilization of greenhouse gases will not be possible. But these countries do not see 
their contributions as the cause of the problem and are focused on what they perceive 
as more pressing internal problems (Cairncross 1994). They are unlikely to be willing 
to reach agreements to cut their emissions unless those agreements are based on per 
capita emissions and unless the industrialised world is willing to transfer the technologies 
and capital necessary for their development programmes to continue unabated. 
Industrialised countries, however, have proved reluctant to do so and are likely to 
support carbon-taxes only if they, rather than an international body, retain control of 
the revenue raised from those taxes (Redclift 1992: 40). 
Another important question revolving around the issue of sustainable development 
returns our discussion to the definition of the concept. For, as Susan Owens (1995: 
208) has put it, sustainable development defined narrowly as material well-being and 
survival is merely an extension of the ideas embodied within those of the resource 
95 
conservation movement and if applied in that sense then 'future generations could look 
forward to a safe and sanitised, but aesthetically and culturally sterile environment'. 
To such writers, sustainable development defined globally and in its broadest sense 
will not be possible without each of us questioning our material needs and wants, and 
will therefore require radical restructuring of our economic and social institutions which 
shape and drive those wants (Redclift 1992: 42, Owens 1995: 213). 
3.6 Summary & Discussion 
This chapter has approached energy conservation from the environmentalist perspective 
and has unravelled the arguments behind the environmentalist demands for energy 
conservation in order to understand why they have been ignored. Four explanations 
have been found for the rejection of these demands. 
The first of these explanations is that although energy conservation is often assumed to 
be an uncontentious policy objective, in reality many awkward questions lie behind the 
idea and that the issues are so complex that there is little consensus on the question of 
what the appropriate level of energy conservation should be. Demands for high energy 
conservation based on the fundamentalist notion that energy conservation is a good 
thing and something we cannot have enough of are simply ignored as they are seen to 
have little relevance for rational policy debate. 
The second explanation for the dismissal of these demands for energy conservation is 
that the arguments upon which they are based are considered ill-informed and irrational. 
Environmentalist opposition to supply expansion is put down as irrational fear of 
unfamiliar or large and complex technologies, unscientific assessments of risks, or 
unproven evidence of energy-related problems. Policy makers are dismissive or sceptical 
about demands for reductions in energy use based on theoretical, general and global 
arguments which shift over time. Concern over these environmental issues is seen to be 
episodic, this fluctuation being attributed to an increase in perceived, rather than 
actual, risks (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983: 10). These demands are considered to be 
buoyed, furthermore, by the concepts of the 'energy-crisis' or the 'environmental crisis', 
concepts referred to in the realist school of the philosophy of science as 'chaotic 
abstractions' (Sayer 1992: 53). These abstractions are constructed by improperly 
bundling together separate entities that cannot simply be grouped together to form a 
single entity the way that atoms can be put together to form a molecule. They are 
therefore interpreted by critics as homogenising agents which falsely smooth out the 
differences between a range of environmental and social problems from one place to 
another and which confuse rather than aid debate. 
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While environmental writers tend to explain this scepticism in terms of denial on the 
part of policy makers, a third explanation for the rejection of these demands for high 
energy conservation is that there exist structural constraints on policy making. Even if 
problems such as the well-being of those less well off in developing countries or those 
not yet born are accepted as real and serious, democratically elected governments are 
severely constrained in what they can and cannot do by their electorates. Without 
change in individual values that results in a reduction in material wants, material 
standards of living and levels of consumption, those problems are not readily resolvable 
by government. While the likelihood that individual values will change is hotly debated, 
those who consider individual values to be shaped largely by our economic and social 
institutions suggest that without radical transformation of those institutions such a 
shift in individual values is unlikely. 
The final grounds upon which these demands for high energy conservation are dismissed 
are that the arguments upon which they are based are considered to be deliberately 
exaggerated or fabricated. Demands for high energy conservation are regarded as 
ambit claims designed to achieve more moderate energy conservation goals, such as 
widespread adoption of solar domestic hot water systems, increased reliance on public 
transport, or urban redesign. The risks of eco-catastrophe are considered by critics of 
environmentalism to be deliberately overstated, while moral arguments about nature or 
the plight of distant others are considered to be used merely to achieve here and now 
human wants (Beckmann 1976: 167, Wildavsky 1979. 396, Wildavsky 1992: ix). That 
environmentalists have to resort to such tactics in order to achieve their more modest 
demands has been attributed to the fact that in the absence of other mechanisms, such 
as the withdrawal of labour supply, the environmental movement's most effective 
weapon in their attempt to bring about reform is to maximise the perceived electoral 
ramifications of not meeting those demands (Bergmann 1993). This is achieved by 
maximising the perceived risks associated with technologies such as nuclear fission 
and with pollution generated through the production and use of energy in general. 
Exaggerations and overdramatisation may well also be, in part, an attempt to counter 
their opponents' attempts to minimise those perceived risks. 
This raises the question of why these more moderate demands for energy conservation 
are dismissed by policy makers and leads into the following chapter on energy efficiency. 
There is, however, another explanation that can be advanced for the need to 
overdramatise and exaggerate environmental problems. This chapter has focused 
primarily on those arguments for energy conservation associated with the scientific 
stream of environmentalism. The concerns behind the second brand of environmentalism 
distinguished by Sandbach (1980: 26), that stream concerned with the social or 
humanitarian impacts of technology and science, have been touched on but have not 
been the dominant part of the discussion. The need to exaggerate risks and overdrarnatise 
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problems, and even energy conservation fundamentalism, could also be explained in 
terms of an inability to bring to formal debate on energy policy many of those social or 
humanitarian issues. For what is 'rational' in modern society, has virtually come to 
mean that which is instrumentally rational (Poole 1991: 67). What is instrumental 
rational, furthermore, has been largely appropriated to mean that which is economically 
rational. Formal energy policy debate is therefore restricted to the instrumentally and 
economically 'rational' planes in which nothing is sacred, all is profane, everything can 
be costed, and risks can be assessed objectively using scientific probabilistic techniques. 
Emotive and social issues such as how much wilderness we ought to leave, what 
aspects of nature should be retained, how to combat the alienation created by a 
society that revolves around cars and highways, what level of perceived risk we want 
to accept, and what sort of society we want to live in and pass on to our children, are 
all described by some as 'less dramatic' environmental causes (Dahlberg et al. 1985: 
77). To others, they are neither irrelevant nor secondary, but all-important (Beck 1992: 
28). They have not been the central focus of this chapter precisely because they are not 
included in formal debate over policy issues. The boundaries of such debate are 
circumscribed not by environmentalist, but by policy makers and the former are forced 
to debate on their opponents' terms and in their opponents' language, and to use the 
particular rather than the general (Socolow 1981: 152). The environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) process, for example, has been criticised as an inherently weak tool 
because of the highly circumscribed role that it plays in decision making. ElAs are 
typically used to merely examine how a specific development project should occur 
rather than whether or where such development should take place (Sadler 1994: 4). The 
important conclusion that can be drawn from this is that in retreating to more moderate 
demands for energy conservation based on energy efficiency, energy conservation as an 
option loses much of its puff as environmentalists are forced to leave behind much of 
what is most important to them (Owens 1995: 213). The dismissal of demands for 
high energy conservation therefore go a long way to explaining why more modest 
demands for energy conservation are also dismissed. For in making the retreat to these 
more moderate demands for reducing energy use based on 'rational arguments, the 
passion that drives environmental campaigns is lost and much of the intensity of 
environmental debate dissipated (Tindale 1995: 205). The extent to which important 
goals can be achieved becomes dependent on the degree to which they can be 
accommodated through such instrumentally and economically rational arguments. 
Environmentalists therefore not only have to debate using the terms and language of 
the dominant discourse, but are also forced to support more moderate demands for 
energy conservation as a retreat to more achievable objectives. As a consequence of 
these compromises, their demands are often inconsistent and contradictory. To argue 
for sustainable development on the basis of moral arguments on the one hand, for 
example, while advancing energy efficiency as a means of increasing the competitiveness 
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of the national economy on the other, are potentially contradictory since increased 
competitiveness of our own economy could deprive developing countries of income. 
This chapter has also been used to partially explain the disparity in policy emphasis 
on energy conservation between countries and regions. It has been shown that moderate 
energy conservation policies have been implemented as national strategic or economic 
imperatives. In certain situations, moderate energy conservation policies have also 
been adopted at the local level as a consequence of local opposition, rational or 
otherwise, to supply expansion proposals. This has occurred particularly in parts of 
• the United States of America (McConnon 1986: 217, Lees 1995: 196). Such public 
opposition to siting of supply expansion projects has been most successful in forcing 
policy makers to adopt moderate energy conservation policies where the judicial system 
permits individual members of the public to challenge the legality of supply expansion 
proposals. Elsewhere, the ability to persuade policy makers to adopt moderate energy 
conservation has been less successful and policy has continued to rely almost exclusively 
on expanding the supply of energy while using technical fixes to resolve or reduce 
energy-related problems. 
The study now follows this retreat away from the demand for aggressive energy 
conservation based on social and ecological concerns to more moderate demand for 
reductions in energy use based on the economically rational arguments and technical 
fixes. The following chapter examines the demands for energy efficiency and attempts 
to explain why these 'rational' demands also tend to be dismissed as policy options as 
a means of reducing the need for expansion of energy supply. 
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Chapter Four 
Energy Efficiency: the Non-Adoption of a Rational Option 
Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the shadow 
— T.S. Eliot (1925) The Hollowmen. 
4.1 Introduction 
Those who advance energy policy proposals based on increasing the efficiency of 
energy use consider the benefits of their proposals to be both multiple (Lovins & Hirst 
1989: 39) and obvious (Blackburn 1987: x). Included amongst these perceived advantages, 
moreover, are economic benefits, and because of this, energy efficiency is considered to 
be a 'spherically sensible' strategy - an energy option which is rational no matter from 
what perspective it is looked at (Socolow 1991: 535). 
Energy efficiency advocates are therefore perplexed by the fact that many individuals, 
energy supply organisations and policy makers tend to overlook the available and 
substantial scope for cost-effectively reducing energy requirements by increasing the 
efficiency of energy use. Why individuals overlook the available cost-effective energy 
efficiency measures has been something of a mystery to such writers , who ask, 'Why, if 
energy conservation is so simple, logical and cheap, is more energy conservation not 
taken up?' (Sathaye & Gadgil 1992: 163). 
Equally perplexing and frustrating to advocates of energy efficiency is the fact that 
energy efficiency is also rejected by energy suppliers when it would appear to make 
good business sense, since the incremental costs of increasing energy supply are 
significantly greater than average costs of existing electricity supply (White 1981: 4546). 
These energy efficiency proposals are also considered to be economically rational from 
a social perspective: 
All experts agree that our society can save about half of the energy we are using 
without any loss in the quality of life ... When the experts make these predictions, 
they are making them on the basis of the technical knowledge that is available 
today. Most importantly they are making the statement that many of these 
conservation investments are economically justifiable and would pay for 
themselves in a few years ... Why then is there not more conservation? (Seligman 
1985: 135) 
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Advocates of aggressive energy efficiency policies have often seen the theoretical practical 
implications of increasing the efficiency of energy use in terms of the reduced need for 
investment in added generating capacity as a potent means of advancing this option: 
One 20 W compact fluorescent lamp gives the same energy service - illumination - 
as one 100 W incandescent bulb. Ten million 100 W incandescent bulbs require 1000 
MW of power station to light them. Ten million 20 W compact fluorescent lamps 
requires only 200 MW of power station to light them. The choice before society is 
obvious. (Patterson 1992: 186) 
Given these seemingly substantial economic benefits of energy efficiency strategies on 
top of the perceived urgent need to reduce the social and ecological costs of energy 
production and use (Mestrovic 1992: 331, Gilchrist 1994: 1, Dovers 1994a: xi), these 
policy proposals are considered by those who advance them to be 'realistic and like 
Keynesian economics, apolitical and equally palatable to political parties and 
administrations of all persuasions (Paehlke 1989: 31). To such individuals, the failure 
on the part of energy policy makers to adopt these economically rational proposals is 
therefore both difficult to comprehend and frustrating (Grubb et al. 1992: xvii). 
Their inability to influence policy makers has led to the portrayal of the debate over 
energy policy as one neatly delineated between just two camps, with advocates of 
aggressive energy efficiency (demand-siders) in one camp, and the 'energy establishment' 
(supply-siders) in the other. Energy efficiency advocates describe their own camp as 
made up of a small and disorganised, but altruistic and determined band of independent 
experts and their supporters (Moskovitz 1992: 399). These experts, who tend to be 
trained in the physical sciences and physics in particular, doggedly persist in offering 
what they reckon to be sensible and unbiased policy advice based on socially and 
economically rational principles. Their opponents in the 'energy establishment's' camp 
are seen to be typically economists, engineers and politicians, who inexplicably and 
persistently refuse to listen to the sensible advice being offered them (NforgArd & 
Christensen 1987: 3-6, Gilchrist 1994: 278). 
The ongoing debate between these two camps is likened by advocates of energy efficiency 
as a frustrating, one-sided affair, akin to the attempt to engage in dialogue with the 
deaf. They produce techno-economic analyses of the potential for reducing energy use 
via energy efficiency, plot trends in energy use that show how much energy has been 
saved by energy efficiency and how much more could be saved, and describe the 
policies available to policy makers to increase the efficiency of energy use. As these 
efforts are to little avail, and not understanding why their seemingly 'sensible' proposals 
are dismissed, energy efficiency experts rework their analyses 'once more' in the hope 
that repetition will eventually pay dividends where rational debate has failed (Blackburn 
1987: xi). 
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The aim of this chapter is to explain why policy makers seem not to have been listening 
to these demands for reducing the requirements for energy by increasing the efficiency 
of energy use. The discussion begins by examining the various sociological or general 
models advanced to explain the rapid growth of energy systems and of energy supply 
technologies in particular. Working downward from the general and most ambitious 
energy efficiency proposals to more specific and modest proposals by looking at the 
history of the development of the energy efficiency concept, the discussion turns to the 
rejection of more modest energy efficiency proposals by examining the planning and 
policy decision making processes, focusing particularly on electricity planning. The 
reason for this focus on electricity is that while the critique that energy policy making 
has relied on expansion of supply and the rejection of energy conservation is common 
to all energy types (Saddler 1981: 4), electricity planning has been most closely associated 
with both rapid growth of energy systems and public conflict, and has been described 
as the most virulent form of 'growthmania' (Daly 1973). 
4.2 Sociological Explanations of the Growth of Energy Systems 
4.2.1 Technological Determinism 
Technological determinism has been described as the single most influential theory 
about the relationship between society and technology (MacKenzie & Wajcman 1985: 
2). The thesis has received a good deal of support form social writers such as Ellul 
(1964), Rosak (1969) and Reich (1970) who have portrayed technology as malevolent 
and anarchic and who have portrayed social, environmental and economic change to 
be a consequence of technological development. Technological determinism, furthermore, 
has come to constitute the most common sociological explanation of the growth of 
technological systems and, by implication, the main sociological theory advanced to 
explain the non-adoption of energy conservation as an option. 
The technological determinism thesis posits simply that technology is an independent 
factor over which society has little or no influence. It is the thesis that technological 
change is the most important source of change in society and that technology is not 
simply a tool used by society, but something which impinges on society from outside. 
As Grundmann (1991: 109) points out, technological determinism is the technological 
parallel of the Marxist economic concept of alienation' and posits that technology 
Marx defined 'alienation' as the process in which the results of human action become 
independent from their producers and cannot be re-appropriated because the process 
retroacts on the producers in a detrimental way (Grundmann 1991: 109). 
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'works behind people's backs'. Those who espouse this theory deny that technologies 
are social constructions and posit, in its most extreme form, that technology is 
autonomous. 
The most thorough attempt to date at undermining the notion that technologies are 
neutral has been that advanced by Langdon Winner (1977) in his Autonomous Technology. 
Winner extended the 'technics-out-of-control' theme to develop his 'reverse adaption' 
thesis. In Winner's view, a specific technology is selected initially as a means of 
achieving a task with a desired social end. On completion of this task, however, the 
technology 'refuses to go gently into that goodnight' (Winner 1977: 25) and spontaneously 
sets in train a series of social transformations which lead eventually to a reversal of the 
ends and means. The original tool, the technology, effectively takes control of society 
and creates its own operational imperatives. While the original purpose of the technology 
was to provide important social ends, the ends become crucial to the survival of the 
system and are pursued regardless of whether they have any further objective value to 
society or not (Winner 1977: 247). The thesis holds that once the technology's original 
use-by date has expired, the technological system develops under its own volition and 
becomes increasingly unresponsive, inflexible and rigid. In the end, technology shapes 
the needs of society rather than passively responding to consumer demand. To do 
this, the technological system has to ensure that there exists a happy coincidence 
between social needs and what the system is able to produce (Winner 1977: 146). 
Advertising, product design and tariff structures are therefore mobilized to this end, 
moulding individual wants to match technological output. Winner used this thesis to 
explain, amongst other phenomena, the rapid expansion of energy supply systems. 
Winner conceded that there was a political dimension to the growth of technological 
systems and relied heavily on Galbraith's (1972) concept of 'technostructures' controlled 
by a cadre of technical elites. Winner replaced Galbraith's concept of 'technical elites' 
with his own theory of 'technological politics' in which who was nominally in control of 
the technology was irrelevant as in reality no one was in control. Whoever was in 
command of the system would be forced, according to Winner, to take more or less the 
same steps with regard to the maintenance and growth of technological means (1977: 
263-4). 
Few outside sociology, including this author, accept the technological determinism 
thesis and dismiss it as anthropomorphism of technological systems. While the rapid 
growth of technological systems does give the outward impression that the technological 
system is closed and uninfluenced by external events, technological determinism overlooks 
the fact that high growth rates of technological systems are politically driven. Examples 
of technologies which have not been taken up or which have been resisted, and the 
differential impacts of a technology in different situations have been used to show that 
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the thesis does not stand up to critical review and is too simple an explanation of the 
relationship between society and technology (MacKenzie & Wajcman 1985: 6). The 
technology-out-of control thesis is therefore useful as a overall description, but has 
little explanatory or predictive power and is therefore rejected by the author as a 
suitable explanation of policy reliance on continued expansion of energy supply and 
dismissal of energy conservation as a means of reducing the need for further supply. 
4.2.2 System Trajectory Thesis 
The trajectory thesis maintains that once large technological, economic or social systems 
are set on a particular course, they continue along that trajectory because they are able 
to resist attempts at changes in direction. Various mechanistic and biological metaphors 
have been employed to describe the mechanisms behind this resistance. Thorsten 
Veblen (1899) considered the problem to be social institutions which were prone to 
'institutional inertia'. In his The Theory of the Leisure Class, Veblen argued that unless 
otherwise compelled by circumstances, human behaviour and thought was habitual 
and that this routinised behaviour had a cumulative and self-reinforcing effect at the 
institutional level; increasing resistance to innovation and reform. He wrote: 
These institutions which have so been handed down, these habits of thought, 
points of view, mental attitudes and aptitudes, or what not, are therefore 
themselves a conservative factor. This is the social factor of social inertia, 
psychological inertia, conservatism. (Veblen 1899; 190-1, cited in Hodgson 1993: 
131) 
Ogburn (1922) used the metaphor cultural lag to convey a similar idea that social 
institutions are slow to adapt to their changing environment, becoming institutional 
anachronisms out of synchronisation with the needs of the new era. His metaphor was 
subsequently borrowed by many other writers, including Hubbert (1949: 109) and 
Odum (1969: 403). 
Yet other writers on technological development have resorted to biological metaphors. 
Giovanni Dosi (1984) used the biological analogy of evolution to describe his model of 
technological development in which technologies were likened to species influenced by 
an environment comprised of the economic, political and institutional systems. To 
Dosi (1984: 20), these environmental forces shaped technology by selecting the initial 
direction of mutation (setting the technological paradigm) and then selecting among the 
mutations (by ex poste trial and error). 
Hodgson (1993) has recently adapted another evolutionary metaphor to describe the 
process by which large systems become locked into certain paths of development and 
104 
are resistant to attempts to alter their paths of development. The tendency of species 
to evolve characteristics which then set the evolutionary development of the species on 
a course and excluded other paths, even though some of these other evolutionary paths 
are possibly more efficient or desirable, was referred to by the biologist Conrad 
Waddington (1957) as chreodic development2 . This tendency of chreods to stabilise on 
one course of development through time was attributed by biologists in part to the 
evolution of hierarchical control sequences in the genotype (Hodgson 1993: 257). 
According to Hodgson, a number of researchers interested in the process of technical 
innovation and change argued during the 1980s that technological systems developed 
hierarchical control sequences and behaved very similar to a chreod. Once a technological 
'paradigm' was selected early on in the development of a technology, these writers 
maintained, the technical system evolved in a relatively fixed path of development and 
it appeared to become increasingly difficult for the system to deviate from this trajectory. 
Technological lock-in was said to have occurred. A good example was the motor car. 
Once the internal combustion motor was chosen in preference to steam, gas or electric 
vehicles, the course of development was set. Furthermore, once the private motor 
vehicle was chosen, it set the course for the development of transport systems which 
then became difficult to alter even after the problems with overdependence on private 
vehicles became apparent. Other examples cited by Hodgson of technological lock-in 
in the face of alternatives that in hindsight appear to have been better were standard 
typewriter keyboards, standard railway line gauges and VHS video cassettes (Hodgson 
1993: 257). The concept of chreodic development applied equally well, according to 
Hodgson, to industrial, economic and institutional systems. 
Hodgson explained the behaviour of chreods in terms of positive feedback effects 
which freeze an attribute or structure in place and make subsequent amendment difficult, 
even if the original development was not perfect. The advantages of alternative patterns 
of development destabilise the system by acting to pull it off its stable trajectory but 
are effectively countered by a strong hierarchical controlling influence that steers the 
system back onto the original course. The inherent danger of this type of development, 
Hodgson concluded, was that the stability of the system may lead over time to ossification 
as prolonged periods of habits of thought and action decrease the ability to respond to 
a changing environment and steer the chreod towards catastrophe. A regional economic 
system, for example, Hodgson suggested could be decimated by an inability to anticipate 
the entry of more vigorous competitors from outside. 
The policy implications of chreodic development, according to Hodgson, are clear. In 
the case of energy systems, for example, attempts at small adjustments to alter the 
2 Waddington 's term, chreod, was from the Greek chre = fated and hodos = path. 
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course of the development of the system toward increased adoption of innovative or 
different technologies will tend to fail as the hierarchically controlled chreod is too able 
to counter these small perpetrations and pull the system back to its original course. 
The only viable way of effecting a transition to a more optimal choice of energy 
technologies is, therefore, a planned and abrupt change of tack rather than piecemeal 
and gradualistic change in direction. 
As with the technological determinism thesis, the concept of technological trajectory 
has been dismissed on the grounds that it omits an understanding of the causes of 
technological momentum. Historian of large energy systems, Ted Hughes (1987: 77) 
has debunked the technological trajectory thesis, arguing that the momentum of energy 
systems is purely an artefact of the durability of their physical components and the 
inability of energy generation and supply organisations to rapidly divest themselves of 
such components. While it is possible to reduce some 'momentum through measures 
such as retrenching workers, it is not possible to abruptly divest debt or infrastructure. 
Critics of the technological trajectory thesis accepted the argument that the choice of 
one technology may have far reaching ramifications in terms of predetermining subsequent 
technological choices. The decision to develop a nationally interconnected grid, they 
suggested, may bias the future system towards the construction of large centralised 
energy systems such as nuclear power stations, whilst locally independent grids would 
favour small renewable systems. They maintained, however, that these original choices 
were not neutral but part of an inherently political process (MacKenzie & Wajcman 
1985: 7). 
Historical instances of broken trajectories have also been used to argue that the trajectory 
thesis was not good at predicting the development of technological systems. Disruptions 
to oil supplies in the 1970s, increased environmental concern in the 1960s, and the 
diminishing potential to increase the technical efficiencies of conventional energy supply 
systems, all challenged the assumptions of unstoppable technological momentum or 
chreodic development. Countless systems have reached a point of stasis, declined and 
disappeared (Hughes 1987: 80). The British electricity system, for example, underwent 
substantial changes during the first world war. Prior to the war, the British electricity 
supply system was based on local government political boundaries. To increase load 
factorsa and the efficiency of fuel use, Parliament overrode local government and 
forced interconnection of the multiple grids. Increased technical efficiency continued to 
be assigned a high priority in post-war reconstruction and the tradition in local government 
control of electricity supply was permanently terminated. 
3 Load factor is the ratio of average to peak load, or the ratio of the average load to the 
generating capacity of a system. 
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To Hughes (1983), the development of technologies was driven by economic imperatives 
rather than compelled by technology acting separately. Because technologies are 
inextricably a part of society and the economic enterprise, Hughes (1983: 80) argued, 
they are open to competition, and are therefore forced to change. The more closely the 
economy of a country is linked to international markets, the greater the pressure exerted 
on that country by technical change outside a country. 
The apparent tendency of energy systems to become less controllable and to steer a 
course independent of human agency as they get larger and gather momentum has 
sufficient semblance of truth to render the notions of autonomous technology and 
chreodic development attractive. The authors of A Time to Choose came close to 
articulating such a view in stating that modern energy systems were not shaped by 
social choice but were allowed to 'drift (Freeman et al. 1974: 3). 
While useful heuritsic aids, the concepts of technological determinism and the trajectory 
theses ignore the structural mechanisms and contingent events that shape technologies 
and cause 'lock-in' to occur. The second world war, for example, is said to have been a 
war of motion and an event that gave huge impetus to the shift from rail to road 
transport (Yergin 1991: 382). While technological trajectory models, such as Hodgson's 
chreodic development, provide a useful metaphor of what occurs at the systems level, 
they offer little by way of explanation of how vested interests shape the initial decisions 
and behind the resistance to change. An example of a more complete understanding 
was Ruth Cowan's (1985) account of the processes that led to the dominance of 
compression cycle over absorption technology in refrigeration manufacturing. 
Describing how the refrigerator got its hum, Cowan described the embryonic domestic 
refrigerator manufacturing industry in the USA and recounted how gas absorption and 
electric compression refrigerator technologies were initially developed independently by 
various small companies in the early years of the present century. Many technical 
experts regarded the absorption system to be the superior technology, and the absorption 
option also had many advantages from the consumer's perspective since it involved 
fewer moving parts, was less prone to breakdown, was easier to maintain, had lower 
operating costs and was virtually silent (Cowan 1985: 211). Gas, moreover, was in 
more widespread use than electricity at the time, and this, Cowan argued, ought to 
have given the absorption refrigeration industry a head start. Two decisive factors, 
however, steered the industry resolutely toward the compression option. 
The first, and most important, was the entry of large manufacturing firms into the 
industry and their subsequent decisions to develop compression refrigerators. General 
Electric purchased the Kelvinator Co. in 1916 and three years later General Motors 
purchased Frigidaire. Refrigeration was a relatively minor activity for these companies 
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and their subsequent decisions to develop compression technology were made purely 
on the basis that this technology married with their broader interests rather than on 
what was optimal from the community's interests. General Electric's decision was 
particularly instrumental and was a direct consequence of the fact that the company 
not only manufactured refrigerators, but also sold electricity. According to Cowan, the 
company made a conscious decision to pursue air-cooled rather than water-cooled 
condensers as the former required greater electricity use (Cowan 1985: 209). 
Once these large US companies invested heavily in the development of compression 
technology, the smaller and undercapitalised companies such as Electrolux-Serval in 
Sweden, were unable to match the rate of innovation made in the laboratories of these 
larger companies and lost the race. As a consequence of both of these factors, the 
industry became locked into compression technology despite the fact that it was never 
demonstrated that it was the optimal technology from the users' point of view but 
purely on what suited the interests of business (Cowan 1985: 214). Many other 
technologies destined for the domestic market, she concluded, met with a similar fate. 
Cowan argued that neither the decision by Hoover and Apex to manufacture portable 
rather than centralised and technically preferred vacuum cleaners, nor Maytag's patent 
on the agitator and vertically rotated drum for washing machines, were based on these 
being the preferable technologies from a social perspective, but on the profitability for 
the company. They nonetheless critically shaped the development of these appliances 
over the ensuing half a century. 
Cowan's account therefore provides a deeper explanation of why technological lock-in 
tends to occur. Most importantly, her account illustrated that technological development 
is the consequence of deliberate decisions made by planners and that the momentum of 
a technology has to be understood in terms of planning and political economy. Initial 
and deliberate decisions by key players have a very significant impact on the future 
development of the technology. Technological lock-in occurs, according to Cowan, 
because influential players have the effective power to pull other players into line. The 
technological determinism and technological trajectory theses, according to Cowan, 
were coarse as they did not explain why technological systems grow in the way that 
they do and why technological lock-in often occurs. 
The discussion therefore turns to energy planning and energy policy decision making to 
provide more complete explanations for the growth of energy systems and the rejection 
of energy efficiency proposals. This discussion begins by tracing the historical 
development of energy efficiency proposals to show how these proposals have developed 
over time. The reasons for the dismissal of the more ambitious proposals are dealt 
with along the way, leaving the explanations of the rejection of more moderate energy 
efficiency proposals for subsequent sections. 
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4.3 The Historical Development of Energy Efficiency Proposals 
4.3.1 Energy Efficiency as a Means of Conserving Resources 
With the outbreak of renewed concern over energy-related issues in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, those in the hard sciences, and physics in particular, quickly brought their 
skills and training to bear on the problem. In the USA, the American Physical Society 
joined the effort to seek solutions to the nation's energy problems by devoting its 
summer school - held a few months before the first oil price rises - to exploring the 
feasibility of increasing the efficiency of end-use equipment more thoroughly (Socolow 
1985: 20). These physical scientists adopted one of two approaches. 
One group approached the problem from first principles, looking for both more efficient 
processes and a means of increasing the efficiency of existing processes. Their approach 
was resolutely apolitical and focused purely on adjustment of end-use technologies 
rather than transforming society or altering the behaviour of end-users (Ford et al. 1975: 
5). These technologists and physicists represented unreconstructed resource 
conservationists, merely shifting the focus of the wise use philosophy to the outputs 
and end-uses rather than the inputs of the energy system. Their efforts were stimulated 
primarily by concerns over energy shortages and their work pointed to considerable 
savings that could be achieved through technical improvements in energy-using equipment. 
One report to the President of the USA, based on techno-engineering analysis, calculated 
that a redesign of household appliances could reduce household sector energy use by 
3.7% over an eight year period (Executive Office of the President and the Office of 
Emergency Preparedness 1973: 23). Other reports were bolder and were based on 
what was theoretically possible. A federal US agency reported that it would be 
possible to approximately halve space heating requirements in the USA with low-cost 
weatherisation measures. It also claimed that it was technically feasible to produce 40 
mpg cars at no extra costs to the consumer and without compromising comfort, 
performance or safety (US Federal Power Commission 1971). In 1972, an independent 
analyst, John Needy, calculated the very substantial savings in energy and household 
expenditure on energy that would be achieved with a hypothetical overnight replacement 
of the entire stock of US domestic refrigerators with the most efficient then available on 
the market (cited in Clark 1974: 189). This hypothetical assessment of the technical 
potential for saving energy and household expenditure on energy, although crude, has 
been a potent means of putting forward the case for the energy efficiency option and 
continues to be employed by researchers such as Herring (1992) who recently used the 
example of the technical potential for increasing the efficiency of household refrigeration 
energy use in the United Kingdom to argue for policy forms in that country. 
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4.3.2 Energy Efficiency as an Environmental Goal 
The second stream of physical scientists working on energy-related problems was 
pioneered by a small number of physicists concerned about the attendant social and 
long-term environmental problems of high energy use. These physicists, such as John 
Holdren and Dean Abrahamson, were closer in philosophy to modern environmentalism 
and their writings were often aligned to the environmental movement (Abrahamson 
1970, 1973, Holdren & Ehrlich 1971, Holdren & Herrera 1971). They did not limit 
themselves to analyses of end-use technology, but made broader critiques of energy 
policy based on the various problems created by the inefficient use of energy in industrial 
society. 
This second strand of physical scientists were inspired particularly by the views of 
biologist Barry Commoner (1971) who served as the bridge between ecologically informed 
environmentalism and the search for technological solutions to environmental problems. 
Contradicting many leading environmentalists of the day, Commoner declared that 
economic growth was 'a popular whipping boy in certain ecological circles' (1971: 141) 
and that the solution to environmental problems required neither a reduction in living 
standards nor a reduction in population, but replacement of faulty technology (1971: 
178-9). He was one of the first leaders of the environmental movement to advance 
aggressive energy efficiency proposals as a solution to environmental problems 
(Commoner 1976). 
4.3.3 Low Energy Growth Proposals 
This more radical and ambitious 'technical fix' vision based on the search for solutions 
to the deeper and broader social and environmental problems associated with modern 
society's high levels of energy use, was articulated for the first time by a pioneering 
report produced for the Ford Foundation in 1974. The study of US energy policy was 
initiated in early 1971 at a cost of (US1971) $2 million, and was the first energy 
modelling exercise based on a scenario analysis. In their final report, the authors 
described as feasible, a Low Energy Growth (LEG) scenario in which the rate of growth 
of US energy use over the remainder of the century was more than halved 'without 
requiring fundamental changes in the structure of the economy' or 'major sacrifices in 
real income growth' (Freeman et al. 1974: 511). The authors added that under an 
even more ambitious Zero Energy Growth (ZEG) scenario, which amounted to a 
restructuring of the economy but only minor lifestyle changes, energy use in the USA 
could be levelled off sometime before the year 2000. 
Of the twelve authors of the report, only one, Ross Williams, was a physicist. 
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The Ford Foundation report included comments by the various members of the advisory 
board which ranged between two extreme views. At one extreme, it was described as 
too apologetic and defensive in tone and to have not gone far enough, as evidenced by 
its failure to recommend the total abandonment of nuclear fission technology (Freeman 
et al. 1974: 356). At the other extreme, many of the report's assumptions were contested, 
its objectivity challenged, and its view of the electricity supply industry dismissed as 
biased (Freeman et al. 1974: 353). 
Early critics described the energy debate as polarised between two groups of hard-liners: 
neoconservative advocates of a business-as-usual approach, and 'eco-nuts' who 
advocated low energy growth proposals (Chapman 1975: 215). The latter, Chapman 
argued, were based on legitimate concerns over the ecological risks associated high 
levels of energy use and social costs of centralised energy systems based on large 
technologies, such as the breakdown of communities, the loss of community self-
sufficiency, and the loss of skills and job satisfaction. He nonetheless dismissed their 
proposals as highly unrealistic, as they created more problems than they attempted to 
resolve. The major consequence of rapid reductions in energy use, he maintained, 
would be massive unemployment (Chapman 1975: 205). These low energy growth 
proposals, according to Chapman, were theoretical rather than practical, as they were 
premised on numerous assumptions, including the assumption that a shift to more 
labour intensive economic activity was beneficial. Chapman maintained that in doing 
so, they ignored the fact that people did not desire monotonous and hard physical 
work, and that a shift to more labour intensive modes of production would increase 
production costs. Unilateral adoption of such a strategy would therefore damage the 
economy's competitiveness. Low energy growth, he suggested, was a laudable, but 
long-term goal. 
4.3.4 The Soft Energy Path 
At about this same time as the Ford Foundation report was under way, a small number 
of apostate nuclear physicists, seeking greater social relevance in their work, abandoned 
nuclear research and went to work for the anti-nuclear movement (Webb 1995: 33). 
One of these renegade nuclear physicists, Amory Lovins, amalgamated the Ford 
Foundation study's technical fix and ZEG proposals together with the ideas of various 
social critics, such as Clarke's (1974) 'soft technologies', Illich's (1973: 21) 'convivial 
tools' and Dickson's (1974) 'appropriate technologies', to produce a 'soft energy path 
(SEP) proposal (Lovins 1976, 1977). Lovins was particularly influenced by the ideas 
of Schumacher who had described 'nuclear economics' as the example par excellence of 
'economics as if people did not matter' and declared that what was needed was 
'technology with a human face' (Schumacher 1973: 136). By blending technical 
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assessments with these social ideas, Lovins was able to make his radical soft energy 
path option sound feasible. His proposal was based on two strategies: greatly increased 
efficiency of energy-using equipment (the technical fix component), and rapid deployment 
of 'soft technologies'. The latter Lovins defined as technologies which were relatively 
simple from the user's point of view (though these could be technically sophisticated) 5 , 
matched in scale and in energy quality to end-use, and which relied on renewable 
energy resources (Lovins 1978: 478) 6 . 
A central feature of the SEP was the argument that very few end-use tasks actually 
required electricity and that the efficiency (second law) of energy use would be greatly 
increased if other sources of energy were used. Although his idea of a SEP relied on 
technology, it was not a purely technical fix solution but an amalgam of technical fixes 
and radical social change to commutarian social structures. Lovins (1977) also claimed 
that the soft and hard energy paths were mutually exclusive, an assertion based on the 
arguments that continued commitment to the hard energy path would starve the soft 
energy path of resources, would bring about changes in social values that would inhibit 
the ability to develop soft technologies, and would create political and institutional 
impediments to development of soft technologies. 
The SEP was developed primarily as an alternative to the deployment of nuclear 
fission technology. By making radical change in energy systems sound relatively easy, 
it struck a chord around the world and triggered the production of a small wave of 
qualitative SEP analyses in number of other countries (Secretariat for the Future 1977, 
Striimpel 1979). The concept was also quickly embraced by mainstream environmentalism 
(Paehlke 1989: 30), a consequence, according to Denton Morrison (1980: 280), of its 
capacity to provide environmentalism of the 1970s with an escape route out of the 
anti-everything corner that it had painted itself into. 
There is little doubt that Lovins work had a major impact on both public debate over 
energy policy and, in certain situations, on policy itself. The reasons for this have been 
discussed by Greenberger & Hogan (1987). These authors analysed the most important 
reports on energy policy and strategies undertaken on the USA over the decade 1973 
to 1982, in order to account for the disparate impacts of these reports on the public 
debate and on policy. Using two groups of energy analysts and researchers (traditionalists 
5 As an example of technology that was simple to use from the user's perspective, 
Lovin's cited the pocket calculator. Soft technologies were technologies which 
individuals could adapt to their lives and use as tools, rather than machines which 
ran their lives (Lovins 1978: 478) 
6 Soft technologies were not required to be environmentally benign and although they 
tended to be, this was 'probably derivative rather than essential to the definition' 
(Lovins 1978: 478). 
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and reformists) together with a control group, they found that the perceived quality of 
the research was inversely related to its perceived impact. Rather than a case of 
professionally done analysis attracting attention and being used by policy makers, 
these researchers found that the highest quality analyses obtained the lowest acceptance 
and had the lowest impact on policy. Lovins' analysis on the soft energy path (1977) 
was ranked the lowest quality research by both the traditionalists and the control 
groups, yet was rated to have the highest impact on public opinion and policy by all 
three groups (Greenberger & Hogan 1987: 251). One of the major determinants of a 
report's impacts on energy policy, they concluded, was not the quality of the research 
but its timing. Lovins' treatise on the soft energy path, they argued, was published just 
as public concern over nuclear proliferation was increased by the news that India had 
detonated a nuclear device, and just as a new U.S. president, unencumbered with an 
entrenched energy policy, entered the White House. 
The SEP was broadly criticised by commentators from across the political spectrum. 
Conservative energy analysts attacked the idea on the basis that its potential political 
and social ramifications had not been addressed (Rossin 1980: 58). If it did not work, 
and resulted in shortages of electricity, rationing would have to be introduced by 
'strong government', therefore exacerbating just what its proponents hoped to avoid 
(Rossin 1980: 59). Rossin argued that not only was the SEP based on the false belief 
that the philosophies of decentralisation and self-sufficiency were universally beneficial, 
but that it could not occur without substantial subsidisation to overcome the market 
power of the electricity companies. In reality, he maintained, it was difficult enough to 
get the public to agree to increased energy prices, let alone increased prices based on 
philosophical arguments. Because of this, the proposal was predicated on a shift in 
social values and attitudes (Rossin 1980: 60). 
While the conservative attack on the SEP concept was relatively weak, the concept 
was more resoundingly criticised by political economists as utopian. Lovins' depiction 
of two mutually exclusive energy paths based on soft and hard technologies was 
dismissed as crude technological determinism (Sandbach 1980: 161) and its basic logic 
flawed, as there was nothing to prevent soft technologies being developed in a way 
which maintained private control and central planning. Many 'hard' technologies were 
considered indispensable, furthermore, for making work and life more satisfying and 
enjoyable (Martin 1978). Political economists considered, further, that the SEP's 
fundamental desiderata, such as decentralisation and self-sufficiency, collided with 
the basic logic of industrialism (Martin 1978: 12, Sandbach 1980: 159). Nuclear power 
and coal-fired energy systems, these political economists argued, were technologies 
favoured by advanced industrial capitalism because they served to centralise control 
over investment and production, to keep the decisions in the hands of the employers, 
and maintain passive consumerism (Martin 1978). From the perspective of political 
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economy, technological choice is not based on technical assessments and rational debate 
and policy making, but is strongly influenced by the social relations of production 
which favour centralised, large energy conversion technologies (Sandbach 1980: 162-3) 
The main weakness of the SEP, these writers suggested, was its underestimation of the 
power and interests of the nuclear, coal and oil industries (Sandbach 1980: 161). The 
adoption of decentralised energy systems by a significant portion of people, these 
writers argued, would therefore require a fundamental redistribution of economic and 
political power (Berman 1988: 83). 
Lovins agreed that hell was likely to freeze over before a significant shift in social 
values to lower material standards of living occurred, but rejected the argument that 
his SEP proposal was either predicated on such a shift in social values or ran counter 
to the logic of capitalism. Sounding like Adam Smith reborn as an environmentalist, he 
advanced his 'Neo-Capitalist Manifesto (Lovins 1978) in which he maintained that 
the modifications to the economic structure required to put the soft energy path in 
place were minor, and that the SEP was not anti-capitalist since reliance on soft 
technologies was simply a cheaper option for energy utilities as well as society. Lovins 
argued that rather than being anti-capitalist, all that was required to start the soft 
energy trajectory was to get government out of energy policy, and leave energy decision 
making to the market (Lovins 1980: 35). 
While debate over the soft energy path waned in the early 1980s, the less radical 
energy policy reform proposals based on increasing the technical efficiency of energy 
use began to make real advances. 
4.3.5 Making Energy Efficiency More Persuasive 
By the mid-1970s, the boldest energy efficiency experts were claiming that it was 
technically feasible to save approximately 50% of US energy use through cost-effective 
energy conservation measures, and that these measures could be put in place over a 15 
year period (Ross & Williams 1976). It was suggested by Socolow (1977: 239-40), 
moreover, that due to the similarity in the structures of industrial countries, the scope 
for reducing energy use in other industrial economies was also close to 50%. 
Policy makers nonetheless remained resolutely behind a strategy of increasing the supply 
of energy, despite the evidence in the form of technical analyses that there existed 
considerable scope for reducing the demand for energy. Unable to account for this 
stubborn resistance to their elegantly simple and logical proposals, these energy efficiency 
advocates gravitated towards Ludwig Wittgenstein's maxim that 'at the end of reasons 
comes persuasion' (1949: 81). What energy efficiency proposals required was improved 
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packaging. To sell the product, recalcitrant policy makers needed to be persuaded that 
energy efficiency was a virtual source of energy and therefore a legitimate means of 
meeting society's energy requirements. To this end, an attempt was made to make 
energy efficiency more real by referring to it as 'conservation energy' (Yergin 1979: 136) 
and by comparing energy conservation to 'drilling for oil and gas' in houses' (Ross & 
Williams 1980: 24-36) or constructing 'mini hydro-electric generators in the corner of 
every home' (Wright & Baines 1986: 5). Far more persuasive tools, however, came with 
the construction of energy conservation supply curves and the development of the 
associated least-cost planning (LCP) methodology. 
Energy supply curves are economic-engineering tools constructed by ranking available 
energy sources according to their assessed unit costs of production (vertical axis) and 
the quantity of energy available (horizontal axis). These stepped functions are used to 
compare various energy sources on an equal basis and thereby assist the energy decision 
maker to select the optimal energy option or mix of options capable of meeting predicted 
increases in the demand for energy. Energy efficiency analysts adapted this tool to 
their cause by working upwards from end-uses, fuel by fuel, and subsector by subsector, 
to produce 'energy conservation supply curves' which indicated how much energy could 
be saved together with the unit cost of the 'saved energy' from each measure. By 
adapting a conventional planning tool in this way, energy conservationists hoped to 
render utility planning more congruent with social cost-benefit determinations. The 
first detailed energy conservation supply curve analysis was undertaken for the 
Californian residential sector in 1978-79 (Wright et al. 1981) and was followed by a 
similar calculation for the entire US residential sector (Solar Energy Research Institute 
1981), the U.K. (Leach et al. 1979) and New Zealand (Wright & Baines 1986). 
The least-cost planning concept was developed by a team of economists from the 
Energy Productivity Centre of the Mellon Institute in the USA (Sant et al. 1979) and 
immediately attracted considerable attention. It added to the energy conservation 
supply curve concept by requiring, first, that planning for future energy requirements 
should take as its fundamental principle that all energy sources, including 'conservation 
energy', should be compared on the same basis, and secondly, that the least expensive 
option from society's perspective should be utilised first. Only after the least-costly 
option had been exploited to its fullest potential should the next least expensive 
option be utilised. By using such a methodology, Sant et al. (1979) showed that 
residential demand for energy in the USA in the year 2000 could be reduced by 28%, 
and total energy use by 6% compared to the official forecasts for that year. It represented 
the first non-government quantified attempt to prepare such energy projections by 
econometric modelling based on the decisions of end-users. While the report's conclusions 
were dismissed by policy makers on the grounds that many of the assumptions upon 
which it was based did not stand up under scrutiny, it nonetheless had a substantial 
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and enduring impact on energy planning'. It popularised the economists' idea that 
energy was an intermediary good and that energy users had use only for the services 
that energy provided, not for energy per se. The report also implanted into the broader 
debate the rationality of the least-cost planning methodology which was quickly adopted 
by the Bonneville Power Authority in North West USA (Lee 1991). Over the course of 
the 1980s, its was adopted as a planning methodology by a number of electricity 
utilities and regulatory bodies throughout the USA (Clinton et al. 1986: 122). 
A third tactic employed to increase the attractiveness of the aggressive energy efficiency 
option to policy makers was to argue that investment in energy efficiency and renewable 
energy created more jobs than did the equivalent investment in expanding conventional 
energy supply (Grossman & Daneker 1979, Brooks & Paehlke 1980, Kazis & Grossman 
1982, Buttel et al. 1984). This attempt, however, fared less well then did least-cost 
methodology and supply curve analyses. It proved difficult to persuade policy makers 
that the energy conservation schemes, where jobs came to an end once houses were 
insulated, were the equivalent of energy supply construction schemes which provided 
not only once-off construction jobs, but encouraged development and led to further 
growth in manufacturing and longer-term employment (Nordlund & Robson 1980: 6). 
Similarly, while it was estimated by some that investment in renewable energy generated 
three to four times the direct employment than investment in the equivalent conventional 
energy supply, these jobs were considered in the main to be low-skilled and poorly 
paid (Nordlund & Robson 1980: 66). More importantly, as Owens (1995: 211) has 
pointed out, these comparisons of the macroeconomic effects of conventional energy 
supply expansion schemes and clean, low-impact energy efficiency and renewable 
energy strategies in terms of employment creation, overlooked the important point that 
what creates political pressure and tension in representative democracies is not concern 
about jobs in general but concern about these jobs in this locality. 
The first least-cost modelling had been presented, not as a forecast of what would 
happen, but as a demonstration of what could happen if government deregulated 
energy prices and the price of energy was allowed to increase to reflect its true costs. 
This theoretical debate was rapidly overtaken by events when President Carter 
deregulated energy prices in the same year the Mellon Institute published its report. 
Deregulation was followed soon after by the second round of oil price rises and the 
combined effect was a rapid reduction in the growth of energy demand in the USA. 
Total primary energy use in 1987 was below the Ford Foundation's (Freeman et al. 
1974) ZEG projection for that year. To proponents of aggressive energy efficiency, 
there could be no more concrete demonstration that their aggressive energy efficiency 
7 Sant et al (1979) assumed, for example, that energy consumers made energy choices 
based on an implicit discount rate of 5%. 
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proposals were realistic. Much of the reduction in the growth of energy use was 
attributed to an increase in the efficiency of energy use (Brower 1990: 12), allowing 
proponents of aggressive energy efficiency to argue that whilst a rapid increase in the 
efficiency of energy use had been dismissed by policy makers as an option, it had 
happened 'anyway' (Blackburn 1987: 6). The accelerated reduction in the energy 
intensity of the economies of the USA and a small number of other industrialised 
countries was taken as evidence, furthermore, that similar reductions in the energy 
intensity were possible in other countries (Chandler et al. 1988) 
The development of the least-cost concept coupled with the rise in oil prices stimulated 
a wave of books, particularly in the USA, advocating aggressive energy efficiency as 
the solution to energy-related problems (Leach et al. 1979, Kendall & Nadis 1980, 
Sorenson 1980, Gibbons & Chandler 1981, Ross & Williams 1981, Solar Energy Research 
Institute 1981, Lovins 1981, Oliver et al. 1983, National Audubon Society 1984). The 
production of energy efficiency assessments became a cottage industry and whilst 
interest in the concept of the SEP went into decline, the attention of most analysts, 
including Lovins, was increasingly focused on the more mundane but achievable solution 
of increasing the technical efficiency of energy end-use. 
Proponents of the aggressive energy efficiency option continued to believe that a major 
obstacle they faced was convincing policy makers that the 'saved energy' obtained from 
increasing the efficiency of end-use was a virtual source of energy. They continued to 
look for persuasive devices to overcome this resistance and when the word 'negawatt' 
appeared as a typographical error in a local utility planning document, it was quickly 
seized upon by energy efficiency enthusiasts as the unit for their virtual energy source 
(Webb 1995: 35). 
Growing environmental concerns in the mid to late-1980s led to another wave of 
publications on energy efficiency. The World Commission on Environment and 
Development described energy efficiency as 'the cutting edge' of sustainable energy 
policies (WCED 1987: 14). Those who argued that energy production and use was 
responsible for the most serious environmental problems (Lovins & Lovins 1989: 2) 
also argued that, by a happy coincidence, these were problems for which a ready 
solution happened to be at hand. 
The estimates of the potential to produce 'negawatts continued to increase over time. 
Blackburn (1987) estimated an 'overnight' substitution of the most efficient energy-using 
equipment on the market would reduce US energy use by one third, while increased 
energy efficiency in tandem with the deployment of renewable energy systems could 
reduce the nation's energy use to about 20% of existing levels early in the new century 
without any reduction in lifestyle. Lovins estimated that about 50% of energy in 
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industrialised countries could be saved at zero net cost, and that much of this could be 
saved at a cost of less than lc/kWh, and probably closer to 0.6c/kWh (Lovins 1989a: 
306), claiming that this figure was based on analyses using exhaustively documented 
technical data (Lovins 1989a: 301). Using the most advanced cost-effective technologies 
and a near-perfect equipment maintenance regime, he further suggested, it would be 
possible to reduce electricity use in the USA by 75% and that: 
... if we simply pursue the narrowest of economic interests, the energy problem has 
already been solved by new technologies - primarily for more efficient end-use, 
secondarily for more efficient conversion and sustainable supply. (Lovins 1990: 193) 
Like their ecologist counterparts, the physicists who advance aggressive energy efficiency 
as a solution maintained that a global perspective was required. Socolow (1985: 18) 
likened the level of energy use to the distinction between classical mechanics and 
relativity. At low levels of energy use, Socolow suggested, a local perspective sufficed, 
while a planetary perspective was required for high levels of energy use. Lovins 
(1989a: 305), on the other hand, based his case for a planetary perspective on the 
'round Earth hypothesis', the limited supply of non-renewable resources and the 
environment's capacity to absorb pollution. To Holdren (1992b: 1), a global view was 
required when discussing energy policy issues because of the uniformity of the nature of 
the constraints on further supply expansion in all countries and regions, and because 
the world as a whole had entered the era of more costly energy. 
As the environmental problems once again took on a global character, so too did the 
energy efficiency assessments. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that 
energy demand in OECD countries could be reduced by 25% by the year 2000 using 
known and cost-effective technologies (IEA 1987). Goldemberg et al. (1987) calculated 
that the use of efficient energy-using technologies could reduce energy use in industrialised 
countries by approximately 50% by the year 2020 while increasing economic growth by 
50 to 100%. The authors further estimated that global energy requirements in the year 
2020 could be met with 11 TW of primary energy, only 1 TW more than the 1980 level 
of global energy use and far lower than the 20 to 40 TW projected for that year by 
conventional forecasts. Schipper & Meyers (1992: 68) also estimated that the energy 
intensities of OECD countries could be decreased on average by almost 50% by the 
year 2010 compared to where the trends appeared to be pointing. By the late 1980s, 
the assertion that is was possible to halve energy requirements through the deployment 
of cost-effective energy efficient technologies had become relatively common. The 
WCED (1987: 14) claimed that many modern appliances could be designed to deliver 
the same energy services with as little as half the primary energy input needed by their 
conventional counterparts. This was a view reiterated by other commentators (Geller 
1985: 4, Lonnroth 1989: 775) and has increasingly come to be adopted within the 
reports of government advisory bodies (ASTEC 1994: 15). 
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From this brief history of the energy efficiency debate, a number of important points 
can be made. The first is the estimates of the scope for energy efficiency have tended 
to increase significantly over time. The most optimistic technical estimates made in the 
1970s suggested that a 40% to 50% reduction in energy use was technically possible 
and cost-effective. The most optimistic current estimates suggest that energy use can 
be reduced by 75% to 90% (Pears & Versluis 1993: Section 2: 8). 
The second point that can be made is that the rate at which energy intensity has been 
reduced over the past two decades has varied between countries, and between states 
within countries. The literature is therefore replete with contradictory views over the 
degree to which energy efficiency is actually occurring. On one hand, the rate of 
increase in energy efficiency in the USA has been described as little noticed but astonishing, 
more so because it has occurred with minimal direct policy intervention (Lovins 1989a 
311). Yet others lament the slow rate of increase in energy efficiency in the USA since 
the mid-1980s, a phenomenon attributed to consumer indifference (Schipper & Ketoff 
1990: 538). The energy efficiency gap, furthermore, is said to remain large for every 
form of energy in virtually every regions and in all sectors (Jochem & Gruber 1990: 340). 
When the global picture is viewed, moreover, the trends are said to be heading in the 
opposite direction to what those who advance aggressive energy efficiency maintain is 
desirable or possible (Schipper 1995). 
The third point to be made is rather than adopt anti-business, anti-capitalist and 
anti-growth positions, energy efficiency proposals have relied heavily on the argument 
that energy efficiency is able to reduce the costs of energy supply to industry and 
thereby increasing national competitive advantage and create new employment 
opportunities (Toyne 1991: 42). The development of an industry manufacturing energy 
efficient products and renewable energy technologies are advanced as a means of 
boosting export income (Saddler 1990). 
The final point is that the refusal of policy makers to adopt energy efficiency proposals 
as an alternative to expansion of supply has perplexed those who advance those 
proposals. This rejection has been interpreted, furthermore, as an inability on the part 
of the 'energy establishment' to make the quantum leap to demand-side thinking (Kohl 
1993: 3). The key to facilitating the necessary transition to demand side thinking, it 
has been assumed, has been seen to employ devices that will persuade policy makers 
that 'saved energy' is equivalent to increasing the supply of energy. The latest example 
of such an attempt has been the construction of an 'energy efficiency McKelvey diagram'. 
This has been used to demonstrate that the 'economic reserves' of 'saved energy' can be 
altered by investment in technology and an increase in the price of energy in exactly the 
same way that the economic reserves of conventional energy sources are influenced by 
these factors (Pears & Versluis 1993, Section 2, pp. 9-11). 
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Despite these attempts at increasing the persuasive power of the case for aggressive 
energy efficiency, policy makers in many situations have continued to overlook this 
option and the discussion now turns to the explanation of why these proposals have 
been dismissed. It begins by looking at the debate over the need for public policies 
aimed at rapidly reducing energy intensity of the economy before moving downward to 
the reasons for the reliance on supply expansion and the dismissal of energy conservation 
within energy planning at the more local level. 
4.4 Proposals to Rapidly Reduce National Energy Intensity 
Debate over the need for policy intervention to accelerate the reduction in the energy 
intensity of the economy has been protracted, with energy efficiency advocates 
maintaining that reducing energy intensity should be the overall goal of energy policy 
(Saddler 1981: 53). The rejection of these demands for policy intervention has been 
based on a 'quasi-law' (Kraus 1987: 266) or 0 mistaken belief by policy makers that 
there exists a causal relationship between energy use and economic growth that flows 
from the former to the latter so that an increase in energy use is erroneously perceived 
to be a necessary condition for economic growth. 
It is true that economists and economic geographers writing in the Long Boom of the 
1950s and 1960s noted the correlation between certain measures of well-being (personal 
income levels) and energy use and that it was deduced from this that the level of 
energy was one of the important attributes of economic growth (Odell 1963: 72, Schurr 
1963: 116, Manners 1964: 16, Larson 1968: 1). The fact that economic growth and 
growth in energy use have historically marched in 'eerie synchrony', and that the ratio 
between the two was amazingly constant over two decades after the close of the 
second world war is thought to have further contributed to the idea that the two 
parameters were causally related (Socolow 1985: 15-16). 
While energy efficiency analysts considered such a belief that energy use caused economic 
growth was understandable prior to 1973, continued adherence to this belief, they 
maintained, became increasing irrational after that date for two reasons. First, techno-
economic energy efficiency analyses pointed to the existence of substantial theoretical 
potential for increasing the efficiency of energy use (Penner 1979: 917). Secondly, the 
energy intensities of a small number of advanced industrialised econornies 8 was 
significantly reduced, and for a brief period energy use actually fell while economic 
8 Energy use actually declined whilst economic output increased in Denmark, Japan, 
Sweden and the USA over the four year period 1979 to 1983. 
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output increased, in the aftermath of the second round of oil price rises in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Energy efficiency advocates interpreted this reduction in 
energy intensity as concrete proof that their proposals were practical rather than 
theoretical. The fact that the energy intensities of many other countries did not decline 
by similar amounts was explained by advocates of energy efficiency in terms of an 
irrational refusal to accept this 'proof' (Hughes et al. 1985: 109, Socolow 1985: 15). 
This argument continues to be used today as the explanation for the rejection of 
aggressive energy efficiency proposals (Pears & Versluis 1993: Section E: 9). 
Statements made by influential decision makers to the effect that relationship between 
energy use and economic growth is fixed, have been used as evidence that policy 
making is based on such a misconception about the relationship between these two 
parameters. Such statements were said to be relatively uncommon prior to the early 
1970s (Abrahamson 1973: 193, Chapman 1975: 117). The Ford Foundation's report 
(Freeman et al. 1974), however, led to heated debate in which a number of influential 
decision makers commented on the nature of this relationship (Saddler 1981: 75). One 
such individual was Donald Burnham, Chairman of the Westinghouse Corporation and 
member of the Ford Foundation study's advisory board. Burnham contested the assertion 
made by the authors of the report that energy use and GNP were not inextricably 
linked and could be uncoupled, maintaining that there existed a wealth of data to 
indicate that they were indeed linked (D. Burnham in Freeman et al. 1974: 367). 
Similar comments continue to be made. The Australian government's premier economic 
forecasting body, the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
[ABARE] recently maintained that the trends continued to reaffirm 'the importance 
that economic growth has for energy consumption growth' (Bush et al. 1989: 3). 
While these statements appear to provide strong evidence of such a belief in an inextricable 
link between energy use and economic growth, there are reasons for doubting whether 
such comments were intended to suggest that it was theoretically impossible to increase 
economic output whilst decreasing energy use. A more plausible interpretation of these 
comments is that these individuals believed that dramatic reductions in energy intensity 
were undesirable rather than impossible. It appears to have been well accepted, for 
example, that the relationship between energy use and GNP was 'far from a one-to-one 
correlation' and that both parameters varied both over time and between places (Cook 
1971: 87, Chapman 1975: 119). The Australia Institute of Engineers stated explicitly 
that the nation's energy intensity would continue to decline as a result of structural 
changes, energy conservation and energy substitution and that the rate of this decline 
would be determined largely by the price of energy (Institute of Engineers of Australia 
1977: 11). 
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That individuals such as Burnham maintained that it was not possible to alter the 
relationship between energy use and economic output, was in fact undermined by the 
fact that Burnham, in making his statement, used a scatterplot showing that this 
relationship varied from one year to the next, and that this change could be substantial. 
His graph (Figure 4.1) showed energy use in the USA to fall by over 7% in 1949 with no 
concomitant reduction in economic growth, and decreased in 1952 by 1% while economic 
glowth increased by 3% (Burnham, in Freeman et al. 1974: 168). That Burnham believed 
an increase in economic growth necessitated an equal growth in energy use, or that there 
existed an immutable relationship between energy use and economic growth, is therefore 
difficult to accept. It is clear, however, that such individuals considered rapid and 
substantial changes in this relationship to be either less possible or undesirable, or 
both. 
Figure 4.1 The scatterplot of energy use and economic output in the USA, 1948 
to 1973, used by Burnham (Freeman et al. 1974: 168) to indicate that 
energy use and economic growth were linked. 
That individuals such as Burnham believed that relationship between energy use and 
economic growth could not be rapidly altered in theory is also highly unlikely, given 
that it is undeniable that an economy based on low energy-intensive activities, such as 
manufacturing cigarettes or computers, would use less energy than an economy based 
on energy-intensive economic activity, such as aluminium smelting. Saddler (1981: 76) 
argued that because this argument was irrefutable, statements such as those made by 
Burnham were 'fatuous' and clearly served the ideological function of protecting the 
vested interests of energy-intensive industries and an ideological commitment to reliance 
on market mechanisms rather than government intervention to determine the structure 
of the economy. 
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While Saddler's neoMarxist interpretation has a certain amount of validity, it is not 
without problems. An alternative explanation for the refusal of policy makers to 
intervene to dramatically alter the structure of the economy is that abrupt and dramatic 
shifts could not be made without causing 'severe economic dislocation' (Cook 1971: 
88). This view was advanced not only by conservative industry leaders but by 
independent energy conservationists such as Peter Chapman who wrote: 
It is just about impossible for a modern industrial society suddenly to change any 
trend - all changes must be gradual. In fact the more slowly the change is made, 
the less disruptive will be its effects. (Chapman 1975: 112) 
Rapid restructuring of the economy requires changes in the nature of employment, 
retraining of the workforce, changes in places of living, and so on. If these changes 
occur too rapidly, they have the potential to inflict considerable hardship. Resistance 
to such demands therefore extends beyond the immediate interests of industry alone 
and includes governments, workers, their families, and secondary businesses reliant on 
energy-intensive industries. Redevelopment of energy-intensive industries to render 
them more efficient is therefore a socially and politically more palatable option than a 
rapid winding down of energy-intensive industries and their replacement with less 
energy-intensive modes of production. But even this investment in redevelopment of 
the existing structure of economy can be a slow process as the durability of energy-
using equipment dictates replacement over decades (Schipper & Darmstadter 1978: 
44). The irony here is that a rapid reduction in energy intensity requires a high rate of 
economic growth: the faster the economy grows, the greater the opportunity to reduce 
the energy intensity of the economy. 
The debate over the potential or desirability of reducing the energy intensity of the 
economy has often omitted the crucial question of how these reductions in energy 
intensity can be, and have been, achieved. Introducing this question raises a number of 
difficult issues. Energy intensity can be decreased by increasing the efficiency of energy 
supply; curtailing nonproductive energy use (in the economic sense) such as private 
transport or space conditioning, fuel switching, and restructuring economic activity to 
shift from energy-intensive activities such as aluminium production to less energy-
intensive activities such as tourism and other services. Approximately a quarter of the 
reduction in OECD energy use from projected energy use levels between 1973 and 1988 
has been attributed to curtailment and behavioural change (lower thermostats, greater 
use of public transport, etc.). Another one third has been estimated to have resulted 
from structural shifts between different sectors of the economy (less aluminium 
production, more computers and so on). The remaining 40 to 45% has been attributed 
to an increase in the technical efficiency of energy use (Saddler 1994: 51-2). 
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These figures, however, conceal a number of possible complexities. Structural shifts 
can be achieved by displacing energy-intensive manufacturing off shore, and to developing 
countries in particular. Increased technical efficiency of energy use can also result in no 
net reduction in energy use if the gain in energy efficiency is offset by increased output. 
The attempt to attribute causes to the reductions in energy use and energy intensities, 
furthermore, can be complex and figures can be misleading. Included in the category of 
increased technical efficiency of energy use, for example, are often changes such as 
structural shifts within sectors of the economy, such as the production of higher value 
added aluminium products rather than low value products. Such changes are in reality 
disguised structural shifts rather than increased technical efficiency improvements but 
are difficult to segregate out from aggregate data. Included in technical increases in 
efficiency, moreover, are supply side efficiency improvements and the impacts of changes 
in fuel mix. It has been pointed out, for example, that the 'decoupling of energy use 
and economic growth in the USA between 1973 and 1987 was limited largely to a 
decoupling of petroleum use from economic growth and that the intensity of other 
energy types actually increased. Electricity use in particular remained highly correlated 
with economic growth and at a global level the relationship remained extremely close to 
1:1 (Ahearne 1989: 1-2). In countries such as the USA in which sectorial energy 
intensity declined approximately 25% between 1973 and 1987, electricity use as a 
portion of total energy use increased (Preston 1995: 50). Estimates of improvements in 
energy efficiency based on the decrease in energy intensity, furthermore, can overlook 
the fact that an increase in the price of commodities such as cars can decrease energy 
intensity without altering energy efficiency. 
This leaves largely unexplained why some countries have managed to restructure their 
economies and decrease their energy intensities significantly while others have not, and 
why in some countries, such as Australia, economic development continues to rely on 
attracting energy-intensive industries (ASTEC 1994: 15). While the answer to this 
question is complex, a small number factors appear to have been particularly important. 
The first has to do with the degree to which the economy is reliant on energy imports, 
and oil in particular. Prior to the rise in the price of oil in the 1970s, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Japan were all highly dependant on oil imports and hence moved 
quickly to reduce the oil intensity of their economies as the vulnerability of their 
situation became clear (this shift involved not only substitution away from oil, but also 
energy conservation). These counties moved quickly to reduce the risks to their economies 
of further oil price rises. The USA was not only a net oil importer but a superpower. 
Oil was therefore an energy source of great strategic importance to the USA and the 
government moved to reduce reliance on imports for strategic reasons. The substantial 
decrease in the energy intensity in the USA was also partially a consequence of the 
higher per capita energy use base that country started from. 
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The second, and related factor, is that of the price of energy. Where energy prices have 
been high, such as in Japan and Italy, the replacement of energy-intensive equipment 
processes has occurred at a more rapid rate than it has in countries where energy prices 
are relatively low, such as Canada and Australia. 
The third reason has to do with the relationship between government and business, a 
relationship which is said to vary substantially from one country to another. Economic 
adjustment can follow either a 'business-led', laissez-faire or 'negotiated' model in 
which government, business and labour cooperate in policy development and 
implementation to varying degrees. In many Scandinavian and continental European 
countries, and particularly in France and Japan, there exists a strong and mutually 
supportive government-business relationship in which the state actively intervenes in 
the affairs of, and supports, business. Economic adjustment in countries such as 
France and Japan is described by political scientists as 'state-led' with collaboration 
between business and government in which an active state role is welcomed by business. 
In contrast, the relationship in Anglo-American countries is one in which politics and 
the economy have been traditionally separated. In such circumstances, the state's role 
in the economy is described as 'weak', making it difficult to implement a concerted 
approach to economic problems (Bell & Wanna 1992a: 10-12). This traditional 
relationship between government and business, and between politics and the economy 
in countries such as Australia, for example, makes many would-be policy solutions to 
problems politically infeasible (Bell & Wanna 1992a: 11). 
In summary, the debate over energy intensity is therefore divided between those who 
demand rapid reductions in energy intensity, but who fail to understand the social and 
economic implications of their reform proposals, and neoconservative economists, who 
consider a public policy of intervening to reduce the energy intensity of the economy to 
be about as rational as reducing the 'custard intensity' of the economy (Sutherland 
1994: 260). The reasons for the differences in the reductions in energy intensity between 
countries, such as energy prices, political cultures and variations in the relationship 
between business and government have often been overlooked. While the sensible 
position appears to be somewhere between the two extremes, it is clear that the pace 
of change in this direction has tended to be undesirably slow in many situations. 
So far, technological determinism and the technological trajectory theses have been 
dismissed in this study as adequate explanations of the growth of energy systems, 
while the reasons that policy makers reject demands for radical restructuring of either 
society or the economy in the name of reducing reliance on large energy conversion 
technologies or the energy intensity of the economy have been covered. The discussion 
now turns to more moderate energy efficiency proposals and the reasons why these are 
dismissed in many situations. Examination of these more moderate demands requires 
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an adjustment of focus to the energy planning and decision making processes. Three 
basic models of policy decision making can be identified within the literature, rational 
strategic and political, all three of which are idealised abstractions of reality. The 
discussion begins with the first of these models, rational planning and decision making. 
4.5 Rational Energy Planning 
To access the degree to which the growth of energy systems and the rejection of energy 
conservation can be accounted for as products of rational planning, the theory of 
rational decision making needs to be first discussed. 
4.5.1 Policy Decision Making Theory: The Rational-Analytical Model 
Rational decision making is commonly referred to in the literature as rational-
comprehensive, rational-analytical or synoptic decision making model. It has been 
advanced as not only the best way to make decisions, but also as a description of how 
decisions are actually made. The presumption of the model is that planning decisions 
are the result of purposive choices made on the basis of pre-existing and consistent 
goals, and is the policy decision making analogue of the economist's rational utility-
maximising individual. Policy makers are assumed to establish precisely defined goals 
and then make a thorough search for solutions and carry out a complete analysis of 
each of these, taking every factor into account. It assumes that a problem can be 
specified and separated from its social context and that a single optimal solution to 
that problem can be logically determined by the following ordered sequence of steps: 
(i) identification of goals; (ii) translation of goals into more specific objectives; (iii) 
ranking of these objectives in order of priority; (iv) examination of the alternative 
means of achieving each objective and the costs and benefits of each; (v) examination 
of the feasibility of the various options and the extent to which they would add to or 
detract from other important values; (vi) selection of one option on the basis of costs 
and benefits; (vii) the implementation of the chosen option; and (viii) monitoring of the 
performance of the policy option to ensure that it leads to the expected result (Doyle & 
Kellow 1995: 138). It is therefore ambitious, confident and comprehensive in its 
approach and aspires to scientifically or analytically 'correct' solutions. 
A problem with the rational-analytical decision making model is the very significant 
demands it places on the decision making process - in much the same way as an 
holistic approach places an unmanageable burden on the researcher. The requirement 
of rational policy decision making for unambiguous information, time and resources to 
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carry out the necessary analyses, and a complete and consistent way of ordering 
preferences, are more than most decision making processes have access to. The rational-
analytical model is therefore limited in its application to resolution of only the most 
simple and straightforward issues. 
Energy policy has been regarded as one such issue that can be managed using the 
rational-analytical model, particularly where the choice of energy options is assumed 
to be made on the basis of narrowly defined engineering and economic parameters. 
The energy options are considered to be sufficiently few to be comprehensively assessed 
and compared, and the selection of the optimal option can be capable of being determined 
analytically using empirically constructed demand forecasts and the application of 
standard cost-benefit analyses. Energy efficiency experts also implicitly adopt such a 
position in advancing aggressive energy efficiency on the basis of their techno-economic 
analysis of the cost-effectiveness criteria. In the following section, the degree to which 
rational energy planning provides an explanation of the growth of energy systems and 
the rejection of energy conservation proposals is examined. 
4.5.2 The Growth of Energy Supply Systems under Rational Planning 
Where planning is based on a narrow economic criteria, the strong tendency of planners 
to rely on expanding the energy supply system and to dismiss energy efficiency proposals 
can be explained in terms of the drive to increase system load factor and system 
reliability. The rejection of energy conservation proposals can also be explained within 
rational planning where the scope for reducing the demand for energy is perceived by 
planners to be limited. 
4.5.2.1 The drive to increase system load factor 
Large discrepancies between average load and system generating capacity, or between 
average and peak loads, increase average unit costs. Load factor was a concept 
developed specifically by the electricity supply industry late in the nineteenth century 
as a direct consequence of the inability to store electricity (Hughes 1987: 73). High 
load factors are desired because generating capacity is not determined by the average 
load, but by the maximum load during the cycle. From the engineering perspective it is 
therefore desirable to smooth out the load profile to ensure that system generating 
capacity is used to the maximum. The goals of minimising the ratio between average to 
peak (diurnal or annual) loads, and creating high and stable base to maximize use of 
generating capacity are both important to managers. The relative importance of these 
goals varies from one situation to another. Where the system is based predominantly 
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hydro-electric generation, peak load factors are less critical as additional generating 
capacity can be brought on line relatively quickly. The attempt to increase load 
factors, Hughes maintained, has been the primary drive behind the historic growth of 
capital intensive technological systems in capitalist interest-calculating societies. 
The two 'elegant solutions' to the problem of low load factors, according to Hughes, 
have traditionally been interconnection of neighbouring energy systems, and the 
construction of new supply capacity. Interconnecting neighbouring distribution systems 
achieves a better overall spread of customer type. Electricity utilities have pursued 
interconnection to spread the load over a diverse range of sectors such as industrial, 
small business, transport and residential sectors. Increasing the supply of energy 
within a separate energy grid, on the other hand, can increase load factors if the 
increase in supply is used to attract new customers with relatively stable loads. 
Over the past one and a half decades, an increasing number of utilities have also 
attempted to increase load factors by encouraging existing customers to shift loads to 
off-peak periods or finding new customers for off-peak demands (discussed in Section 
2.4.) It is for this reason that most demand side management programmes adopted by 
utilities to date have consisted primarily of peak shifting, valley filling or peak clipping 
strategies rather than load reduction (Geller 1989: 741). 
This desire to increase load factor through the dual strategies of reducing peak load 
and building up off-peak load explains the lack of utility encouragement of energy 
conservation measures. Advocates of energy conservation and renewable energy, for 
example, have often criticised the lack of energy utility encouragement solar hot water 
systems which they consider to be the most mature of the renewable energy technologies 
and to have been economically competitive with conventional energy supply systems 
for quite some time. This has been interpreted as evidence that managers of energy 
supply have a 'hostile attitude' towards renewable energy technologies (Diesendorf 
1994a: 12-17, Gilchrist 1994: 278, Lowe 1994: 206). But while renewable energy 
enthusiasts and energy conservationists consider low off-peak tariffs which reduce the 
cost-effectiveness of solar water heating perverse, energy suppliers see low off-peak 
tariffs simply as a means of deferring the need for further peaking capacity. The fact 
that low off-peak electricity tariffs reduce the cost-effectiveness of solar hot water 
systems is, to managers of electricity supply organisations, no different from the fact 
that off-peak tariffs also compete with other fuels such as gas. 
Electricity utilities actually have a double incentive to discourage the use of solar hot 
water systems if these are used in a way that increases system load factor (Gibbs 
1991: 15). The adoption of solar hot water systems can reduce total load. Owners of 
solar hot water systems who boost their solar systems with the general electricity tariff 
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and draw off most of their hot water in the early evening, add to the evening peak 
load. For this reason, electricity authorities have tended to restricted electric boosting 
of solar hot water systems to off-peak tariffs. There is therefore a contradiction 
contained in the criticism of low off-peak tariffs. Energy efficiency proposals are often 
advanced as a means of deferring costly investment energy supply expansion programmes 
(Lovins & Hirst 1989: 34). The most costly supply systems are those associated with 
the expansion of peak load capacity and energy conservation measures which reduce 
peak load are therefore advanced as particularly cost-effective from a social perspective 
(Lewis et al. 1987: 1). The use of cheap off-peak tariffs to reduce peak load in order to 
defer the need for investment in new supply, however, also undermines the cost-
effectiveness of conservation measures. 
In a similar manner, renewable energy enthusiasts have objected to proposals for 
interconnecting grids on the grounds that interconnection increases the supply of cheap 
energy and thereby reduces local reliance on renewable energy technologies (Diesendorf 
1994b: 156). Where interconnection is seen as a means of reducing the need for further 
construction of conventional supply infrastructure, however, factions of the 
environmental movements have supported interconnection proposals (Kohl 1993: 25). 
Behind these contradictions lie not only fundamentalist notions about energy conservation 
being a good thing, but a failure to understand when load reduction is in the interests 
of the utility, and how much energy conservation is possible. The first of these questions 
will be momentarily put aside and addressed in Section 4.6, while the issue of how 
much energy conservation is being referred to is discussed in Section 4.5.2.3. 
4.5.2.2 The need to increase system reliability 
Growth of energy supply systems can also be explained in terms of rational planning 
attempts to increase system reliability. The interconnection of grids may reduce 
uncertainty over system capacity to meet demand if the interconnected systems are 
based on different supply technologies or fuels. By increasing the diversity of the 
energy system, a shortage of one fuel could be partially overcome by temporary increased 
reliance other fuels. Alternatively, the construction of new energy generation capacity 
based on different fuels within an independent energy system serves the same function. 
By interconnecting a grid supplied by hydro-electricity with another supplied by coal-fired 
power stations, the overall efficiency of the system can be increased with the hydro-electric 
facilities used to provide peak loads and the thermal plant used to provide a steady 
base load. The costs of energy are also decreased as the need for reserve plant margin 
is also reduced. Reducing the costs of energy in this way, however, also reduces the 
cost-effectiveness of energy conservation measures. 
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4.5.2.3 A perception of limited scope for reducing demand 
The dismissal of aggressive energy conservation proposals can also be explained under 
rational planning where planners perceive the scope for reducing demand to be relatively 
limited. Tension over energy policy arises in this area when the perceptions as to the 
scope for reducing demand differ and it is worth considering the causes of these 
differences in perception. 
Central to this debate is the concept of barriers to energy conservation. The term 
'barriers is a physical metaphor originally employed in psychology to explain resistance 
to individual mobility between social groups (Lewin 1936). From psychology it was 
borrowed by consumer research, where it was used to label the causes for limits on the 
market penetration of new products (Woods 1981: 153). The term barriers is now in 
widespread use in many fields, including that of energy conservation. As an explanation 
of the what causes the gap between the potential to reduce energy use and actual levels 
of energy conservation, however, the term can be problematical. Without empirical 
attempts to identify the actual nature of these causes, the term is tautological as it 
amounts to tacit acceptance of the hypothesis that high adoption rates are expected, 
and then postulates the existence of barriers as a secondary hypothesis in order to 
account for the fact that the predictions of the first hypothesis are not observed. 
There is, furthermore, a strong tendency on the part of those who use the term barrier 
to treat it as an explanation rather than a metaphor. Sayer (1992) has discussed at 
length the potential problems that such displacement of metaphors can lead to in 
research and used diffusion theory as an example. Diffusion theory, he argued, takes 
as its fundamental premise that the expected diffusion of technical innovations can be 
modelled on the basis of the diffusion of pathogens, whilst ignoring the fundamental 
differences between pathogens and technical innovations (Sayer 1992: 53). The 
temptation to label as a barrier anything which retards the increase in energy efficiency 
is therefore fraught with risks and has the potential to lead to much confusion in 
analysis (Sawhill & Cotton 1986: 9). The confusion would probably be significantly 
reduced if the term barriers to energy conservation was avoided and the term reasons for 
low adoption rates of energy conservation measures were used instead. 
The different perceptions over the scope for energy conservation is further complicated 
by the fact that there are several interpretations of the optimal level of energy efficiency 
(Jaffe & Stavins 1994). This difference in meaning has been at the root of the often 
heated debate between economists and technical energy efficiency experts (Brookes 
1990, 1992, Grubb 1992, Jaffe & Stavins 1994, Sheraga 1994, Sutherland 1994). To 
understanding the difference in perceptions of these two groups it is necessary to 
understand the economists' distinction between barriers (or market barriers), market failures 
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and non-market failures. While economists dismiss the notion of barriers to energy 
efficiency as a myth (Sioshansi 1991), economists generally define market barriers as 
those factors that cause the gap between what is technically cost-effective and what 
occurs in practice. Unlike energy efficiency experts, however, economists maintain that 
many market barriers are normal characteristics of a well-functioning market. To the 
economist, the diffusion of technologies such as solar hot water systems tends to be a 
gradual process by nature and the existence of an energy efficiency gap is therefore a 
natural and expected phenomenon rather than a mystery or a problem Gaffe & Stavins 
1994: 804). Policy intervention to overcome market barriers to increase the rate at 
which energy conservation measures are adopted, according to economists, may or 
may not be warranted (Brookes 1991, Sutherland 1994). Sutherland (1994: 267), for 
example, described falling electricity prices as a market barrier to the increased adoption 
of solar hot water systems. But it does not logically follow, he argued, that policy 
makers should attempt to increase the adoption rate of solar hot water systems. Some 
market barriers, however, do warrant public policy intervention to overcome them and 
these are referred to by economists as market failures (Jaffe & Stavins 1994: 805). 
What constitutes market failures, however, is not always clear. Because the available 
theoretical models of how markets work are relatively crude, only relatively large 
deviations between what is expected from a rational economic perspective and what 
actually happens in practice are taken as substantive evidence of market failure (Hinchey 
et al. 1991: 8). Potential sources of market failure commonly identified include lack of 
information and a split in the incentive between those who purchase energy equipment 
and those who pay their running costs. Intervention to overcome these market failures, 
economists argue, may be justified. 
Economists also recognize non-market failures which retard the rate of adoption of 
energy efficiency measures. These non-market failures are caused by such considerations 
as the uncertainty of future energy prices, the uncertainty about the actual savings from 
energy technologies and the irreversible nature of energy efficiency investment decisions. 
All of these make consumers cautious about investing in energy efficiency. Energy 
performance, furthermore, is not the only basis on which purchase decisions are made 
as size, features, brand, reliability and maintenance service are all factors used by 
consumers in making such decisions. One colleague recently reported to the author that 
he selected a new refrigerator on the basis of the door handle. Another colleague 
selected his new refrigerator on the basis of the rapidity with which it would cool 
down beer. Compact fluorescent lights provide another example of purchasers basing 
their decisions on factors other than energy efficiency. While CFLs are more cost-effective 
than incandescent globes in many situations, individuals may decide against purchasing 
them on the basis of the risks of breakage, the hue of the light, or their non-instantaneous 
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Not all energy efficient equipment, furthermore, is economically efficient for all users. 
Heap pumps, for example, are more economically efficient than electric resistance 
heater where space heating requirements are substantial. For those who heat only 
small areas, or who use space heating equipment only rarely, less technically efficient 
electric resistance heaters may be the more economically rational option. 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that there exist differences in opinion as to 
what constitutes the optimal level of energy efficiency. Jaffe & Stavins (1994) defined 
the 'hypothetical technical potential' for energy efficiency as the level of energy efficiency 
achieved by an overnight substitution of the existing stock of energy-using equipment 
with the most technically efficient available. These authors then defined the 'technologist's 
optimal level', as the level that could be achieved by removing all 'market barriers' to 
energy efficiency irrespective of their nature or difficulty of doing so. They then 
defined the 'economists' optimal level' as the level of energy efficiency achieved by 
eliminating all market failures for which it was cost-effective to do so. The socially 
optimal level of energy efficiency Jaffe & Stavins argued, was a totally separate issue 
and revolved around the debate over the degree to which the social costs of energy 
production and use should be internalised. The reasons why policy makers resist 
demands for including the full social costs of energy in energy prices were discussed in 
the previous chapter. Jaffe & Stavins' useful schemata of the relationship between 
these various definitions of the optimal level of energy efficiency is reproduced in 
Figure 4.2 [Note: the various levels of energy efficiency shown in Figure 4.2 have been 




Baseline or business as usual energy efficiency level 
Figure 4.2 The distinction between the technically, economically and socially 
optimal levels of energy efficiency [from Jaffe & Stavins 1994: 808]. 
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For reasons discussed above, policy makers are likely to perceive the scope for reducing 
energy use through energy efficiency to be more limited than do proponents of aggressive 
energy efficiency. The more marginal the perceived capacity of energy conservation to 
defer supply expansion, the lower its attraction as a planning option. Energy efficiency 
improvements that are able to defer the need for another nuclear power station, coal-fired 
power station or large hydro-electric scheme for only a short period also fail to excite 
environmentalists. 
Interest in energy conservation as a planning option on the part of an energy supply 
organisation will be limited unless the perceived scope for energy conservation is above 
a certain threshold. Here, the practical planning definition of energy conservation given 
by Lee (1991: 337), as the capacity to rein in some of the slack in the energy system 
during periods of hardship or stress, is perhaps more important than the precise, 
technical definition of energy conservation given in Section 2.2. Lee's definition infers 
that for policy makers to have an interest in energy conservation, the scope of energy 
conservation has to be seen as sufficient to provide a meaningful solution to a planning 
problem. If the scope for reducing energy use is modest, permanently attempting to 
maximise the efficiency of energy use is not considered worthwhile or realistic and 
energy planners could be bothered expending effort to reduce energy use only when the 
problems associated with energy supply problems are pressing. In this view, the 
behaviour of energy supply organisations is akin to that of the individuals who is 
aware that there is a large gap under the back door through which heat escapes but 
who could not be bothered doing anything about it until prompted by a sudden rise in 
the price of energy or an exceptionally cold snap. Where the scope for reducing 
demand is perceived to be limited, planning interest in energy conservation is therefore 
a matter of timing. 
Planners may also decide to defer reliance on energy conservation even where the 
perceived scope for reducing demand is considered significant. If for example, the 
expansion of electricity supply is financed with low interest government loans, it may 
be rational from the energy supply bureaucracy's perspective to continue the expansion 
programme in order to ensure that the gain from these low interest loans is maximised 
while they are available. Energy conservation would then be allowed to build up over 
time with energy conservation programmes kept in abeyance until the scope for energy 
conservation reaches a threshold level or until the situation dictates that the time is 
right for this slack in the system to be tapped. 
The above sections have attempted to explain the growth of energy systems and the 
dismissal of energy conservation as a planning option from the perspective of narrow 
engineering and economic management goals. It has been shown that the growth of 
energy supply systems and the rejection of demands for energy conservation policies 
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can be partially explained as the consequences of rational planning narrowly defined. 
It is less possible to explain very rapid rates of growth in the energy supply system for 
the rejection of energy conservation where the perceived scope for reducing demand is 
substantial. There are also many theoretical problems associated with the rational-
analytical policy decision making model which lead to the need to look at alternative 
decision making models for energy policy decision making. 
A serious problem with the rational decision making model is that it may not be 
possible to identify all options, problems may not be clearly defined, and there may be 
conflict over values and goals. The technical information available may be either 
woefully deficient and therefore ignored, or so comprehensive that it is beyond the 
ability of policy makers to appreciate its significance (Walker 1994: 186). An attempt 
at truly comprehensive-rational decision making would place extraordinarily large 
demands on the decision making process in that it assumes that goals can be specified 
and agreed upon, and that it is possible to rationally evaluate a number of means of 
achieving these goals. Yet, as Canfield & Siemenski (1975: 324-5) argued, 'nowhere is 
the problem of multiple goals more troublesome than in the area of energy'. Policy 
makers, they argued, struggle to balance and harmonise the often conflicting objectives 
of assuring reliable supplies at the lowest possible cost while trying to protect the 
environment, minimise energy imports and prevent gross inequities in the system. 
Attempting to convince policy makers that these conflicting goals can best be achieved 
by means other than greatly expanding energy use, Canfield & Siemenski argued, can be 
difficult. 
If these problems in the rational-analytical model result in short-cuts in decision making, 
the claim to comprehensive rationality is immediately compromised. At the practical 
level, the major problem with the model is the time constraints on decision making. 
Time is often of the essence and the decision making process therefore needs to be 
hurried. Speeding up analyses, however, dramatically drives up the costs of analysis. 
A fully rational-comprehensive search for the best possible solution, therefore, would 
be a recipe for paralysis. Policy makers would therefore tend to weigh up the likelihood 
that an informed guess would arrive at the same answer more quickly and demand a 
lot less in the way of resources than rational planning. Another likely consequence of 
the short availability of time is that if information upon which a particular option is 
based is seriously questioned by any party, even if it were the optimal decision in 
reality, that option is quickly abandoned in the rush to reach a decision in the time 
available (Kellow & Doyle 1995: 232). 
A further problem with the analytical approach has to do with the way information is 
presented to decision makers. Georges Pompidou, the President of France in the 
1970s, once stated that there were three ways to ruin. While the most enjoyable road 
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to ruin, according to Pompidou, was to chase after women, and the fastest was to 
gamble, the most certain way to ruin, he asserted, was to follow the advice of experts 
(Cane 1981: 1). Policy makers often have a healthy scepticism over the accuracy and 
completeness of information supplied by 'experts which is seen to be biased to varying 
degrees as experts are not impartial participants in the debate but carpetbaggers 
peddling favoured options. Individuals, specialised organisations and interest groups 
are able to selectively choose, withhold and distort the information they advance in 
order to further their goals (Kellow & Moon 1993: 138-9). This presents decision 
makers with the difficult task of deciding which source of information is the more 
reliable. 
The above problems have been broadly considered by many policy analysts to render 
the comprehensive-rational or rational-analytical model so problematical that its use in 
decision making is severely restricted. While many consider that decisions over small, 
well-defined issues such as energy policy making are amenable to resolution through 
the use of such analytical or quasi-analytical tools as cost-benefit analyses and 
environmental impact statements, there is virtual consensus amongst policy analysts 
that most policy decision making conforms in reality to something closer to the alternative 
strategic decision making model. 
Rational planning is therefore able to partially explain the growth of energy systems 
and the dismissal of some energy conservation proposals. It is also able to explain 
why peak load demand management strategies have tended to be in more common use 
than overall load reduction strategies. What is clear from this discussion is that for 
energy conservation to be adopted as an planning option, the perceived scope for 
reducing the demand for energy needs to be significant. Secondly, the value of energy 
conservation from a planning perspective is only useful when planners are contemplating 
the means of meeting demand for energy beyond the output of the existing supply 
system. The discussion has to turn to the second decision making model, that of 
strategic decision making, and the degree to which growth in the energy supply system 
and the rejection of energy conservation proposals can be explained using this model. 
4.6 Strategic Energy Planning 
Policy decision making under the strategic model is more limited in its intellectual 
aspirations than is the rational-analytical model. It assumes that people cannot master 
all of their problems and are forced to rely on simplifying devices such as trial and 
error or rules of thumb, or to fall back on routinised and habitual responses to certain 
categories of problems. Policy making is therefore a more cautious, steady-as-she-goes 
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approach that accepts that whilst rational decision making would be ideal in theory, 
the practical constraints on rational-decision making rule it out as a real option. At the 
very best, rationality is considered to be bounded' and decision makers choose the first 
course of action that will do rather than searching for the one which is optimal (Simon 
1957). 
Lindblom (1959) considered that most policy decision making was more pragmatic 
and less rational than even the bounded rationality thesis posited. Policy decision 
making, he argued, was deeply conservative and based on looking for the most familiar 
solutions. In its most basic form, he argued, it was disjointed and incrementalist and 
did not seek optimal or 'satisficing' solutions, but merely tended to ask what decision 
was made last time and whether it had worked. If this does not satisfy the requirements, 
the next most familiar is tried, and so on, policy makers constantly looking for marginal 
alterations rather than brave innovations. In this model, the evolution of policy is a 
slow process that involves a series of incremental steps rather than a discontinuous 
process characterised by small quantum shifts in direction. The advantage of this 
approach, according to those who advance it as a prescription for policy making, is 
that it provides a simple and practical way of dealing with uncertainty. Most importantly, 
it is a flexible approach as it allows policy decisions, in theory at least, to be quickly 
reversed once mistakes are recognised, and other options tried. 
In contrast to the rational-analytical decision making model, policy making in the 
strategic-incremental model sets relatively simple goals, ignores most social values and 
does not attempt to rank those that are considered. Rather than steered by the ends, it 
chooses between ends and means simultaneously and is guided by the pragmatic 
notions that means are more readily agreed upon than goals and that the test of a good 
policy is not whether it is rational but by how acceptable it is to all engaged in the 
debate. Its strength, therefore, is seen to be its essentially democratic nature as the 
final decision is seen to be arrived at via an iterative process of haggling between all 
parties engaged in the debate. As a result of this process, referred to by Lindblom as 
partisan mutual adjustment, the ultimate compromise reached never strays too far from 
the consensual position. The notion of partisan mutual adjustment is related to the 
pluralist model of political conflict resolution, the thesis that conflict over policy is 
resolved through a zero-sum game in. which all interest groups have equal access to 
political process and which thus guarantees the stability of the system. In the pluralist 
model, the function of the government is simply to act as a scorekeeper or referee in a 
debate between all interested groups (Kellow 1986: 13). 
This pluralistic decision making process can, however, result in decisions which are 
irrational from the social perspective. If each interest group gains support for their 
proposal by trading consent for other proposals, then the sum of the policies agreed 
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upon can be undesirable to the majority. This can occur, according to Dahl & Lindblom 
(1953: 339), where there is little interest in, or analysis of, the general consequences of 
the policy proposals in terms of long-term economic consequences, government 
expenditures or taxation levels. To this list could now be added localised or long-term 
environmental consequences. 
The logic of incremental-strategic decision making is, above all else, that of damage 
limitation (Collingridge & Reeves 1986: 148). It considers the time interval in which a 
decision has to be reached to be critically brief and the outcomes of bold policies 
unpredictable, thus forcing policy makers to chose the safest rather than the optimal 
policy. The safest decision is taken to be that which makes marginal adjustments to 
existing policies. Strategic policy decision making is extremely conservative, its primary 
aim being to ensure that policy mistakes are kept within tolerable limits. By making 
small incremental steps, it is able to accommodate change and avoid serious, lasting 
mistakes. The policy maker is therefore less concerned with arriving at the 'correct' 
policy than with being able to avoid big mistakes and with being able to correct any 
mistakes that are made. It therefore places a high premium on corrigible decisions, 
those which can be relatively easily corrected at low costs. Rather than assign a heroic 
role to technical and scientific analysis, decision making in the strategic model is based 
on the philosophy of moving with one's eyes wide open rather than on the pretence 
that it is based on scientific analysis. This mode of decision making has therefore been 
described by its proponents as 'knowingly muddling with some skill' (Lindblom 1979: 
319). 
While rational-analytical decision making enjoys considerable esteem, and 'planning' is 
seen as the most desirable approach to policy, such approaches are regarded by 
proponents of the incrementalist-strategic school to be in reality an abstract activity 
engaged in by engineers, economists and scientists trained in analytical methods but 
who overlook the role of social interaction in policy making. In truth, adherents to the 
strategic model argue, policy decision making relies on technical and cost-benefit analyses 
merely as an aid and policy decision making is never totally analytical. In polyarchies, 
declared Lindblom, planning and policy making 'are always - without exception - 
strategic, although there are many attempts at synopsis' (Lindblom 1977: 314). 
The strategic model of policy making has the power to explain the deeply conservative 
nature of past energy policy decision making. As such, it provides an immediate 
explanation of the rejection of radical demands for policy reform such as the low 
energy growth and zero energy growth strategies advanced by the Ford Foundation 
(Freeman et al. 1974), and the soft energy path advanced by Lovins (1976). It also 
explains the lack of policy response to environmental demands for the inclusion of 
social costs in the price of energy (Walker 1994: 196). 
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The incrementalist approach explains what many policy analysts have seen as the ad 
hoc nature of policy decision making and most policy analysts have concurred that the 
incrementalist model of policy making provides a more accurate description of actual 
policy decision making than does the rational decision making model. As a prescription 
of what should happen, however, it has offended those who consider a more rational 
decision making process to be desirable. Strategic decision making has also been 
criticised as inappropriate for decisions which are essentially irreversible. A small 
number of policy analysts therefore developed hybrid decision making models with 
features of both the comprehensive-analytical and the incrementalist-strategic models. 
Dror (1968) advanced his own two-staged policy decision making. The first stage 
employed a rational-analytical approach in which policy objectives were clarified and 
major alternatives were surveyed. Once this process was completed, policy makers 
then decided whether greater benefits would accrue by advancing incrementally or 
through bolder innovation. Etzioni (1967) developed a similar two-stepped model of 
decision making, the 'mixed scanning' model, in which broad policy goals were established 
using a synoptic approach, omitting the details in order to obtain greater breadth. 
Once these broad goals had been rationally decided upon, the specific details were 
chosen through an incremental process. 
Neither Dror's nor Etzioni's hybrid models gained wide support (Davis et al. 1988: 
114). Their many critics pointed out that neither were able to state unequivocally at 
What point decision making should flip from a synoptic to an incrementalist approach 
as the boundaries between the general and the particular aspects of decision making 
were often vague. These hybrid models were further criticised on the grounds that even 
if only one stage of the decision making relied on a synoptic approach, it still placed 
unrealistic demands on decision making. Many therefore dismissed these hybrid models 
as afflicted by the weaknesses of both the synoptic and the strategic models. 
While Etzioni's mixed scanning model was criticised on the grounds that it could not 
resolve the problem of multiple and conflicting policy goals, Etzioni maintained that 
his model was applicable to at least those decisions which involved a single goal such 
as how best to meet society's future energy requirements. Rational planning, he argued, 
should be able to apply standard analytical techniques to assist in the choice of the 
optimal energy option and the selection of the optimal size of a energy supply projects. 
This was particularly the case where these decision were based on narrow economic 
and engineering criteria (Davis et al. 1988: 115). 
There have been two models of electricity planning advanced to explain the energy 
supply construction cycle which have seen energy planning as a combination of rational 
and strategic decision making (Collingridge 1980, Puiseux 1987). In both cases, energy 
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policy decision making is assumed to be basically a rational process, but is ultimately 
forced to adopt a more strategic approach because of the inability to accurately predict 
future demand. These two models of energy planning are discussed individually 
below. 
4.6.1 Rational Planning Under Uncertainty 
David Collingridge (1980) devised a model of the planning of essential goods and 
services, such as energy, based on the principles of Bayesian rational decision making 
theory. While technical experts are said to be obsessed with forecasting methodology 
and numbers (Hogwood & Gunn 1984: 128), to Collingridge, policy makers were more 
sceptical about the ability to accurately predict demand and therefore used forecasts 
merely as devices used to assist policy making by allowing the implications of policy 
decisions to be explored. He dismissed as erroneous the conventional view that 
planning attempted to match supply to an accurate forecast of demand and argued 
instead that the primary requirement of energy planning was to avoid shortages potentially 
damaging to economic growth. He therefore concurred with those political analysts 
who maintained that the task of policy makers was not to eliminate risks of decision 
making, but to suggest hedges against those risks (Quade 1982: 278). 
The danger inherent in planning based on forecasting is that the planning decisions lead 
to the changes in demand in a way that makes forecasts self-fulfilling prophecies. The 
tendency for this to occur in regard to the energy, Collingridge maintained, was due to 
two important constraints on planning. Having accepted a forecast, he argued, the 
rational energy decision would be to chose the option which produced this amount of 
energy at the cheapest cost. But this had to be balanced, he argued, against the 
possibility that the technology chosen would fail to perform adequately and result in 
energy shortages. To avoid such risks, Collingridge posited, policy makers preferred 
tried-and tested rather than the cheapest technologies. Planning, in his view, consisted 
of first selecting the most reliable technology and then attempting to minimise costs by 
constructing large units to capture economies of scale. Reliance on large technologies to 
capture economies of scale, however, rendered the expansion of energy supply lumpy. 
This introduced the second constraint on planning as it created large surpluses of 
cheap energy. The laws of supply and demand therefore came into play and ensured 
that consumers adjusted their demand to match output. In this way, the forecast for 
energy demand became self-fulfilling and the original planning decision appeared to be 
justified (Collingridge 1980: 85). 
Planning for essential goods and services, according to Collingridge, thus became a 
vicious circle. With self-fulfilment of the forecasts, the gap between demand and 
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supply was once again closed and planning began anew. But as the previous planning 
decision had driven up demand, construction of the next supply system had to be 
scaled up yet again. In this way, Collingridge saw planning as being locked into the 
proven technology and ever increasing scale of construction. The inherent contradiction 
contained in this process was that the strategy of hedging against shortages induced by 
plant failure resulted in reliance on ever increasing scale of construction which, in turn, 
increased the risk of oversupply. This hedging cycle continued, Collingridge presciently 
posited, until the demand for the energy was saturated and consumers could not longer 
absorb the excess. The inevitable result was therefore an oversupply crisis, the greater 
the scale of the excess the more expensive it would be and the longer it would take to 
correct. 
Collingridge's explanation of the rejection of energy conservation as a planning option 
has to be understood in terms of where he perceived energy conservation to fit into the 
planning cycle. To Collingridge, energy conservation and supply expansion could not 
be deployed in parallel but only in series. The reason for this was that growth in 
energy supply was lumpy and once new supply came on line, energy conservation was 
no longer in the strategic interests of the energy supplier. The supplier, having borrowed 
to construct new capacity, was debt-driven and therefore engaged in load growth as a 
means of maximising revenue income. Only when this spare capacity had been soaked 
up did demand reduction as a means of deferring the need for further investment in 
supply again become a potentially useful option for the energy supplier. 
The pertinent question then became why energy conservation was not adopted once the 
gap between supply and demand was narrowed. Collingridge argued that the rejection 
of energy conservation was a product of the uncertainties associated with the capacity 
of energy conservation programmes to reduce energy demand. By the time the stage in 
the planning cycle was reached where demand was approaching supply, he suggested, 
a decision had to be made as to whether to begin construction of the next supply 
expansion project or to rely on energy conservation to reduce demand. The long lead 
times of supply expansion projects, however, meant that a decision had to be made 
quickly to avoid possible shortages. Lack of experience in managing demand for 
energy, however, mitigated against reliance on the adoption of demand reduction 
strategies as it was not possible to know precisely how much, or how rapidly, energy 
could be saved. The combination of the planning priority on avoiding shortages and 
the uncertainties associated with the capacity of energy conservation programmes to 
reduce demand, according to Collingridge, led to rejection of the energy conservation 
option. In the rush to reach a decision in time, energy conservation option was jettisoned. 
Collingridge's depiction of the energy planning process is provided in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3 A stylised sketch of the factors that drive energy planning 
under uncertainty as advanced by Collingridge (1980) [Author's 
own sketch]. 
Collingridge's model lends support to this author's initial hunch that the rejection of 
energy conservation as an option is connected to the rate at which the supply of energy 
increased. Although Collingridge did not discuss whether energy conservation was 
more or less likely to be adopted depending on whether the demand growth was high 
or low, his model suggests that energy conservation is more likely to be adopted as a 
planning option if growth in demand is relatively low. The reason is simply that if 
demand growth is rapid, the period in which to make a decision is shorter and the 
risks of supply shortages caused by the failure of energy conservation programmes to 
meet the demand are increased. With low growth in demand, on the other hand, there 
is more time to put energy conservation programmes in place. With low rate of growth 
in demand, the risks of disruption to economic growth if energy conservation programmes 
fail to produce the expected savings are also lower as there is more time in which to 
correct the decision by bring forward the construction programme. 
The Collingridge model, however, is weakened by assumption that new energy utilities 
become locked into a particular technology because of the attendant risks of relying on 
less tried and tested technologies. There is not one, but a number of tried and tested 
technologies available including gas, coal, nuclear, hydro-electric. The energy supply 
industry, furthermore, relies on spinning and stationary reserve plant to hedge against 
the risks of shortages caused by technical failure. As an explanation of technological 
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lock-in, therefore, avoidance of shortages caused by technical failure is not completely 
solid. Lock-in is more likely to be caused by a desire to rely on locally available 
sources of energy and the comparative costs of different sources of energy. As an 
explanation for the rejection of energy conservation, Collingridge's model appears to be 
credible. A more complete explanation of the tendency for policy to rely on large 
supply expansion technologies and for the phenomenon of overgrowth of energy supply 
is that provided by Puiseux. 
4.6.2 Risk Asymmetry in Rational Energy Planning 
Louis Puiseux (1987), an econometric modeller with Electricite de France (EdF), argued 
that planners had to work with the knowledge that forecasts are necessarily inaccurate. 
They therefore had to work with probabilities and the critical decision they faced was 
whether to err on the side of over or under-supply. The consequences of aiming too 
high were over-investment which tied up scarce resources in the form of costly idle 
capacity that was not producing income. This served to increase the average unit price 
of energy produced by the system. The consequences of aiming too low, on the other 
hand, were the inconvenience to consumers and the damage that shortages would 
inflict on the economy. These risks were not symmetrical from the planners perspective 
as the prospect of blackouts or rationing in the middle of winter when the demand for 
electricity was highest, or of increasing unemployment due to a slowing of industrial 
expansion, were potential political nightmares that planners and politicians could 
ill-afford: 
One can ... imagine the sweat breaking out on the forehead of politicians when 
the possibility of a shut-down of factories and shivering householders is evoked, 
and all this punishment for their stinginess seven or eight years earlier when 
they failed to allocate the required financial means. (Puiseux 1987: 197) 
This perceived asymmetry in the risks associated with the two alternative planning 
options, Puiseux argued, lead planners to systematically adopted high load forecasts 9 . 
The inherent risk in this strategy was the potential for overgrowth in supply and a 
serious imbalance between supply and demand. To minimise these risks, Puiseux 
suggested abandoning the strategy of constructing generating units of ever increasing 
size which was driven by the attempt to capture economies of scale, but increased lead 
times and, therefore, the planning period. This, in turn, increased the uncertainties over 
future demand and, therefore, the risks of oversupply. The rational alternative, according 
9 Puiseux acknowledged that the concept of asymmetrical risks in forecasts as an 
explanation for policy preference for high load forecasts was first advanced by 
Bergougnoux (1982) [Bergougnoux J (1982) La Prevision de la Demande d'Electricite. Paper 
presented at the Colloquium Futuribles, Avignon, 20 December]. 
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to Puiseux, was to proceed more incrementally with smaller-scaled and lower capital 
cost generating units. Although this would increase the unit costs of energy by foregoing 
economies of scale, this disadvantage would be offset, Puiseux asserted, by the reduction 
in risks of oversupply and costly idle capacity as lead times would more closely match 
to those of industrial expansion projects. It was a strategy that involved treading a 
finer line between supply and demand, with the risks of shortages constantly greater 
should growth in demand suddenly accelerate unexpectedly. The ability to bring on 
new generating capacity in a shorter period of time, however, reduced these risks. 
To Puiseux, the real problem was the systematic bias in planning for oversupply and 
related risks of overcapacity rather than low planning emphasis on energy conservation 
per se. Nort does reliance on a more incremental supply expansion programme, based 
on smaller-scaled and lower capital cost technologies necessarily render active demand 
reduction a more attractive planning strategy from the perspective of energy suppliers. 
Collingridge's explanation of the rejection of the energy conservation option in terms of 
the short planning decision times, the uncertainties over the capacity of energy 
conservation to reduce demand, and the primary planning objective of avoiding shortages, 
all remain unaltered. In one way, Puiseux's suggestion of reliance on smaller-scaled 
generating units could serve to reduce the attractiveness of energy conservation as a 
planning option. Many writers maintain that the primary value of energy conservation 
to planners is the financial savings obtained form deferral of the need for costly 
investment in supply infrastructure. The actual value of energy conservation from the 
perspective of planners, however, may be the capacity to reduce the financial risks 
associated with further investment in capacity expansion, risks associated with a 
failure of the expected increase in demand to materialise. If this were the case, and it 
appears likely that it would be in many situations, then reducing the size of the 
increments in capacity expansion would reduce these financial risks and, therefore, the 
attractiveness of energy conservation as a strategy. This argument was supported by 
Lucas & Papaconstantinou (1982) who used a probabilistic model that integrated the 
uncertainties associated with supply side outages, of demand, and of the costs of 
outages. They concluded high uncertainty favoured smaller-scaled and less capital 
intensive energy supply options but large planning margins. 
Three important points need to be made here. First, planning as described by both 
Collingridge and Puiseux places a premium on security of supply. This injects into the 
rational planning process a large subjective element as energy security is not something 
that can be objectively measured but is 'a comfort level' that varies according to many 
factors. What is valued in expanding supply is not the energy itself but the perception 
of security associated with that level of supply (IEA 1991a: 44). Energy supply 
organisations, business and governments tend to value energy security more highly than 
do individuals. 
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Secondly, conventional rational energy planning as portrayed by Pusieux is client-based. 
It assumes that existing clients will expand their needs for energy and that new clients 
will arrive in response in more or less the same way that they have done to date. It 
consists of forecasting the likely increase in demand and then producing enough energy 
to meet the predicted increase. Demand then rises is response, reversing cause and 
effect as the policy decision to increase supply has the effect of increasing demand as 
the events that will influence future demand for energy are policy-determined or policy-
influenced variables (Robinson 1982a: 629). So much has been written about the 
inaccuracies of such predictive forecasting attempts in the 1970s and 1980s based on 
extrapolation that there is no need to use yet another graph to demonstrate these 
inaccuracies. One response has been the attempt to improve the reliability of forecasting 
by using more sophisticated econometric models and the use of conditional 'if-then' 
clauses to make the uncertainties in the assumptions explicit. Forecasting based on 
trend analyses attempts to determine where we seem to be heading. It is an inherently 
conservative process as the lack of historcial data on unconventional energy options 
such as energy conservation automatically means that projections of likely increased 
reliance on these options will understate their true potential (Robinson 1982b: 228). 
Another approach has been the development of end-use or bottom-up analyses that 
more closely mimic energy consumption processes (Bartels 1988: 113). While these 
bottom-up approaches permit a better evaluation of energy conservation potential 
(Robinson 1982a: 628) it has been argued that attempting to improve the fidelity and 
accuracy of forecasting models will not resolve the fundamental problems associated 
such a planning approach and that the real problem is the attempt to predict what is 
likely rather than what is desirable. Such individuals advocate the use of end-use 
analyses in conjunction with 'backcasting' to explore the feasibility of various energy 
future scenarios (Robinson 1982a, 1982b, 1982c, 1988, 1990). Such an approach, 
however, deviates from the traditional client-based mode of energy planning. Rather 
than attempting to estimate what future clients may need by way of energy, it asks 
what more can be squeezed out of existing energy supply and use systems. This turns 
traditional planning on its head as any future increase in energy requirements have to 
be accommodated within this boundary. Such a way of planning is foreign to most 
energy planning organisations (Schrecker 1980: 27). 
The third important point is that advocates of aggressive energy efficiency proposals 
have overlooked the risk asymmetry between under and oversupply. Such experts 
have quite rightly maintained that the risks associated with supply-side strategies are 
real and potentially serious. Drought, for example,is a perennial uncertainty associated 
with hydro-electric schemes. Engineering errors such as miscalculation of evaporation 
effects on hydro-impoundments, as in thre case of the Aswan dam (Sandbach 1980: 
139), mean that long term generating output is less than anticipated. These experts 
insist, moreover, that supply and demand uncertainties are approximately equal: 
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The estimates of the size and costs of conserved energy are not inherently more or 
less uncertain than those of conventional supply. (Wright & Baines 1986: 6) 
Such statementss indicate a failure to comprehend tthat planners treat the risks of 
under and oversupply differently. Even if the risks of conservation and energy supply 
were considered to be more or less equal in degree, planners would still consider them 
to be substantially different in their consequences and place greater weight on the 
uncertainties that could result in supply shortages than on other uncertainties. 
Collingridge's and Puiseux's explanations for the rejection of energy conservation as a 
policy option in electricity planning have been given tacit support within the literature. 
It is commonly accepted that agencies responsible for electricity planning will tend to 
err on the side of security and overproduction as managers of these agencies stand to 
be severely censured if the generating system subsequently proves unable to meet 
demand (Wilde 1978: 213). A recent interpretation of the reasons behind the undermining 
of demand management in electricity planning in the Australian context (Chatfield et 
al. 1992) also lent support to these explanations. The choice of large scale electricity 
generating units, these authors argued, avoids shortages but is a gamble as planning 
forecasts that are too high result in large surplus capacities. These risks are amplified 
by the fact that the choice of large generating units required the construction of large 
reserve plant generating units, since the generating capacity of reserve plant is related 
to the size of the generating units in use. Once the new large plant come on line, their 
argument went, energy demand management conflicts with the strategic interests of the 
utility. Until the rise in demand catches up with the increased capacity of the system, 
there is little incentive for the utility to engage in demand management. But at that 
point, the authors added, the long lead times for new plant construction necessitates a 
quick decision and the lack of utility experience in demand management strongly 
mitigates against its deployment as an option (Chatfield et al. 1992: 164). 
As the above-mentioned authors were the managers of the demand management 
programmes in Australia's largest electricity authorities, it is evident that the Collingridge 
model has much support from within the electricity supply industry itself. Collingridge's 
explanation, and that of Chatfield et al., may have erred, however, by overstating the 
period for which energy conservation is in the strategic interests of the energy supplier. 
The conventional view supporting the Collingridge model is that planning interest in 
energy conservation does not die off until the new generating plant is commissioned. In 
reality, the attraction of energy conservation to the energy supplier may dissipate well 
before the new plant comes on line. For once construction loans have been arranged 
and contractual commitments associated with the construction of new supply projects 
have been entered into, the energy supplier is committed to the supply rather than the 
conservation strategy (Natural Resources and Environment Committee 1988: 21-2). 
145 
The argument that expansion of energy supply represents the less risky option, moreover, 
continues to be advanced as a 'rational' argument for further supply side construction. 
In Finland, it has been argued that whilst energy conservation is an obvious component 
of the Finnish greenhouse gas reduction strategy, it is necessary to hedge against the 
uncertainty associated with energy conservation (Silvennoinen 1991: 508). The perceived 
risks of relying on energy conservation alone were curtly summed up by Silvennoinen in 
the following way: 
To the extent that energy savings are prone to be based on wishful thinking, the 
power producer is faced with a situation where capacity shortages can be avoided 
only by installing whatever kind of capacity can be built at short notice. In 
regard to the situation in Finland this means that overly wishful plans for 
savings and so-called negawatts eventually turn out to be coal-fired megawatts. 
(Silvennoinen 1991: 505) 
To avoid the risk of increased carbon dioxide emissions from these coal-fired megawatts, 
Silvennoinen advocated the construction of a fifth nuclear power station. 
That uncertainty over the scope, timing and costs of energy conservation leads to 
reliance on supply-side options was recently given tacit support by the Australian 
Institute of Engineers. When a recent Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS] national 
survey of household energy conservation effort found that only 50% of Australian 
households had insulated their ceilings, the President of the Queensland Branch of the 
Institute of Engineers of Australia responded on national radio by arguing that the 
energy supply industry could not be accused of needlessly increasing the supply of 
electricity when even those opposed to the construction of new power stations did not 
attempt to conserve energy (ABC Radio National, National News, 25 October 1995). 
Central to this rational explanation for the rejection of aggressive energy conservation 
as an option are the assumptions that energy savings from energy conservation 
programmes are difficult to predict and that only by implementing such programmes 
can their actual effects be assessed (Natural Resources and Environment Committee 
1988: 21) and that those who advance energy conservation tend to overstate these 
savings (Atkins & Evans 1992: 143). It is this assumption that has led to 'extensive 
and often heated' debate, with energy efficiency advocates annoyed by the persistent 
claims that their proposals are unrealistic (Pears & Versluis 1993, Section 2: 8). It is 
therefore useful to look at what are considered by various writers to be the more 
important causes for this uncertainty. These are described below. 
(i) Lack of an adequate baseline data on energy end-use 
It may be unclear what portion of energy consumption is used for a particular end-use 
within a particular sector. If, for example, no definitive information is available on 
how much energy is used by household refrigerators, then it is immediately difficult to 
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gauge how much energy could be saved by implementing an energy conservation 
programme designed to increase the efficiency of household sector refrigeration. Lewis 
et al. (1987: 11) alluded to this problem when they noted that estimates of total annual 
household sector refrigeration energy use in Victoria given in the literature varied from 
5% to 17% of total annual household sector electricity use. 
(ii) Uncertainty about the take-up rates of energy conservation measures 
It has been argued that household sector levels of energy use are relatively fixed by the 
nature of the stock of energy-using equipment in use. As this equipment is not replaced 
simply when a more efficient version arrives on the market but at the end of its useful 
life, improvements in energy efficiency do not occur overnight but gradually over a ten 
to fifteen year period, householders exhibit low short-term demand elasticities (Sioshansi 
1991: 231). The average life of appliances and energy-using equipment, furthermore, is 
not known with any precision. The author was informed by the Australian Consumers' 
Association that the Association was unable to make either a general or informed 
statement about the expected life of appliances (Sandra Leach, personal communication, 
October 1991). Energy efficiency advocates, however, contend that this assumption 
that a rapid take-up is not possible is in fact erroneous and that a rapid take-up is 
'certainly possible' (Pears & Versluis 1993:, Section 2: 14). 
(iii) Administrative complexities 
The difficulty of encouraging energy users to take-up energy conservation measures 
renders this option administratively far more difficult and less straightforward than 
the option of increasing supply (Reddy 1991: 955). Programmes to promote the more 
efficient use of energy are inherently more difficult to implement than those organised 
to sell electricity, gas or oil. The marketing of energy conservation is considered to be 
relatively complicated as the markets for energy services are complex and dynamic. 
Energy conservation planning therefore involves a wide range of novel marketing problems 
(Williams 1989: 834-6). Proponents of aggressive energy efficiency proposals have 
been criticised for neglecting to appreciate this difference (National Institute of Economic 
and Industry Research 1990: 15). These difficulties are exacerbated, moreover, by a 
lack of experienced technical and managerial skills required for their formulation and 
implementation (Reddy 1991: 957). Support for the case that a rapid take-up of 
energy conservation is possible is premised on a faith that while the take-up of energy 
conservation is obstructed by market 'imperfections', demand siders are 'smart enough 
to understand the mechanisms needed to overcome them' (Gilchrist 1994: 278).. 
(iv) The 'take-back' effect at the microlevel 
Individuals and firms that take-up energy efficiency measures do not always use these 
increased efficiencies to reduce energy use but often use part of the gains in efficiency 
to increase the output of energy services. Khazzoom (1987, 1989) used the example of 
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the motor car to make this point. This argument has been countered on the grounds 
that people do not use other energy-using equipment in the same way that they use 
cars and there is only limited scope for off-setting the increased energy efficiency of a 
refrigerator by leaving the door open, or TV set by watching more television. For many 
end-uses such as refrigeration, however, increases in the energy efficiency have not 
always translated into decreased average household refrigeration energy usedue to a 
trend towards larger refrigerators, two-door models with separate refrigeration and 
freezing compartments, and extra features such as automatic defrosting (Geller 1991: 
21, Schipper & Meyers 1992: 53). Herendeen & Jacobs (1982) therefore assumed in 
their end-use forecast for household energy use that energy use would increase despite 
efficiency improvements. 
This argument has been supported by the finding that the dominant motive behind the 
installation of insulation has been to improve thermal comfort rather than to save 
money (Kerby 1985). The term 'take-back' in this case is a misnomer as there was 
never any intention on the part of the individual to save energy. Similarly, while 
microwave ovens have the technical potential to reduce the energy requirements for 
cooking by approximately 50% (IEA 1991: 115) and over half of Australian households 
own microwave ovens, it has been found that very few householders use these for other 
than reheating leftover meals (ACA 1992: 14). Such effects render it difficult to 
estimate energy savings as they depend not only on the operation of the technologies 
but also on the behaviour of the people who use them. Stern et al. (1987: 351-2) 
warned against estimating energy savings from new technologies without comprehensive 
field trials. Engineering estimates were inadequate, these authors argued, because 
energy-efficient technologies consume less energy, but also free income that can be 
spent on other uses, some of which are likely to use energy (Stern et al. 1987: 351-2). 
Quantifying the possible impacts of energy conservation on electricity demand is therefore 
'a rather subjective exercise' (Johnson & Rix 1991: 64). 
Poulsen & Forrest used this arguemnt (1988: 337) in expressing scepticism over the 
merits of energy efficiency codes for new buildings and financial incentives to improve 
the energy efficiency of the existing dwelling stock. Building codes, they argued, often 
had the effect of making increased power use more affordable rather than promoting 
conservation. Brookes (1990) has taken the argument further in positing that the 
proportion of average household income spent on energy has historically remained 
amazingly fixed, suggesting that the level of expenditure on personal energy use remains 
relatively unchanged while the efficiency of energy use changes. 
(v) The 'take-back' effect at the macrolevel 
Many economists have taken issue with the assumption that an increase in the efficiency 
of energy use at the microlevel will result in reduction in energy use at the macrolevel 
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equivalent to the sum of these microlevel savings. They argue that it has been well-
documented that increased energy efficiency at the microlevel does not necessarily 
translate into macrolevel energy savings as an increase in the efficiency of energy use 
effectively decreases the unit costs of using that energy, with the result that demand 
adjusts accordingly. In its submission to the Inquiry into the health effects of 
electromagnetic radiation (Gibbs 1991), the Australian Electricity Supply Association, 
for example, stated that demand management had the theoretical potential to reduce 
industrial expenditure on energy by up to 20% in the long-term. The Association 
added, however, that there was no evidence to indicate whether these potential monetary 
savings would result in reduced consumption as they could 'equally make electricity 
more competitive and so lead to its increasing its share of the total industrial energy 
market' (Gibbs 1991: 11). Economists also have questioned whether improvements in 
technical energy efficiency at the microlevel would translate into equivalent reductions 
in energy use at the macrolevel (Sheraga 1994: 267). Whilst energy efficiency advocates 
have claimed that the goal of energy conservation policy is to reduce the energy efficiency 
of the economy (Saddler 1981: 71), the more extreme economists claim that by increasing 
the efficiency, the demand for energy would be increased and that they have serious 
doubts whether energy efficiency has any relevance for energy policy at all (Sutherland 
1994: 267). 
(vi) Technological uncertainties 
Experts on all sides are considered prone to exaggerate the claims made of their 
favoured technologies. The early claims of proselytizers of nuclear fission are now 
legendary. It has been suggested by Khallizad & Bernard, however, that the claims 
made by contemporary renewable energy enthusiasts are amazing carbon copies of 
those earlier pro-nuclear claims (cited in Smil 1987: 87). Of the claims that renewable 
energy has the capacity to rapidly displace oil or fossil fuel, one energy analyst remarked 
that he only wished that this were 'a lesser fiction than oil depletion and the economic 
viability of nuclear fission' (Odell 1992: 292). There is reputed to be a similar scepticism 
held by many over the technical potential of end-use energy efficiency measures (Schipper 
& Meyers 1992: 55). Inaccuracies in techno-economic analyses, furthermore, are said to 
give rise to uncertainties over the economic benefits of these energy efficiency measures 
and resistance to their adoption (Jochem & Hohmeyer 1992: 219). Jones et al. (1991: 
33) have claimed that market failure such as lack of awareness of the benefits of energy 
conservation measures is unlikely to be a full explanation of why individual firms and 
householders take-up cost-effective energy conservation measures. They hypothesised, 
instead, that not all the energy efficiency measures cited in the literature were in reality 
as cost-effective as these analyses assumed them to be. They suggested that a first 
priority was to test this alternative hypothesis by testing the validity of the claims 
made in the literature. This question of the technical uncertainties associated with 
energy efficiency assessments is examined more closely in Chapter Eight in which 
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energy performance tests on domestic refrigerators and the results of these tests are 
discussed. 
There is said to be, furthermore, 'strong disagreement' between energy efficiency advocates 
themselves as to the cost-effectiveness of energy efficiency measures (Pears & Versluis 
1993, Section 2: 9). Inconsistent methodologies, lack of awareness by some energy 
efficiency experts, the technical scope of some measures, and the use of 'simplistic 
methodologies' are all considered to this lie behind this disagreement . According to 
many economists, furthermore, the affects of DSM programmes are multiple and varied. 
They can alter the costs of electricity (up or down), can effect system reliability, and 
can lead to changes in the quantity and quality of energy services provided. Energy 
conservation policies also involve equity issues as they may effectively transfer income 
from participants to nonparticipants. All of these issues and uncertainties render the 
estimation of the economic benefits of DSM more complicated than the mere comparison 
of the expense of 'negawatts with the cost of megawatts' (Hobbs 1990: 86). 
Pears & Versluis (1993, Section E, p. 11), concede that it is not possible to be precise 
about the cost of saved energy or about the cost of energy produced from alternative 
systems but insist that despite these uncertainties there remains a clear economic 
justification for 'a serious commitment' to these options. They charge, moreover, that 
policy makers have consistently underestimated the technical scope for increased energy 
efficiency. 
It has been argued that these uncertainties associated with conservation programmes 
means that although a large number of energy conservation programmes have been 
undertaken, especially in the USA, these energy conservation initiatives have not been 
in place long enough to allow planners to understand how effective they are (Prindle 
1991). It is still unclear, it has been argued, what the impact will be on the balance in 
electricity planning between construction of supply and energy conservation. The 
unpredictable nature of the potential, timing and persistence of energy conservation 
together with the uncertain costs of energy conservation programmes and their high 
uncertainties, are seen by planners as added complications to what is an already 
difficult task of planning in which mistakes can be long-lasting and expensive. Planners 
concede that energy conservation programmes could turn out to be more effective than 
predicted, but their major concern is that they could also turn out to be less effective 
(Hemphill & Meyers 1986: 137). Despite the occasional claims that there has been a 
revolution in the adoption of DSM, scepticism within the US electric utility industry 
over the capacity of DSM to serve as a resource for utility planners remains high. 
Commonwealth Edison delightedly ran advertisements in 1988 stating that 'The 
16,138,000 kilowatt-hours you weren't supposed to need until 2005 were supplied last 
Tuesday with the help of two new power plants we weren't supposed to need until 
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2005' (cited in Ahearne 1989: 15). It has been maintained that while the size, reliability 
and longevity of DSM resources remains uncertain, this scepticism is justified (Prindle 
(1991: 205). 
(vii) Energy inefficiency as a buffer against short-term energy shortages 
Before leaving the topic of rational planning under uncertainty, one further explanation 
of why energy conservation is not adopted as a policy option can be advanced. 
Electricity planning under uncertainty has been shown to involve the attempt to find 
strategies to cope with uncertainties in relation to long-range future demand. According 
to Collingridge and Puiseux, the major strategy employed is to err on the side of over-
rather than under-supply, a strategy which can lead to overgrowth of supply. But 
there are also shorter-term and unpredictable shortages associated with the supply 
and demand that lead to problems in matching demand with supply. Needle peaking, 
for example, is an unusually high peak within normal peak loads. It can be caused by 
such things as atypically harsh weather. To cope with such events, utilities can enter 
into interpretability clauses with large consumers of electricity so that the sudden 
increase in demand in one sector can be met by temporarily interrupting supply elsewhere. 
Of interest here, however, are unanticipated temporary supply shortages or demand 
increases of longer duration - weeks or months. These could be caused by a number of 
factors including plant failure, or prolonged periods of atypically harsh weather 
conditions. The usual strategy for coping with these shortages is to rely on reserve 
plant. In some instances, furthermore, the problem could be caused by reductions in 
fuel supplies due to strikes in coal mines or, in the case of hydro-electric systems, 
droughts. In such cases, it may be in the interests of the energy supplier to use the 
slack in the demand side of the system - the scope for temporary energy conservation - 
as a buffer against short-term shortages. In this way, the energy supplier could use 
inefficient energy use as a means of reining in some of the slack during temporary 
shortages, and increasing the slack in the system by encouraging energy use once the 
shortage was over. 
The proceeding sections of this chapter have attempted to cast a wide net in order to 
pull in as many plausible rational explanations for the low priority given to energy 
conservation as a planning option in situations such as Australia. The aim has been to 
provide a description of, rather than a prescription for, policy making. One conclusion 
that flows from these explanations is that once the rate of growth of energy supply 
exceeds a certain threshold, energy conservation is effectively undermined as an option. 
With rapid expansion of energy supply, incorporating energy conservation into the 
planning process becomes more difficult. The question of what drives the expansion of 
energy systems is therefore critical to the explanation of why energy conservation is 
overlooked as an option. 
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A number of factors driving the growth of energy supply have been examined. To 
many commentators, however, these explanations of the low priority given to energy 
conservation within energy planning are inadequate. This school of thought considers 
that lack of action in terms of energy conservation on the part of utilities or governments 
cannot be adequately explained in terms of insufficient information or uncertainty as 
there has been a vast amount of research and demonstration effort already undertaken 
in this field to date, especially in the USA. This is taken to mean that the 'element that 
is missing is not information but action' (Senate Standing Committee on Industry, 
Science and Technology 1991: 7) and that 'conservation deserves more action from 
governments and electricity authorities than has been carried out so far' (Rosenthal & 
Russ 1988: 284). 
The rate of expansion of energy supply, it is argued, cannot be explained purely in 
terms of rational or strategic planning as these explanations fail to account for the fact 
that electricity planning has often led to the construction of generating units larger in 
scale than what has been economically efficient (Harris 1982: 55). Muddling through, 
on the other hand, is above all else, designed to avoid grand mistakes and hence 
should, in theory, lead to a predominance of prudent over obviously flawed decisions. 
In this view, rational and strategic planning models fail to explain the preponderance 
of what have proved to be injudicious decisions in the form of massive overcapacities 
throughout the industrialised world during the 1980s and early 1990s and which 
strongly suggest that energy planning has been based on something other than ad hoc 
pragmatism. In this view, essential to understanding why energy conservation is rejected 
as an option is an understanding of what determines the scale of the supply expansion 
projects. The Collingridge thesis, that it is driven purely by consideration of economies 
of scale combined with a progressive ratchetting up of demand, does not adequately 
explain past overgrowth of energy systems and the widespread occurrence of massive 
overcapacities in electricity generation throughout the industrialised world in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Other explanations are therefore seen to be required to explain 
this phenomenon and the associated rejection of energy conservation as an energy 
planning option. The discussion now turns to those explanations. 
4.7 Political Decision Making 
Political decisions have been defined as those made on the basis of preferences of 
actors without regard to the public interest (Pfeffer 1981: 22). According to Pfeffer, 
many of those not schooled in political science find it difficult to accept political 
explanations and tend to fall back on rational decision making models as explanations 
of the rejection of energy conservation as an option. Hughes (1987), for example, 
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argued that such explanations could be invoked to explain policy decisions to expand 
energy supply only if this expansion programme could not be explained as the outcome 
of rational decision making. The problem with this position, in Pfeffer's view, was that 
whether a decision was made on the basis of rational or political decision making 
processes cannot be divined from the decision outcome since any outcome can be 
consistent with rational choices (Pfeffer 1981: 21). 
It has been argued, however, that in the case of energy planning, and electricity planning 
in particular, planning outcomes have not suggested a rational decision making as they 
have clearly 'left much to be desired', even in terms of what is economically rational 
(McColl 1976: 148). It is therefore necessary to look at political decision making as an 
explanation of the rate of growth of energy systems and the rejection of energy 
conservation. The first step in this process is to extend the theory of energy policy 
decision making by looking at elitist policy decision making and non-decision making. 
4.7.1 Elitist Policy Decision Making and Non-Decision Making Theory 
Whilst Lindblom's description of policy decision making as pragmatic and strategic 
muddling was broadly accepted as a descriptive model of decision making, it was 
denounced by many policy analysts as 'nothing but a handy excuse to avoid more 
difficult explanations' (Downey 1987: 31) and a perverse normative model of decision 
making (Goodin 1982: 19). Incrementalism was regarded as inimical to policy reform 
and dismissed by those seeking such reform as an ideological reinforcement of the 
pro-inertia and anti-innovation forces prevalent in all human organisations. 
Lindblom's incrementalist-strategic model was also criticised as a description of policy 
decision making, its major defect considered to be its pluralist-like assumption that all 
interest groups had equal power to advance their case. These pluralist explanations of 
which issues get on to the political agenda, and which do not, and of the way in which 
issues subsequently slip off the policy agenda as public interest in the issues subsides, 
were discussed in Section 3.3.1. An alternative explanation of which issues do and do 
not get onto the policy agenda posits that influential actors and decision makers have 
the political ability to prevent certain problems from becoming issues through the 
process of 'politically informed neglect' (Crenson 1971: 184) or are played down or 
nipped in the bud before they become fully fledged political issues. Some groups are 
seen to be more able to promote their interests and determine the outcomes of policy 
decision making than are ordinary citizens. In the most extreme form, the dominant 
values and the power of influential groups have the capacity to effectively keep certain 
grievances from developing into full-fledged issues so that there is no call for policy 
decisions (Bachrach & Baratz 1962, 1963, Crenson 1971). 
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Which issues make it onto the finite policy agenda is, in this model, governed by the 
law of limited numbers and the mobilization of bias. Each group attempts to keep its 
issues on the finite agenda space by keeping competing issues off. Some issues are 
thereby organised into politics while others are organised out (Schattschneider 1960: 
71). Policy proposals are therefore adopted or rejected not on the basis of their social 
rationality or analytical rigour, but on the basis of political power and preference 
(Walker 1994: 197). 
While not shifting from his position that policy is always strategic and usually 
incrementalist, Charles Lindblom agreed that actual policy decision making was 
fundamentally flawed and conformed to the political decision making model. 'I have 
failed to communicate', he wrote, '... just how bad I think policy analysis and policy 
making are, even under the best of circumstances' (Lindblom 1979: 517). While 
maintaining that incrementalism was the theoretical optimal mode of decision making, 
it failed because it was undermined by the privileged positions of some interest groups 
vis-a-vis others in the policy making process (Lindblom 1977: 168). To Lindblom, the 
pluralist model was a 'lie' as the participants in policy debate did not represent the 
interests and values of society, but the dominant interests and values (Lindblom 1979: 
523). The more important the decision, he argued, the less representative was 
participation in decision making. Debate over grand issues, such as the distribution of 
wealth, corporate prerogative and the distribution of political power were simply 
organised off the political agenda. Policy, declared Lindblom, was not only strategic: 
it was too strategic (1979: 520). And this, he added, 'could put us on road to 
ecological collapse' (1977: 347). 
Those influential groups with an interest in continued and rapid expansion of energy 
supply, and which are therefore likely to oppose, overtly or tacitly, proposals for 
greater reliance on demand reduction strategies, are discussed in the following section. 
4.7.2 Political Support for Rapid Growth of Energy Supply 
Governments are sometimes assumed by those who advance aggressive energy efficiency 
and renewable energy options to be ideal purposive agents in control of policy and 
governed by an overarching goal of improvement of the community's standard of living 
(Berrill et al. 1991: 10). As energy efficiency and renewable energy reduce the social 
and economic costs of energy, it logically follows, to such writers, that these options 
should be adopted. Governments, however, are fragmented and more complex, with 
one government bureaucracy often working at cross-purposes to another. The relationship 
between government, society, business and bureaucracy is also not as simple as many 
advocates of energy conservation assume. 
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Some political analysts depict the state (political system) within liberal capitalist 
societies as poised between the business (economic system) and social spheres (social 
system). This relationship together with their interrelationships to the energy system is 
shown in Figure 4.4 below in which the state is seen as precariously juggling the two 
key functions of assisting business accumulate capital and maintaining legitimacy. 
Figure 4.4 The adapted Habermas/O'Conner/Offe model of the relationship 
between the state, business and society [adapted from Pusey 1991: 
197] to which the energy system has been added. 
Capital accumulation is increased by assisting business through tax relief, the provision 
of infrastructure and a trained workforce. As business requires stability, a major role 
of government is to provide a controlled, secure, entrepreneurial climate in which 
financial risks can be taken (Galbraith 1972: 90). Legitimation, on the other hand, is 
maintained by expenditure on public welfare (O'Conner 1973, Offe 1975, Habermas 
1979). Balancing these two functions is seen by these writers as a delicate task. Too 
much attention to encouraging business at the expense of ignoring the needs of the 
community, many of which are created by the expansion of the economic activity, risks 
public unrest. Too much expenditure on public welfare and services and insufficient 
attention to maintaining economic stability and growth, on the other hand, results in a 
fall in government revenue. This forces the state to engage in an austerity drive and cut 
back on services and welfare which, in turn, results in reduced popularity, electoral 
backlash and a reversal of the policies. The attempt to resolve these tensions is 
therefore seen to create, alternatively, fiscal and legitimation crises. As a result, the 
state's role in the economy oscillates between laissez-faire minimalism and socialist 
intervention. 
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The interests of each of the three spheres - business, the state and the energy bureaucracy 
- in continued and rapid energy supply expansion programmes, and the political 
influence each of these spheres has on policy making are discussed in more detail 
below by taking each of these separately. 
4.7.2.1 The state's role in energy policy 
The Impotent State 
A small number of political economists have perceived capitalist economies to be 
based to a high degree on energy-intensive manufacturing industries and a policy 
emphasis on conservation as being inimical to the economic viability of major corporations 
(Walker & Large 1975: 470). Such writers have argued that energy policy within a 
capitalist system is determined primarily by the interests of industry and that the state 
is therefore relatively impotent in regard to developing meaningful energy policies. 
Other writers have disagreed and have argued instead that the business community is 
too fragmented and divided to dictate energy policy in such a way. To such writers, 
the state does not increase energy supply for the interests of specific businesses but as 
a general means of increasing economic growth (Caldwell & Woolley 1976: 117). 
Many governments, however, have subsidised energy-intensive industry as a means 
of gaining legitimisation. The contradiction inherent in this approach is that these 
industries most aggressively mechanise and displace labour. This process results in a 
cycle in which further investment in energy supply has to be made, to accelerate growth 
so as to take-up the displaced labour, or to provide welfare and retraining assistance 
to displaced workers. Either way, the fiscal crisis of the state is deepened (O'Conner 
1973). Because of this, the latitude of the state to deal with energy problems is 
severely constrained and it therefore continues to rely on continued expansion of 
supply (Caldwell & Woolley 1976). 
The State as Developer 
An alternative view of the relationship between the state and business is that it is a 
complex and two-way influence, with public spending tending to accommodate the 
needs of business (Galbraith 1972: 316). This is as equally true in business-led, 
laissez-faire economies such as Germany as it is in state-led economies such as France 
and Japan. In its most extreme form, governments use resources and public investment 
in infrastructure such as energy supply as a means of encouraging capital to invest and 
is referred to as developmentalism. 
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Governments have both indirectly encouraged economic development to varying degrees 
by investing in research and infrastructure and directly by investing in resource 
development projects. The degree to which Australian state governments have intervened 
directly in economic development has historically been inordinately high in comparison 
to other capitalist democracies. This has been attributed to their colonial origins and 
the 'tyranny of distance' from world markets which forced state governments to 
strategically intervene by mobilising resources to attract 'much needed' foreign capital 
(Davis et al. 1988: 15). Australian state governments have provided significant 
infrastructure in the form of railways, ports, power generation and have offered generous 
concessionary resource agreements in order to attract such capital investment. As a 
consequence, Australian was branded by capitalists such as Henry Ford as a socialist 
country. To neoMarxist writers, however, this intervention has not constituted socialism 
but 'corporate socialism', the true intention of which has been to provide the necessary 
conditions for private firms to make large profits (Saddler 1981: 115). According to 
Saddler, business has been content to allow governments to take on the marginally 
profitable or unprofitable undertakings, such as railways and electricity supply, as it 
freed them to invest in more profitable ventures. By nationalising their electricity 
industries, Saddler argued, the Australian state governments were not acting against 
capital, but for it. 
The 'ideology of development' or 'developmentalism' (Saddler 1981: 4) has been much 
more potent at the state than the federal level in the Australian context. The reasons 
for this has to do with the Constitutional arrangements of the Australian federation 
which give the states little control over macroeconomic policy while barring them from 
raising income from bounties or tariffs. With few other avenues available to them for 
generating employment, the states turn to the one thing they own: their natural resources. 
Resource development provides both revenue and highly visible jobs and is therefore 
seen as a vote-catching strategy. 'It is this political calculus', according to Kellow 
(1986: 13), 'which encourages the developmentalist ideology in the [Australian] states'. 
4.7.2.2 The power of business 
The power of business resides in its monopoly over capital investment decisions. 
Restriction on energy supplies could seriously damage economic growth as businesses 
do not just appear. Any business contemplating setting up a new plant asks some 
fundamental questions about the costs of energy and energy security. If they do not 
like the answers they receive, they look elsewhere (Rossin 1980: 61). 
Business confidence can be damaged with policies that impact negatively on profits. 
Regulations to protect the environment, increased taxes to pay for environmental repair 
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programmes, reduced public spending on infrastructure such as rails, ports and electricity, 
or substantial increases in electricity prices, are all viewed as detrimental to business 
interests. Reduced business interests, furthermore, could trigger economic downturn 
(Dryzek 1995: 294). 
While proponents of aggressive energy efficiency are adamant that their option would 
generate as many or more jobs, and would provide a greater economic growth than 
would an increase in the supply of energy (Gilchrist 1994: 227-8), the fact remains that 
the political clout of advocates of the aggressive energy efficiency option is seriously 
diminished by the fact that it is not energy efficiency advocates who control the means 
of production and wealth which generate employment. They therefore tend to be less 
well represented within the policy debate than those who do command such factors 
(Kellow & Moon 1993: 248). 
Firms which are a major source of direct or indirect employment within regional 
communities, furthermore, are in a particularly strong position. The economies of 
localities dominated by such industries are considered by some writers to be effectively 
held hostage to this power of large business (Schrecker 1990: 160-171). In such cases, 
overt threats on the part of industry to decamp are usually unnecessary within the 
capitalist system as both local communities and governments are well aware of the 
economic ramifications of industrial disinvestment (Bell & Wanna 1992b: 268). The 
corporate executive thus becomes, in Lindblom's (1979: 178) words, ' a public official 
in the market system'. 
Many writers have argued that this relationship between the three spheres is extremely 
lopsided and the state's ability to address social issues is restricted by its dependency 
on a well-performing business sector. If business performance falters, the state's capacity 
to tax business to run the state apparatus is reduced. This reduction in the state's 
capacity in turn weakens its legitimacy. Business therefore enjoys a privileged position 
in the policy debate, and this seriously undermines government's ability to resolve 
serious problems such as environmental degradation and energy shortages. 'The private 
corporation, wrote Lindblom, 'has rights that the citizen does not; they are taller and 
richer persons than the rest of us dwarfs' and because of this, much would-be effective 
regulatory decisions are blocked (Lindblom 1979: 520). In this view of politics, 'public 
interest is less important than private profit' (Walker 1992b: 251), governments are 
severely checked in what they can do as any action which threatens private profit is 
opposed by business (Dryzek 1987: 84) and the social sphere is effectively reduced to 
that of a 'generic externality' (Pusey 1991: 10). 
In market-driven economic systems, therefore, governments are seen by many political 
writers to be checked in their attempts to adopt 'seemingly desirable policies such as 
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energy conservation or environmental protection where these threaten to undercut 
business profits (Lindblom 1977: 347). In the USA, President Carter is said to have 
recognised that energy conservation was in the national interest but was aware that 
any attempt by his administration to introduce policies encouraging conservation of oil 
would be resisted by Congress due to the power and influence of the oil companies 
(Dahlberg et al. 1985: 39). Manufacturers successfully opposed even relatively mild 
environmental regulations such as container deposit legislation for years because it 
increased handling costs and reduced output of nonreturnable products (Dahlberg et al. 
1985: 53). Business is less resistant to the introduction of environmental regulations 
where it is possible to pass on the costs of these measures such as pollution control 
devices on vehicles onto customers without impairing its competitiveness. 
A pertinent example of business exercising such a veto power in regard to energy 
conservation policies would be the opposition of manufacturers of energy-using equipment 
to mandated minimum energy performance standards where the imposed standards 
require expensive retooling or substantially increased research and development of new 
designs or a loss of competitive edge. If the appliances produced by local manufacturers 
are less energy efficient than those of imported models, as is the case with refrigerators 
in the United Kingdom (Herring 1992), local businesses are likely to put up strong 
resistance to the introduction of mandated energy efficiency standards which their 
models could not meet but which their imported competitors could. Governments are 
likely to be swayed by such pressure, moreover, if the introduction of mandated 
standards threatens local jobs. 
The threat of standards to the appliance manufacturing industry, however, may be not 
so much the initial standards themselves as the fear that standards, once in place, 
would be rapidly ratchetted upwards. Regulatory bureaucracies are not necessarily 
captured by the industry they are designed to regulate and can become the driving 
force behind rapidly tighter standards (Jones 1975: 41). Whitegoods manufacturers in 
the USA have complained bitterly that once the National Appliance Energy Conservation 
Act (1987) was introduced, the US Department of Energy rapidly increased the minimum 
standards (Weizeorick 1991: 526). 
4.7.2.3 The public energy supply bureaucracy 
Bureaucracies behave in characteristic ways and with well-documented pathologies 
(Presthus 1962). In particular, the tendency for self-aggrandisement to become the 
dominant bureaucratic goal is a well-worn path in political theory (Self 1993: 35). 
While Hughes (1989: 69) was sceptical about the role that organisational empire-building 
has played in electricity planning, others have suggested that the desire for bureaucratic 
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growth has played a relatively important (McColl 1976: 52), or even dominant (Saddler 
1981: 76) role within the Australian context. The drive for organisational growth has 
also been perceived as the dominant motivating factor driving supply expansion elsewhere 
(Freeman et al. 1974: 85, Hughes et a/. 1985: 109-10). 
There is little mystery as to why bureaucracies pursue such growth. Just as governments 
find the management of the state an easier task with an expanding economy than they 
would under static economy, bureaucracies operate as organisations most smoothly 
when they are growing or maintaining their size. Institutions such as electricty supply 
authorities, and their executives, are rewarded for pursuing high growth activities and 
punished for pursuing low growth activities (Robinson 1982: 235). But it is also a 
consequence of the characteristic ways in which bureaucracies operate. Large 
organisations tend to be extremely conservative (Maslow 1966: 34) and develop 
bureaucratic ideologies which engender organisational rigidity and ossification. Through 
this process they become resistant to innovation (Blau & Meyer 1971) and reluctant to 
take on alternative ideas or follow new paths as long as they continue to be rewarded 
for meeting the established milestones set out for them (Nader & Milleron 1979: 955). 
If the milestones are to produce electricity at the cheapest possible unit cost, they 
continue to do so until this charter is altered. But they also tend to prefer to set their 
own charters than have their charters dictated to them (Crenson 1971: 36). Because of 
this, bureaucracies tend to follow routine behaviour rather than problem solving and 
are robust and resistant to change. In Lindblom's words, they possess 'strong fingers, 
no thumbs' (Lindblom 1977: 76-89). 
Organisational structure also plays a role. As career maximizers, bureaucrats are loyal 
to the goals of the organisation (Presthus 1962: 16). The process of induction into a 
profession, furthermore, leaves an indelible imprint on the mind set of the individual - 
engineers think like engineers, economists think like economists. Because of this, engineers 
find it difficult to think in terms of altering demand as the traditional engineering 
approach is to work on the load end of the equation. A bureaucracy in which the 
dominant section is run by engineers will therefore develop an engineering culture that 
determines the organisations outlook (Nader & Milleron 1979: 959). For such 
organisations, grand engineering supply expansion projects such as large dams, nuclear 
power plants, or wind farms are a more appealing option than the attempt to decrease 
energy use through the encouragement of lots of small and relatively drab measures 
such as constructing pelmets over windows, insulating attic spaces, or replacing 
refrigerators with more energy efficient models. 
Because bureaucracies are inherently conservative, once they have established an expertise 
in a certain field lock-in results from a preference to stick with tried and proven 
programmes closest to existing ones. Bureaucrats seek incremental change (Pfeffer 
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1981: 22) and seek it for their own perceived interests (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983: 
52). They are optimistic because they need to be in order to fulfil their expansionist 
plans, and this optimism colours their forecasts (Robinson 1982: 234-5). They have an 
inability to see the unexpected, will not readily take political risks on board, tend to 
deny failure, resist external program evaluation and hold on to incomplete or 
inappropriate theories in the face of manifest failure. Bureaucratic planning failure can 
therefore be perpetuated to the point where it becomes spectacular (Dryzek 1987: 
101). 
Given these bureaucratic pathologies, the relevant question is the extent to which 
bureaucracies, rather than their political masters, control policy making processes. 
There is no one answer to this question as the interplay between bureaucracy and 
government is complex. Dahl & Lindblom (1953: 341) argued that political control of 
bureaucracies requires fine balance. Too much political direction and influence, those 
authors suggested, would undermine the bureaucracy's ability to make discretionary 
judgements that is indispensable if rational decisions are to be made about complex 
technical questions. Too little political control, on the other hand, damages the democratic 
process. It has been suggested that this political-bureaucratic relationship can fit any 
one of five different models. At one extreme, the bureaucrats are portrayed as being in 
control by virtue of their expertise and knowledge - the Yes, Minister! mode1 10. At the 
other extreme, politics is portrayed as being in command of the bureaucracy. Such 
extremes have been descibed as rare and actual relationships as being intermediate 
between the two, and to range from cooperative to conflictual (Self 1993: 35). 
The relationship is complicated further, however, by the strong tendency of bureaucracies 
to be secretive. Such secrecy in electricity planning in the Australian context was noted 
by McColl (1976: 149). Saddler (1981: 115) was more trenchant and attacked the 
tactics of Australian energy bureaucracies as 'secretive, devious and dogmatic'. Crowley 
has recently used evidence of such secretive bureaucratic behaviour as empirical support 
for her somewhat tautological thesis that 'ecopolitical demands are constrained by the 
material interests of capital' (Crowley 1994: 12). Yet Max Weber long ago told us that 
it would be surprising if bureaucracies did not behave in this way: 
Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed 
by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret. Bureaucratic administration 
always tends to be administration of 'secret sessions': in so far as it can, it hides 
its knowledge and action from criticism. (Weber 1952: 233) 
10 Yes, Minister! was a popular television series produced by the B.B.0 in England which 
satirised political decision making based on the public choice model. 
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4.7.2.4 A convergence of interests 
It is clear that various possible combinations and permutations of mutual interests in 
expanding the supply of energy and opposing aggressive energy conservation exist. 
The relationship between bureaucracy and government in decision making can 
considerably tip the scales in favour of the bureaucracy by the closely interwoven 
interests between resource bureaucracies and their industrial clients. Such a common 
interest is seen to potentially create a formidable counterweight to the 'nominal' decision 
making capacity of the state (Janike 1990: 13). The State may also support industrial 
and bureaucratic interests in expanding the supply of energy as part of its 
developmentalist policies. 
There are also many other influential individuals and groups who could have an 
interest in expanding the supply of energy. Politicians obtain electoral benefits from 
providing jobs in their electorates through energy supply construction programmes or 
attracting new industries. Secondary industries supplying construction equipment and 
material, and small service businesses advantaged by the general increase in economic 
activity generated by investment in supply expansion and in further industrial expansion, 
are also likely to support such policies. Trade unions whose members are employed in 
energy supply construction and industrial expansion projects are also likely to support 
continued energy supply construction programmes. 
With the outlook of political decision making, the earlier discussion on energy planning 
can now be revised to incorporate some of these important ideas to see how political 
and bureaucratic decision making modify energy planning. 
4.7.2.5 Technocratic planning 
One of the first to note the important ways in which the characteristics of both large 
energy conversion technologies and large bureaucracies interact to alter planning was 
the economist, J.K. Galbraith. According to Galbraith (1972), industrial development 
which relied on sophisticated technologies were characterised by certain features which 
dictated that manner in which development proceeded. The development of large 
technological systems, he argued, was driven by the technical imperative of achieving 
economies of scale to minimise unit production costs. Increasing the scale, however, 
made them capital intensive and increased the lead times, committing the organisation 
to inflexible and large resources, a specialised work force, and a highly developed 
organisation: they became technocracies. Above all, such technical development required 
planning because the commitment to large amounts of capital long before production 
came on line was problematical and conflicted with the ability to predict demand over 
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long lead times. To overcome this uncertainty, according to Galbraith, demand had to 
be shaped: 
... the system, if it accommodates man's wants, also and increasingly accommodates 
men to its needs. And it must. This latter accommodation is no trivial exercise in 
salesmanship. It is deeply organic. High technology and heavy capital use 
cannot be subordinate to the ebb and flow of market demand. They require planning; 
it is the essence of planning that public behaviour be made predictable - that it 
be subject to control (Galbraith 1972: 317). 
In contrast to Collingridge's model of rational planning under uncertainty in which 
demand passively self-adjusted to supply as dictated by the laws of supply and 
demand, in the Galbraithian technocracy model, an elite corps of technocrats make 
investment decisions involving large requirements for capital. Demand was then actively 
manipulated to ensure that what is ultimately foreseen eventuates in fact' (Galbraith 
1972: 35). Investment risks are reduced by the use of mechanisms such as advertising 
and tariff structures, to control demand. 
The Galbraithian technocracy thesis has been given support from a proponent of the 
French nuclear energy generation programme. Cade (1995: 32) attributed the success of 
that programme directly to the persistence of political support for the programme and 
the political ability to deflect or quash public criticism that would slow the pace of 
construction. This was critical, according to Carle, because continuity was the key to 
success in the planning of large technologies such as nuclear power supply. Given the 
large time constraints involved in nuclear planning (up to eight years), any hiccups in 
the otherwise smooth planning process had a dramatic effect on costs. Continuity of 
the construction programme, moreover, meant constant workload for suppliers and 
thereby further reduced costs. Disruption to construction once begun, what's more, 
had a paralysing effect on the whole nuclear programme, as it added greatly to 
construction costs and eroded the economic advantages of the nuclear option. There 
was no better example or evidence of the severity of the impacts of public questioning 
of nuclear power construction, Carle suggested, than the United States. Once construction 
of a nuclear plant was started, it therefore became critical that it was continued not 
only for the sake of that plant, but for the entire ongoing nuclear programme. 
Kellow (1986, 1996) considered that the construction of electricity generating technologies 
was substantively different from the development of other technologies in two ways 
and that this required the Galbraithian model to be adjusted. The first of these 
differences, according Kellow, was that in pursuing economies of scale in order to 
decrease electricity production costs, construction lead times became inordinately long. 
This critically exacerbated the problems associated with inflexible commitments to 
large amounts of capital. Planning was therefore more essential in electricity generating 
then it was in other types of technological developments. The second difference 
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between electricity generation developments and other technical developments pointed 
out by Kellow, was the need to maximise plant output over both the long and short-runs. 
The reason for this was, as has already been seen, that electricity could not be effectively 
stored (Hughes 1983). The goal of electricity planning therefore became to maximise 
plant output over both the long and the short-terms (Kellow 1986: 3). 
Kellow then used the 'bureaucratic politics' model to argue that empire-building 
technocrats constructed forecasts that matched their organisational ambitions. 
Maximising the forecast demand and then selling the surplus meant more construction 
activity and organisational maintenance and expansion (Kellow 1986: 5). When the 
predicted demand for electricity failed to materialise, the excess output was sold 
cheaply in order to generate income and service the debts. In this way, the forecasts 
became self-fulfilling not, as Collingridge (1980) would have it, as a result of the laws 
of supply and demand, but by the active creation of markets using cheap supplies of 
energy. The main beneficiaries of this process were by necessity energy-intensive industries 
with the ability to take-up large blocks of electricity. Once the electricity supplier was 
committed to construction of new supply, they were saddled with the excess capacity 
and thus became 'encumbered vendors' (Kellow 1986: 4). With shorter lead times than 
those of electricity generation projects, energy-intensive industries such as aluminium 
smelting firms were therefore able to take-up the cheap electricity on a buyer's market. 
This relationship between electricity suppliers and industry was not parasitic but 
symbiotic as the addition of a large bulk load customer aided the utility by providing a 
guaranteed customer and therefore assisted with debt servicing. The main advantage 
of these bulk users, from the energy supplier's perspective, however, was that they also 
provided a relatively stable load and therefore helped smooth out the daily load by 
reducing the relative proportion of variable peak loads on the system. 
To Kellow, this convergence of private and public sector interests may have been an 
elegant solution to management problems and an optimal outcome in a narrow economic-
engineering sense, but it was neither socially nor economically rational in a broader 
sense. Such planning, Kellow argued, placed 'undue power in the hands of the technocracy' 
and 'posed a serious threat to democratic decision making' (Kellow 1986: 4). While it 
was an arrangement which benefited the energy supplier and large energy-intensive 
industries, it did not necessarily involve forcing politicians to move in directions they 
did not want to take' (1986: 14). 
Kellow therefore concurred with the common environmentalist critique of electricity 
planning in arguing that bureaucratic aggrandisement was the driving force behind the 
preference of large-scale energy projects and the distortion of forecasts. In doing so, he 
debunked the 'technological determinism' thesis as an explanation for the increasing 
scale of energy generating systems and the widespread overcapacities of energy suppliers. 
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The problem, according to Kellow, was not technology but technocracy. It was the 
people who made the technological choices that ultimately created the problems. Writing 
before Puiseux (1987) had put forward the case for small-scaled capacity expansion 
programmes, Kellow maintained that the technological determinism thesis was 
undermined by the fact that there was no reason why small scale technologies could 
not be deployed, and their short lead times in fact increased the rationality of these 
technologies as they decreased the lumpiness of both debt and supply output. They 
were dismissed, according to Kellow, not because they were technically =suitable or 
not economically viable, but because they did not suit the interests of individuals and 
organisations. The rate and shape of technological growth was not determined by 
technology itself, but by the individuals making technological choices (Kellow 1986: 4). 
4.8 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has briefly traced the evolution of the aggressive energy efficiency proposals 
before looking at various models and theories that can be advanced to account for the 
energy efficiency advocate's grievance that policy makers seem not to be listening to 
their demands. This historical account showed that radical zero energy growth scenarios 
such as Lovins' SEP relying on major social and economic structural changes gained 
considerable support were gradually abandoned and purely technical energy efficiency 
alternatives took their place. The essential source of frustration appears to be that the 
proponents of aggressive energy efficiency considered their option to be not only socially 
desirable but also economically rational. Advocates of aggressive energy efficiency, on 
the other hand, perceived their proposals to be politically neutral and, therefore, realistic. 
It has been argued in this chapter that the related questions of why energy systems 
tend to grow and why policy makers tend to favour expansion of supply over energy 
conservation can be answered from a number of perspectives. These explanations 
range from the systems approach of technological determinism to the 'analytically 
rational', strategic and political perspectives. From a systems model approach, it was 
seen that all large systems are prone to inertia and therefore afflicted by a substantial 
incongruence between the direction they are heading and what is socially optimal. The 
technological deterministic model provides a useful description of the behaviour of 
large technological systems, but its central thesis that society is relatively incapable of 
taking command and that change in this regard usually arrives only after the problems 
created by technological expansion reach crisis proportions is unappealing to those 
seeking immediate policy reforms. Which of these explanations applies in a particular 
circumstance will obviously have great bearing on the nature of research that will be 
useful in accelerating the take-up of energy conservation. Theoretical research which 
attempts to show that there exists significant technical cost-effective scope for increasing 
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the efficiency of energy use is liable to have little impact on energy policy where it 
needs to be explained, for example, in terms of political or ideological explanations. 
Historically, the growth of systems has been driven by the search for elegant engineering 
and management solutions. This raises the question of why energy efficiency, also an 
elegant engineering-management solution has tended to be rejected. By looking at 
decision making theory, it was shown that 'rational' decision making is forced to retreat 
to strategic incrementalism in order to minimise risks of under-supply and this has 
been used to explain the phenomenon of widespread overcapacities. An alternative 
explanation is that these overcapacities have been the consequence of decision making 
shaped by those influential groups with an interest in continued expansion of supply 
and which therefore support the incrementalist approach and are able to use uncertainties 
surrounding energy issues to ensure that policy remains incrementalist in nature. 
There is unlikely to be one correct model that can explain why energy efficiency tends 
to be rejected as an energy option in a particular place. Certainly no model can explain 
the outcomes of energy policy and planning in all places and at all times. There is a 
sufficient uniformity in energy-related problems, however, to suggest that similar causal 
mechanisms have been at play in many locations and that those places in which policy 
has lagged in embracing energy conservation, the mechanisms or reasons for policy's 
tendency to reject energy conservation as an option are likely to be structurally similar. 
The following two chapters examine a case study of the growth of energy systems and 
the rejection of energy conservation as an option in favour of the expansion of energy 
supply. This case study is used to access the applicability of the various explanations 
for the growth of energy systems and the tendency of policy makers to reject energy 
conservation in one particular situation in which the adoption of energy conservation 




Come, come, of words enough we've bandied; 
'Tis time that deeds were now begun. 
— Johann Wolfgang von Goethe ( 1770-1831 ) Faust. 
Chapter Five 
Tasmania: A Case Study of Electricity Planning - Part 1 
'It's a Little Anxious', he said to himself, to be a Very 
Small Creature Entirely Surrounded by Water' 
— A.A. Milne (1926) Winnie-the-Pooh 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Tasmania as a Case Study 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the way in which the rate of growth in 
energy supply, and the nature of resistance to energy conservation proposals as a 
means of reducing the rate of growth in supply, are determined by a blend of rational, 
strategic and political decision making. The degree to which these three factors determine 
policy outcomes differs between one place and another. As Davis et al. (1988: 5) have 
pointed out, all attempts to explain policy decisions are ultimately limited and are 
specific to a particular location. While this may be a nuisance for policy analysts, 
these authors added, it is something that has to be accepted. There are, however, 
groups of countries or regions in which the outcomes of energy policy decision making 
have been remarkably similar. Not only has the phenomenon of overgrowth in energy 
supply been extremely widespread (Patterson 1992: 188, Jaffe & Stavins 1994: 806), 
but in a number of instances, overgrowth of energy supply has been particularly 
pronounced. Tasmania is one such region in which the rate of growth of electricity 
supply has been rapid, and policy emphasis on energy conservation has been relatively 
low. Tasmania is therefore used in this and the following chapters as a case study of 
low emphasis on energy conservation in electricity planning with a view to illustrating 
the reasons for this rapid rate of growth in energy supply and the low priority given to 
energy conservation in planning. But while Tasmania represents an extreme case in 
terms of the low policy emphasis on energy conservation and rapid expansion of 
supply, Platt (1988: 13) has noted that such extreme cases studies serve a valuable 
function in research where they are able to uncover explanations and to illustrate 
points that are difficult to uncover or demonstrate in more normal contexts. In this 
regard, Tasmania represents a highly appropriate case study of electricity planning 
because it has a number of other attributes which add substantially to its usefulness in 
studying politics and society. 
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Tasmania has been regarded by many writers as almost unique in its ability to explore 
and explain political and social issues. As a small island community, it provides a 
closed and manageable natural research unit and many researchers have made use of 
this feature. Economic geographers used the State to construct the first complete 
input-output energy analysis of an entire economic region (Larson 1968). Small island 
communities, furthermore, have been seen as microcosms of the larger world where 
events are more observable and decisions more readily explained. MacLean (1972), in 
his study of the process of cultural disintegration on St Kilda, noted that such island 
communities provide natural laboratories for studying social phenomena. In small 
states such as Tasmania, policy decision making is more readily explained as it is 
thrown into greater relief. As Humphrey McQueen (1982: 105) sardonically put it, 
while there is probably no less rottenness and repression in Tasmania than exists in the 
larger Australian states, in Tasmania it can be recognised walking down the main 
street. 
Tasmania is also an interesting case study of electricity planning and energy conservation 
as it has been the Australian state in which public conflict over electricity planning has 
been most pronounced. That this has been the case has to do with the fact that conflict 
over electricity planning in the State was precipitated by proposals to construct hydro-
electric schemes in wilderness areas. As discussed in Section 3.5.5, hydro-electric 
construction has been associated with greater conflict than has any other form of 
energy supply construction programmes, largely because of the limited availability of 
technological fixes to reduce the social and environmental costs associated with hydro-
electric development. This inability to reach compromise over wilderness issues gives 
them an either-or like quality akin to those associated with moral and constitutional 
issues. It has been suggested that as a consequence of environmental conflict over 
hydro-electric development in Tasmania, nowhere in the world has a community been 
so intensively subjected to the environment versus development debate (Hay and Haward 
1987: 92). As a result of this, Tasmania was the first Australian state in which 
aggressive energy conservation proposals were seriously advanced as a means of deferring 
specific energy supply expansion projects, and in which moderate energy conservation 
proposals were first adopted as government policy. 
Finally, Tasmania's capacity to serve as a valuable case study of electricity planning is 
further increased by the relative lack of complexity of the Tasmanian energy system. 
Hydro-electricity has been by far the major source of electricity on the island to date. 
Like many other places in which electricity is supplied predominantly by a single 
technology, electricity planning in the State therefore provides a case study of technological 
lock-in and its causes. The alternatives to electricity in Tasmania, furthermore, are also 
limited as natural gas has not been made available. Other sources of energy, such as oil 
and wood, fall outside the ambit of Government energy policy, and because of this, 
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electricity planning in Tasmania has historically been a relatively uncluttered affair. 
Tasmania is a useful case study, therefore, because electricity planning in this small 
island at the end of the world', run by what Dr Norm Sanders called 'a rinky clink 
parliament' 2 , is more readily understood than it is in the larger world. Furthermore, 
although electricity planning in the State has involved construction of 'dinky little 
hydro-electric schemes' compared to the very large schemes constructed in other parts 
of the world, it has led to a scale of public conflict unprecedented in Australia. It was 
because of the scale of this conflict that planning was opened up to public scrutiny, 
and as a result, the politics of electricity planning in the State is relatively well-documented. 
Insights into the reasons behind the rapid scale of supply expansion and the rejection 
of energy conservation as a means of reducing that rate of growth in supply are 
therefore more discernable in Tasmania than they are in many other places. As means 
of explaining the rate of expansion of electricity generating capacity, and low policy 
reliance on energy conservation, Tasmania represents an extreme, and, therefore, an 
extremely useful, case study. 
5.1.2 Three Historical Phases of Electricity Planning in Tasmania 
It has been argued that in order to understand why certain policies prevail over others, 
it is critical to understand the historical context of the policy in question (Anderson et 
al. 1984: 10-11). In this view, past energy policy and the historical development of the 
relevant organisational structures are significant determinants of present policy and 
largely define the parameters of possible policy reform in the present era. The reason 
for this is that the strategic nature of policy decision making dictates that energy policy 
reforms are likely to occur in small steps, the more disjointed and incremental the 
policy decision making process, the slower the pace of change. For the purposes of this 
study, it was considered convenient to distinguish three broad historical phases in the 
historical development of electricity planning in Tasmania. 
The first of these three stages is taken to be the period from the initial development of 
an electricity supply industry in the State, until the first major outbreak of public 
questioning of electricity planning in the mid 1960s. This period illustrates the initial 
impetus behind State involvement in electricity supply, and the ways in which electricity 
policy altered. The public electricity authority's changing role in planning over the 
period is also illustrated. The events that occurred and decisions made during that 
1 This term is borrowed from MacLean (1972: 2) who described his case study, the Outer 
Hebridean island of St Kilda, as a small island at the end of the world. 
2 Dr Norm Sanders, a migrant from California who became Tasmania's first green 
representative of the House of Assembly, described himself as member of a rinky dink 
parliament (cited in Green 1984: 152). 
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early phase are important to this discussion as they gave energy policy in the State a 
momentum that carried through to subsequent stages. Planning failure in the form of 
large excess capacity was not a feature of electricity planning during that early era, and 
energy conservation was not raised as a policy option. The momentum of electricity 
planning built up during that period, however, was critical to the eventual oversupply 
of electricity and the rejection of energy conservation as a policy option in subsequent 
phases. It has been appended, therefore, as a separate section at the end of the study 
(Appendix I). 
The second evolutionary phase of electricity planning in Tasmania described in this 
study covers the period during which the legacy of early energy planning decisions 
began to result in the overgrowth of electricity supply and the threat of considerable 
surplus generating capacity. It also covers the public conflict and political turmoil 
generated by further proposals to expand the supply of electricity. This period from 
the early 1970s to the early 1980s is the subject of the present chapter, which focuses 
on the debate over the capacity to slow both the accelerating demand for electricity 
and the energy supply construction programme, by using energy conservation programmes 
and policies. The chapter describes electricity planning in Tasmania in order to illustrate 
the factors that lead to overgrowth in electricity supply, and the response of policy 
makers to environmentalists' demands for energy conservation as a means of slowing 
down the supply construction programme. The subsequent attempts to reform electricity 
planning in the State, the degree to which energy conservation has been adopted as a 
policy option and the way in which energy conservation programmes have been 
implemented are the subject of the following chapter. To begin, a brief description of 
Tasmania, and a summary of the early hydro-electric development in the State follow. 
5.2 Description of Tasmania 
5.2.1 Political Economy 
Australia was once facetiously described as a country lying in the Southern Ocean 
whose economic development had been severely retarded by an unfortunate dispute 
between geographers as to whether it was an island or a continent (Bierce 1906). Had 
Bierce described Tasmania as an island lying in the Southern Ocean whose economic 
development had been retarded by a similar dispute as to whether it was an island or 
a state, his statement would have been closer to the truth. For as Australia's smallest, 
poorest and only island state, Tasmania has not only shared in Australia's traditional 
economic problem - the 'tyranny of distance' from European and North American 
markets (Blainey 1966) - but has had to contend with its own problems. The greatest 
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of these problems has been the constraint on economic development imposed by what 
has come to be referred to as the 'tyranny of Bass Strait', the 300 km stretch of water 
that separates the island state from the Australian mainland (see Map 5.1). 
The island's small and highly decentralised population, and the persistent outmigration 
from the State, have contributed further to its economic problems. With a current 
population of less than half a million, the island's small domestic market is fragmented 
into three separate economic units which are often more closely linked to Victoria's 
capital, Melbourne, than they are to each other (Grosvenor et al. 1993: 5). The State's 
economy is dominated by a small number of large firms with boardrooms interstate 
and whose economic positions are vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices. Due 
to its peripheral location, the Australian economy is said to bear many structural 
similarities with the economies of less developed countries (Drake & Nieuwenhuysen 
1988: 7). This similarity is particularly marked in the case of the Tasmanian economy 
(Fehningham & Rutherford 1989: 416) which is more export orientated than any of the 
mainland states and is based predominantly on low value-added mineral concentrates, 
forest products, processed metals and agricultural produce. In many respects, the 
State's economic structure and problems bear a close similarity to those of the Canadian 
Atlantic maritime provinces as described by Burrill & McKay (1991), though these 
problems are less extreme than the similar problems caused the small size and peripheral 
location of small Pacific island nation states discussed by Hughes (1990). 
These combined problems, often referred to collectively as 'the Tasmanian problem' 
(Callaghan 1977: 34), have meant that the State has never enjoyed the rates of economic 
growth and development achieved by its mainland counterparts. It has traditionally 
had the highest rates of unemployment, the highest youth unemployment, and the 
lowest economic growth of all the Australian states. The greatest source of revenue for 
the State has been Commonwealth grants, with over fifty per cent of State revenue 
coming from that source in 1989 (Grosvenor et al. 1993;15). With less than 3% of the 
nation's population, Tasmania receives 3.5% of Commonwealth grants, or $250 million 
over and above the amount of Commonwealth revenue collected from the State. 
5.2.2 Political system 
Apart from its economic backwardness, Tasmania is characterised by a slow pace of 
change and a deeply conservative community. Only on occasion have the State's 
captains of industry or political leaders demonstrated a willingness to experiment 
boldly, the two examples most pertinent to this study being its ambitious programme 
of hydro-industrialisation and the creation of its unique Hare-Clark voting system 
(Bowman 1979: 210). With a budget equivalent to that of a small county in the USA, 
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Map 5.1 Tasmania with place names mentioned in text and hydro-
electric and fossil fuel-power stations either in service or 
planned by the early 1970s. 
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or a large local city council on mainland Australia, Tasmania is governed by a bicameral 
parliament consisting of a total of 54 elected members. The lower house, the House of 
Assembly, is the house of universal suffrage and is made up of thirty five members 
elected under the Hare-Clark proportional voting system, reputed to be the most 
democratic in the world (Newman 1992). The upper house, the Legislative Council, by 
contrast, is made up of nineteen members elected under a highly undemocratic voting 
system strongly biased in favour of property owners and non-urban voters (Newman 
1977). The Legislative Council, while protected from all its members ever having to go 
to the polls simultaneously, has the constitutional power to force the Government to 
the polls (Kellow 1996: 47). This disparity in the democratic nature of the voting 
systems for two houses of the Tasmanian parliament has been instrumental in determining 
the course of electricity planning in the State. 
5.3 A Summary of Early Electricity Planning in Tasmania 
A comprehensive account of the history of electricity planning in Tasmania is given in 
Appendix I and only the most salient features of that story have been extracted to 
construct the summary below. 
Public involvement in the production of electricity in Tasmania began in the early years 
of the twentieth century with the development of a private hydro-electric scheme on the 
Central Plateau designed to supply the electricity required to by a separate prospective 
zinc processing firm. When the venture collapsed, the State took over the task of 
construction to avoid losing the chance of developing a zinc processing industry. The 
Hydro-Electric Department was established in 1914 and staffed by the management of 
the collapsed company, providing a close association between energy-intensive industry 
and the public electricity authority from the Department's inception (Tighe 1992: 128). 
Public development of the State's hydro-electric resources was immediately viewed by 
the new department as a means of promoting economic development by attracting 
energy-intensive industry. It was seen by Government as one of a small number of 
measures used in attempting to attract capital to the State. 
The powers of the public electricity authority were gradually extended, first to ensure 
that development of the State's electricity supply system was coordinated. In 1929 the 
Hydro-Electric Department was abolished and the Hydro-Electric Commission (HEC) 
installed in its place with wide ranging monopoly over the production, distribution and 
sale of electricity in the State. 
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This vision of accelerated economic growth based on energy-intensive industrial 
development supplied with cheap hydro-electricity, failed to materialise. In the period 
before the second world war, development of the State's hydro-electric resources 
proceeded at a slow pace. Funded by low interest Commonwealth loans, it was used 
largely a means of providing employment relief. Over the thirty year period from 1920 
to 1950, the demand for electricity in the State doubled. 
With the close of the war, the policy of hydro-industrialisation was accelerated. Two 
footloose energy-intensive industries, an aluminium smelting firm (Comalco Bell Bay) 
and a producer of ferro-manganese alloys (Temco), established in the State in the 
1950s and 1960s respectively. Largely as a consequence of the expansion of these two 
firms, the demand for electricity in Tasmania quadrupled in the two decades from 
1950 to 1970. Further power was handed to the HEC. The 1944 HEC Act removed 
the Commission from Ministerial control. While the Minister for the HEC was answerable 
to parliament for the activities of the Commission, the Commission was not answerable 
to the Minister but to parliament. By the 1950s it had become the most powerful 
bureaucracy in the State and the public electricity authority with the most extensive 
powers in Australia with complete control over the planning, construction, generation, 
transmission, distribution and sale of electricity in the State. 
Hydro-industrialisation in the post-war period became an entrenched policy to the 
extent that it has been labelled a 'deep-rooted ideology' (Hay 1987: 4). To label it as 
such, however, glosses over the reasons behind the dogmatic adherence to a policy of 
rapid construction of hydro-electric schemes. For a community faced with severe 
economic disadvantages and struggling to achieve the population and economic growth 
rates of the wealthier mainland states, it represented a pragmatic means of creating 
regional employment and economic growth. For successive State governments, it was 
both an electorally successful means of retaining power and a means of regaining 
control of the State's destiny. It was propelled, furthermore, by a structural relationship 
between the Commonwealth and the states which left the latter with few means other 
than resource development to create new jobs and symbols of progress. 
Nor would it be entirely accurate to describe hydro-industrialisation as a hegemonic 
vision, as some have done, since the policy was not without its critics and detractors. 
Rather, hydro-industrialisation during the post-war period can be regarded as policy 
dogma in a political climate in which energy policy was controlled by a small number of 
highly influential decision makers. By the late 1950s, the policy of continued construction 
of hydro-electric schemes was steered by four individuals: the Premier, Eric Reece, his 
deputy, Roy Fagan, the HEC Chief Commissioner, Allan Knight, and the State's Under 
Treasurer, Kenneth Binns. 
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Conflict over electricity planning erupted again in the mid 1960s when the HEC, having 
exhausted all other potential sites, turned to the rivers in the State's rugged South West 
wilderness areas to further expand the supply of electricity. An environmental campaign 
to prevent the inundation of Lake Pedder National Park in the State's remote south 
west wilderness as part of the Middle Gordon scheme was thwarted by the secrecy of 
the planning process on the part of the HEC and the Premier. The HEC's managers 
were also able to use their monopoly on technical expertise to persuade the uninformed 
and politically powerful Legislative Councillors that further expansion of electricity 
supply was needed, that hydro-electric development remained the cheapest supply 
option, and that there existed no satisfactory technical or economic means of reducing 
the scale of the scheme in order to avoid flooding Lake Pedder. Drought-induced 
electricity shortages in the late 1960s added considerable weight to the Commission's 
arguments. Drought had the capacity to severely damage the State's reputation as a 
reliable supplier of electricity to existing and potential industrial clients and, therefore, 
economic growth. As such, it was regarded by policy makers as something to be 
avoided at all costs. The Middle Gordon scheme was hurriedly sanctioned by parliament 
together with construction of a 120 MW oil-fired power station as a further drought 
protection measure. 
Despite the political power of its proponents, opposition to the hydro-electric scheme 
increased during the construction of the Pedder Scheme, and in the ensuing debate the 
Commonwealth intervened by holding an independent enquiry into the issue. The HEC 
and the State's politicians were increasingly required to provide a posteriori justification 
for their decision to proceed with the scheme. The debate's initial focus on wilderness 
versus development issues was extended in this debate, furthermore, to include cost 
comparisons of hydro-electricity and thermal options. Also increasingly questioned 
were the economic and employment benefits of continued expansion of electricity supply 
to provide the electricity for the expansion plans of energy-intensive industries while 
those industries were shedding jobs at a faster rate than could be offset by their 
expansion programmes. 
The Lake Pedder controversy set the seeds for further public conflict over hydro-electric 
development during the Franklin River controversy a decade later. Electricity planning 
during the interval between the Lake Pedder and Franklin River controversies was also 
instrumental in shaping subsequent opposition to further hydro-electric development. 
5.4 Electricity Planning in the Aftermath of the Lake Pedder Controversy 
In 1970, during the midst of the conflict over the flooding of Lake Pedder, the HEC 
submitted to parliament a proposal to construct the 230 MWav Pieman scheme at a 
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cost of $139 million' that would increase the total generating capacity of the State's 
electricity system to 1087 MW. Without immediate commencement, the Commission 
argued, the State would face a shortage of electricity by the early 1980s (HEC 1970:18). 
The Commission also argued for, and was granted, funding to build a second 120 MW 
oil-fired generating unit at Bell Bay as further measure against drought proofing. Added 
to the latter proposal was the argument that it would provide a low capital cost 
contingency for meeting any unanticipated increase in demand for electricity before the 
controversial Middle Gordon hydro-electric scheme was completed (HEC 1970). As 
there were no indications that such demand for this electrical energy would materialise, 
it represented a deviation from the Commission's just-in-time policy and a shift towards 
planning for spare capacity (Kellow 1996: 51). 
The HEC's decision to begin planning for spare capacity to meet unanticipated increases 
in demand occurred, however, just as the drought eased. Growth in the demand for 
electricity, furthermore, slowed as world commodity prices fell and the Tasmanian 
economy went into recession. Industries which had previously indicated that they 
would require substantial additions to their loads put off their expansion programmes. 
Apart from an export woodchip industry with a small load, no new industries arrived 
in the State and demand for electricity actually fell between 1967 and 1972. 
With a decreasing rate of growth in demand and the easing of the drought, the HEC 
began to promote electricity use once again. This action was justified on the grounds of 
the benefits it provided. Building up off-peak load, according to the HEC, reduced the 
overall unit price of electricity and contributed to the State's economic well-being as 
expenditure on electricity rather than oil or gas meant that the revenue remained within 
the State. As the main Australian manufacturer of off-peak electric heaters was based 
in Tasmania, the promotion of off-peak heating further assisted the State's economy. 
Increasing residential electricity sales, the Commission added, was also a means of 
maintaining the Commission's revenue income during periods of reduced income major 
industrial sales (HEC 1972: 2). 
The promotion of electricity while simultaneously arguing the need for the Pieman 
scheme and a second oil-fired generator, led to criticism from the environmental lobby. 
3 Implicit in the HEC's proposals to Parliament was that construction costs were estimates 
based on pre-feasibility studies and that more accurate estimates of costs could not be 
obtained until a full feasibility studies was undertaken. As full feasibility studies were 
costly, these could not be undertaken until parliamentary approval for the scheme was 
granted. The convention adopted was for the HEC to advise parliament of any major 
revisions in the estimated construction cost as a result of the more complete analysis. The 
Commission also revised its costs estimates in the light of changed circumstances (strikes, 
price hikes in the costs of materials, etc.) and changes in either Government or the 
Commissions construction policy (e.g. deceleration of construction as a consequence of a fall in 
the growth in demand). 
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Environmentalists had hoped that the fall in growth for electricity demand would 
permit a temporary halt to the construction of the Middle Gordon scheme and allow 
further examination of the possibility of saving Lake Pedder. The HEC's Chief 
Commissioner dismissed these calls on the grounds that the slow-down in demand for 
electricity was likely to be a temporary phenomenon: 
The Commission's plans of development relate to a ten year period. Surplus 
power now has only small relevance to the needs in the years ahead. Temporary 
variations in the demand for power have frequently been experienced in the 
past, but the demand has always caught up over subsequent periods. However, 
even if a very pessimistic rate of growth of demand is assumed to continue over 
the next five to ten years, the whole of the inflow of the Gordon and Pedder 
storages will be required to meet the load forecast. (HEC 1972: 22) 
Knight's assessment of the situation was fully supported by the Premier, Eric Reece. 
The Premier's view of electricity planning amounted to a virtual article of faith that 
demand would continue to increase much as it had done in the past and that supply 
therefore had to be increased. Rather than cautiously err on the side of over supply as 
suggested by Collingridge (1980) or Puiseux (1987), Reece's view of electricity planning 
was a far cruder 'what did we do last time' process: 
We have got to keep developing. There have been times in my experience when 
the power need has doubled in a period of ten years here, so there will always be 
growth. (Reece, quoted in Green 1984: 30) 
Embarking on a new strategy of planning for spare capacity just at a time that growth 
in demand was falling presented the HEC with a problem. Although independent 
economists were arguing that the thermal option was the cheaper option for Tasmania 
(Davidson 1972), the HEC insisted that hydro-electricity remained the cheaper option. 
It was well known to economists, however, that a slower rate of growth made the 
thermal option even more attractive as the higher capital costs and the longer lead 
times of the hydro-electric option meant that revenue to pay off the construction loans 
was delayed and the interest accruing on the loan increased. Critical to this debate 
was the length of time it took after construction of a hydro-electric scheme to fully 
utilise the full generation capacity of the system. Delays on increased loads impacted 
on the economics of hydro-electric schemes far more than they did on thermal plants. 
The economics of hydro-electric construction were summed up by a World Bank discussion 
paper in the following manner: 
The maximum rate of return is obtained, of course, on the extreme and convenient 
assumption that the load grows fast enough to make possible the full utilisation 
of the dam's capacity immediately on its completion (van der Tak 1966: 52). 
To the problem of a slow-down in growth of demand for electricity in Tasmania, the 
HEC was able to find a convenient solution that allowed the Commission to turn this 
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'extreme and convenient assumption' into near reality. Conveniently for the HEC, the 
decline in the rate of growth in demand meant that the increase in demand could be 
met with electricity produced from the Middle Gordon scheme rather than the oil-fired 
power station. Once approval was obtained to construct the Pieman scheme and a 
second 120 MW oil-fired generating unit, the HEC announced that the starting date of 
the Pieman scheme would be deferred (HEC 1972: 1). The Commission immediately 
entered into contracts to provide the aluminium smelting firm, Comalco, with an additional 
44 MW block of electricity from the Middle Gordon Scheme (Block E). On a buyer's 
market, the price paid by the company was fixed at 0.35 c/kWh for the first three 
years and 0.4 c/kWh for the following four years, buffering the firm from the effects of 
inflation (Kellow 1986: 9). Four years later, the HEC entered into a second long-term 
contract with Comalco to provide a further 40 MW (Block F) from the Middle Gordon 
scheme at 0.52 c/kWh, with no escalation until 1975. Although the cost of producing 
electricity from the Middle Gordon scheme was higher than the costs of producing 
electricity from earlier schemes (Wilde 1978: 225), the unit price Comalco paid for the 
electricity from the Middle Gordon scheme was lower than its contract unit price for 
the blocks of power it obtained from those earlier schemes (TWS 1984: 14). 
The company also won a concession from the Government to alter the escalation clause 
of all of its contracts to reduce the variation in its prices by 0.02 c/kWh per seven units 
in variation of the HEC's Operation Cost Index (the previous contracts had varied 
prices by 0.02 c/kWh per five units of variation in the HEC's Operation Cost Index). 
This minimised the effects of real wage increases and further protected the company 
from the effects of inflation. The Government further reduced the contract price for 
Block F by 4% until the end of 1978. The purpose of the rebate was, according to the 
Commission, to encourage growth in demand at times when it suited the Commission's 
operations (Kellow 1986: 9). Comalco entered into the contracts to expand at a time 
when rising inflation had brought to a halt plans by a consortium, of which Comalco 
was a major partner, to construct a huge smelter at Boyne Island in Queensland (Wilde 
1978: 212). As Kellow pointed out, while inflation over the 1970s paid the HEC's 
interest bills and eroded the value of its outstanding loans, the benefits of this were not 
passed on to its customers evenly but were effectively used to subsidise Comalco. 
These contracts, Kellow argued, were strong indications of a Galbraithian buyer's market. 
But it was not a case of a technocratic political model in which bureaucracy and 
industry colluded behind the backs of politicians, as politicians were involved in these 
generous contractual agreements (Kellow 1986: 9). 
By 1979, industry accounted for two thirds of electricity consumption in the State, the 
two footloose firms, Comalco (199 MW) and Temco (61 MW), accounting for 
approximately two thirds of the industrial load. 
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5.5 The Franklin River Controversy 
5.5.1 The Lead -Up to the Franklin River Controversy 
Following the Lake Pedder debacle, environmentalists were immediately anxious about 
further plans to construct hydro-electric schemes in the State's South West. Of particular 
concern was the Franklin River. At a press conference in March 1974, the HEC 
Commissioner indicated that the Commission was investigating construction of a dam 
that would involve the Franklin River but that no firm decisions had been made. The 
statement sent a wave of concern through both the environmental movement and the 
Government. The Labor Party had been considerably damaged by the Pedder affair, 
and many of its rank and file members had resigned. It was therefore keen to avoid 
further conflict over electricity planning and the Commissioner's assumption that the 
decision over the State's next energy expansion option would be made without reference 
to Government therefore perturbed several Labor politicians (Lowe 1984: 49). 
As the HEC was planning its next proposal to parliament, doubts over the wisdom of 
continued hydro-electric development in the State were growing. The myth that hydro-
industrialisation was a cure-all for the State's economic problems was becoming increasing 
apparent. Manufacturing sector employment had peaked in 1971 at 32,000. By 1979 
it had fallen to 28,000. Declining industrial electricity prices on the mainland as a 
result of the economies of scale achieved through the construction of large coal-fired 
power stations further reduced the prospect of attracting new industries to the State. 
The possibility of already established industries rationalising and closing down their 
Tasmanian operations added to the concerns of policy makers in the State (Wilde 
1975: 304). Those sceptical about the likelihood of attracting new energy-intensive 
industries to the State had good reasons. No new energy-intensive industries had 
established in the Tasmania since the early 1960s and growth of industrial load in 
Tasmania had been virtually restricted to the expansion programmes of the already 
established industries. One reason for this was that unlike the situation in other states 
where the price of electricity was averaged over all existing plants, in Tasmania the 
price major industries paid for electricity was tied to the historical cost of the scheme 
from which it was nominally produced. Those contracts linked to earlier schemes were 
therefore the cheapest and any new industries would have to purchase blocks from the 
newest schemes at a higher price. This acted as a large disincentive for new energy-
intensive industries to locate in the State. 
A Commonwealth government Inquiry into Tasmania's structural economic and 
unemployment problems (Callaghan 1977) found that not one of these established 
industries was contemplating expansion. The policy of hydro-industrialisation, 
Callaghan concluded, had 'permitted the expansion of some sectors of the Tasmanian 
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economy (but) has now run its course (Callaghan 1977: 75). Independent analysts had 
also suggested that it was difficult to see how the HEC's projections of an average of 
2.7% p.a. increase in Major Industrial load and 5.5% p.a. growth in retail load could 
come about (Wilde 1978: 213). 
On top of this were increasing concerns over the costs of further hydro-electric 
construction. As growth in demand for electricity declined throughout the 1970s, work 
on the Pieman scheme had been slowed to avoid surplus capacity. This deceleration of 
the construction had led to a blow-out in the costs of the scheme as it meant that 
interest on the loans would be increased and revenue income to repay the loans deferred. 
In 1978 the HEC approached Parliament with a request for approval to increase 
borrowings for the scheme from the original $139 million (1970 dollars) to $400 million 
(1978 dollars) (Wilde 1978: 224). 
This increasing pessimism over the prospects of attracting new energy-intensive industries 
to the State contrasted, however, with the buoyant economic optimism in Canberra 
over the prospects of attracting energy-intensive industries to Australia. The Liberal 
Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, was a staunch supporter of both conservation and 
development. On the latter score, his vision was to lead Australia into a new era in 
which it could take a role in world affairs and to this end had no ideological objection 
to public sector intervention in the economy despite espousing laissez-faire economic 
philosophies. Public expenditure on national development projects was seen by Fraser 
in much the same way as wartime Labor Prime Minister , Billy Hughes, had used public 
finance to undertake the Snowy Mountain hydro-electric scheme (Kelly 1989: 90). With 
Fraser's support, the Loans Council not only approved, but solicited infrastructure 
loans, the majority of these loans being for electricity generation projects (Kelly 1989: 
91). Fraser's vision was bolstered further by the 1979 OPEC oil price rises as they led 
to the belief that OECD member countries would shift away from oil and move their 
energy-intensive industries, especially aluminium smelting offshore. For Australia, the 
OPEC oil price rise was interpreted as a potential bonanza in the form of increased 
coal and gas exports and rapid expansion of the energy-intensive manufacturing sector. 
5.5.2 Labor's Attempts at Electricity Planning Reform 
It was within this economic and political environment that a young reformist Labor 
Premier, Doug Lowe, came to power in 1977. The avidly pro-hydro Premier, Eric 
Reece, had been forced to retire in 1975 by disaffected Pedder supporters within the 
ALP who succeeded in setting a new 65 year age limit for endorsed ALP candidates. 
With the retirement of Sir Allan Knight as HEC Commissioner in the following year, the 
pro-hydro forces had lost their two staunchest allies. Lowe immediately set to attempting 
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to rein in the powers of the HEC and regaining government control of electricity planning. 
His attempt to place the HEC under limited Ministerial control was opposed, however, 
by both the HEC and the Legislative Council (Kellow 1996: 41). The relationship 
between the Minister for Energy, Andrew Lohrey, and the Commission quickly became 
unworkable, forcing Lowe to take on the energy portfolio himself. The dumping of the 
Minister led to calls from the Opposition for an inquiry into the electricity planning and 
the HEC, and for a thorough investigation of all energy options before further hydro-electric 
construction in the Lower Gordon area proceeded (Wilde 1978: 224). 
Despite opposition from the HEC, the Lowe administration established two independent 
energy advisory bodies. An Energy Advisory Council was created in late 1978, followed 
by a small Directorate of Energy within the Premier's Department in February 1979. 
Although the Government negotiated with the Legislative Councillors over the nature 
and extent of the reforms, the Legislative Council used the Bill to embarrass the 
Government, stating that the HEC deserved better treatment (Herr & Davis 1982: 10). 
The HEC Chief Commissioner served as a reluctant member on the Energy Advisory 
Council (Lowe 1984: 119). The purview of the HEC was widened to require the 
Commission to investigate all energy sources in the State upon the request of its Minister. 
Lowe accordingly instructed the HEC Commissioner to prepare a report on all the 
State's future energy options, making it clear that the HEC could not assume that its 
preferred option would be accepted by the Government (Kellow 1996: 42). 
Coincidentally, the HEC announced early in 1979 that the No. 1 oil-fired unit at the 
Bell Bay power station would be brought into service for the first time to offset possible 
shortages from low rainfall. Reliance on the stand-by power station was to increase 
over the course of the following years, peaking in 1982/83 when it was used to 
produce over 5% of the total electricity generated in the State (HEC 1984). In October 
of the same year (1979), the Commission tabled its report on the Gordon River Power 
Development (Stage II) with a load projection to the year 2000. The report recommended 
an immediate start to construction of a dam on the Lower Gordon River approximately 
1 km downstream from its confluence with the Franklin River (the 'Gordon-below-Franklin' 
or 'GbF' dam). It was to be the first in a series of dams in an integrated scheme that 
was to include further dams on the Gordon, King and Franklin Rivers at an estimated 
cost of $1.36 billion and a maximum generating capacity of 296 MW. The assessed 
long-term average energy output (ALTAEO) of the Gordon-below-Franklin dam, 172 
MWav, represented a 15.8% increase in the output of the State's generating system. 
Alternatives to the Gordon-below-Franklin scheme were included in the report, but all 
were treated in a shallow manner and dismissed as too costly. The Premier later wrote 
that the report to fall well short of what he had requested (Lowe 1984: 121). 
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Lowe's response was to open up the debate to the public and order independent 
submissions and a report from the Directorate of Energy and the Department of the 
Environment, neither of which could match the resources of the HEC. Rumours that the 
HEC was interfering in the preparation of these reports were given support when it 
was revealed that the Mines Department had substantially redrafted its submission 
according to the requirements of the HEC (Herr & Davis 1982: 8, Weinstein 1982, 16). 
When the Department of the Environment released its report, the HEC threatened to 
take legal action over its contents (Cockburn 1982). 
Wishing to avoid political conflict over the decision, Lowe proposed that the State's 
next power option be considered by a Joint House of Parliament Committee which 
would then make a recommendation to parliament. The Liberal Opposition, however, 
preferred to capitalise on a rare opportunity to differ from the government on a major 
policy issue and to appear decisive and strong compared to a vacillating government. 
The Opposition Accordingly once again abandoned its misgivings over hydro-
industrialisation and the HEC and rejected Lowe's proposal.. The Government was 
thereby forced to make a unilateral decision. 
Concerned that the government might adopt an option other than its preferred Gordon-
below-Franklin scheme, the HEC lobbied the members of the Legislative Council to set 
up their own Select Committee into the State's future power options. 
5.5.3 Aggressive Energy Conservation Proposals 
Energy conservation was not seriously advanced by the environmentalist lobby during 
the Lake Pedder debate as the problem was seen to be hydro-industrialisation rather 
than wasted energy use. It was suggested, however that growth in retail load could be 
curbed if the HEC desisted from promoting the use of electricity (Hean 1972: 105). By 
the time the Hydro-Electric Commission presented its next construction proposal to 
Parliament in 1979 energy conservation was quickly adopted as the main plank of 
environmentalist counter-proposals to further hydro-electric construction. The 
environmental lobby had learnt that it could not afford to allow parliament to decide 
the fate of the Franklin river solely on the choice of the two conflicting philosophies of 
wilderness preservation and development and that it needed to put forward alternatives 
to the HEC's proposals for meeting the State's future energy requirements (Newstead 
1980: 22). 
The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) argued that the goal of energy policy 
should be to steadily reduce the rate of growth of energy demand to zero, citing 
Sweden as an example of a place where this goal had been successfully achieved (Hill 
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1980: 80). The ACF advocated that short-term energy requirements be met by a 
combination of non-grid energy supply systems, such as solar hot water collectors and 
wood heaters, smaller-scaled hydro-electric schemes outside the South West wilderness 
area, and the use of wood waste as a fuel for centralised electricity generation. The 
main policy instrument advanced by conservationists to reduce demand for electricity, 
was to increase the price of electricity to its long-term marginal cost of production. 
Citing from evidence given to the Newport Review panel in Victoria by Californian 
experts, it was argued that the energy conservation could reduce load in a region such 
as Victoria or Tasmania by approximately 5%, equivalent to two years growth in 
forecast demand. This, the ACF argued, would defer the need for construction on a 
new electricity supply project for two years (Hill 1980: 87). If the community proved 
unwilling to restrain demand to levels that could be met with these 'small' energy 
supply options, it was argued, a coal-fired thermal station could be built (Hill 1980: 
86). 
The main function of energy conservation was to delay the decision over the choice of 
energy supply options, thereby allowing time to mount a more sustained attack against 
the real problem — continued rapid expansion of electricity supply and the expansion 
of energy-intensive industry. By stalling the decision, it was hoped that the debate 
could be redirected to a more thorough assessment of the State's future energy requirements 
and of the how those energy requirements could best be met (Jones 1980: 93). 
Environmentalists derogatorily described State energy policy as a vacuum that was 
filled by the first option that came along, which was invariably another hydro-electric 
scheme pushed by the HEC. As no other energy option was subjected to thorough 
analysis, the HEC's hydro-electric development proposal became policy without first 
establishing if more electricity was actually needed. This process, environmentalists 
charged, was the reason that Tasmania had failed to rely on energy conservation to the 
degree that many other countries had, despite the fact that the strategy of increasing 
the supply of subsidised energy was a 'thoroughly discredited' job creation strategy as 
the energy-intensive companies in Tasmania used more electricity but employed fewer 
people than they did 30 years previously (Jones 1980: 104). 
The most aggressive proposal for using energy conservation as a means of deferring the 
need for investment in new electricity supply was that advanced by the Tasmanian 
Conservation Trust (Harwood & Hartley 1980). The Trust's 'report drew on the small 
number of energy efficiency supply curve analyses produced overseas (Leach et al. 
1979) to argue that increasing the efficiency of energy use represented a least-cost 
option for meeting increased energy requirements in Tasmania. The report took the 
increasingly standard environmentalist line that the policy of hydro-industrialisation 
ought to be abandoned on the basis of the high public investment per job created 
through this means, and the high risk of saddling the State with considerable idle 
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capacity and large debts should the anticipated industrial expansion not eventuate 
(Harwood & Hartley 1980: 60, Saddler et al. 1980: 39). The fact that the HEC's 1970 
forecasts proved to be inaccurate was used as evidence that these risks were real. 
Having argued that expansion of electricity supply to encourage energy-intensive 
industrial expansion could no longer be justified on the basis of employment generation, 
Harwood & Hartley (1980) then argued that growth in demand for electricity without 
an increase in industrial load would be sufficiently low to permit it to be met by 
increasing the efficiency of energy use. To achieve increases in efficiency, the authors 
advocated a number of policies, including mandated energy efficiency standards and 
dwelling thermal performance levels. These policies were justified on the grounds that 
the benefits were so great that regulation to ensure they occurred was justified (Harwood 
& Hartley 1980: 28). As an example of these savings, it was stated that for an extra 
capital cost of $20-30 the electricity consumption of refrigerators could be reduced by 
37-40% and that the reduction in electricity bills would mean that these were paid back 
in less than three years (1980: 27). The authors assumed that a variety of economic 
instruments would be used to increase the adoption of wood heaters, solar collectors 
and heat pumps to preset levels. By 1995, the authors believed, solar hot water 
systems could be installed on over 20% of dwellings, compared to a 1980 level of less 
than 1% of dwellings (1980: 24). Public investment in electric generating capacity could 
be further reduced, the authors contended, by using industrial cogeneration to meet 
20% of the pulp and paper manufacturing industry's electricity requirements. Their 
end-use analysis suggested that if an aggressive energy conservation and cogeneration 
policies were adopted, the demand for electricity in 1995 could be reduced to 1105 
MW compared to the HEC's mid-range estimate of 1388 MW 4 , allowing the decision 
to construct further generating capacity to be deferred for fifteen years (1980: 39). The 
authors conceded that their forecast would eventuate automatically, but only if their 
recommended policies were put into effect (1980: 15). 
The environmental lobby immediately supported Harwood & Hartley's energy efficiency 
proposal, while maintaining that many of Harwood & Hartley's estimates of the scope 
for reducing energy use in the State were in fact too conservative (Thompson 1981: 117, 
Weinstein 1982: 14). By scrapping Comalco's antiquated and inefficient Bell Bay 
smelter and redeveloping it to bring the smelter up to world best efficiency standards, 
it was argued, the firm's load could be reduced from 237 MW to 180 MW. It was also 
maintained that the portion of the pulp and paper industry's electricity requirements 
met by cogeneration could be increased from 20% to 100% (Thompson 1981: 120). In 
the unlikely event that these strategies did not negate the need for further supply 
expansion, increased demand could be more cost-effectively met, environmentalists 
4 Average load in 1980 was approximately 900 MW. 
185 
maintained, by wind and solar energy technologies than with hydro-electric or thermal 
power. Others went further and argued that not only should the policy of energy 
supply expansion to provide energy-intensive industries with more electricity be 
abandoned, but that the energy-intensive industries in the State were likely to decamp. 
Tasmania's hydro-electric system was seen to be rapidly becoming too small to compete 
with the large aluminium smelters being constructed elsewhere, supplied by very large 
hydro-electric or coal-fired power stations. Comalco's Bell Bay plant, it was asserted, 
would therefore inevitably close down, probably when the joint-venture refinery at 
Boyne Island in Queensland in which Comalco was a partner began production in 1.982 
(Sanders 1980: 53). To provide employment in the place of hydro-electric construction 
and energy-intensive manufacturing industries, conservationists advocated development 
of cottage industries, ecotourism and small-scaled, value-added manufacturing such as 
PV cells, wood heaters and heat pumps (Sanders 1980: 18). Environmentalists argued, 
moreover, that going on past escalations in the costs of hydro-electricity construction 
projects, the final cost of the GbF scheme was likely to be twice the figure suggested by 
the HEC. This, it was argued, made energy conservation, cogeneration and renewable 
energy even more economically rational options. 
Harwood & Hartley's estimates of the scope for energy conservation contrasted sharply 
with the estimates for saving energy made by the HEC. The Commission's estimates of 
the possible effects of energy conservation programmes, which were included in its own 
lower band forecast, was that there existed the potential to save 109 MW of electricity 
in the retail sector through energy conservation measures over the period 1979 to 2000 
(HEC 1979, Appendix II: 15). But as the HEC also estimated that electrical space 
heating load over that period would increase by 94 MW as a consequence of a shift 
from oil to electricity for space heating, the total potential for reducing energy use in the 
retail sector was estimated to be only 15 MW over the 21 year period. Electricity was 
used for heating in approximately 12% of Tasmanian homes (Wilde 1978: 223) and 
econometric models had predicted that as oil prices rose householders would switch to 
electricity in preference to wood heaters (Fleming 1979). Any increase in the efficiency 
of major industrial sector energy use, the Commission argued, would be taken up as 
increased output rather than reduced energy use. The HEC's overall conclusion was 
that while there existed scope for saving electricity, it was unrealistic to assume that 
energy conservation would produce anything but a small and temporary diminution in 
the rate of growth in electricity demand (HEC 1979, Appendix II: 8-9). 
Harwood & Hartley's (1980) proposal was also dismissed by independent energy 
policy experts. The Directorate of Energy commissioned resource planning expert, 
Professor John Burton from the University of New England in NSW to prepare its own 
critique of the HEC's report and to recommend energy options. Professor Burton 
described Harwood & Hartley's contribution as 'useful', but rejected it as a prescription 
186 
for policy on account of the large number of assumptions upon which it was based. Its 
authors, Professor Burton maintained, had little knowledge on energy matters and bore 
no responsibility should their estimates of the scope for energy conservation prove 
highly inflated and result in supply shortages (Burton 1980: Section 3: 45). Not only 
was Harwood & Hartley's proposal based on numerous technical and cost-effectiveness 
assumptions, but many of its recommendations were considered by Burton to be 
unpopular and politically infeasible (Burton 1980: Section 3: 56). 
It was in regard to the HEC's load forecasts, however, Professor Burton reserved his 
most damning comments. To predict growth in retail load the Commission had assumed 
that growth would continue until 1985 at a rate of 2.95% p.a. as it had done over the 
past half a decade, whereupon it was assumed to gradually return to its earlier, much 
higher rate of growth rate of 5.5% p.a.. Burton maintained that the HEC put forward 
no solid justification for these assumptions. The methodology employed by the HEC 
to estimate growth in industrial load, Burton considered to be even harder to justify. 
The Commission had arrived at a forecast of probable future industrial load by surveying 
major industries and obtaining their estimates of anticipated future electricity 
requirements in the event that the electricity was available at commercially acceptable 
prices. As a forecasting methodology it was doubly flawed. The companies were not 
contractually bound to these estimates, and the estimates were made without 
consideration of what the actual price of electricity would be. If the HEC's survey of 
major industries was used, industrial load would increase by 506 MW in 21 years. 
Over half of this forecast increase in demand (228 MW) would be from one firm, 
Temco. 
The HEC considered an average rate of industrial load growth of 20 MW p.a. unlikely 
and arbitrarily halved the forecast rate of industrial load growth to about 10 MW per 
annum. When this was combined with the projected retail load, the result was a 
projection of total load growth that dovetailed perfectly in timing and output with the 
Commission's preferred Gordon-below-Franklin scheme. Professor Burton politely 
suggested that it was tempting to conclude that the Commission's forecast was strongly 
influenced, if not governed, by what its preferred hydro-electric option could supply 
(Burton 1980: Section 3: 64). 
The Coordination Committee on Future Power Development (1980) accordingly dismissed 
Harwood & Hartley's aggressive energy efficiency proposal outright, describing it as 
essentially subjective. The report argued that the lack of research into the demand for 
energy in the State and the consequent poor information base on energy end-use data, 
mitigated against the political feasibility of such an untested option. It was pointed 
out that the estimates of energy savings and the cost-effectiveness of these measures 
varied substantially across all end-uses and energy conservation measures, from solar 
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hot water systems to dishwashers. The government was ethically bound, the Committee 
argued, to have a better understanding of the impacts of energy conservation measures 
before imposing it on the community through regulations (Coordination Committee on 
Future Power Development 1980: 155). The Committee therefore advised the Government 
to adopt an energy conservation programme with all urgency but claimed that this 
would be insufficient to negate the need for expansion of the system (Coordination 
Committee on Future Power Development 1980: 6). 
The Coordination Committee's strategy for undermining the HEC's argument for the 
Gordon-below-Franklin scheme was the reverse of the environmental lobby's. Accusing 
the HEC of arbitrarily reducing projected industrial load growth to match its hydro-electric 
option, the Coordination Committee estimated industrial load growth to be significantly 
higher than assumed by the HEC. As this demand forecast could not be met with a 
hydro-electric scheme with a lead time of over ten years, the Coordination Committee 
argued, it necessitated immediate construction of a 200 MW coal-fired power station, 
followed by construction of the smaller dam on the Gordon just above its junction with 
the Olga River (See Map 5.1). The Gordon-above-Olga scheme was the HEC's second 
favoured option and had the advantage of avoiding inundation of the Franklin River. 
5.5.4 Political Support for the Hydro-Electric Option 
As the debate moved into the public sphere, the pro-hydro forces organised on an 
unprecedented scale and the Government came under pressure from several fronts at 
once. At the instigation of the Hobart Chamber of Industries, thirteen of the major 
industries in the State formed a working party which commissioned a public relations 
firm to steer public opinion towards the HEC's preferred option and also hired a 
professional lobbyist to take their case to politicians (Lowe 1984: 110). HEC employees 
also formed their own organisation, the Hydro-Employees Action Team (HEAT), to 
protect the jobs of the HEC's construction workforce by publicly campaigning for the 
Gordon-below-Franklin scheme. Kellow has argued that since HEC employees were 
forbidden by law from making public statements concerning the HEC, HEAT enjoyed 
at least the tacit approval of the HEC as the Commission did not censure their activities 
(Kellow 1996: 44). Most damaging to the Government, however, was the formation of 
a pro-HEC lobby group, the Association of Consumers of Electricity (ACE). Its 
membership included former Liberal and Labor Premiers, Sir Angus Bethune and Eric 
Reece, as well as the ex-HEC Commissioner, Sir Allan Knight. 
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5.5.5 Moderate Energy Conservation as a Compromise Strategy 
On the 8th of July, 1980, Cabinet met to consider the options. Both the HEC's integrated 
hydro-electric scheme and the all-thermal option were immediately rejected. The thermal 
option was rejected as the HEC was able to easily convince the members of Cabinet 
that electricity produced from coal would be more expensive than electricity produced 
from hydro-electric sources. But while the HEC insisted that hydro-electricity continued 
to represent the cheaper option, independent economic analysis again suggested that 
coal had become competitive with further hydro-electric construction by the early 1970s 
(McColl 1976). The government's acceptance of the HEC's cost estimates was made in 
the face of growing concerns over the blowout in the costs of the incomplete Pieman 
scheme. 
A number of possible contributing factors to the Government's acceptance of the HEC's 
stance can be suggested. Primarily, politicians found themselves dealing with complex 
economic and technical issues which they did not fully understand. They therefore had 
to decide which expert advice to accept, that of the HEC, or that used by the Coordination 
Committee. The choice of the former was probably based on 'the Devil you know' 
principle, together with the more dominant presence of the HEC in the debate. This 
advice, however, was subsequently shown to be seriously deficient (Kellow 1982, Saddler 
1982). Critiques of the HEC's comparative cost estimation methodology pointed out 
that these comparisons were not based on the normal tools of project evaluation but 
relied on undiscounted cost streams and ignored the cost implications of small errors in 
forecasting. The HEC's cost comparisons were also shown to be based on economic 
costs analysis of the Gordon-below Franklin scheme in isolation from, rather than as a 
component of, the entire State's integrated electricity generating system. The discount 
rate employed by the HEC was lower than was normal for public project appraisal, the 
efficiency of modern thermal power stations was understated by the HEC analysis, 
and while the costs of the thermal option included the costs of land, no attempt was 
made to place a cost on the loss of wilderness or other values in the hydro-electric 
option. The costs of coal were also inflated in the HEC analysis at a rate of 8% p.a. 
compared to an inflation rate of 6% p.a. for all other inputs. Independent analysts 
also claimed that the HEC understated the capital costs of the hydro-electric option. 
Alternative independent analysis using more conventional economic appraisal techniques 
found the thermal option to be 'significantly cheaper than the hydro alternative to meet 
the HEC's forecast load growth to the year 2000 except under then unlikely circumstances 
of a 2 % p.a. escalation in the price of coal' (Kellow 1982: 10). 
Politicians were unable to make similar criticisms of the HEC's cost comparison 
methodology. Although some early critiques pointed out the deficiencies of the HEC's 
comparative cost methodology (Hill 1980), by the time more comprehensive comparative 
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cost evaluations were produced by independent investigators, the Government had 
committed itself to the hydro alternative. Cabinet's support for the hydro-electric 
option may also have been based on a strong desire to believe that hydro-electricity 
was cheaper than coal simply because the implications of believing otherwise were 
far-reaching. It was clear that Tasmania could not produce electricity from coal at 
prices competitive with the large mainland coal-fired power stations. Reliance on coal 
would mean that the State had no advantage over the mainland states in electricity 
generation. If coal were the cheaper option, moreover, it would require a decision with 
high political costs in the from of retrenchment of the hydro-electric construction 
workforce. 
Given that much of the pressure on the government came from HEC employees and 
trade unions, employment implications were of paramount importance in reaching a 
decision (Kellow 1996: 42). When the HEC admitted that the Gordon-above-Olga 
scheme would be more labour-intensive than the Gordon-below-Franklin scheme, Lowe 
believed that it provided a compromise that would offer both the HEC's construction 
workforce and the environmental lobby their major goals. Cabinet's final decision was 
to proceed with the 120 MW Gordon-above-Olga scheme. As the output of the 
compromise option was 52 MW less than the HEC's preferred option, Cabinet adopted 
a moderate energy conservation package designed to reduce growth in retail load by 60 
MW over one decade. As a further measure to ensure security in the supply of cheap 
electricity, the conversion of the Bell Bay stand-by oil-fired power station to coal was 
also adopted as part of Cabinet's energy strategy. Cabinet took its compromise energy 
proposal to parliament confident that it would be accepted as it avoided both the need 
to flood the Franklin River and the need to retrench HEC workers. 
To lend credibility to its energy conservation proposal, the Government needed to be 
seen to be able to achieve its target of a 60 MW reduction in electricity demand. A 
semi-autonomous Energy Management Centre was established within the HEC to promote 
energy conservation (Sioshansi 1990, Section 4: 7). The Energy Advisory Council was 
also instructed to appoint a working party to prepare legislation that would alter the 
State's building codes to mandate minimum thermal performance standards for new 
dwellings. The Working Party, headed by Graeme Wathen, handed its report to the 
government and the legislation to put the new regulations into effect was tabled in 
Parliament in late 1981 (Working Party on Thermal Insulation of New Dwellings 1981: 
1). To add to the visibility of its energy conservation efforts, the Government also 
established the Tasmanian Energy Research Council (TERC) which made available 
grants for research on energy conservation. A research team from the University of 
Tasmania quickly took advantage of this new source of research funding and applied 
for an $86,500 to undertake a comprehensive survey of Tasmanian households with a 
view to developing a sophisticated econometric model of household sector energy use 
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and thereby improve forecasting of future demand (Challen et al. 1983). The University 
Research Team applied for the funding using the argument that the greatest problem for 
overall electricity planning in the State was the uncertainty associated with future retail 
sector demand, of which the household sector was the largest component. According 
to the University research team': 
Relative uncertainty about demands imposed on all energy sources by the domestic 
sector makes it difficult to plan the provision of energy supply for the other 
sectors even where long-term contractual arrangements give some certainty to 
the estimation of future demand in those sectors. (Challen et al. 1983: 1-2) 
This view conflicted with the those such as Professor Burton who considered the 
uncertainty associated with forecasts of major industrial load to be far greater than 
those associated with forecasts of retail sector load. The research aim to develop a 
model which could include the effects of saturation levels and increased end-use energy 
efficiency, and so 'enable the prediction of the likely effects of government policy 
initiatives in the conservation area (Challen et al. 1983: 2), however, appeared to be 
potentially useful. 
5.5.6 Political Resistance to Alternative Energy Strategies 
The major weakness of the government's energy proposal was seen to be that the 
estimated cost of electricity produced by the Gordon-above-Olga scheme of 1.6 c /kWh 
was 0.2 c /kWh higher than the estimated cost of electricity produced by the HEC's 
preferred Gordon-below-Franklin scheme. It was estimated by the HEC that this price 
differential would cost the State in the vicinity of $3 million p.a. (Newstead 1980: 25). 
The government maintained that this was a fallacious argument as although its 
compromise would increase the unit cost of electricity, total expenditure on electricity 
would not be increased as demand for electricity would be reduced through its moderate 
energy conservation programme. Critical to the government's energy policy strategy, 
therefore, was its ability to convince its critics that the energy conservation programmes 
would result in the 60 MW electricity savings assumed by the government. 
The Government's compromise option was passed in the House of Assembly but was 
rejected by the pro-hydro lobby and by conservationists. The seven-member Legislative 
Council Select Committee on Future Power Developments held hearings in camera, 
denying access to environmental groups whilst giving free access to HEC and industry 
representatives. The Managers of the HEC provided the Committee with reports not 
supplied to the Government (Bates 1983: 3), an action the Commission justified on the 
grounds that the Commission was responsible to Parliament rather than to the government 
of the day, and merely worked to ensure that parliament was fully informed (Cockburn 
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1982). The Commission, furthermore, continued to produce load projections that took 
no account of the Government's estimates of the scope for energy conservation and 
publicly warned that electricity tariffs would rise unless the Gordon-below-Franklin 
Scheme went ahead (Thompson 1981: 21). 
The recommendations of the Legislative Council Select Committee report tabled in early 
1981 surprised few as five of its members had expressed their support for the HEC 
option before hearings began (Bates 1983: 2). The Committee reasoned that the State 
could not afford to jeopardise its economic future by adopting anything but the energy 
option that provided electricity at the lowest unit price. In an unprecedented move the 
Legislative Council altered the wording of the Government's Bill by deleting 'Gordon-
above-Olga', inserting 'Gordon-below-Franklin' in its place and recommending immediate 
start on construction. The government refused to accept the Legislative Council's 
amended Bill and a Conference of Managers consisting of members of both houses of 
Parliament was formed to break the impasse. The Conference of Managers remained 
deadlocked throughout 1981. 
In the absence of any other constitutional mechanism for resolving the impasse, Lowe 
took the debate into the public arena (Herr & Davis 1982: 8), relying on the fact that 
opinion polls had consistently shown majority public support for saving the Franklin 
River (Lowe 1984: 110). Under the criticisms from the HEAT, ACE, the major industries 
and the HEC, the resolve of a number of Labor parliamentarians began to weaken. 
When the government also came under attack from its traditional support base, the 
trade union movement, the rift within the Government's own ranks widened. Large 
unions had close connections with the Commission and these unions brought their 
considerable influence within the ALP to alter Government policy and undermine the 
Premier's position. At an ALP State Council meeting in early July 1980, a union 
attempt to commit the Government to the Gordon-below-Franklin scheme was defeated 
but a motion to put the issue to a referendum was passed (Kellow 1996: 44). The 
result was an unsuccessful challenge to Lowe's leadership and a reshuffling of his 
Cabinet. A junior member of Cabinet, and a supporter of the Gordon-above-Olga 
option, Julian Amos was given the Energy portfolio. Within days of gaining the energy 
portfolio, Amos switched to the pro-hydro camp (Lowe 1984: 148). His first official 
duty was to announce a 13.6% increase in retail sector electricity tariffs. The new 
Minister attempted to link the increase in electricity charges to the Government's energy 
conservation policy by simultaneously replacing the declining block general retail tariff 
with a flat rate tariff (The Mercury 31 July 1981: 1-2). 
Union support for the Gordon-below-Franklin scheme was not absolute. The Public 
Service Union commissioned the doyen on matters economic in Tasmania, Dr Bruce 
Felmingham from the Department of Economics at the University of Tasmania, to put 
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forward its case that expenditure on public administration created more income and 
jobs than did expenditure on hydro-electric construction (Felmingham 1982). Felmingham 
produced a report damning further hydro-electric construction and the policy of hydro-
industrialisation. Comalco, he claimed, paid less than the marginal cost of supply for 
the electricity it received and that while the firm attempted to justify this subsidy on 
the basis of the contribution the company made to the direct and indirect employment 
in the State, this argument was readily undermined by the fact that hydro-industrialisation 
was an excessively costly job creation strategy. Politicians, Felmingham stated, had 
ignored a number of the reports which had indicated that hydro-industrialisation had 
already run its course in the State and should be laid to rest (Felmingham 1982: 25). 
Nor was business support for continued hydro-electric development complete. A 
group of small businesses formed their own association opposed to the Lower Gordon 
scheme and commissioned international economist and energy consultant, Shann Turnbull, 
to prepare an independent report on the State's future energy options. The 'Turnbull 
report', released in September 1981, foreshadowed more recent reforms of the electricity 
supply industry by advocating that the HEC be split into generating, distribution and 
retail units, and that the HEC's monopoly be broken by allowing private generators to 
compete (Turnbull 1981). The report proposed that generators bid to supply a central 
distributor, an Energy Efficiency Office (EEO), with bulk electricity which would be 
resold in bulk to independent retailers. The function of the EEO would be to act as a 
regulator and ensure that electricity was used efficiently. Like other independent 
economists, Turnbull was also of the opinion that the cost of thermally produced 
electricity would be less than that produced from hydro-schemes and recommended 
construction of a coal-fired power station rather than further hydro-electric development. 
Turnbull's recommendations were publicly supported by the Minister for National Parks 
and Wildlife, Andrew Lohrey. On the insistence of Amos, Lohrey was sacked (Lowe 
1984: 154). Just before his sacking, Lohrey made a request to the Prime Minister to 
nominate South West Tasmania for inclusion on UNESCO's World Heritage List. The 
request initially went unnoticed amid the political turmoil but was to be of paramount 
significance to the eventual outcome 5 . With Lohrey's sacking, Lowe lost his support 
and on 11 November 1981 was toppled. An HEC spokesperson publicly stated that 
the Premier had been properly dismissed for failing to heed the advice of its bureaucracies 
and there was a common perception that the HEC had played a direct role in the 
Premier's fall (Cockburn 1982, Hay 1987: 5). To political analysts Herr & Davis (1982: 
5 Lowe (1984: 165) stated that he personally sent the request. According to another member 
of Cabinet at the time, however, it was Andrew Lohrey who sent the request and did so 
without consulting Cabinet. It was this action, the author was told, that led to the initial 
push from the pro-HEC faction within Cabinet for Lohrey's sacking (Bob Graham, personal 
communication, December 1995). 
193 
7), however, this was a too literal interpretation and understated the subtlety of the 
HEC's involvement. 
The new Labor Government abandoned Lowe's energy strategy and Lowe resigned 
from the Party to sit as an independent. The referendum was held on the future power 
option, giving the public the choice of only two options: the Government's Gordon-
above-Olga scheme, or the HEC's Gordon-below-Franklin scheme. The Government did 
not campaign for its own option, which received only 8% of the vote. The HEC's 
option polled 47%. Almost one third of all voters chose neither option but elected 
instead to write 'No Dams' across their ballot papers. When Labor Whip, Mary Willey, 
followed Lowe by resigning and sitting as an independent, the Government lost its 
majority and parliament was immediately prorogued by Lowe's successor for three 
months to defer the inevitable vote of no confidence. While in recess, the new Labor 
administration adopted the Gordon-below-Franklin scheme as policy on the grounds 
that it was the option that had received the greatest support in the referendum. 
The new Labor administration set about dismantling Lowe's electricity planning reforms. 
The Energy Advisory Council was abolished and the Directorate of Energy was replaced 
with a small Energy Policy Unit within the Premier's Department. Interestingly, the 
energy conservation programme put in place by the Lowe administration was retained. 
The Energy Policy Unit was asked to produce an Energy Policy statement reaffirming 
the Government's commitment to energy conservation (Government of Tasmania: 1982a: 
27-8). The government used the statement to declare that it had set a goal of reducing 
government sector energy (not electricity) use by 20%, and that a broad range of energy 
conservation policies would be used to encourage household sector energy conservation. 
It was announced that the legislation mandating thermal performance standards codes 
for new dwellings would be introduced as soon as Parliament resumed. 
An updated and extended version of the Policy statement was used to justify the 
government's support for the Gordon-below-Franklin Scheme on the basis of the greater 
economic and social benefits the option provided during the construction phase. It 
gave the function of the energy conservation programmes as the tailoring of demand to 
supply during the long construction time of the dam (Government of Tasmania 1982b: 
71). This ignored the fact that the Pieman scheme would be commissioned in the 
interim period and left unanswered why such energy conservation policies were seen as 
necessary when the Gordon-below-Franklin scheme was defended by the HEC using a 
forecast that was not contingent upon moderate energy conservation efforts. 
As soon as Parliament resumed the Government fell, and the Liberals were swept to 
power in March 1982 under their new leader, Robin Gray. The Bill approving the 
Gordon-below-Franklin Scheme passed both Houses of Parliament and the Deputy 
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Premier was sent off to Paris to dissuade the UNESCO Committee from including 
South West Tasmania on the World Heritage List. With a federal election approaching, 
the Liberal Prime Minister offered the Tasmanian government $500 million to construct 
an 800 MW coal-fired power station instead of the Gordon-below-Franklin dam. Gray 
dismissed the offer out of hand (Green 1984: 197). 
During the course of the Franklin River, dispute three industrial firms operating in the 
State had permanently closed their doors. One of these, the Carbide works at Electrona 
had been propped up by the Government by the purchase of $12 million shares in the 
company which it then resold to the company for $1. To save the jobs of the company's 
180 workers, its contract electricity price was reduced to a fraction of a cent per unit. 
In 1980 the company folded and reneged on its take-or-pay electricity contract (Tasmanian 
Wilderness Society 1984: 15). None of these closures appeared to have any impact on 
the question of the accuracy of load forecasts and the associated risk that there would 
be excess capacity when the Gordon-below-Franklin Scheme was completed. 
5.5.7 Renewed Debate over Electricity Planning and Energy Conservation 
The environmental lobby took its campaign to the federal sphere and persuaded the 
Australian Democrats in the Senate to establish a Senate Select Committee of Inquiry 
on South West Tasmania. The Senate Inquiry permitted a more thorough examination 
of all issues, including load forecasts, comparative costs of the energy options and the 
scope for energy conservation. Both Weinstein (1982) and Kellow (1996) have noted 
the further insights into the electricity planning in Tasmania obtained during the course 
of the Inquiry, and especially the responses of the HEC's Chief Commissioner to questions 
from the Select Committee of Inquiry. 
When asked by the Committee if he would advise the Tasmanian Parliament to approve 
construction of a hydro-electric scheme in the absence of palpable evidence of any 
increase in demand for electricity, HEC Chief Commissioner, Russell Ashton, stated 
that his advice to the Parliament would be that expansion of supply would be prudent, 
even in the absence of firm increase in demand (Weinstein 1982: 16). This answer 
surprised the Committee members, who then asked the Chief Commissioner whether he 
considered that the attempt to project demand based on all of the HEC's analysis of 
data was irrelevant. To this the Chief Commissioner replied: 
In many ways I think it is. I would say about the general load again, for instance, 
that may be we are out in our estimates of general load; may be we can achieve 
better results with conservation than we assume and that will drop the general 
load down a bit. But all that does is give us a little bit more for industry, and it 
is a mighty valuable thing to have. I do not see any problems about it (Senate 
Select Committee of Inquiry on South West Tasmania 1982a: 3275). 
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The HEC's Chief Commissioner had previously described forecasting as more of an art 
than a science, an analytical method which relied heavily on experience and judgement 
(Newstead 1980: 22). His response to the Senate Select Committee of Inquiry illustrated 
that in the Commission's art of forecasting, the scope for retail sector energy conservation 
was deemed to be not only uncertain, but largely irrelevant. 
The Senate Select Committee concluded that it was not possible to arrive at any 
absolute position on the comparative costs of energy supply options as there existed 
no consensus on likely future interest rates, discount rates, or future fuel costs. To 
resolve these issues, more investigation was needed (Australian Parliament 1982b: 
220). On the question of forecasts, the Committee was equally ambivalent. The 
environmental lobby suggested that the retail load in Tasmania in the year 2000 would 
be around 700 MW, well below the HEC's upper band estimate for that year of 1,100 
MW. The HEC's justification for its retail load projections the Committee considered 
'incomplete and in some cases erroneous' (Australian Parliament 1982b: 61) While the 
HEC assumed a 5.95 % p.a. increase in retail load to 1984, reducing to 3.95 % after 
1987, environmentalists assumed a 2 % p.a. growth in retail load. The disparity 
between the highest and the lowest load projections for the year 2000 submitted to the 
Committee was 436.2 MW (Australian Parliament 1982b: 75). Given that actual retail 
demand in 1979 was 293 MW, this range in forecasts was considered exceptionally 
large (Australian Parliament 1982b: 88). The Committee found a similar disparity in 
the forecasts of major industrial loads. Its own survey of Tasmanian firms found that 
plans to increase demand before the mid 1980s were tentative and that no company 
had any firm plans to increase demand beyond that date. This conflicted with the 
HEC's assessment of the situation. 
In his submission to the Senate Inquiry, independent energy consultant, Dr John Todd, 
suggested that the HEC's load projections were too high, that demand could be further 
reduced with energy conservation, and that any increase in demand for electricity to 
the year 2000 could therefore be met using renewable energy technologies. Dr Todd 
maintained that it would be more than possible to increase the efficiency of energy use 
in Tasmania by 1.8% p.a. over the following decade. As this would amounting to the 
180 MW reduction in electricity demand over the decade - equivalent to the output of 
the Gordon-below-Franklin scheme - energy efficiency could be used , according to Dr 
Todd, to defer the decision over which energy supply option was in the best interests 
of the State until the early 1990s. When pressed by the Senate Committee members for 
substantiation of this opinion, Todd expressed surprise, claiming that such scope for 
energy conservation was simply accepted everywhere else (Senate Select Committee 
1982a: 1222). Asked whether increased energy efficiency was likely to result in increased 
output rather than reduced energy use, Dr Todd claimed that in his experience as an 
energy consultant to small to medium-sized industries, this was not the case. 
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That there existed significant, though not as dramatic scope for electricity conservation, 
was also argued by the Commonwealth's Department of National Development and 
Energy (DNDE). In its submission to the Senate Inquiry, the DNDE claimed that it 
would be possible to save 780 GWh of electricity p.a. in Tasmania by the year 2000, 
reducing the HEC's projected load growth for the year by one third. The Department 
estimated 80% of this scope for energy conservation to be in the industrial and commercial 
sectors, with the other 20% in the household sector. 
These claims were hotly contested by the Department of Industrial Development of 
Tasmania (DIDT), the predecessor of the Tasmanian Development Authority. According 
to the DIDT, assessment of the scope for energy efficiency in the industrial sector 
required specialist skills and detailed local knowledge. The Authority gave its own 
best assessment of such scope for conserving energy in Tasmania as 85 GWh p.a. by 
the year 2000, most of this scope for energy efficiency being in the industrial and 
commercial sectors. Such energy efficiency, the DIDT asserted, was likely to be taken 
up as increased output rather than a decrease in electricity use. The DIDT claimed, on 
the other hand, that the scope for household sector electricity conservation was frequently 
over-estimated. It was argued that householders who used electric space heating had 
been encouraged by the HEC's Customer Advisory Service to insulate their dwellings 
for over two decades, and were therefore likely to have disproportionately higher rates 
of insulation. Increased insulation, it was argued further, was more likely to result in 
increased thermal comfort levels rather than in decreased electricity use. As the price 
of oil rose, moreover, it was asserted that there would be an increasing switch to 
electric space heating. In regard to the potential to reduce household sector electricity 
use in other end-uses such as lighting and refrigeration, the DIDT was totally dismissive 
(Department of Industrial Development of Tasmania: 1982: 74). The real scope for 
industrial cogeneration, the Authority also suggested, was a fraction of that claimed by 
conservationists and the DNDE. In the DIDT's estimation, the actual scope for electricity 
savings was a mere 22 GWh per annum.. In arriving at this figure, the DIDT made the 
extraordinary statement that higher estimates of the scope for electricity conservation 
assumed that Government policy would be revised (Department of Industrial 
Development of Tasmania 1982: 87), implying that it was necessary to ensure that 
sufficient supply of energy was available in case government energy conservation 
programmes were not put in place. The DIDT in essence advocated expanding supply 
as a hedge, not only against the limited uncertain scope for energy conservation, but 
also against uncertainties of policy implementation. It amounted, in effect, to an 
extreme form of Collingridge's (1980) hedging circle. 
Faced with these conflicting views and forecasts, the Committee commissioned the 
McLachlan Group to independently critique the forecasts and to prepare an independent 
load projection. The McLachlan Group considered the HEC's forecast band to be too 
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narrow and substantially increased the upper band and reduced the lower forecast 
band. The Senate Committee of Inquiry Committee considered the forecast prepared 
by McLachlan Group to be the most reliable and noted that if the McLachlan Group's 
lower band forecast was accepted as the basis for planning, no supply expansion 
would be needed before the year 2000. If, on the other hand, the Group's upper band 
was used as the basis for planning, hydro-electric development could not meet the 
required load increase in time (Senate Standing Committee of Inquiry on South West 
Tasmania 1982b: 219-20). In view of the large uncertainties, the Senate Select Committee 
of Inquiry considered the most prudent option to be a 'just-in-time' construction 
programme using small-scale supply expansion projects with short lead times, while 
investigating all other options, including the scope for reducing demand with a 
comprehensive energy conservation programme, and research to improve demand 
modelling (Senate Standing Committee of Inquiry on South West Tasmania 1982b: 
221). 
5.6 Federal Intervention 
In March 1983, the Labor Party gained office at the federal level, coming to power 
promising to halt construction of the Gordon-below-Franklin scheme using 
Commonwealth constitutional powers to protect areas on UNESCO's World Heritage 
List. A challenge by the Gray government in the High Court narrowly failed when the 
full bench of the High Court ruled by a 4 to 3 majority, on 1st July 1983 in favour of the 
Commonwealth, and the Gordon-below-Franklin dam was abandoned (Bates 1983: 
11). Federal intervention to override states in order to achieve important environmental 
goals became known within Australia as 'the Tasmanian solution' (Lowe 1994a: 325). 
The HEC quickly prepared a report on alternative hydro-electric schemes outside the 
South West and revised its load projections — upwards! Comalco, which had previously 
indicated that it would probably require an extra 60 MW by 1990 and no further load 
thereafter, now indicated that it would probably require a further 250 MW by the year 
2000. In all other respects the HEC considered that its 1979 load projection remained 
accurate, and on the basis of this, recommended immediate start to the King (68 MW) 
and Anthony-Henty (44 MW) schemes at an estimated cost of $605 million. Under the 
federal compensation package, the costs of the electricity from the schemes was to be 
subsidised to bring it down to the equivalent of the cost of electricity from the abandoned 
Gordon-below-Franklin scheme. The Federal government also entered into a commitment 
to subsidise the State to make up the 60 MW difference in the output between the 
abandoned Gordon-below-Franklin scheme and the alternative King and Anthony-Henty 
schemes, should the demand for the extra electricity materialise. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
As a consequence of their State's intractable economic problems, Tasmanian policy 
makers traditionally placed singular importance on the potential economic benefits of 
electricity supply expansion projects. Social costs were given little consideration and 
supply expansion options were judged purely on the basis of achieving the lowest unit 
cost of electricity possible. Policy makers relied on the expertise of the electricity 
supply bureaucracy for advice as to both the likely increase in demand and the cheapest 
means of meeting those future electricity requirements. The electricity bureaucracy's 
supply expansion proposals were uncritically accepted. Where questioning of these 
proposals did occur at the State level, questioning was superficial, as politicians lacked 
the technical or economic ability to challenge the bureaucracy and were unwilling to 
demonstrate their inadequacy. The bureaucracy was therefore given a free rein in 
deciding the likely rate of growth in demand for electricity and the optimal means of 
meeting this increase in demand. Rather than technology being out-of-control, it was a 
case of a bureaucracy being in control. 
This mode of electricity planning collided with changing social attitudes and the demand 
for a shift in the balance between development and environmental protection. Both 
government and the energy bureaucracy resisted the demands to slow down the hydro-
electric construction programme for environmental reasons and bureaucratic secrecy in 
electricity planning, and direct intervention in the democratic process were politically 
tolerated, but publicly resented. 
Although political concern over the degree of bureaucratic control of electricity planning 
in the State surfaced soon after the rate of expansion of electricity supply began to 
accelerate, industry rather than the bureaucracy was the ultimate arbiter of the rate of 
expansion throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. If the bureaucracy's construction 
programme was not synchronised with industrial expansion programmes, industry 
demanded that the hydro-electric construction programme be accelerated. By end of 
that decade, however, industrial demand was slowing and the expansion of electricity 
supply was increasingly based on planning for surplus capacity as a contingency for 
unanticipated growth in demand. According to Collingridge (1980), inherent in such a 
shift in planning was the risk of an oversupply crisis. Collingridge failed to see how an 
oversupply crisis could be averted by entering into contractual agreements with energy-
intensive industry to take up the spare capacity at low rates, should the demand for 
the extra electricity fail to materialise. The speed with which the electricity bureaucracy 
entered into such agreements suggested, however, that the rate of electricity supply 
expansion increasingly came to be based on what was optimal from the electricity 
supplier's perspective. Kellow (1986: 13) pointed out that while politicians supported 
this arrangement and participated in the negotiations, it did not follow the classical 
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corporatist model of policy decision making, in which 'strong' government negotiates 
with peak industrial bodies. Rather, it was a case of 'weak' government negotiating 
with individual companies. 
The political attempt to regain control of electricity planning during the Franklin River 
episode was resisted by the bureaucracy and conservative politicians. Political reformers 
attempted to include consideration of changing social values and attitudes. An attempt 
was also made to reduce the rate of electricity supply expansion to a level that more 
closely matched the public interest. These attempts were frustrated by the collective 
power of the bureaucracy and pressure groups, including trade unions and energy-
intensive industries, with a vested interest in continued expansion of hydro-electric 
construction at a maximum rate. The rift between government, and the bureaucracy 
and industry during this controversy, permitted the influence of these pressure groups 
on policy and planning to be more clearly seen. The reformist government was undermined 
by the combination of the conservativeness of the pro-development Legislative Council 
and the political expedience of individual politicians who exploited the dispute as a 
means of acquiring political power. Though more subtle than its earlier intervention in 
the democratic process to undermine the environmentalist campaign to halt the flooding 
of Lake Pedder, the bureaucracy worked to undermine the government once the latter 
sought a change in direction. Ultimately, the bureaucracy was defeated by a Federal 
government more removed from the imperatives of economic policy making at the local 
level, and by a single vote in the High Court. 
Environmentalists' proposals to alter the State's economic direction by abandoning the 
policy of hydro-industrialisation, can be considered to be completely analytical and 
rational. They were supported by sober and independent economic reports which 
argued that the policy of hydro-industrialisation had run its course (Callaghan 1977). 
Along with aggressive energy conservation proposals, these proposals were rejected by 
policy makers on both sides of the debate, and this rejection can be seen as a consequence 
of the strategic nature of policy making. Despite all the problems it created and the 
limited benefits it provided, without an alternative vision, Tasmanian policy makers 
were unwilling to radically alter policy direction. But without abandoning the policy of 
hydro-industrialisation, aggressive energy conservation proposals could not avoid the 
need for further expansion of electricity supply. Energy policy debate therefore remained 
centred on the question of economies of scale to produce electricity at the lowest unit 
cost. Energy conservation alone could not meet the environmentalists' demands. 
The moderate energy conservation proposal adopted by the Government, on the other 
hand, was estimated to save 60 MW of electricity in the retail sector over a ten year 
period. It therefore neatly made up the difference between the outputs of the HEC's 
preferred option (the 180 MW Gordon-below-Franklin scheme) and the Lowe 
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Government's preferred option (the 120 MW Gordon-above-Olga) scheme. How could 
the Government be sure that its energy conservation programme would make up the 60 
MW when there had been little or no assessment of the impacts of these programmes? 
The simple answer is that how much or how little energy the energy conservation 
programmes actually saved, was not critical from the Government's perspective. Unable 
to challenge the HEC's forecast, the function of the moderate energy conservation 
programme was purely to provide the Government with the political means of arguing 
that this forecast load could be met with an alternative strategy. 
The Government's compromise energy strategy had three fundamental weaknesses that 
opponents were able to exploit. First, although the Gordon-above-Olga provided 
temporary job security, it opened the door for the hydro-electric construction programme 
to be terminated after completion of the dam. Trade unions and HEC employees 
preferred to keep the HEC in control of electricity planning for long-term job security. 
Secondly, although the Government's energy conservation programme was moderate 
compared to the programmes being adopted at the time by a small number of Northern 
European and North American countries, it represented a bold step for Tasmania. No 
government in Australia had proposed reducing the demand for electricity on such a 
scale. But while the Government was willing to adopt an energy conservation package 
despite the large uncertainties over the energy savings that would be achieved, its 
opponents were able to exploit those uncertainties in their attempts to resist policy 
reform. The risks of those energy conservation measures not translating into reduced 
demand, and thereby leading to shortages and reduced economic growth, were used to 
undermine the alternative energy strategy. 
Thirdly, from the environmentalist perspective, this moderate energy conservation 
package was of limited value if it was unable to avoid further construction of hydro-electric 
schemes in the South West. 
The outcome of the Franklin River dispute left the Liberal government and the HEC 
with a smaller hydro-electric construction programme than they had supported, together 
with an energy conservation programme that they had not supported. The way in 
which those energy conservation programmes inherited by the Government were 
implemented are discussed in the following chapter. Also described are the changes 
introduced in the attempt to place electricity planning on a more rational basis, the 




Tasmania: A Case Study of Electricity Planning - Part 2 
History teaches us that men and nations behave wisely 
once they have exhausted all other alternatives. 
— Abba Ebam, Israeli Foreign Minister, 1970. 
Quoted in The Cassell Dictionary of Cynical 
Quotations. Cassell, London. 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the case study of electricity planning in Tasmania is extended to cover 
the more recent period. This is necessary because the political conflict created by the 
technocratic style of electricity planning eventually led to the introduction of planning 
reforms. As the financial problems created by the technocratic planning described in 
the previous chapter became more pressing, the pace of those reforms accelerated. It 
was when factors outside the state came into play, however, that the reform process 
rapidly gained momentum and underwent a substantial shift in direction. The important 
question from the perspective of this study is to what extent those reforms resulted in, 
or are likely to result in, a greater reliance on energy conservation as a planning option. 
Energy planning in the State following the Franldin River dispute is in fact more difficult 
to explain than it is in the period prior to, or during, that conflict for a number of 
reasons. One reason for is that electricity planning in the State after the Franklin River 
dispute became a lower key affair, relatively devoid of the public conflict. As a result, 
there has been less written on electricity planning in the State during in this more recent 
period and it is less well understood. The issue of electricity planning in the State, 
furthermore, became more complex during the 1980s and 1990s as the ongoing planning 
reforms introduced were the consequence of an interplay of number of pressures. 
To discuss electricity planning in Tasmania the post-Franklin era, the period from 1983 
to mid 1996 is divided into three separate stages. The first of these was the period 
immediately following the forced abandonment of the Gordon-below-Franklin scheme 
up to the late 1980s, when shortages re-ignited debate over the State's next power 
option. Explaining the low priority on energy conservation during that time is relatively 
straight forward as it was primarily the product of the planning decision to continue 
with hydro-electric development. The changes to electricity planning made during that 
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time nonetheless had considerable bearing on policy in the subsequent stages. 
During the second stage, from the late 1980s to the early 1992, there arose the perception 
that energy conservation needed to become an important component of both State and 
Federal policy. A number of energy conservation programmes were put into place, 
some of which were more effective and enduring than others. 
The final stage discussed covers the period from 1992 to mid 1996. During that time, 
debate over reform of the electricity supply industry and energy policy intensified, 
leading to tension between those groups attempting to retain political control over 
electricity planning in order to encourage industrial expansion, those groups seeking to 
place electricity planning on a more economically rational footing, and the environmental 
lobby which demanded both economically rational and democratic planning reforms 
which increased public participation and which would ensure that energy conservation 
became the linchpin of energy policy and planning in the State. 
6.2 The Legacy of Past Electricity Planning in the post -Franklin Era 
6.2.1 The Inability to Halt further Hydro-Electric Construction 
Once a substitute for the Gordon-below-Franklin had been decided upon, a small 
number of attempts were made to persuade the policy makers to abandon construction 
of the King and Anthony-Henty Schemes using economic arguments. Blakers & Outhred 
(1983) continued to criticise hydro-electric construction and the HEC forecasts upon 
which this strategy of meeting future electricity was based. The cost of electricity 
produced from wind energy systems, these engineers maintained, would be approximately 
6 c/kWh, well below 11 c/kW they estimated to be the cost of electricity produced 
from the King and Anthony-Henty schemes. As wind turbines could be added in small 
increments, reliance on wind would effectively reduce the forecasting horizon to eighteen 
months or so, and would reduce the risks of oversupply resulting from inaccurate 
forecasting. 
Although not advanced as an alternative to the King River scheme, another wind energy 
proposal offered insights into the continued resistance to proposals for reforming 
electricity planning in the State. In January 1983, a group of private individuals sought 
approval to finance, install, operate and maintain two 55 kW wind generators on King 
Island as a commercial operation. Their intention was to demonstrate the feasibility of 
wind energy systems for the State. A company, Tasmanian Wind Enterprises (TWE), 
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was formed and took to the Government a proposal to sell approximately 200 to 600 
MWh of electricity p.a. to the HEC. The Commission's diesel generating system on the 
island produced electricity at an estimated cost of 11 to 12 c/kWh, but as the Commission 
was required by legislation to charge residents on the island the same rate as customers 
on the Tasmanian mainland, the King Island system ran at a loss. The operating loss 
for the 1981/82 year was $627,248. 
The TWE group argued that to make a reasonable return on their investment, the price 
would need to be approximately 10.5 c/kWh (The Examiner 15 Feb., 1983). The group 
finally accepted a price of 9 c/kWh on the condition that the Commission cooperate 
with TWE in assessing the true value of electricity over the first twelve months of 
operation. The TWE group argued, however, that as its proposal was a high risk 
venture, the most appropriate method would be to index the price of electricity to the 
price of diesel. This also appeared to be fair method as it was directly related to the 
HEC's own costs of producing electricity on the island. The HEC insisted that the 
electricity be indexed to the price of electricity on the Tasmanian mainland (Private 
Letter, Dr John Greenhill of TWE to the Secretary of the HEC dated 7 December 1983). 
After protracted discussions, agreement could not be reached and the venture was 
abandoned. 
While the King Island wind energy proposal was a practical proposal in that it had no 
immediate ramifications for overall electricity planning in the State, the Tasmanian 
Wilderness Society engaged in a more ambitious attempt to halt construction of the 
King and Anthony-Henty schemes well after work on the King scheme had started. 
Adapting the title of Pardy et al.'s (1979) critique of the hydro-electric development in 
Papua New Guinea l , the Tasmanian Wilderness Society's Overpowering Tasmania 
(TWS 1984) demanded that the King and Anthony-Henty schemes be abandoned on 
the grounds that the electricity was not needed and that continued hydro-electric 
construction would serve merely to aggravate the HEC's already considerable debt. 
The report did little other than reiterate the by then well-rehearsed argument that past 
HEC forecasting had proven to be inaccurate and that current HEC forecasts were 
therefore likely to similarly over-optimistic, and that investment in hydro-electric 
development had failed to produce adequate returns to the State in terms of employment. 
Using the same arguments as Harwood & Hartley (1980) and other writers, the TWS 
report maintained that increasing the supply of electricity to provide for the expansion 
plans of energy-intensive industries such as a Comalco and Temco was an expensive 
means of creating employment. A single sentence was devoted to the assertion that if 
Pardy R, Parsons M, Siemon D & Wigglesworth A (1979) Purari: Overpowering PNG. 
International Development Action Group, Fitzroy, Victoria. 
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hydro-industrialisation was abandoned, increased retail sector energy requirements 
could be cost-effectively met through energy efficiency policies. The report made no 
impact on policy debate. 
A third attempt to halt the hydro-electric schemes was made a year later. In 1985, a 
petrogeologist, John Davidson, discovered natural gas deposits in the already well 
investigated Yolla Basin in Bass Strait. Davidson lobbied politicians, arguing that 
bringing natural gas ashore would result in far greater economic benefits for the State 
than would further hydro-electric construction (John Davisdon, personal communication, 
Dec. 1993). 
While the abovementioned attempts to derail the King and Anthony-Henty schemes 
could perhaps be described as rational in the economic sense, in the political sense they 
could only be described as extremely ambitious. After the Gordon-below-Franklin 
scheme had been blocked by the Federal government, public interest in the Tasmanian 
energy issue rapidly dissipated and little support could be mustered to extend the 
acrimony and community division. Furthermore, once the alternative schemes had been 
started, contracts signed, and loans negotiated, the prospects of halting construction 
became more and more difficult. The attempt by the Wilderness Society in 1984 to halt 
further dam construction well after construction on the King River scheme had begun, 
using well-rehearsed and, in places, relatively speculative arguments, was particularly 
quixotic. Thirdly, and most importantly, no amount of evidence that other options 
were technically feasible or cheaper was likely to dissuade a Premier who had ridden 
to power on the basis of support for continued hydro-electric construction and decisive 
leadership. The failure of TWE attempt to use wind generators to enter the electricity 
supply market, on the other hand, indicated the determination of the public energy 
bureaucracy to retain control over electricity planning and its monopoly as the sole 
electricity supplier in the State. 
6.2.2 The Demise of Labor's Energy Conservation Programmes 
The Liberal government and the HEC had inherited a small number of energy conservation 
initiatives from the Lowe administration which they had opposed and which they 
maintained were unlikely to achieve the energy savings assumed by the Lowe government. 
According to Collingridge's (1980) interpretation of the supply construction cycle, 
however, once a decision has been made to start on a new supply expansion project, 
energy conservation is no longer in the mid-term strategic interests of the electricity 
supplier and planning interest in energy conservation is deferred until demand once 
again catches up with supply. The problem for the HEC was that the energy conservation 
policies and programmes it inherited had the clear potential to conflict with the need to 
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increase electricity consumption once the Pieman scheme came on-line. Collingridge 
(1980) also assumed that the scale of supply construction cycle increased in order to 
capture greater and greater economies of scale, and that as the size of the new supply 
systems increased, the risks of an oversupply crisis also increased due to the eventual 
saturation of the demand for electricity. Collingridge's model did not strictly apply to 
the Tasmanian situation, however, for a number reasons. In the case of the largest 
scheme constructed, the Middle Gordon scheme 2, an oversupply crisis was avoided 
by selling large blocks of cheap electricity to an electricity-intensive industry. The 
potential for an oversupply crisis with the commissioning of the slightly smaller 230 
MWav Pieman scheme was nonetheless real as a consequence of other factors. Increased 
public scrutiny of electricity planning as a consequence of the Franklin River dispute 
rendered it more difficult to dispose of any surplus from the Pieman scheme by entering 
into contracts with energy-intensive industries at subsidised prices. If the HEC's forecasts 
proved to be accurate, on the other hand, then its King and Anthony-Henty schemes 
would not be capable of meeting demand by the late 1990s and either a new supply of 
energy would need to be found or energy conservation programmes would be required 
to tailor demand to existing supply. 
Rather than put these policies and programmes on hold until there was another shortage, 
the Liberal government set about dismantling the energy conservation policies put in 
place by the Labor government. The legislation mandating thermal energy performance 
standards for new dwellings was one of the first pieces of legislation debated when 
parliament resumed and was defeated by the Liberal government. The Energy Policy 
Unit was disbanded and responsibility for energy planning returned to the HEC. A 
Planning and Public Affairs Group (PPAG) was created within the HEC and charged 
with the responsibility of the planning of all energy sources in the State. The Energy 
Management Centre continued to promote substitution away from oil and encourage 
energy conservation and the HEC undertook minimal pilot testing of solar hot water 
systems in the HEC's laboratories and on five houses on King Island (HEC 1984: 9). 
The field work for the University of Tasmania's $86,500 household energy use survey 
funded by the Lowe administration had been completed and the raw data published 
(Challen et al. 1983: 1). It eventually became clear that the research was not going to be 
used to develop an econometric model of household sector electricity demand. The 
reason for abandoning the project was never made clear, but according to the leader of 
the project, Mr Don Challen, the research was terminated due to an oversight. The 
2 The hydro-electric scheme with the greatest generating capacity in the State was the 
Poatina scheme (300 MWav). As the Poatina scheme involed the decommissioning of the 
Waddamana power station, the largest scheme in terms the additidional generating 
capacity provided was the Middle Gordon scheme (288 MWav). 
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initial intention had been to obtain information on household oil use for space heating 
for the year 1982 once those households that used oil for that purpose had been 
identified in the survey. A failure to collect this information, according to Mr Challen, 
undermined the usefulness of the data for modelling purposes (Mr Don Challen, personal 
communication, Dec. 1991). This does not appear to be a complete explanation, 
however, as econometric modelling had been frequently carried out with far less precise 
data than was available to the research team. It appears more likely that interest in the 
research waned as energy conservation lost its political appeal and that this contributed 
both to the failure to follow up with the collection of oil use, and the failure to use the 
available data to construct an econometric model. 
By the early 1980s, it was clear that the expected resource boom from the OPEC oil 
price rise had in fact turned out to be a recession. Industrial load growth had actually 
fallen 1% between 1979 and 1983. To offset this, electricity tariffs were increased 15% 
in February 1983. The costs of the Pieman scheme had blown out and in Novemeber 
1984 the Pieman Bill was amended to increase authorised expenditure from the original 
$139 million (1970 dollars) 3 to $681 million (1984 dollars). The new reformist Federal 
Labor government had inherited a badly performing and heavily indebted economy and 
embarked on a programme of sweeping microeconomic reform to increase the country's 
competitiveness. One of the first measures introduced by the Hawke government was 
to place a ceiling on Loans Council borrowings, forcing the HEC to increase internal 
revenue raising and to rely on semi-government external borrowings at higher interest 
rates to complete the construction of the Pieman scheme and finance construction of 
the King and Anthony-Henty schemes. 
In 1986, the No.1 unit at the Bell Bay oil-fired power station, which had been in use 
since the beginning of the Franklin River dispute, was shut down. Industrial load 
growth had been slower than anticipated while the forecast rate of growth of the 
general load growth was reduced from the HEC's 1983 forecast of 3.5 % p.a. to 1.53% 
per annum. The HEC argued that the slower rate of growth in demand would allow 
further hydro-electric development would proceed ahead of construction of a coal-fired 
power station (HEC 1987: 17). This new forecast continued to be based on the 
assumption that householders would switch from oil heating to electricity rather than 
wood heaters (Islam 1985), despite the evidence to the contrary in the form of a 
substantial shift to wood heating. The HEC's generating capacity was also set to 
3 Both the HEC and the Australian Bureau of Statistics advised the author that there is no 
readily available inflator with which to convert estimated hydro-electric construction 
costs in Tasmania in 1970 to 1984 dollars which would permit a direct comparison of the 
HEC's original and revised cost estimates. An appropriate index would need to include the 
inflation in the costs of both labour and materials specific to dam construction, and to 
weight these appropriately. 
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increase when the Pieman scheme was commissioned and a third 144 MW generator 
had been installed in the Middle Gordon scheme to increase peak load capacity. The 
Director of HEC's PPAG, Bill Gaskell, declared that many energy conservation measures 
had become uneconomic (HEC 1986: 16) and the HEC embarked on a $190,000 campaign 
to encourage electricity use (Knibbs 1987: 44). 
6.2.3 Reform of Electricity Planning under the Liberal Government 
The Liberal Party had risen to power in Tasmania by supporting the HEC's formula for 
electricity planning based on economies of scale and continued development of the 
State's hydro-electric resources. It was therefore opposed to the style of reforms of 
electricity planning put in place by its predecessor and the creation of independent 
energy planning and advisory bodies. Despite this, the Liberal Government under Gray 
proved able to achieve what the Labor Party in terms of reining in the control of the 
HEC's Power Engineering Branch over electricity planning. A dominant character, Gray 
was unwilling to be dictated to by government bureaucracy and put into effect the 
Carter recommendations of the public sector administration reforms initiated by the 
Lowe administration (Cartland 1981). The HEC Act was amended in 1985 to place 
the HEC under ministerial control and to create the positions of four government 
appointed Associate HEC Commissioners. This was followed by removing decision 
making over the Commission's financial borrowings. The HEC had taken out its semi-
government loans to finance the King scheme in Swiss francs and when the Swiss 
currency devalued in 1986, the interest rates on the HEC's loans increased from 11.7% 
to 14.05% over a short period. Management of the HEC's external borrowings was 
quickly taken out of the HEC's control and handed over to Tascorp, a newly created 
body of economic experts within the Tasmanian Development Authority (TDA). 
When the HEC Chief Commissioner's contract expired in February 1987, it was not 
renewed. The HEC Act was again amended to abolish the position of Chief Commissioner, 
replacing it with the two separate positions of Chief Executive and Chairman, both 
whom served on an HEC Board with four government-appointed Commissioners. To 
increase managerial experience of the Board, Brian Gibson, ex-Managing Director and 
then Director of Australian Newsprint Mills (ANM), one of the major industries in the 
State, was appointed Chairman of the HEC. An outsider with a wealth of managerial 
experience in international companies, Graeme Longbottom, was appointed Chief 
Executive. With these moves, HEC's Power Engineering Branch lost its control of the 
organisation. Under this new management, the policy of commercialising the HEC to 
turn it into a profit-oriented business was accelerated. To this end, a Marketing Group 
was established within the HEC to identify and meet customer needs (Sioshansi 1990, 
Section 4: 5). 
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6.3 Supply Shortages and Revived Interest in Energy Conservation 
6.3.1 Electricity Planning Reforms under the Labor -Green Accord 
In May 1989 the Liberal government lost power when five Greens were elected to the 
House of Assembly and held the balance of power. The Greens entered into an accord 
with the Labor Party and the latter formed a minority government (Larmour 1990). 
Ironically, the issue which had initially created the environmental movement in the 
State, electricity planning, was at the time at the back of the policy agenda and was 
not included as part of the Accord agreement (Davis 1992: 119). The new Labor 
government accelerated the pace of reform of electricity planning in the State by creating 
a Department of Resources and Energy with the function of providing advice to 
government on all aspects of energy policy. The Secretary of this new Department was 
a Commissioner of the HEC. 
At the national level, however, awkward questions were being asked about the debts of 
the Australian state electricity authorities and the Treasurer, Paul Keating, had instructed 
the Industry Assistance Commission (IAC) to investigate the electricity supply industry. 
The IAC's report revealed that the HEC's profit to loss ratio in 1987/88 of -24.2% was 
the worst of any Australian electricity authority. The HEC's reserve plant margin of 
74.5% compared with world standard practice of 20% (IAC 1989: 6). The Commonwealth 
government instructed the Commission to hold a full Inquiry into the Australian electricity 
supply industry. 
One of the first tasks of the new Department of Resources and Energy in Tasmania 
was to commission an international consultant to undertake a review of HEC tariffs. 
The consultant's report, acknowledged that the HEC had managed to provide Tasmanians 
with relatively cheap electricity, but was highly critical of the HEC's use of historic 
rather than replacement costing, and the lack of regulation over HEC contracts with 
major industries (Bartels 1990: 13). HEC's tariffs, the consultant noted further, bore 
little relation to actual costs. The HEC simply used its monopoly power to reduce 
prices for those consumers sensitive to electricity price while increasing prices for those 
less sensitive to price. Industrial users were price sensitive and a small increase in the 
price of electricity would lead to a substantial shift from electricity to other energy 
sources in the industrial sector. Small businesses and the household sectors, on the 
other hand, could use only electricity for many end-uses such as lighting and were price 
insensitive. A substantial increase in retail electricity prices would not result in a major 
reduction in electricity use. 
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6.3.2 Recession and Further Commercialisation of the HEC 
The minority Labor government's term in office was dogged by two major crises. The 
first was the State's chronic economic position. A report released by the Mainland 
group, the Evatt Research Foundation (1989), had shown the State's financial position 
to be precarious. Six months later, the USA based financial group, Moody's, down-graded 
the State's credit rating from a top (Aaa) to a third ranking (Aa3). All other Australian 
states continued to received a top ranking (Aaa) except Victoria which was dropped 
to a second ranking (Aa2). The Labor government introduced a series of austerity 
measures, including sweeping public sector retrenchments and closures of small country 
schools to reduce State's debts. The State Authorities Management Sector Act of 1990 
was introduced, requiring State government income-producing instrumentalities to pay 
tax equivalents and a dividend to State Treasury. This placed further strains on the 
HEC's financial position and stimulated the Commission to move more quickly towards 
commercialisation in order to increase profitability and performance. The Commission 
seized on the first wave of public service retrenchment offers to massively reduce its 
workforce. The Commission also adopted the Standard Australian Accounting Practice 
which was based on asset replacement costing. This resulted in an additional $50 
million depreciation costs which meant that the HEC could not afford to pay a dividend 
and a 5% levy was imposed on the bills of all classes of customers to pay the dividend 
to Treasury. 
6.3.3 Electricity Shortages and Environmental Concern over Energy Use 
On top of this came drought. For the first time in the State's history, both 120 MW 
oil-fired stand-by generators were fired and 11% of total electricity in the 1990-91 year 
was generated from the oil-fired generating station. Coinciding with the rise in oil 
prices induced by the Gulf War, the cost of fuel oil was $12.8 million in 1989-90 and 
increased to $53.6 million in the following year. The Dean of Economics at the University 
of Tasmania, temporarily forgetting that he had joined the chorus denouncing the 
Gordon-below-Franklin Dam during that dispute as uneconomic 4, blamed the 
environmentalists who had blocked the dam for the electricity shortages and the need 
to rely on the stand-by generators (Felmingham 1990: 2). His argument was not only 
inconsistent, but overlooked the fact that even if construction of the dam had gone 
ahead it would not have been completed in time to alleviate the need for reliance on the 
oil-fired generators. It also overlooked the fact that the oil-fired generators were simply 
4 See Section 5.5.6. 
210 
being used for the purpose for which they had been built and that a hydro-electric 
system was prone to drought-related shortages. 
The crisis mentality associated with the use of the oil-fired generators was exacerbated 
by the fact that the drought coincided with the rise of political concern over the 
greenhouse issue. Not only were Tasmanians increasing their greenhouse gas emissions, 
but they were paying a small fortune to do so. The result of these combined factors 
was a resurgence of interest in energy conservation. Pasminco-EZ (formerly Electrolytic 
Zinc Co.) approached the HEC with a proposal to alter its take-or-pay contract to 
allow the company to reduce its total contractual load if it undertook measures to 
reduce energy use by increasing efficiency. The company claimed that a 15% to 20% 
reduction in its energy demand would avert the need to use the Bell Bay generators (The 
Mercury 19 August 1993: 1). A Demand Side Management working group was established 
within the HEC, but without permanent staff and with nominal organisational support 
its contribution to planning was tokenistic (Sioshansi 1990, Section 4: 6). The Department 
of Resources and Energy was instructed to commission a consultant's report on the 
scope for energy efficiency. The report, An Energy Efficient Blueprint for Tasmania, 
described Tasmania as an 'energy efficiency gold mine' and the Tasmanian community 
highly supportive of the energy efficiency strategy compared to consumers in the USA, 
while energy conservation legislation lagged behind that of many other places (Sioshansi 
1990: Section 2: 6). Sioshansi's report made 107 recommendations, including 
reorganisation of the HEC to ensure that demand side management was supported by 
a permanent office and was made an integral part of planning. Dr Sioshansi also 
recommended that legislation to mandate thermal performance standards for new 
dwellings be re-introduced. It would be possible, Dr Sioshansi suggested, to reduce 
electricity use by 1% p.a. over a fifteen-year period. 
Following the SECV's lead, the HEC moved towards more openness in its decision 
making. In late October, the Commission held its inaugural Annual General Meeting to 
which the general public were invited. At the meeting the HEC General Manager made 
it abundantly clear that the cost of producing electricity from hydro-electric construction 
in Tasmania was no longer cost-competitive with mainland electricity producers. The 
cost of electricity produced from the Pieman scheme (5.9 c/kWh) was on average 44% 
higher than the unit cost of electricity produced from new coal-fired power stations in 
other states, while the unit cost of electricity produced from the King and Anthony-Henty 
schemes (8 c/kWh) 5 was estimated to be almost double the cost of electricity produced 
by mainland thermal plants. This meant, according to the HEC General Manager, that 
5 The true cost of electricity from the King and Anthony-Henty schemes was closer to 
11 c/kWh if the Commonwealth contribution to the scheme's capital costs was 
included (Blakers 1995: 117). 
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Tasmania would need to find an alternative to further hydro-electric development in 
order to produce energy at a price competitive with prices on the mainland. By the 
Commission's own reckoning, there existed the potential to save somewhere between 10 
and 100 MW of electricity at a cost below the marginal cost of expanding supply 
The HEC also released at the Annual General Meeting a new load forecast which 
estimated that demand for electricity would increase between 1990 and 2015 at a rate 
of 1.3% to 2.2% p.a.. This compared with a rate of over 3.5% p.a. predicted by the 
HEC's 1983 forecast. The Minister for Energy announced at the meeting that the 
Government intended to introduce a number of energy conservation programmes, including 
annual energy efficiency awards (Weldon 1991). The government also resurrected the 
Energy Advisory Council. While applauding the move, environmentalists were disgruntled 
over the lack of community representation on the Board whose membership was made 
up of the General Manager of Comalco, HEC management, and representatives of the 
Tasmanian Development Authority (TDA), the trade union movement, and other 
industries. Environmental groups, consumer organisations, smaller industries and small 
businesses were unrepresented. 
The HEC gave all the indications that it would take energy conservation seriously and 
was the only other electricity authority in Australia apart from the SECV to place 
increased emphasis on DSM as a planning option during the period (Johnson & Rix 
1991: 3). The HEC declared, in fact, that its intention was to be the national energy 
efficiency leader among Australian electricity authorities (HEC 1991a: 17). A Demand 
Management Unit was established within the HEC which hurriedly identified 30 MW 
of economically viable energy savings in the State, including $5 million p.a. savings at 
Pasminco-EZ and $1 million p.a. at Comalco (HEC 1991a: 18). Tasmanian householders 
were treated to multiple energy conservation campaigns. 
Many responses to the energy shortages and the renewed enthusiasm for increasing the 
efficiency of energy-use were rushed and ill-thoughtout, or served merely as symbolic 
gestures. The office of the Federal member for the Hobart seat of Denison, for example, 
hurriedly distributed to all households in the electorate with poorly produced photocopies 
of an out-of-date mainland energy conservation brochures. Most of the initiatives 
deployed by the HEC, furthermore, were of a type that could be easily terminated 
should the occasion demand it. These efforts included highly visible energy conservation 
competitions - with electric appliances offered as prizes - and the preparation, in 
conjunction with ABC Radio, of booklets on energy efficient cooking based on public 
suggestions and ideas (HEC 1990b). A large part of the HEC's campaign consisted of 
exhorting its customers to 'switch on wisely and to this end the HEC's Energy Advisory 
Service began encouraging customers to use the appliance energy efficiency labels that 
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had previously gone unmentioned. These labels had appeared on new equipment 
retailed in the State as an unintended consequence of decisions made in Victoria and 
NSW rather than decisions made by the Tasmanian government or the HEC. Once the 
governments of those larger mainland states introduced mandatory labelling, distributors 
made the administrative decision to label all appliances sold within Australia. The 
smaller states such as Tasmania therefore inherited a default energy labelling programme. 
With the drought, the HEC was able to piggyback on this programme. 
As a demonstration of this commitment to DSM and energy efficiency, the HEC removed 
the regulations barring customers with solar hot water systems from boosting these 
with the continuous hot water tariff 6•  The impact of this change in regulations, 
however, was very small since solar hot water systems were installed on approximately 
only 0.5% of Tasmanian houses. Most of these, furthermore, were likely to remain on 
the off-peak tariff since solar contribution of solar hot water systems is maximised, 
and the electric boosting minimised, if most of the hot water draw-off occurs in the 
morning and electric boosting occurs at night. The Commission also began small-scale 
pilot testing of demand side management strategies. The impact on energy demand 
from replacing incandescent globes with compact fluorescent lamps was investigated 
on King Island, while the energy savings achieved from installing insulation was monitored 
using 100 electrically heated homes in Launceston. The results of these pilot programmes 
were never released publicly. 
Not all demand side management strategies are purely load reduction strategies as 
some are double-sided and can be used to increase market share when the time dictates. 
One of the recommendations made by the energy efficiency consultant was to encourage 
the replacement of electric resistance space heaters with energy efficient electric heat 
pumps (Sioshansi 1990, Section 7: 8). Other independent analysts also pointed to the 
substantial scope for increasing the efficiency of residential sector energy use in Tasmania 
by switching from wood to electricity for space heating (Wilkenfield 1990: 405, Wilson 
et al. 1993: 34). The promotion of electric heat pumps therefore had the potential to 
lead to not only a switching from electric resistance heaters but to also increase the 
market share of electricity by competing with other energy sources for space heating. 
Sutherland (1996: 369) has recently made the claim that many utility DSM programmes 
undertaken in the USA during the 1980s were conservation programmes in name only 
and that they were in reality disguised marketing programmes. The degree to which the 
HEC's promotion of heat pumps was a means of reducing energy demand by increasing 
6 The continuous hot water tariff rate was 6.47 c/kWh. Prior to the change in the 
regulations, customers with solar hot water systems could connect these to only the off-peak 
tariff (4.44 c/kWh) or the normal household tariff (9.09 c/kWh). 
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the efficiency of energy use and the degree to which it was a means of increasing market 
share was, therefore, a question of balance. When the HEC embarked on a $250,000 
advertising campaign promoting electric heat pumps, it raised the ire of wood heating 
manufacturers and distributers who saw the balance as heavily tipped in favour of 
increasing electricity's market share. 
The promotion of energy efficiency came not only from the HEC but also from the 
Federal government as a consequence of the public and political pressure for action to 
curb Australia's greenhouse gas emissions. The Federal government, as part of its 
greenhouse response strategy, prepared an information booklet on energy efficiency in 
conjunction with the Australian Consumers' Association, copies of which were distributed 
to every household in Australia (Australian Government & Australian Consumers' 
Association 1991). 
Another boost to Tasmania's energy efficiency drive also came as part of the national 
greenhouse response strategy. The Federal government announced that it would jointly 
fund a national Integrated Energy Management Centre (IEMC) which would encourage 
and trial energy efficiency programmes for all fuels in all sectors of the economy and 
serve as a demonstration for similar projects around the country. Submissions of 
interest were called for and Tasmania's submission was accepted, largely on the basis 
of the manageability of preparing and assessing energy conservation programmes in a 
small location. The IEMC was set up in Hobart's northern suburbs as a semi-autonomous 
body with a two-year funding from the Commonwealth and staffed by personnel 
seconded from the HEC. 
6.4 Renewed Pressure for Increased Electricity Supply 
6.4.1 The End of the Drought 
By mid 1991, the drought had eased and the Bell Bay power station was again shut 
down. The King River scheme was due to come on-line in early 1992. Industrial load 
growth had been slow due to the recession and forecasts had been revised downward. 
By October 1991 the government's interest in energy conservation was waning. An 
Inter-Departmental report on the State's future energy options stated that although 
energy conservation was an important component of energy policy, energy conservation 
programmes had to be thoroughly assessed before being implemented and their timing 
needed to be consistent with the State's major policy objectives (Inter-Departmental 
Committee 1991: 38). The main interest of the government turned to which source of 
energy to use to meet future energy requirements. 
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Inter-Departmental Committee report (1991) suggested that a new supply of energy 
would be required in the near-term and indicated that the government was considering 
all options including a coal-fired power station using local coal, further hydro-electric 
development and wind energy. An option that received much attention was Basslink, 
a proposal to connect the Tasmanian and South East mainland grids with a submarine 
cable. This option had been looked at on every occasion the State's future energy needs 
had been contemplated since the mid 1960s. It had been persistently opposed by the 
HEC on the grounds that a cable would result in importing electricity from the mainland 
and exporting jobs from Tasmania. Policy makers had also preferred to maintain the 
State's energy independence to ensure security of supply. The HEC had also dismissed 
the idea that a cable would allow Tasmania to profit from exporting high cost hydro-
electric peaking power while importing low-cost base load imports from mainland 
coal-fired stations. The main flaw with the proposal, according to the HEC's Director 
of Planning and Public Affairs, Bill Gaskell, was that without the Gordon-below-Franklin 
scheme Tasmania's hydro-electric system lacked the necessary downstream storage to 
allow off-peak pumping of water back up stream for re-use. Without such facilities, 
Gaskell maintained, the ability to sell peaking power to the mainland would be too 
limited to be profitable. It was argued further that neither of Tasmania's two existing 
storage hydro-electric schemes, the Poatina and Middle Gordon schemes, had the 
capacity to serve entirely as peak load generating systems. It was argued that in the 
case of the Poatina scheme, constant use to generate peak load for the mainland would 
result in flooding of farming areas downstream. Gaskell maintained that sustained use 
of the Middle Gordon scheme to serve the same function, on the other hand, would 
cause considerable erosion and other environmental problems on the lower Gordon 
River (Knibbs 1987: 46). Despite these arguments, the cable proposal was lent a new 
lease of life in the early 1990s as a result of the growing debate over restructuring of the 
Australian electricity supply industry. 
6.4.2 National Reform of the Electricity Supply Industry 
The Industry Commission's report on the electricity supply industry requested by the 
Treasurer, Paul Keating, was tabled in federal Parliament in May 1991. The report 
recommended sweeping structural reforms of the industry in order to increase its economic 
performance and thereby contribute to reduce the costs of electricity to the manufacturing 
sector and thereby enhance national competitiveness. The Industry Commission estimated 
that national economic output could be increased by $2.2 billion p.a. through competitive 
market reform of the electricity supply industry and advocated breaking up the state-
owned public electricity monopolies by ring-fencing these into commercial business 
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units within the existing public authority, or by breaking up the functions of the authorities 
and selling these as separate businesses (Industry Commission 1991a). According to 
the Industry Commission, institutional barriers to energy which represented the greatest 
obstacle to energy conservation and increased efficiency of energy use and removing 
these institutional barriers would result in both economic and environmental benefits. 
Critical to the Commission's proposal to create a competitive market for electricity and 
gas was the need for open access to the networks (high voltage transmission lines or 
gas pipelines) between energy producers. 
The electricity supply industry tentatively concurred with the general thrust of the 
report and in July 1991 a National Grid Management Council (NGMC) was set up to 
encourage and coordinate the most economic and environmentally sound electricity 
supply industry in the eastern and southeastern States. In 1991 Paul Keating became 
Prime Minister and the vision of a national grid gained added momentum as it accorded 
with his 'One Nation' policy plan. As part of that policy package, the Commonwealth 
offered to contribute up to $100 million towards the Basslink option. A pre-feasibility 
study was undertaken and estimated that a 390 MW cable would cost $550 million 
and provide a net benefit to Victoria and Tasmania of $1.17 billion over a 24 year 
period (SECV & HEC 1991a). These benefits included reduced need for oil at the Bell 
Bay station in Tasmania and the ability to defer investment in additional supply 
capacity in Victoria beyond 1989. A full feasibility study followed and the estimate of 
the net present value of the cable using a 10% discount rate to be substantially reduced 
at $310 million. This reduction in the net present value was due largely to the reduced 
load forecasts produced in the interim by both the SECV and the HEC (SECV & HEC 
1991b). 
6.4.3 The Decision over Tasmania's Next Energy Option 
The Tasmanian Development Authority's preferred option was to bring natural gas 
ashore. A consortium (Tasgas) consisting of the HEC, Comalco Bell Bay Ltd and the 
Tasmanian government was formed to investigate the feasibility of the gas option. The 
consortium estimated that if natural gas could be brought ashore from the Yolla Field in 
Bass Strait at $4 /GJ, and if the minimum size of a gas-fired power station built was 
150 MW, it would be possible to produce electricity at 4 to 6c/kWh. Tasgas formed a 
joint venture with the exploration firm Sagasco to undertake a $40 million drilling 
programme to firm up the gas resource. 
As consideration of the next energy option continued, the HEC was undergoing further 
structural and philosophical change. The national electric supply industry reform 
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debate gave added momentum to the HEC's new drive towards commercialisation. 
Following the Industry Commission report, the HEC produced its Blueprint for the 
Future (HEC 1991b) in which it outlined its plans to restructure as a commercial body 
by ring-fencing into six separate profit-making business units by March 1992. An 
unanticipated consequence of this was a weakening of the relationship between the 
HEC and its traditional ally, its major industrial clients. 
6.4.4 Tension between Industry and the HEC over Reforms 
Driving the debate on energy planning in Tasmania was a single firm, Comalco Bell Bay 
Ltd. The entry of eastern European aluminium manufacturers into the world market in 
1989 had led to a glut in aluminium and a slump in price. The small, old and 
inefficient Tasmanian smelter began to run at a loss of approximately $30,000 per day. 
The company commissioned a $1 million feasibility study of the investment strategies 
open to it and was presented with three options: The first was a total redevelopment 
of the plant to best world practice at a cost between $0.6 and $1 billion. The firm 
claimed this option would and require an additional 150 MW of electricity. The 
second option was a partial upgrade of the plant to extend its life by 15 to 20 years 
and meet new environmental standards planned for introduction in July 1994. The 
estimated cost of the partial upgrade was estimated to be between $200 million and 
$300 million. The last option open to the company was to make no further investment 
in the plant and permanently shut down the smelter when its existing contract for 
electricity expired in the year 2001. The company publicly announced that its preferred 
choice was the first of the above, total redevelopment, but warned that it would not 
commit itself to that option unless guaranteed a long-term contract for electricity at a 
price sufficiently low to allow it to remain competitive. 
Negotiations between the HEC and Comalco over a new contract price began in late 
1991. Simultaneously, Comalco's Tiwai Point plant in New Zealand and the Boyne 
island smelter, in which Comalco had a 30% stake, were negotiating similar price 
contracts and conditions for investment in redevelopment. Comalco Bell Bay's parent 
company, CRA, insisted that all three investments could not be undertaken concurrently 
and that unless an agreement on a new electricity contract was reached in Tasmania 
before the decision to proceed with investment in New Zealand and Queensland, the 
Tasmanian redevelopment decision would be deferred for a number of years. The 
company set July 1992 as the deadline for a decision. 
Although no official figures were ever released, it was commonly believed that in its 
negotiations with Comalco, the HEC demanded a 100% increase in the contractual 
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price the company paid for its electricity be increased, from 1.7 c/kWh to 3.4 c/ kWh. 
Comalco Bell Bay Ltd was believed to unwilling to pay more than 2.0 c/ kWh (The 
Mercury 29 July 1993: 6). 
As the debate dragged on, Comalco's bargaining position strengthened. Sagasco, the 
joint venture partner in the natural gas project, threatened to pull out of the $40 million 
drilling programme unless the Tasgas consortium could guarantee a minimum market 
for the gas of 20 PJ per annum. Tasmanian Development and Resources estimated that 
an 8 PJ p.a. market for gas could be created by encouraging susbstitution from fuel oil, 
distillate and LPG in the industrial sector located in the north of the State. The only 
way that a 20 MJ p.a. market could be created therefore was to construct a gas-fired 
power station of a size that would use the extra 12 PJ of gas. This worked out to be 
150 MW. The catch was that under its just-in-time policy, the now commercialised 
HEC was unwilling to commit itself to construction of such a large gas-fired plant 
without a firm market for the electricity. While Comalco Bell Bay Ltd expressed an 
interest in a new contract for an additional large increment in electricity, it was the only 
firm to do so. The aluminium smelting firm, furthermore, was unwilling to commit itself 
to this expansion unless it was guaranteed long-term security of supply at a sufficiently 
low price. The impasse could not be broken and Sagasco withdrew from the venture 
(Energy Council of Tasmania 1994: 52). 
Next to collapse was the wind option. Early in 1992, the two separate firms independently 
investigating the feasibility of constructing privately-owned wind farms in the State 
reported to the government that their estimated costs of producing electricity from 
wind ranged between 9 c/ kWh and 11 c/kWh. As the quoted price was well above 
the estimated costs of electricity from either a submarine cable or gas, the government 
abandoned its interest in developing wind energy. 
6.4.5 Collapse of the Labor-Green Accord and the Return of Power to the HEC 
The prospects of further construction of hydro-electricity were dismissed not by 
government but by the HEC itself. In early 1992, the minority Labor government fell 
out with the Greens and called an early election with the hope that of gain a majority in 
its own right. Both Liberal and Labor produced energy policy statements during the 
course of the election which included further hydro-electric developments in the State. 
The HEC remained silent on the issue. Together with the Commission's previous 
statement that it considered the hydro-electric option to be no longer cost-competitive 
with electricity producers in the Australian mainland states, this silence strongly 
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suggesting that with the transformation of the HEC to commercial organisation the 
vestiges of enthusiasm for hydro-industrialisation lingered as a political rather than 
bureaucratic vision. 
The Labor government's strategy in calling an early election backfired. Campaigning on 
the need for stable government, the Liberal Party regained government on the 18th of 
February 1992. Following the report of a Royal Commission into a political bribery 
scandal (Royal Commission into the Attempt to Bribe a Member of the House of 
Assembly 1991), the former Liberal leader, Robin Gray, had been replaced as leader of 
the Liberal Party by Ray Groom. As Deputy Premier, Gray retained both his old 
Energy portfolio and his leadership ambitions. Under Gray, the HEC regained much of 
the control over energy planning it had lost under the Labor government. The Department 
of Resources and Energy was abolished. The ten-member Energy Advisory Council 
was replaced with a three-member Advisory Council and supported by an Office of 
Energy Planning and Conservation with a staff of two. Gray also exempted major 
industrial consumers from the 5% surcharge on electricity which the HEC had introduced 
for all customer classes as the means of providing the government with the dividend it 
now demanded. The Liberals, however, like their Labor predecessors, had no plausible 
energy policy and were unable to develop one while Comalco continued to hold the key 
to energy decision making in the State. 
6.4.6 Pressure for Privatisation of Public Electricity Generating Assets 
As the HEC rapidly moved towards a more commercial business-like enterprise with 
the aim of becoming more profitable, its negotiations with Comalco became deadlocked. 
Increased profitability, warned the Commission, would not be possible without 
progressively increasing revenues and this would need to include increases in contract 
prices paid by major industries (HEC 1991a: 4). Industry's reaction was surprise as it 
had assumed that the purpose of commercialisation was to reduce the costs of energy 
to the manufacturing sector. Individual industries claimed that they could not afford 
to increase electricity prices. The debate was inflamed by the release of the 'Curran 
Report', the report of the Independent Commission of Review of Tasmania's Public 
Sector Finances (1992). 
In handing down its findings, the Independent Commission of Review recommended a 
series of economic rationalist policies to cut public sector spending and debt, including 
large-scale retrenchments and public asset sales. Among these was the sale of a 300 
MW block of the HEC's generating system and construction of the Basslink cable as a 
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private venture. The Independent Commission of Review's recommendations provided 
Comalco with another bargaining lever and came at a time in which the HEC's position 
in its negotiations with Comalco was becoming more difficult. 
Growth in electricity sales had been slower than forecast and surplus capacity was set 
to increase with the imminent commissioning of the King River scheme. Faced with this 
surplus, two promotional campaigns had been initiated by the HEC to increase electricity's 
share of the space heating market. A clever and effective Smoke gets in Your Eyes media 
campaign extolled the environmental virtues of electric heating compared to wood 
heaters. The 'Hydroheat' campaign reduced the electricity rate for electric space heaters 
with a rating of 3.5 kW or more to the cheap continuous hot-water tariff as a means of 
increasing the market penetration of heat pumps. It was subsequently extended to 
include all electric space heating equipment rated above 3.5 kW. 
Negotiations between Comalco and the HEC became more complicated when, in 
September 1992, the Government announced that it would be phasing out all Ministerial 
exemptions to the Environmental Protection Act by mid 1994 when a new Bill would 
be introduced. Comalco had two such exemptions, one permitting the company to emit 
4.75 kg of fluoride into the atmosphere per tonne of aluminium produced'. The other 
exemption permitted the firm to release liquid waste containing cyanide into the Tamar 
River. Comalco responded to the government's announcement with the claim that as its 
operation at Bell Bay was already unprofitable it could not afford to invest in pollution 
control equipment except as part of its full redevelopment option. It put further 
pressure on the negotiations over the firm's new contract electricity price and price 
security. The company, frustrated by the deadlock in the negotiations, demanded that 
the only means by which it could achieve sovereign risk protection was through the 
acquisition of public generating assets. The contemporary discussion over whether to 
introduce a national carbon tax may well have contributed to the company's desire to 
acquire hydro-electric assets. 
The company's proposal to buy part of the HEC's generating assets caused a great deal 
of consternation within both the Tasmanian community and other industry members. 
The concern of other industries was that a partial sale of HEC assets to Comalco 
would reduce the efficiency of the overall system and increase costs to the HEC's other 
customers. It was also clear that the scheme that Comalco sought was the 300 MW 
Poatina Scheme. That scheme was originally constructed to meet the firm's expanding 
demand and had been paid off. It was also a storage scheme and could provide 
7 This was four times the level of emissions per tonne of aluminium permitted in the 
mainland states. 
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protection against drought. Comalco indicated that unless an agreement on the sale of 
assets was reached in the near future it would shelve its redevelopment plans and close 
the plant in the year 2001. 
As all other schemes apart from the Middle Gordon scheme were run-of-river schemes, 
the sale of the Poatina scheme would greatly reduce the overall efficiency of the remaining 
generating system, decrease the ability to protect other customers from drought-induced 
shortages and increase the need to rely on the thermal back-up generators. The demand 
to acquire generating assets was therefore of considerable concern to the HEC's other 
customers. The manager of Australian Newsprint Mills (ANM) opposed to the sale 
and voluntarily offered to increase his firm's contract electricity price to 3.4 c/kwh. 
The HEC also opposed the sale of assets, arguing that the State's generating system 
needed to be operated as an integrated whole and that fragmentation into separate 
generating systems would substantially reduce its overall efficiency. To defuse the 
pressure for asset sales, and supported by the Minister for Energy, Robin Gray, the 
Commission maintained that the price that Comalco paid for its electricity was so low 
that should the firm close, a new market for only a part of its 237 MW load would 
need to be found to make up the shortfall in revenue. This, the Commission argued, 
could be achieved by increasing its share of the electric space heating market (The 
Mercury 12 Nov. 1993: 5). Comalco responded by announcing it would withdraw from 
the negotiations with the HEC unless a sale of HEC assets was on the agenda. 
The Premier overrode the HEC and initiated direct government negotiations with Comalco 
over the partial sale of HEC assets. The HEC retaliated by taking a line previously 
adopted by the environmental lobby and commissioning a confidential economic analysis 
of the impacts of Comalco's closure on the State. The report indicated that the impacts 
of Comalco's closure would not be as severe as generally believed and that it could 
even provide a net economic benefit for the State (Centre for Regional and Economic 
Analysis 1993: 16). The HEC's bargaining position, however, continued to be eroded. 
A glut of aluminium on the world market caused by the entry of eastern European 
producers forced the global industry to agree to cut world aluminium production by 
12%. Tasmania's antiquated and inefficient aluminium smelter was a logical place to 
begin production cuts. Comalco Bell Bay Ltd closed its No. 2 potline and reduced its 
load by 60 MW, further increasing the HEC's nominal surplus. One hundred and fifty 
workers were retrenched (The Mercury 5 February 1993: 1). 
When, in mid 1993, the government announced that a sale of assets to Comalco was 
imminent, it failed to anticipate the public backlash. Newspaper editorials, environmental 
groups and unions joined in the chorus of protest. The Government stonewalled, 
dismissing calls for a referendum. As Comalco's $650 million redevelopment was vital 
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for economic growth in the State, the Government argued, the sale of generating assets 
was essential. The traditional supporters of the HEC, including the ex-Labor Premier 
Reece, ex-HEC Commissioner Ashton, and HEC employees were joined by Labor and 
Green members of Parliament, and environmental groups at a public meeting which 
unanimously passed a motion condernning any sale of HEC assets. Consensus among 
this odd assortment of bedfellows was nonetheless limited and a second motion put 
up by environmentalists opposing the sale of subsidised electricity to Comalco was 
resoundingly defeated ( Weekend Australian 26-27 July 1993: 10). Other industries also 
put pressure on the government to abandon the sale of HEC assets. ANM suspended 
its own $120 million expansion programme and warned that it would wind down its 
own operations in the State if the asset sale went ahead. The proposal to sell part of 
the HEC's generating assets also made clear a split that existed within the Liberal 
government. The Minister for Energy, Robin Gray, wrote to all HEC staff declaring his 
opposition to the sale of HEC assets. He also espoused the view that the loss of 
Comalco would not represent a severe economic cost to the State (The Saturday Mercury 
3 July 1993: 5). 
With little public support for the sale of HEC assets even in the Bass electorate in 
which Comalco's Bell Bay smelting operation was located, the government backed 
down and in mid-1993 announced that the sale of HEC assets was no longer an 
option. The low, but undisclosed, offer made by Comalco was given as the reason for 
its decision s . Comalco retaliated by announcing that its withdrawal from the 
negotiations and its intentions to begin winding down its operations. To give weight to 
its threat, the firm retrenched 80 workers. Unmoved, the Government insisted that 
asset sales were permanently off the agenda. To entice the firm back to the negotiating 
table, the Government indicate a willingness to limit its demand for a price increase in. 
the firm's contract price to 150% of the previous price (The Mercury 19 August 1993: 3). 
This offer would have taken the contract price to approximately 2.5 c /kWh. 
With the closure of Comalco's potline in February 1993, the HEC's nominal excess 
capacity increased. Commissioning of the 44 MW Anthony-Henty Scheme was set to 
increase total spare capacity to 130 MW. Comalco's threat to close, if made good, 
would increase total spare capacity 350 MW, one third of total hydro-electric capacity 
and double the output of the abandoned Gordon-below-Franklin Scheme. Comalco 
rejected the Government's offer of a reduced increase in the contract price for electricity. 
8 It was believed that Comalco's offer was $350 million while the scheme in question had 
been valued at $700 million (The Mercury 29 July 1993: 1). 
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6.4.7 Environmentalist Proposals for Electricity Planning Reform 
Buoyed by the level of public opposition to the sale of HEC generating assets, the 
environmental movement sought to exploit the rift between the HEC and Comalco to 
promote its preferred version of planning reform. The Social, Economic, Ecological and 
Cultural Alliance (SEECA), formed in 1993 as an attempt to form a link between the 
Left faction within the Labor Party and the Greens, advanced a proposal for restructuring 
the State's electricity supply industry (Kohl 1993) that was a virtual copy of the earlier 
proposal advanced by Turnbull (1981). Many of SEECA's recommendations, furthermore, 
were economically rationalist and conformed to those put forward by the Industry 
Commission report (1991a). The Alliance's proposal included fragmentation of the 
HEC into a single electricity generation body and multiple retail entities, and the 
creation of a new regulatory body, the Public Utilities Board (PUB), with representation 
of community and environmental groups. The clear underlying intentions of the proposal 
were to emasculate the HEC, to break the strong nexus between the HEC and major 
industries, and to rupture the political decision making process that had given the HEC 
virtual monopoly control over electricity planning in the State. By increasing competition 
and by making electricity planning more democratic, it was hoped to slow down the 
supply construction programme and to install energy conservation as the mainstay of 
public energy policy. 
SEECA realised that its presumed virtues of competitive reform of the industry were 
likely to remain academic while the HEC possessed a large surplus of generating 
capacity. With a large excess generating capacity, the HEC's low short-run marginal 
costs of supply would undermine the viability of any potential electricity supply 
competitor. One solution was to split the HEC into separate generating units. As this 
would play into the hands of Comalco Bell Bay Ltd's attempt to purchase part of the 
HEC's generating assets, pivotal to the SEECA proposal was an alternative means of 
disposing of the HEC's surplus without fragmenting the hydro-electric system. The 
Alliance therefore demanded that the proposal to connect the State's grid with Victoria's 
proceed. The underlying assumption used by SEECA to support its demand was that 
a submarine cable would create a market for peaking power and allow the State to 
receive a high price for the electricity it produced from its hydro-electric system, while 
buying back cheap base-load power from the mainland coal-fired electricity producers. 
Echoing the Industry Commission (1991a) report, SEECA argued that the cable would 
defer the need for expansion of generating capacity in both Victoria and Tasmania and 
was a potential 'big bang' efficiency measure, would reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
and was therefore a moral necessity (Kohl 1993: 23). 
To sell its proposal, SEECA ran a high profile public campaign while demanding that 
the issue of electricity policy be taken to the public arena through government sponsored 
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public symposia. It was greatly assisted in this demand by the publication of a 
scathing critique of past electricity planning in the State in the national electricity 
magazine, Electricity Week (Beatty 1994). 
The Electricity Week article was a condensed version of an article published later in the 
year in an academic environmental journal (Blakers 1994). Dr Andrew Blakers, an 
engineer from the Australian National University, accused the HEC of squandering 
$350 million dam compensation money, and of wrecking the State's economy by frenzied 
and unnecessary dam construction. This construction programme, Blakers charged, 
had been based on forecasts which had proven to be highly inaccurate, while the 
forecasts advanced by environmental lobby were shown to have been remarkably accurate. 
The costs of electricity from the unneeded King and Anthony-Schemes, the article 
contended, had left the State with a massive overcapacity and had contributed to 44% 
of the State's crippling debt. The article created a wave of questions and recriminations 
in Parliament, the Greens and the environmental movement calling for a Royal Commission 
into past HEC forecasting (The Mercury 9 March 1994: 9). As Premier at the time those 
planning decisions were made, Gray was the focus of these attacks. He defended his 
decision to proceed with the King and Anthony-Henty Schemes on the grounds that all 
the expert advice he had been given at the time indicated that the extra electricity 
would be required. More importantly, he added, 2300 families needed an income. 
The Minister for Energy and the HEC also came under attack from the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee of Public Accounts (Parliament of Tasmania 1994). The Committee 
was asked to report on the HEC in response to the protracted negotiations between 
Comalco and the HEC and by the high level of opposition to the Government's proposal 
to sell HEC assets. Its report was highly critical of the degree to which the Commission's 
commercialisation had brought it into conflict with its major industrial clients. Healing 
this rift between the HEC and the major industries was seen by the Committee as 
imperative to avoid damaging the prospects for economic growth. The Committee was 
also perturbed about the declining public support for hydro-industrialisation and 
dismissed the claim that major industries received subsidised electricity as 
unsubstantiated (Parliament of Tasmania 1994: 24). Whether the price these industries 
paid for the electricity was cost reflective or not, the Committee argued, was irrelevant 
as the reality was that these industries paid what the market would bear. Any 
attempt to increase their contractual prices would undermine industrial investment in 
the State and put economic growth at risk. The Committee accused the HEC of having 
little understanding of the imperatives of industry and therefore recommended that 
members of Tasmanian Development Resources (TDR) 9 , with their close relationships 
9 The Tasmanian Development Resources (TDR) was formerly the Tasmanian Development 
Authority (TDA). 
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with industry, serve as HEC Commissioners (Parliament of Tasmania 1994: 21). The 
Commission's commercialisation, according to the powerful parliamentary committee, 
had gone too far and the Government had lost control of the its energy bureaucracy. 
Plans to fully corporatise the Commission, the Committee argued, ought to be abandoned. 
The Committee also dismissed the Commission's assumption that it could find new 
customers to make up the shortfall of revenue if the aluminium smelter closed. It was 
recommended that the HEC's revenue income should be increased by raising household 
and commercial tariffs rather than the prices paid by major industries (Parliament of 
Tasmania: 25). 
The besieged Minister for Energy conceded to SEECA's demands for public consultation 
and ordered his Office of Energy Planning and Conservation to prepare a discussion 
paper on future electricity options in the State ready for a public seminar in May. The 
discussion paper outlined the national electricity supply industry reforms which would 
require the HEC's monopoly powers to be ended and a more competitive industry 
structure established. While privatisation at some stage in the future was not ruled 
out, the discussion paper followed Gray's line that, if Comalco closed, the HEC would 
be able to use the electricity to attract new industries and markets (Energy Council of 
Tasmania 1994: 11). This discussion paper outlined the various energy options available 
to the State government and the problems and estimated costs associated with these 
options, noting that there existed about a 25 MW potential to save energy at a cost of 2 
to 5 c/ kwh (Energy Council of Tasmania 1994. 25). SEECA interpreted the gesture as 
evidence of interest in its proposals for energy policy reform, restructuring the HEC and 
the Basslink option (The Examiner 4 April 1994 1). 
On the eve of the seminar a confidential report commissioned by the HEC's Corporate 
Business unit in 1993 was leaked to the media. The report, prepared by the International 
firm, Merril Lynch, estimated that the HEC's revenue from its major industrial clients to 
be approximately $130 million p.a. 1° and that this income from the sale of electricity 
to its major industrial clients fell short of costs by $200 million p.a. It was not 
possible, the consulting firm claimed, to make up this shortfall by increasing retail 
tariffs alone (The Mercury 7 May 1994: 1). 
At the seminar, various speakers put forward their respective energy options for meeting 
the State's future energy requirements. The Managing Director of the Integrated Energy 
Management Centre (IEMC), Dr Peter Davis, indicated that although there was a 
potential to save between 20% to 25% of the energy used in the State, the IEMC was 
HEC revenue raised from retail sector sales (2,958.7 GWh) in 1993 was $293 million, 
while the revenue raised form bulk contracts with major industries (5.224.5 GWh) was 
$127.9 million. 
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out on a bureaucratic limb while electricity conservation programmes conflicted with 
the HEC's current commercial interests (Davis 1994: 4). Dr Davis suggested, however, 
that through the actions by the Australian and New Zealand Minerals and Energy 
Council, such as its pressure for the introduction of national Minimum Energy Performance 
Standards (MEPS) for household appliances, the efficiency of energy use in the State 
was likely to be increased irrespective of HEC or State policies (Davis 1994: 3). 
6.4.8 Rejection of Environmental Reform Proposals & Energy Conservation 
On the day following the seminar, Gray dismissed the Basslink proposal as too risky. 
With the reforms of the national electricity supply industry and the major restructuring 
of the Victorian electricity industry by the Liberal government in Victoria, Gray maintained 
that the situation had become too confused and volatile to permit an assessment of the 
impacts of the cable option in Tasmania (The Mercury 9 May 1994: 4). Under the 
National Grid Protocol adopted by all state governments except Tasmania, generators 
would compete on to supply customers with loads above 30 MW, decreasing to 10 
MW by mid 1996. The major concern of the HEC and the Tasmanian government was 
that reform of the Victorian electricity supply industry would lower the price of electricity 
produced in that state, in which case interconnection would result in Victorian producers 
engaging in 'cherry-picking' — taking the HEC's high-paying customers whilst leaving it 
with its low-paying customers. SEECA's demand for the Basslink option and restructuring 
of the electricity supply industry in the State were dismissed as ill-thoughtout. The 
Alliance continued to press, nonetheless, for it electricity planning reforms. 
To undermine Comalco's demand to purchase HEC assets, ANM signed a contract to 
pay 3.4 c/ kwh for its electricity. The Managing Director of Pasminco-EZ publicly 
applauded the deal (The Mercury 28 June 1994: 6). The Chairman of Comalco Bell Bay 
Ltd's parent company, CRA Ltd, merely reiterated that unless an agreement could be 
reached that would protect Comalco from sovereign risk of price increases, the Bell Bay 
smelter would be closed. 
Without warning, and with the Minister for Energy out of the country, the HEC announced 
on 8 July 1994 the introduction of a new retail tariff structure which included a new 
transmission tax of $109.50 p.a., to be increased to $219 p.a. in 1996. Together with 
the supply charge householders in 1995/96 would pay $350 p.a. on top of electricity 
charges. The new 'pole tax', the HEC argued, would be offset by a reduction in 
electricity rates so that the average householder would pay only a 2.5% net increase in 
1995. The 'Hydroheat' tariff would be reduced from 6.99 c/ kWh to 6.20 c/kWh in 
1994/95, and to 5.5 c/ kWh in 1995/96. The new HEC cost structure was clearly 
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designed to encourage electricity use and was highly regressive, increasing the bills of 
low electricity users and decreasing those of high electricity users. 
For those who had attempted to establish a wind energy generating company in the 
state, or who had quixotically attempted to persuade the then Premier, Robin Gray, to 
abandon the King River scheme in the early 1980s, it suddenly appeared as if their 
monster was indeed turning to windmills. Returning from the USA, the Minister for 
Energy, declared that the next new energy generation project in Tasmania could be a 
wind farm. There was, however, a caveat attached to the wind option. Gray defended 
the restructured tariff charges, arguing that there was little point in encouraging energy 
conservation whilst there was an excess of electricity generating capacity. He described 
the State's three energy scenarios as being (i) the closure of Comalco's aluminium 
smelter with a resultant large spare capacity and no need for energy conservation, (ii) 
the redeveloped of Comalco, which would necessitate the need for a large increase in 
generating capacity which would make energy conservation irrelevant, and (iii) the 
retention of Comalco's smelter without redevelopment. Energy conservation and wind 
energy, the Minister stated, would only be relevant in the last of the above scenarios 
and provided, furthermore, that growth in demand for electricity from other sectors 
remained low (The Mercury 25 July 1994: 5). 
The new Environmental Management and Pollution Control Bill 1994 was passed in 
July. Comalco reiterated that it would close before 2001 when its electricity contract 
expired if it was forced to comply with the Bill, claiming that it had no incentive to 
invest $200 million in pollution control when it was running at a loss of $20 million p.a. 
(The Mercury 4 September 1993: 7). 
By the time the second public symposium on future electricity options in the State was 
held, in November 1994, the situation had altered. In February 1994, the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) had agreed in principle to the national competition 
policy as set out by the 'Hilmer report' (Independent Commission of Inquiry into National 
Competition Strategy 1993). The report recommended that all government business 
enterprises came under the Commonwealth Trade Practices Act to end their monopolies. 
It was an ironical situation in which a Labor Prime Minister extolled the virtues of the 
free market to reluctant, and mainly Liberal, state Premiers. Only Tasmania demurred, 
uncertain of how the reforms would impact on the financial position of the HEC. In 
August 1994, COAG agreed to a package of specific national competition measures 
including the introduction of state legislation to remove the monopoly powers of the 
electricity supply authorities. The focus of the Public Symposium in Tasmania was 
therefore narrowed to discussion of the implications of these reforms for Tasmania. 
The Government insisted that because of Tasmania's small size, and because of the 
need to operate the hydro-electric generating system as an integrated unit, SEECA's 
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proposal of fragmenting the HEC into separate and multiple generation and distribution 
units was not feasible. 
Disgruntled over the public consultation process, and with both their demand for the 
Basslink option and their proposed restructuring of the HEC rejected, SEECA members 
joined other environmental groups in their call to drain and restore Lake Pedder. The 
proposal had quietly built up momentum over a considerable period and, in late 1994, 
environmentalists saw the time as right. The Lake Pedder 2000 group was formed and 
publicly launched its proposal to drain the Lake by the Year 2000. With a surplus 
capacity of 150 MW that was likely increase to 350 MW when Comalco decamped, the 
environmental lobby argued, the 65 MW that the Pedder impoundment contributed to 
the HEC's generating system was no longer required. It was seen as an opportunity to 
achieve a major environmental goal without even the need to advance energy conservation 
proposals. Although debunked as a hare-brained idea by local Labor and Liberal 
politicians, the Federal Minister for the Environment took the proposal seriously and 
requested the House of Representatives Standing Committee on the Environment 
investigate the feasibility of draining the Pedder impoundment (House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts 1995). In its evidence to 
the Inquiry, the Managing Director of Comalco Bell Bay Ltd claimed that draining Lake 
Pedder would reduce the capacity of the State's generation system to avoid drought-
induced shortages and rationing, would undermine investment confidence in the State, 
and would jeopardise his company's $650 million redevelopment plans (The Mercury 
28 March 1995: 1). The House of Representatives Standing Committee ultimately 
recommended against draining the impoundment on the grounds that there was no 
surplus electric generating capacity in the State. 
To counter declining public support for hydro-industrialisation and the growing public 
and political support for re-orientation of economic policies towards encouragement of 
small business as a substitute for large industries, eleven of the State's largest industries 
formed a industry body, the Major Employers Group. The Group commissioned a 
team of economists to assess the importance of their industries to the State's economy 
(Felmingham et al. 1995). The report asserted that industrial load would increase by 
up to 100 MW by the year 2003 and that, together with growth in retail load, this 
would require commencement of construction of additional generating capacity in the 
near-term. In making this statement, it was assumed that Comalco would redevelop 
(Felmingham et al. 1995: 44). The report stated that full redevelopment of the Bell Bay 
smelter, would require an additional 50 MW demand for electricity, one third of the 
increase in load suggested when the redevelopment option was first announced. The 
clear message of the report conflicted with earlier claims that the policy of hydro-
industrialisation ought to be buried (Felmingham 1982) and argued instead that the 
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State's economic well-being was still inextricably linked to that of a small number of 
large industries. Although the contributions made by these industries to the State's 
employment and economy was declining, it was argued, the industries remained the 
core of the State's economy and could not be neglected. Releasing the report, the 
authors claimed that failure to encourage development of these industries would result 
in their closure and reduce the State's economy to that of a Third World Country (The 
Mercury 17 March 1995: 2). The conclusion that could be drawn was that energy policy 
in particular continued to be governed primarily by the needs of those industries. 
That these industries had good reason to be concerned over their weakening grip on 
State economic policy was demonstrated by a second report commissioned by the 
Major Employers Group. The second, unreleased, report surveyed public acceptance of 
major industries and found that the number of Tasmanians who thought that these 
industries were holding back economic development in the State (39.2%) was slightly 
higher than the number that thought that these firms were assisting the State's economy 
(35.6%). The report also found that only 10% of Tasmanians considered these large 
companies to be the most important sector of the State's economy, and that two-thirds 
of Tasmanians did not believe that the HEC achieved the right balance in what it 
charged householders and what it charged industry (Volpato 1995) 11 . 
6.4.9 Capitulation to the Federal Government's Reform Agenda 
To entice the Tasmanian government to follow the lead of other state governments by 
putting the national competition reforms into effect, the Federal government provided 
the State with an extra $8 million in Commonwealth grants, conditional upon legislation 
to corporatise the HEC and remove its monopoly powers being in place by July 1995. 
On the 29 June, the HEC Act was replaced with the Hydro-Electric Corporation Act. 
Accordingly, the HEC's planning functions were removed and vested in an independent 
Office of Energy Planning. The HEC's regulatory functions were also removed and 
invested in an independent Office of the Regulator. While regulation of the new 
Corporation's tariffs was assigned to an Oversight Commission, bulk electricity contracts 
with major industries remained outside the purview of the regulator, indicating that 
the intention of the reforms of electricity supply industry were not to create a truly 
competitive electricity market. 
With these changes, Comalco's bargaining position had been undermined. Its sister 
plant in New Zealand had failed to persuade the New Zealand government to sell part 
The author of the report, Richard Volpato, retained the rights to the data and kindly 
provided the author with the above information. 
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of its hydro-electric generating assets. The firm had nevertheless proceeded with its 
$320 million redevelopment. The New Zealand-based smelting firm, furthermore, had 
entered into a new electricity contract with N.Z. Electcorp at an increased price (The 
Australian Financial Review 9 Dec. 1994: 8). The Tasmanian based smelting-firm, Comalco 
Bell Bay Ltd, also signed a new nineteen-year electricity contract with the Hydro-Electric 
Corporation and committed itself to a $200 million upgrade (The Mercury 13 November 
1995: 1). As a consequence of the partial upgrade, the company planned to reduce its 
workforce by another 20%. Its new power contract, furthermore, was for 250 MW, an 
increase of only 13 MW above its previous contract. The company also did an about 
turn by agreeing to comply with the new environmental regulations despite its previous 
claims that it could not afford to do so without undertaking the full $650 million 
redevelopment option. 
6.4.10 Prospects for Reduced Growth in Demand & Energy Conservation 
By the mid 1990s, the attempt to increase electricity sales by obtaining a greater share 
of the domestic space heating market was beginning to show signs of putting stress on 
the distribution system, and disruptions to electricity supply had become more common 
by the mid 1990s. The HEC was forced to spend $10 million on upgrading Launceston's 
electricity distribution system. Growth in demand nonetheless looked set to remain 
low and as the aluminium smelter had not taken up the redevelopment option, the 
HEC was left with considerable surplus generating capacity. Energy conservation was 
not in the short-term interests of the new Corporation. The slow rate of growth in 
demand, however, meant that there was little risk of shortages and no urgent need to 
plan for supply expansion. This meant that not only would energy conservation 
programmes were better able to meet future load requirements and defer the need for 
new capacity for longer, but that there was ample time, with a bit of foresight, to plan 
for energy conservation in the future with this extended planning horizon. Proponent 
of the energy conservation option therefore appeared to have grounds for hope about 
the future prospects for an increased emphasis on energy conservation in planning. In 
this regard, however, the final comments made by the Minister for Energy before resigning 
from parliament in late November 1995 were pertinent. Gray claimed that there were 
good prospects for rapid industrial expansion in the State but that these would be lost 
without increasing the supply of energy. He urged the government to quickly begin 
construction of a new energy supply option (The Examiner 24 November 1995: 1). For 
those keen to see greater emphasis placed on encouragement of energy conservation, it 
was a case of plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose. 
Gray's parting words captured the essence of Tasmania's problem. Despite the persistent 
misgivings about the social and economic benefits of the strategy of expanding energy 
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supply to encourage industrial expansion, Tasmanian politicians remained focused 
predominately on opportunities for industrial development. Gray's final message was 
a reminder that although electricity planning in the State could no longer be described 
as technocratic, energy planning nonetheless remained a client-based strategy. Large 
blocks of energy continued to be made available in order to attract potential investors 
on the basis of noncommittal expressions of interest. It indicated the perennial 
ambivalence towards energy conservation at the political level in that while demand 
reduction strategies were not opposed per se, these strategies remained an aside to 
what was perceived to be the real purpose of energy policy: ensuring that sufficient 
surplus capacity was always at hand lest opportunities for industrial investment were 
lost. Although the political emasculation of the HEC's Power Engineering Branch had 
brought to an end the phenomenon of 'reverse adaption' as described by Kellow (1986, 
1996), the supply construction cycle remained intact and was now driven by Tasmanian 
Development and Resources (TDR). While that mentality remained, the prospects for 
increased reliance on demand reduction strategies appeared remote. 
As this study drew to a close, the debate over electricity tariffs continued against the 
backdrop of the fact that the proportional increase in electricity tariffs in Tasmania 
from 1991 to 1996 was larger than the increase in any other Australian state. By 1996, 
Tasmanian households paid a higher unit price for general tariff electricity than did 
households in Queensland or New South Wales, and paid a higher unit off-peak price 
higher than did households in all other states except Western Australia. Commercial 
and small business consumers, moreover, paid a higher unit electricity price than their 
counterparts in any other state, and double that paid by commercial consumers in New 
South Wales and Queensland (Government Prices Oversight Commission 1996: 11-13). 
The first task of the new regulator, the Government Prices Oversight Commission, was 
to hold an inquiry into HEC tariffs and prices. Predictably, the Greens and Labor 
opposition called for the scrapping of the electorally unpopular network charge and the 
introduction of a tariff structure that would be likely to encourage energy conservation 
(The Mercury 9 May 1996: 6). These calls ignored the fact that any adjustment of retail 
tariffs to encourage electricity conservation would be countered by the HEC while the 
Corporation still held a substantial surplus generating capacity. More importantly, 
they ignored the fact that while tariff restructuring could be used to encourage retail 
sector energy conservation, its impact on overall energy use would be limited while 
industrial electricity contact prices remained beyond the ambit of public debate, and 
while the priority of both Liberal and Labor parties was to attract capital *using the 
State's natural resource base as the lure. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
Tasmania has been used as a case study of electricity planning to show that it is not 
possible to explain the rate of expansion of energy supply or the degree of emphasis 
ascribed in electricity planning to conserving energy without understanding who controls 
electricity planning and for what purpose. The Franklin River controversy represented 
the beginnings of a major shift in control of electricity planning in Tasmania. The Lowe 
administration had confronted the HEC head on and attempted to reduce the 
organisation's influence over planning by creating new energy policy bureaucracies. 
This attempt was successfully countered by the HEC and the Legislative Council and 
only marginal reforms were put in place. In the aftermath of public and political 
conflict over electricity planning in Tasmania in the early 1980s, the Liberal government 
under Gray took a different approach and reformed the HEC from within. Rather than 
create independent energy bureaucracies or increase public participation in policy 
formulation, under Gray, the power and influence of the Commission's Power Engineering 
Branch was usurped by a new group of business managers under whose control the 
organisation was run along the lines of a private business. 
This set up a duel between the factions wanted the HEC to retain political control of 
electricity planning in order to foster industrial expansion, and those who supported 
the new economically rationalist agenda. Business at first supported those reforms, 
assuming that the outcomes that would naturally flow from them would be lower 
electricity prices to industry. Only when business realised that the reforms would in 
fact increase the price of electricity to industry did the reform process fragment the 
previous harmony between industry, the electricity supply organisation and politicians. 
The economic rationalists eventually won the day, supported by political rivalry and 
intervention by an economically rationalist Federal Labor government. At the end of 
the day it was no longer an engineering corps which controlled electric planning in the 
interests of the organisation and its industrial clients, but a leaner and meaner commercial 
business operation with a narrow economically rational agenda. It was not parliament, 
but the market. 
Debate over energy conservation during this period of reform was like a background 
tune that came to the fore only briefly during intermittent lulls in the major score. The 
reasons for this continued low emphasis on energy conservation were the conflicting 
prospects faced by planners. The legacy of past technocratic planning together with 
the slow-down of the growth in demand for electricity in the State presented planners, 
on the one hand, with the prospect of an enduring and serious energy supply crisis. If 
this eventuated, as environmentalists argued it would, then it would render energy 
conservation irrelevant as a planning option in the short to mid-term. The alternative 
prospect was the loss of industrial expansion opportunities due to an incapacity to 
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expand energy supply in time to meet the needs of prospective industrial clients. It 
was the rapidity with which debate over energy planning oscillated between these two 
diametrically opposed concerns that made energy conservation difficult to accommodate 
within electricity planning in the State. While decision makers remained optimistic 
about the prospects of industrial expansion and the associated need for rapid supply 
augmentation projects, energy conservation was relegated a low priority as a planning 
option. The reforms put in place meant that energy planning had become more 
economically rational and that a just-in-time policy was again adopted. While further 
hydro-electric schemes were abandoned as a planning option, the minimum size of the 
mooted gas-fired power station (150 MW) was dictated not by demand but by the 
minimum size of a market that would making the venture profitable for the developer. 
Although smaller than the Poatina, Middle Gordon and Pieman hydro-electric schemes, 
a 150 MW gas-fired power station was larger than the combined output of the King 
and Anthony-Henty schemes. Hence Puiseux's (1987) proposal that the risks of 
oversupply be minimised by reducing the lead times and scale of new generating capacity 
to match those of industrial user was only partially possible. Planning, furthermore, 
remained a client-based affair in which the planners scrambled to ensure that sufficient 
energy was available to prospective industries. While the move to economically rational 
planning therefore served to avoid the risks of overgrowth of electricity supply with the 
creation of costly large excess capacity, these reforms did not increase the likelihood 
that planning would place greater priority on energy conservation. While policy makers 
continued to desire as rapid growth in demand as possible, electricity planning continued 
to consist of a cycle between load growth as a means of reducing excess capacity and 
decisions over capacity expansion to meet future requirements. The decision period 
between these phases of the cycle remained short and this mitigated against increased 
reliance on energy conservation 
Critics of past electricity planning in the State were quick to seize on these prospects of 
an expensive large excess of generating capacity as proof that their low growth forecasts 
had been accurate while the HEC's forecasts had been disastrously optimistic. Those 
recriminations overlooked the fact that the deviation between projected and actual 
demand was caused not only by over-optimistic forecasting on the part of the HEC but 
also by the many changes that occurred during the interim period such as the changes in 
State and Federal governments and policies. The imposition of a ceiling on Commonwealth 
loans, for example, increased the price of electricity from uncompleted schemes and 
this is likely to have influenced industrial demand. Increased public scrutiny of electricity 
planning in the aftermath of the Lake Pedder and Franklin River controversies was 
increased further once the Greens held the balance of power in parliament and eroded 
the Commission's ability to engage in 'reverse adaption' by disposing of large blocks of 
excess electricity by entering into contracts with industry at subsidised prices, thereby 
further reducing the rate of growth in demand. More importantly, as a consequence of 
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the reforms of electricity planning and the structure of the electricity supply industry, 
the relationship between the HEC and its industrial clients was substantially altered. 
The Commission itself demanded higher prices for electricity from its industrial clients, 
further slowing growth in electricity sales to industry and the demand by industry for 
acquisition of public electricity generating assets. 
The environmental demand for increased public participation, radical restructuring of 
the electricity supply industry and regulation to ensure that energy used efficiently 
went almost unnoticed. While the environmentalist's long-term demand that energy 
planning be based on a more rational footing had been achieved, environmentalists 
mistakenly thought that the rift between the HEC and its industrial clients would lead 
to increased environmental consideration in planning and increased representation of 
community and environmental groups. The Minister conceded to environmentalists 
demands for public seminars to open the debate to the public, but these seminars were 
used merely to defuse the debate and to deflect the environmentalist own proposals for 
the organisational restructuring of the electricity supply industry. 
Energy conservation became an option that was constantly held up as desirable, but 
one which needed to be applied in practice only when the time was right. The time was 
rarely right and was confined to periods of sudden shortages or heightened environmental 
concern. Many of these drought-induced energy conservation efforts tended to be 
symbolic or superficial. Others were potentially more long-lasting. The IEMC was 
established and energy savings in industry, the government sector, and particularly in 
schools, were actively encouraged. There was less focus on the household sector due to 
the requirement that the IEMC was to eventually become a self-funding organisation. 
As household sector energy conservation was not profitable, minimal efforts were 
expended in encouraging energy conservation in that area. As the electricity shortage in 
the State eased and public concern over the greenhouse issue waned during the early 
1990s, however, the IEMC found itself out on a bureaucratic limb, its organisational 
goals in direct conflict with those of the HEC. The Centre's future is now uncertain and 
at the time of writing is being debated by the new Liberal State12 and Federal governments. 
The IEMC's instigator and Managing Director, Dr Peter Davis, took up a senior position 
as the HEC's marketing manager and immediately turned his considerable entrepreneurial 
skills to the task of increasing electricity sales, a task that had the capacity to undermine 
alternative energy options. A project aimed at using methane from the Hobart City 
Council's landfill operation failed to materialise as prospective clients for the 2 MW of 
energy, including the Royal Hobart Hospital, were offered incentives by the HEC's 
12 In early March 1996, the Liberal government lost its outright majority and the Greens 
again held the balance of power in the Tasmanian House of Assembly. The Liberals 
remained in power as a minority government. 
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marketing division to continue to be use electricity supplied by the HEC (The Saturday 
Mercury 22 June 1996: 9). To Dr Davis it was all healthy competition that forced the 
HEC to improve its services to customers. 
With the partial move towards a market-led energy supply industry, the degree to 
which electricity conservation is adopted in the future in Tasmania remains uncertain. 
It has been argued that unregulated energy supply industry has little interest in encouraging 
customers to reduce energy use (Moskovitz 1992: 399) and that the degree to which 
energy conservation will be pursued in a competitive market environment has been 
seriously overstated (Moskovitz & Austin 1993: 3). This view has been lent support by 
evidence on the ground (Cocklin 1993, Mittra et al. 1995: 45, ANZMEC 1995: 38). The 
weaknesses in terms of achieving optimal environmental and social outcomes have been 
discussed by numerous writers (Dietz & Vollebergh 1988: 53, Haavelmo & Hansen 
1992, Self 1993: 276). The need for a regulatory energy in order to substantially 
increase the efficiency of energy use or reduce the demand for energy has also been 
argued by such writers as Saddler (1981: 166), Johnson & Rix (1991: 64), Roberts et al. 
(1991:19-20), Kinrade (1992, 1995a), Cairncross (1993: 63) and Lowe (1994a: 208-9, 
1994b: 326-7). The degree to which energy conservation is accelerated is therefore 
likely to depend on the extent to which the industry is regulated to ensure that energy 
use is maximised and energy waste minimised. 
What will happen in terms of energy conservation in Tasmania as a consequence of the 
reforms put in place is not yet clear. Some maintain that the adoption of energy 
conservation in Tasmania may accelerate even without regulations to mandate DSM or 
energy performance standards. As it became clear to the environmental movement that 
its demands for increased regulation of the electricity supply industry and increased 
public participation in electricity planning were unlikely to be met, this belief that the 
efficiency of energy use in Tasmania would increase in Tasmania despite a continued 
lack of encouragement by either the HEC or the Government became more common 
(Porsch & Sharples 1993: 28). It was a view premised partially on the assumption that 
IEMC would remain actively involved in the encouragement of energy conservation in 
the State, and partially on the belief that decisions made at the national level would 
impinge on energy use in Tasmania. The combined result of these two factors was seen 
to be that the State would be involuntarily caught in an energy conservation 'slipstream 
effect'. A case in point was the default energy labelling programme that eventuated 
when the NSW and Victorian governments unilaterally imposed a requirement for 
labelling. For administrative ease, appliance manufacturers and distributors placed 
labels to appliances retailed in all of the Australian states so that the smaller states 
effectively acquired labelling schemes. A similar involuntary change occurred when the 
NSW government unilaterally introduce unleaded petrol. It did so only after it failed to 
reach agreement with other states to introduce unleaded petrol as a uniform national 
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policy measure. The view that the Federal government would introduce policies aimed 
at increasing the efficiency of energy use as part of its commitment to reducing greenhouse 
emissions was therefore seen as a way in which the rate of increase in efficiency 
end-use in Tasmania would be exogenously determined. Finally, an increase in the rate 
of adopt of energy conservation was considered by such individuals to be likely to 
occur as public concern over environmental issues such as the greenhouse effect increased. 
As a consequence of a shift in attitudes, it was assumed that individuals would alter 
their energy-using decisions, especially if this was encouraged by government. The 
degree to which such strategies, if adopted, are likely result in reductions, and the 
likelihood that they will be implemented, are the subject of the following chapters. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Effectiveness of Public Information Campaigns 
In order to save the environment, massive human behaviour change is 
necessary and this is urgent. Raising environmental awareness and 
fostering more positive attitudes may encourage greater environmental 
friendliness. 
— Prof. Margaret Prior (1994: 94) 
... savings for households might appeal to the 'piggy bank' that is in us all. 
— Nader & Milleron (1979: 958) 
7.1 Introduction 
From an examination of past electricty planning in a particular location, the study now 
turns to an examination of the effectiveness of specific energy conservation strategies. 
The case studies presented in this and the following chapter critically examine the 
potential effectivness of two such strategies in order to assess their potential effctiveness 
and to tease out the more important difficulties that could be encountered in their 
implemenation. This is used to provide further support for the arguments presented so 
far that energy conservation proposals are often resisted by exploring the reasons for 
such resistance. This also allows the discussion to be steered from what has occurred 
in the past what could possibly happen in the future. Such critical examination of the 
effectiveness of energy conservation strategies is important since the degree to which 
energy conservation will be pursued voluntarily in a reformed competitive electricity 
supply industry in the absence of regulatory structure is not yet clear. The case study 
of reform in the previous chapter showed that within a replacement cost pricing policy, 
it is possible that electricity use will continue to be encouraged. It also showed that the 
theory that market solutions are effective is unlikely to even be put to the test until the 
legacy of large surplus capacities are overcome. In those cases where the energy is 
supplied from fossil fuels, overcapacity will result in conflict between the short-term 
commercial interests of the utility and the longer-term need to reduce electricity use for 
social reasons. In such situations, intervention is likely to be required to achieve an 
outcome that advances the public interest. This will mean that either a regulatory 
structure is put in place which actively promotes or mandates utility energy conservation 
programmes or that the interventionist measures employed work in opposition to 
electricity or energy utility efforts to encourage increased energy use. Much of the 
debate will therefore be over whether there will be a need to mandate Least-Cost 
Planning and the implementation of demand management strategies, or whether reliance 
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on market forces through such mechanisms as the development of a strong and 
independent energy service industry will suffice will be set by the effectiveness of 
energy conservation programmes in reducing energy use and the extent to which the 
benefits flowing from these programmes outweigh their costs. The effectiveness of these 
strategies is critical since, as discussed in section 4.6 , while the socially optimal level of 
energy efficiency remains narrowly defined, electricity utilities are unlikely to be required 
to implement demand management programmes that are not in their commercial interests 
or energy conservation programmes that have not been proven to be cost-effective 
(Industry Commission 1991b: 202). While advocates of market solutions argue that the 
effect of pricing energy at its real cost will automatically ensure that energy is used 
efficiently, advocates of a more interventionist approach counter with the argument 
that markets, and energy markets in particular, are so lopsided that until energy prices 
reflect the full social costs, including pollution costs, the level of energy use will remain 
higher than that defined narrowly by the cost-effectiveness criterion. 
This raises the questions of what instruments are likely to be employed by government 
to encourage reductions in energy use and how effective these various policy instruments 
are likely to be. Two policy instruments particularly favoured by the conservation 
lobby are, as discussed in Section 2.4, pricing and regulatory approaches. Conservationists 
have long argued that energy prices need to be increased to reflect full social costs of 
energy production and use and pollution taxes are recognised as one means of achieving 
this. The idea of a carbon-tax was taken to the Federal Labor Cabinet in December 
1994 by the Federal Minister for the Environment, Senator John Faulkner. The proposed 
levy would have netted $900 million over three years (The Age 12 December 1994:1). 
As well as reducing natural greenhouse gas emissions, the tax was advanced as a 
means of improving the national Balance of Payments figures before the next federal 
election and allowing greater expenditure on various other environmental problems. 
Most importantly it would have saved the Minister the embarrassment of arriving at 
the Berlin round of negotiations on the climate change treaty in the following March 
empty-handed. The tax was opposed, however, by the finance and development 
Ministers on the basis of a 'Catch-22 . For a carbon-tax to have any significant effect 
on the level of greenhouse gas emissions, it was argued, it would need to be set at a 
relatively high rate. A substantial tax would be both inflationary and damage the 
competitive positions of Australian export industries. Senator Faulkner went empty-
handed to Berlin and the Federal government opted to rely on other measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. A variety of measures have been used to date, including 
initial funding of a national Integrated Energy Management Centre (IEMC) in Tasmania, 
the provision of relatively low interest loans for solar hot water systems, and dissemination 
of energy conservation information. A second policy approach favoured by proponents 
of energy conservation is the regulatory approach. Mandated energy efficiency standards 
(MEPS) for household appliances and the use of building codes which mandate thermal 
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performance standards for dwellings have been mooted. Assessing the effectiveness of 
any such policy instruments is clearly important for a number of reasons, not least of 
which is the fact that, as discussed in Chapter Four, much of the failure to adopt 
energy conservation policies to date has been attributed to the uncertainty over the 
impact that such energy conservation measures will have. The focus of this study, 
therefore, moves to the issue of the effectiveness of specific energy conservation measures. 
In this and the following chapters, the effectiveness of two such policy instruments are 
examined. These two instruments studied are commonly perceived as lying at opposite 
ends of the spectrum in terms of both their effectiveness and their contentiousness. 
This chapter takes as a case a study behavioural conservation strategy involving the 
dissemination of public information. Although a low energy conservation strategy, it is 
a politically palatable and safe instrument. As such, the reality is that it is likely to be 
relied on and that it is therefore worth examining the effectiveness of such a strategy 
and this can be maximised. In the following chapter, the more contentious, but potentially 
more effective, instrument of regulated minimum performance standards for energy-using 
equipmment is examined. 
The 'soft' strategies of information and education campaigns were the most prevalent 
means by which utilities, governments and community organisations attempted to 
encourage householders to reduce energy use during the 1970s and early 1980s (Clinton 
et al. 1986: 101). The rise in concern over the greenhouse effect has seen a second wave 
of books, booklets, posters and other material produced by electricity utilities, private 
television networks, individual writers, environmental community groups and state and 
federal government departments, all urging individuals to save energy and offering 
advice on ways by which this can be achieved. Environmental writer, Gavin Gilchrist 
(1994), for example, ended his polemic on the Australian electricity industry with a 
six-paged addendum in which he listed the various ways by which householder could 
save energy in the home by using lids on saucepans whilst cooking, replacing incandescent 
globes with compact fluorescent lamps, and so on. The Federal government, in association 
with the Australian Consumers' Association, prepared a more comprehensive booklet 
on energy efficiency which was distributed to every Australian household in late 1991 
(Australian Government & Australian Consumers' Association 1991). And the HEC, in 
association with the Tasmanian Environment Centre, produced a 'Be an Energy Saver' 
poster'. 
It therefore appears likely that information campaigns will continue to represent a 
major component of any government strategy to reduce household sector energy use in 
Australia in order to reduce the social impacts of energy use, this attempt at public 
education relying on both the publication of such material and on regulation which 
requires manufacturers of energy-using equipment to display estimates of energy 
consumption and relative energy efficiency on their products. It is also likely that in the 
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event that energy utilities do adopt demand management programmes, that these will 
include such information campaigns. One reason for this is that those who advocate a 
free market approach to the allocation of energy resources and resolution to energy-related 
problems tend to consider the provision of information to be the most, and in many 
instances the only, useful or legitimate form of government intervention in the energy 
market (Industry Commission 1991b: 188). For these reasons it is useful to consider the 
effectiveness of the dissemination of information as an energy conservation strategy. In 
this chapter, the literature on information strategies is briefly reviewed and their perceived 
effectiveness and the theoretical means of maximising their effectiveness is discussed. 
A specific energy conservation information campaign undertaken in the Victorian city 
of Brunswick is then reviewed in order to assess the effectiveness of an information 
campaign designed in the light of these theoretical considerations. 
7.2 The Value of Energy Conservation Information Campaigns 
Energy conservation information campaigns have been the staple approach to increase 
the take-up of energy conservation measures. Much of this material, moreover, has 
remained unchanged over the course of two decades. Both Holliman (1974: 128-30) 
and Elkington & Hailes (1989: 182-201), for example, included in their books remarkably 
similar lists of useful ways that readers could save energy. Governments, energy 
suppliers and community organisations have tended to rely on such dissemination of 
information to encourage energy conservation for a number or reasons. One of the most 
obvious reasons is that they provide a relatively inexpensive means of reaching large 
sections of the community (Senate Standing Committee on Industry, Science and 
Technology 1991: 43). If they are effective they therefore represent a cheap and easy 
victory and a potentially valuable policy tool (Griffin 1986: 219). From an administrator's 
perspective, they also have the advantage of being highly flexible, with the capacity to 
be started and stopped at short notice (Crossley 1979b: 41), while from a political 
perspective they are both =intrusive and highly visible. They are therefore highly 
palatable to the public compared to other strategies such as enforcement or pricing 
mechanisms (Crossley et al. 1986: 96), and have the political advantage of providing a 
highly visible means by which politicians or bureaucracies can be seen to be doing 
something to encourage energy conservation. The critical question, however, is just how 
effective, or ineffective, public information strategies are. On this score, there are two 
diametrically opposed schools of thought. One is that such information strategies have 
little or no effect and amount to tinkering. The other is that when properly constructed 
and designed, the combination of exhortation and education used in public information 
campaigns can be effective and therefore constitutes an important, if not essential, part 
of a total energy conservation policy. 
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This disparity of opinion over the usefulness of public information campaigns can be 
attributed to a number of causes, including the vagueness of the label 'information 
campaign'. The types of strategies included under this umbrella term range from very 
general and broadly dispersed material to site-specific or equipment-specific information. 
Poor design has also been found to be the reason many information campaigns fail to 
result in either increased energy conservation behaviour or reductions in energy use 
(Clinton et al. 1986: 137). Differences in opinion over the effectiveness of energy 
conservation information strategies are also likely to be related to the fact that evaluation 
of the effectiveness of those programmes is difficult and evaluation is either rarely 
undertaken or is superficial (Clinton et al. 1986: 138, Schipper & Meyers 1992: 209). A 
recent comprehensive review of household sector energy information campaigns in 
Australia undertaken for the Commonwealth government (SRC International Pty Ltd & 
Artcraft Research 1994), found that of the 127 programmes undertaken in Australia 
between 1990 and 1994, an attempt was made to evaluate only one third. Approximately 
one third of these, moreover, involved very informal evaluation methodologies and no 
evaluation costs were available for one third of those programmes formally evaluated. 
Not one programme was comprehensively evaluated and very few programmes attempted 
to assess how much energy had been saved as a result of the programme, whether the 
programme was cost-effective, or whether the impacts of the programme were likely to 
be persistent (SRC International Pty Ltd & Artwork Research 1994, Section 1: 3-4). A 
major reason for the low attempt at evaluation is that thorough assessments of 
effectiveness can be arduous and resource consuming (Schipper & Meyers 1992: 209). 
Another reason, however, is that many information campaigns have not been designed 
to reduce energy use but merely to increase awareness of the issues (Crossley 1979b: 
50), so that accurate evaluation of the effects of such campaigns would serve little 
purpose. 
The results of the research on the impacts of energy conservation information strategies 
have been mixed. Much early research found that the provision of information on its 
own had a negligible effect on either energy-using behaviour or levels of energy use 
(Milstein 1976, Olsen and Goodnight 1977). This conflicted with the view that the 
major cause of the nonadoption of energy conservation was that individual energy 
users were either not motivated or uninformed and that this could be corrected with 
information campaigns. To this group of researchers, information campaigns could, in 
theory, have an effect and are an important component of any broader approach which 
includes behavioural and regulatory strategies (Ester 1985: 96, Crossley et al. 1986: 53, 
Lewis et al. 1987: 72). There are a number of possible explanations to account for the 
apparent ineffectiveness of many past energy conservation information programmes. 
One possible cause of the relative ineffectiveness of energy conservation campaigns is 
that the theoretical assumptions upon which they are based are invalid. A central 
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assumption has been that the provision of information designed to increase awareness 
of energy-related problems will alter attitudes, and that this in turn will lead to a 
change in behaviour. Many researchers who have endeavoured to find ways to increase 
the take-up of energy conservation by this means have been puzzled, therefore, by the 
consistent finding that individuals with pro-conservation behaviour are little, if any, 
more likely to adopt energy conservation measures than those with without such positive 
attitudes towards energy conservation (Crossley 1982: 160, Lewis et al. 1987: 43). Yet 
this finding is not surprising when viewed against the background of similar research 
findings about the relationship between attitude and behaviour in fields other than 
energy conservation (Cook & Berrenberg 1981: 81). Social science, moreover, has 
consistently shown that the existence of such a gap between attitude and behaviour is 
the norm rather than the exception (La Pierre 1934) and this led many early writers to 
suggest that from a purely theoretical perspective there were good reasons for scepticism 
about the effectiveness of appeals to consumers to conserve energy. One such commentator 
stated that: 
If designers of these public persuasion programs had first examined the 
extensive social science literature on the linkage between attitudes and 
behaviour ... they might have selected other strategies ... as there is little 
clear evidence that attitudes can be predictably changed by cognitive appeals, 
or that if they are changed that they will have any predictable influence on 
behaviour. (Olsen 1978: 97) 
This is consistent with research evidence which indicates strongly that changing people's 
attitudes does not necessarily alter behaviour and that attitudes towards energy 
conservation are very weak predictors of energy-using behaviour (Condelli et al. 1984: 
490, Ester 1985: 34). One social science researcher has surmised that personality is 
likely to be a better predictor of conserving behaviour than are attitudes towards 
conservation (Brandstatter 1993: 475). The existence of a correlation between personality 
and energy conservation behaviour, however, has little policy relevance. 
Another important underlying assumption of energy conservation information campaigns 
is that the gap between what is possible by way of energy conservation and what 
actually happens is attributable to an information deficit. This assumption has been 
supported by research which has shown that many individuals are not very knowledgeable 
about the factors that contribute to energy use or what actions they can take to reduce 
energy use (Cunningham & Lopreato 1977, Tashchian & Slama 1985, Crossley 1980a, 
Lewis et al. 1987). This literature indicates that people lack awareness of the individual 
and social benefits of energy conservation and of what they can do as individuals to 
reduce energy use (Crossley 1983: 540). A survey of 2000 households in Victoria 
undertaken by the SECV (1992: 32), for example, found that 90% of householders 
could not estimate the electricity consumed by their refrigerator. Recent research, 
furthermore, suggests that this situation is true of environmental issues in general (Prior 
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1994). Further support has come from studies which have also shown that households 
which have adopted a larger number of energy conservation measures have also received 
more information from government agencies or electricity suppliers (Brown & Macey 
1985: 50), suggesting that the energy information literature may have a causal effect on 
behaviour. It has also been found that low-income and elderly groups tend to take up 
fewer energy conservation measures and also rely on more limited and parochial sources 
of information (Brown & Rollinson 1985: 298). 
The counter-argument is that, although lack of information or poor attitude towards 
energy conservation may be important causes of the failure to take up energy conservation 
measures, there exists a large number of other constraints on behaviour other than lack 
of information or poor attitude. Crossley (1983: 581), found that in only a small 
number of instances could the non-adoption of energy conservation measures be attributed 
solely to an information deficit or to negative attitudes towards energy conservation. 
Again, however, the evidence is not conclusive as other researchers have found a lack 
of information to be the single greatest cause for the non-adoption of household energy 
conservation measures (Brag et al. 1984: 303). The disparity in the conclusions of the 
two studies can perhaps be best explained by the differences in the methodological 
approaches. Crossley's Australian research employed an in-depth qualitative survey 
using a small, non-random sample while that of Brag and his colleagues relied on a very 
large random sample of German households and used a comprehensive and multiple 
quantitative approach together with a household audit. Yet other commentators maintain 
that the ineffectiveness of public information strategies should not be surprising when 
the high effort-to-savings ratio of even low-cost energy conservation measures is 
considered. Nonadoption of apparently cost-effective energy conservation measures in 
this view is attributed to apathy or indifference rather than ignorance, an apathy 
induced by the fact that the amount of savings provided by each energy conservation 
measure is trivial compared to total household expenditure (Cook 1980: 21, Reddy 
1991: 945). Other researchers have pointed to energy conservation's pedestrian nature 
and have suggested that this is a major cause of the non-adoption of energy conservation 
by individual energy users. The argument goes that low levels of adoption of energy 
conservation measures occur despite general high acceptance of its value and need and, 
furthermore, that this is attributable at least in part to the lack of appeal. Support for 
this explanation has come from a survey of Hawaiian residential consumers which 
concluded that energy conservation lacked 'romantic appeal' vis-a-vis other environmental 
issues because unlike 'water, trees and baby mammals, the concept of saving energy 
cannot be seen, felt or heard' (Ward Research 1991: 27). The inability of energy 
conservation to conjure up 'concrete' and 'tangible' images such as those evoked by the 
more romantic environmental issues undermined its capacity to provoke actual public 
engagement in energy conservation behaviour (p. 9). The report concluded that energy 
conservation, by definition, faces challenges relative to image association and the way 
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people relate to it (p. 27). One respondent, it was reported, agreed that energy 
conservation was important but confessed to being apathetic and unable to get excited 
about the issue (p. 16). 
Some researchers have taken the argument a step further in arguing that the original 
premise of energy conservation information campaigns is incorrect in that individuals 
do not in fact waste energy and that increasing energy use is not a behavioural but a 
purely technical issue (Aldershot & Kanis 1984: iv). To these writers, urging householders 
to limit the amount of time that refrigerator doors are opened, not to use washing 
machines and clothes dryers unless fully loaded, or not to place warm food in refrigerators 
is of very limited practical value in reducing energy use. Yet other research has found 
that the differences in the way refrigerators are used accounts for a substantial portion 
of the differences in refrigeration energy use of identical models of refrigerators (Pedersen 
& Lawwtz 1989: 4). 
The argument that not all the information supplied to energy users in energy conservation 
material has been accurate was lent support by a test carried out by the Australian 
Consumers' Association (ACA). One almost standard item in such material has been 
the advice to householders to use clothes driers only with full loads. This advice 
appears to have been based on commonsense and on the fact that it accords with 
advice given to householders concerning the use of dishwashers and washing machines. 
Yet when ACA (1992: 16) put it to the test, it was found that a clothes drier with half 
a load used half of the energy when used with a full load. This is consistent with the 
results of Woodson (1976: 130) who measured the energy consumption of six machines 
under various loads and found that operating the clothes dryers with less than half 
loads decreased the energy efficiency of the clothes dryer but that the efficiency losses 
were reduced for loads greater than 50% of full capacity and that for some machines 
there was little difference in efficiency for full and half loads. 
This dispute over the effectiveness of such campaigns is reflected in the debate over 
appliance energy performance labelling. It is the contention of those who advocate the 
use of appliance labels that they have had an effect on energy use and energy efficiency 
levels (Industry Commission 1991a: 201). According to one estimate, the energy efficiency 
of new domestic refrigerators has increased by 15% in NSW in the two years after 
labels were first introduced into that state in 1987 (SECV & DITR 1989c: 5). Others 
have estimated that the improvement in efficiency of refrigerators has been as much as 
30% (Pears & Brotherton 1990: 51) while the recent disappearance of 'one star' appliance 
models from the Australian market has been advanced as evidence of the impact of 
labelling (Senate Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology 1991: 113). 
This assumed effectiveness of the Australian labelling programme stands in stark contrast 
to the belief that the effects of labelling in other countries has been very limited (Griffin 
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1986: 231, Schipper & Meyers 1992: 210) and the claim by the Demand Management 
Marketing Unit (1994: 38) in Victoria that the benefits of labelling are as yet largely 
unconfirmed and that more thorough research is required. One possible explanation for 
this contradiction is that increased efficiency of refrigerators in Australia may have 
been due to causes other than labelling. The personal opinion of the Director of the 
Australian Consumers' Association (ACA), Mr Norm Crothers, is that factors such as 
changes in refrigeration manufacturing practices in Australia introduced between the 
mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, especially the use of rigid polystyrene foam, were made 
purely for engineering and economic reasons but had the spin-off effect of increasing 
energy efficiency. The introduction of labels just happened to be coincidental with 
these other changes. 
A similar increase in the efficiency of other appliances, especially dishwashers, occurred, 
according to Crothers, because these are often brand-engineered and the firms involved 
switched to another product (Mr Norm Crothers, personal communication, January 
1992). The cause of the increase in the energy efficiency of dishwashers, on the other 
hand has been attributed directly to the introduction of appliance performance labelling 
by the Executive Director of the Australian Electronics and Electrical Manufacturers' 
Association (AEEMA), Mr Bob Adams. Unlike their imported counterparts, Australian 
made dishwashers prior to the late 1980s had no cold wash cycle. This did not affect 
sales, according to Mr Adams, as Australian consumers did not use a cold water wash 
cycle. With the introduction of labelling, however, imported dishwashers received the 
highest performance rating because they had such a cycle and Australian manufacturers 
were therefore forced to retool at considerable cost to produce models with cold wash 
cycles. Hence the labelling programme resulted directly in an increase in the efficiency 
of dishwashers sold on the Australian market. According to Mr Adams, however, it is 
doubtful that this led to any energy savings as there is no evidence that Australian 
households used these cold wash cycles. 
While the impact of labelling on actual energy use may in this instance be contentious, it 
does suggest that manufacturers at least regard the labels to have sufficient potential to 
alter consumer purchasing behaviour to warrant retooling. This is further supported by 
the comment made by the Executive Director of Australia's largest whitegoods 
manufacturer, EMAIL Australia, that Australian refrigeration manufacturers dramatically 
increased the efficiency of their products in the late 1980s in response to both the 
introduction of energy performance labels and the strong shift in consumer preference to 
energy efficient products (Toone 1991: 5). 
Against this mixed body of opinion, many social researchers and others have insisted 
that a major limitation of energy conservation campaigns has had to do with their 
design and that well-designed programmes are likely to be more effective (Crossley 
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1980c: 299, Byrne et al. 1985: 9, Ester 1985: 9, Lewis et al. 1987: 109, Senate Standing 
Committee on Industry, Science and Technology 1991: 45, Foster & Holmes 1994: 130). 
While the provision of information, on its own, is unlikely to have a very large effect on 
household energy use, these commentators posit that there remains real scope to reduce 
energy use via such a strategy and that information strategies are therefore potentially 
valuable. The two important questions are that of what constitutes a well-designed 
information strategy and, secondly, the criteria by which the effectiveness of such 
campaigns need to be assessed. The latter question is tackled first. 
There are various ways by which the effectiveness of energy information campaigns can 
be judged. A common approach has been to ascertain the degree to which it has 
induced an increase in the take-up of energy conservation measures. The weakness of 
this approach, however, is that it has been found that success in inducing householders 
to take up energy conservation frequently has very little effect on levels of use (Crossley 
1981: 30, Brown & Macey 1985: 50). Crossley (1981), for example, found that households 
which reported adopting energy conservation measures used only slightly less energy 
than other households which reported that energy conservation measures had not been 
adopted. Reported adoption of energy conservation is therefore a poor measure of 
effectiveness, as are commonly used measures such as householders' ability to recall the 
content of the material (Coltrane et al. 1986: 140). The assessment of the effectiveness 
of such campaigns therefore requires that actual changes in energy use levels induced by 
the provision of information be measured. Accurately monitoring changes in energy use 
levels requires that the energy use of sufficiently large numbers of households is monitored, 
that energy use is adjusted to account for changes in weather conditions and that a 
control group is used against which the changes can be gauged (Ester 1985: 9). Katzev 
& Johnson (1983: 282) add that great care is needed to ensure that the control group is 
not influenced by the experiment since even apparently innocuous influences have been 
shown to have an impact on the electricity use of the control group. Attention now 
turns to the issue of the design of information material. 
7.3 Design of Energy Information Campaigns 
From the above discussion and from the relevant literature it is possible to list the 
important attributes of a well-designed information campaign. First, there is virtual 
consensus that to be effective, energy conservation campaigns should aim at altering 
behaviour rather than merely attempting to alter attitudes (Lewis et al. 1987: 97). To 
this end they should rely on not only the rationale for conserving energy but should also 
provide information about what the individual can do to save energy (Clinton et al. 
1986: 137, Crossley et al. 1986: 96). Communication theory suggests that a well-designed 
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information campaign would need to provide specific behavioural advice on what 
individuals can do as well as prompts based on the social and individual benefits of 
conserving energy (van Raaj & Verhallen 1983: 58, Crossley et al. 1986: 96). 
Features of the information material considered paramount are that it be vivid and 
eye-catching and able hold the individual's attention (Anderson & Claxton 1982: 163, 
Yates & Aronson 1983: 440), that the source of information is perceived as credible 
(Nader & Milleron 1979: 958, Cook & Berrenberg 1981: 74, Coltrane et al. 1986: 134, ), 
that the information be comprehensive and specially tailored to the target group (Ester 
1985: 10), and that the emphasis of the material be on actually saving energy rather 
than simply altering attitudes (Lewis et al. 1987: 98). It needs to be made clear that the 
actions recommended do not involve sacrifice or loss of comfort (Byrne et al. 1985: 94), 
that the information provided be useful, reliable and accurate, and that prompts to 
conserve energy and to conserve money relate to measures with relatively short payback 
periods (Costanza et al. 1986: 525). It has also been noted for energy conservation 
campaigns to be effective they must be persuasive. As a primary measure of 
persuasiveness is its salience to the individual (Cook & Berrenberg 1981: 78), it is 
therefore necessary to discuss the motivation behind individual adoption of energy 
conservation. The two motives of particular interest in this study are those of saving 
money and protecting the environment, largely because these are seen as the primary 
motives for conserving energy from the individual and societal perspectives, respectively. 
7.4 Motives for Conserving Energy 
One of the most important salient features of material is its underlying motivation of 
the prompt. During the energy crises, many information campaigns stressed the benefits 
of energy conservation in terms of the public good and therefore appealed to consumers' 
altruism. As discussed in Section 3.7.1, behavioural theory suggests that prompts 
based on self-interest may be a stronger motivator than altruism, and that in situations 
where the choice is action which is in the individual's short-term interests and against 
the long-term interests of society, individuals will tend to choose the former (Olson 
1965). Urging individuals to conserve energy for the public good is problematical for 
other reasons. As Liek & Kolman (1978) argued, even if individuals are convinced that 
saving energy contributes towards the collective good, it may still be rational from their 
perspective to continue to use high amounts of energy rather than invest time, effort 
and money into reducing energy use. They may, for example, consider that saving 
energy is futile if it simply results in others using more energy and to therefore play the 'I 
will if you do' game. 
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Around the late 1970s and early 1980s, opinion within the energy conservation research 
literature began to shift to favour the argument that saving money might be a more 
potent motivator of energy conservation than civic responsibility (Anderson & Claxton 
1982: 164). If this thesis was correct, it had major implications for the design of energy 
conservation information campaigns as it would mean that energy conservation material 
that failed to adequately incorporate potential monetary savings would have low salience 
and limited effect on behaviour. The two goals, saving money and furthering the 
collective good, are not necessarily in conflict and energy conservation campaigns have 
increasingly attempted to reduce the negative social consequences of energy use by 
informing individuals about what is in their own monetary interests (Anderson & 
Claxton 1982:164). If a consumer buys an energy efficient refrigerator on the basis of 
his/her desire to minimise life cycle costs, it has exactly the same environmental impact 
had the same purchase decision been based on the desire to reduce the environmental 
impacts of personal energy use. Behavioural theory, and many observers, simply 
consider the former to be the stronger motivator and that energy conservation programmes 
should therefore rely on the 'what's in it for me' motive rather than the 'do the right 
thing' motive. 
It is clear, however, that monetary savings are not the whole story (Becker & Seligman 
1981: 2). Individuals behave both as self-interested consumers who make their welfare 
preferences on the basis of an instrumentally rational calculus (homo economicus), and 
as members of a social group who can be persuaded to base their preferences on 
consideration of what is in the collective best interests (homo civilus). It is also obvious 
that these two beings can come into conflict where the interests of the individual are not 
congruent with the interests of the group (Sagoff 1988: 8). Under such circumstances, 
rational behaviour theory predicts that homo economicus will dominate and individuals 
will tend to behave in ways which provide individual short-term benefits at the expense 
of the long-term collective good (Olson 1965). As discussed in Section 3.3.4 this has 
been cited as a major mechanism behind environmental degradation. Because of this, it 
is clearly important that information campaigns attempting to reduce energy use based 
on the appeal to reduce the environmental impacts of energy use avoid advocating 
energy conservation measures which involve sacrifices such as reduced comfort or 
inconvenience. What is of interest here, is whether the appeal to consumers' self-interest 
(saving money) is stronger, weaker or on a par with the appeal to individual's sense of 
social responsibility (environmental protection) in terms of encouraging the take-up of 
energy conservation measures. 
Much of the literature has assumed that saving money is the primary motivation behind 
individual energy conservation (Milstein 1976, Perlman & Warren 1977, Cunningham & 
Lopreato 1977, Gottlieb & Matre 1976). Perlman & Warren (1977), for example, found 
that a majority of respondents to their survey reported conserving energy because it 
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saved money rather than from a sense of civic duty or belief that the energy crisis was 
real. One plausible explanation for this is that individuals perceive the potential of 
energy conservation to reduce household energy bills as significant while not being 
convinced that household sector energy conservation can make a significant contribution 
to solving society's overall energy problems. Since the household sector accounts for a 
relatively small portion of total energy use, it has been argued further, even if substantial 
energy conservation were to occur in this sector it would have only a modest impact on 
total energy requirements and individuals therefore find it difficult to be motivated to 
conserve for the public good (Humphrey & Butte! 1982: 178). This argument is supported 
by research undertaken in the mid 1980s in which it was found that householders 
reported that saving money was their primary reason for both energy conservation 
measures already adopted and for intended adoption of energy conservation measures. 
Far fewer respondents reported that their reason for saving energy is for the public 
good or to conserve resources (Crossley et al. 1986: 33-34, Foster & Holmes 1991: 4, 
Foster & Holmes 1994: 127). Interestingly, the difference does not appear to have been 
always large and to have varied from one measure to the next. Crossley et al. (1986: 
73), for example found that almost 50% of households took up space heating conservation 
measures to increase comfort or convenience, 17.7% to save money, 15.7% to save 
resources and 0.5% for the public good. For water heating the respective values were 
16.8% to increase comfort and convenience, 27% to save money, 14.6% to conserve 
resources and 0% for the public good. This compares with the results of more recent 
social research based on diffusion theory in Queensland where it was found that 45% 
of new home builders who installed solar hot water systems reported that they did so 
to save money, while 21% reported that their main reason for installing the system was 
to conserve resources (Foster & Homes 1991: 4). For ceiling insulation, 64% reported 
that the motive for installation was comfort, 13% for structural reasons and only 7% to 
save money. The results indicated that motives behind energy conserving behaviour 
varies from one measure to the next. They are also likely to be differences between 
places and fluctuate over time. The finding that individuals conserve energy to save 
money rather than from a sense of civic duty may be related to the fact the research 
was undertaken at a time that a belief in an energy crisis was low. Whether a current 
belief in the need to reduce energy use in order to limit global climatic change is a more 
likely to stimulate householders to conserve energy than was the 'oil crisis', for example, 
has not been adequately tested but is a question that has implications for the design of 
energy conservation information campaigns. 
The questions asked in this section of the study are how effective well-designed energy 
conservation information campaigns are, and whether campaigns based on prompts to 
conserve money (self-interest) are more or less effective than campaigns based on 
prompts to protect the environment (collective good). While few would dispute that 
saving energy remains an important motive behind the take-up of energy conservation, 
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many researchers have maintained that saving money must be the main message of the 
energy conservation material (Ester 1985: 87). This has been challenged by Joerges 
(1983: 87) who has argued that with the gradual decline in world energy prices over the 
early 1980s, energy conservation strategies were required to place increasing emphasis 
on non-economic motives. There have been few attempts, however, to test this assertion. 
One project which attempted to compare the effectiveness of information campaigns 
based on these two motives is reviewed in the remainder of this chapter. The research 
(Thomas et al. 1993) was undertaken with a grant provided by the Energy Research and 
Development Corporation (Project No. 1425) by a small team led by Dr Ian Thomas 
from the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) and Dr John Todd from the 
Centre for Environmental Studies at the University of Tasmania with the assistance of 
Karen Blakemore and the author of the present study. 
7.5 Review of the Brunswick Energy Conservation Project 
The Brunswick energy conservation project undertaken jointly by the RMIT and the 
University of Tasmania involved the dissemination of energy conservation leaflets to 
households in the city of Brunswick, a small city approximately 11 km' in area and 
with a 1990 population of approximately 18,000. The city, which is located 
approximately five kilometres north of the Central Business District of Victoria's capital 
city, Melbourne, has traditionally had a high proportion of low-income and migrant 
households and a large number of low-rise apartments, although gentrification of the 
city began in the early 1980s (Prosser 1984: 4). There were two major reasons for 
selection of the city. The first was that the Brunswick City Council at the time the 
study was undertaken owned its own municipal electricity distribution system, the 
Brunswick Electricity Supply Department (BESD). The BESD, along with a number of 
other municipal electricity distributors in the Melbourne area, purchased electricity in 
bulk from the State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV) and resold the electricity 
to its own rate payers. The philosophy of the Brunswick Council was to operate the 
distribution system to the benefit of the community rather than purely as a source of 
revenue and the local electricity department had a strong commitment to keeping 
ratepayers bills as low as possible. To this end, the BESD actively encouraged energy 
conservation and was therefore likely to be considered a highly credible source of 
information on energy conservation. The second reason for the selection of Brunswick 
City for the study was the offer of cooperation from the BESD which supplied the 
necessary records of electricity use for blocks of households. This allowed the impacts 
of the pamphlets on electricity use to be monitored. 
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The aim of the project was to design two energy conservation pamphlets, one prompting 
householders to conserve energy in order to save money, the other prompting householders 
to conserve energy to protect the environment. Both pamphlets were designed according 
to the concepts discussed in Section 7.3 above and consisted of a folded A3 sheet with 
a title ('Save Energy to Save Money' or 'Save Energy to Save the Environment') and 
appropriate graphics on the cover with more detailed discussion on the benefits of 
conserving energy on the inside folds. A wall-chart was constructed on the reverse of 
the pamphlets, containing 70 separate household energy conservation measures classified 
by task (hot water, lighting, etc.) and by either their cost-effectiveness (Save Money') or 
how much energy they were likely to save (Environment). In all other ways the two 
pamphlet designs were kept as similar as possible. To increase the longevity of the 
pamphlets, householders were encouraged to hang the checklist on a wall. Brief 
descriptions of the pamphlets messages were also given in five non-English languages 
and householders were encouraged to seek further advice and information. Contact 
addresses and phone numbers of a number of various agencies including the Brunswick 
Electricity Supply Department were provided. Copies of the pamphlets have been 
inserted into the pocket on the inside of the back cover of this thesis. The pamphlets 
were sealed in envelopes and mailed to approximately 2,200 households in the first 
week of November, 1990. Approximately half these households received the 'Save 
Money' pamphlet and the other half the 'Environment' pamphlet. A third group of 
about 1100 households received neither pamphlets and served as the control. 
Records of electricity use were made available for clusters of households rather than 
individual households to ensure confidentiality. The BESD recorded electricity 
consumption on a rotating bimonthly basis and records from Sep/Oct 1986 onward 
including the three bimonthly billing periods following the distribution of the pamphlets. 
The selection of households in the three groups, nominally referred to as the 'Save 
Money', 'Environment' and 'Control' groups, was achieved non-randomly by dividing all 
Brunswick households into 'blocks' using census collector districts. Each census block 
comprised between 100 to 120 households. Those blocks of households for which 
BESD electricity records had the highest incidence of continuous supply records (low 
changes of ownership) over the previous four years were selected for use in the study. 
Socioeconomic data from 1986 Australian Bureau of Statistics census data was then 
used to sort blocks of households into groups of 10 blocks, ensuring that each group 
was made up from a similar range of blocks according to age distributions, ethnicity, 
household income and educational qualifications. In total, approximately 20% of the 
city's population was involved in the monitoring project. 
Total bimonthly household electricity use for each block was used to calculate mean 
household electricity use per block. This data was then used to calculate mean bimonthly 
electricity use for each of the three groups. While this aggregation guaranteed 
251 
confidentiality for households, it rendered the data coarse. It also meant that standard 
deviations could not be calculated. All electricity use data was converted to megajoules 
(MJ) so that direct comparisons could be made with gas. Gas use data obtained from 
the Gas and Fuel Corporation of Victoria (GFCV) was more restricted, covering only 10 
bimonthly billing periods for the 'Save Money and 'Environment' groups prior to the 
delivery of the pamphlet (from Apr/Mar 1989), and only eight bimonthly billing periods 
for the Control group, as well as the three bimonthly billing periods after the pamphlet 
was distributed. Monthly average data on evaporation, barometric pressure, rainfall, 
relative humidity, hours of sunshine, and minimum and maximum daily temperatures 
were obtained for the Melbourne area from the Bureau of Meteorology. 
7.6 Results of the Brunswick Study 
Due to the nature of the sample selection process, neither parametric nor nonparametric 
data analysis could be used. Instead, simple graphical analysis was employed to gauge 
whether the dissemination of the conservation material had resulted in a change in 
electricity or gas use. This visual inspection of the data indicated a tendency for mean 
household electricity use in all groups to increase over the winter and spring months 
with a small increasing trend in the summer and autumn months over the period 
March/April 1987 to March/April 1991. A similar trend in mean household gas use 
for all groups was observed over the more limited period for which gas records were 
available (March/April 1989 to March/April 1991). As expected, examination of 
records of mean monthly maximum and minimum temperatures indicated that these 
trends could be partially explained by the average minimum and maximum temperatures, 
although no other meteorological factors appeared to be related to changes in mean 
household electricity or gas use. 
To determine the effects of the pamphlets on electricity use, mean household electricity 
use for the three billing periods Nov/Dec, Jan/Feb and Mar/Apr were plotted for each 
of the three group for the years 1986/87 to 1990/91 (Figure 7.1). In each case, the last 
point in the series represents mean household electricity use in the two-monthly billing 
periods following the distribution of the pamphlets. The other points in the series 
represents the electricity use in the same two-monthly billing period in previous years. 
It can be seen from Figure 7.1 that mean household electricity use in the Control group 
displayed a tendency to increase over the years in Nov/Dec and Jan/Feb, but decrease 
in the Mar/Apr. A very similar pattern was observed in the 'Save Money' group. In the 
'Environment' group , however, mean household electricity use for the Nov/Dec and 
Jan/Mar periods followed a similar patterns to those in the Control group, but mean 
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Figure 7.1 Mean monthly household electricty use 1986/87 to 1990/91 for each 
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Note 1: The last point in each series (marked x) represents average household electricty 
use for the group in the same billing period after the distribution of the 
pamphlets. 
Note 2: To ensure confidentiality, the BESD supplied only aggregated data on electricty 
use for blocks of 100 to 120 households. Each point on the above graphs 
represents the average of ten such groups. Because the data was received in 
such an aggregated form, it was not possible to indicate standard errors on the 
line graphs. 
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household electricity use in Mar/Apr 1990 was 13% lower than it was for the same 
period in the previous year. This was not a trend shown in the other two groups. 
Electricity use in the Control group for the Mar/Apr 1990 period was, by contrast, only 
1.1% lower than it was in the Mar/Apr 1989 period. As there was no explanation for 
this relatively large decline in mean household electricity use for the 'Environment' 
group, it suggested a relatively high level of 'noise' in the data. 
Changes in mean household gas use were compared for Nov/Dec, Jan/Feb and Mar/Apr 
for the limited period that data was available (Figure 7.2). Again the trends between 
the groups were similar except for the inordinately large rise in mean household gas use 
for the 'Environment group in the Mar/Apr period in 1991 compared to the same 
period in 1990. This suggested that any changes induced by the pamphlets was of the 
same order as the 'noise' in the data. 
To smooth out the fluctuations in mean household electricity use for each billing period 
over the four years prior to the distribution of the pamphlet, these were added and an 
average calculated. The percent change in mean household electricity use in each of the 
three billing periods following the distribution of the pamphlet from the corresponding 
average of the previous years was calculated for each of the three groups. The percent 
changes in the 'Save Money' group and the 'Environment' group relative to the percent 
change in the Control group were then calculated. A similar calculation was made for 
the percentage changes in gas use from the same period in the preceding year. The 
results are shown in Table 7.1 and Figure 7.3 (a and b). 
Table 7.1 
The change (%) in mean electricity and gas use per household in the three bimonthly 
billing periods following distribution of the energy conservation pamphlets 
compared to the average electricity and gas use in the same period in previous 
years and relative to the percent change in the Control group for the same period. 
-...%'%""■..,............, Months Environment Group 
Save Money 
Group 
Nov/De -1.0% -1.0% 
Electricty Jan/Feb -2.6% -3.6% 
Mar/Ap -1.1% -0.1% 
Nov/De -10.1% -6.3% 
Gas Jan/Feb +1.0% -9.3% 
Mar/Ap +13.8% -4.9% 
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Figure 7.2 Mean monthly gas use per household 1988/89 to 1990/91 for each 
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Note 1: The last point in each series (marked x) represents average household gas use 
for the group in the same billing period after the distribution of the pamphlets. 
Note 2: To ensure confidentiality, information on gas use was aggregated for blocks of 
100 to 120 households. Each point on the above graphs represents the average 
of ten such groups. Because the data was received in such an aggregated 
form, it was not possible to indicate standard errors on the line graphs. 
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Figure 7.3a Percent change in mean household electricity use from same billing 
period in previous years relative to percent change in Control group. 
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Figure 7.3a Percent change in mean household gas use from same billing period in 
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The impact that the pamphlets had on mean household electricity and gas use can be 
gleaned from these figures. In both the 'Save Money' and 'Environment' groups, electricity 
use decreased by approximately 1% relative to the Control group in the Nov/Dec 
billing period immediately following the distribution of the leaflet. In the following two 
months (Jan/Feb), mean household electricity use in both groups relative to the Control 
group decreased further, and by the Mar/Apr period, the differences between the two 
groups and the Control group had disappeared. This suggests that the pamphlets had 
a small impact on electricity use but that this was relatively short-lived. It should be 
noted here that these results differ slightly from the original results of Thomas et al. 
(1993: 46) which were based on comparisons of electricity and gas use in the period 
following distribution of the pamphlets with only the preceding year rather than the 
average of the four preceding years. This showed the effects of the pamphlet on 
electricity use to be smaller but more persistent than the method used in this study. 
The data in Table 7.1 on changes in mean household gas use, indicate that the pamphlets 
had an initial impact for both the 'Save Money' and 'Environment' groups, but that 
while this effect was persistent for the 'Save Money' group the effect was short lived for 
the 'Environment' group. The 'Environment' group actually increased gas use in the 
Mar/Apr billing period by a greater margin from the same period in the preceding year 
than did the Control group. It is possible that the shorter-term gas savings in the 
'Environment' group compared to the 'Save Money' group was due to differences in the 
types of measures that householders in 'Environment' and 'Save Money' groups adopted 
in response to the information leaflet. However, this would not explain why the 
'Environment' group subsequently increased gas use relative to the Control, nor the size 
of this relative increase (13.8%). The coarseness of the data, together with the lack of 
feedback from individual householders, meant that the differences in changes in gas use 
between the 'Environment' and Save Energy groups in the period following the distribution 
of the pamphlets could not be adequately explained but suggested that the scale of the 
changes induced by the pamphlets was of the same order as the 'noise' or natural 
fluctuations in energy use of the groups over time. 
7.7 Discussion of Results and Conclusions 
The results of the Brunswick energy conservation study are mixed. They suggest first 
that provided certain conditions are met, even the 'soft' energy conservation strategy of 
broad dissemination of information leaflets may be have a significant and relatively 
durable impact on household sector use for some fuels and some end-uses. Two of 
these conditions are that the material be well-designed and that the perception of 
genuine interest on the part of the energy supplier to encourage energy conservation. 
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Secondly, the results of the Brunswick project suggest that the prompts based on 
self-interest (save money) or the collective good (save the environment) were of 
approximately equally potency. Although the electricity savings resulting from the 
energy conservation campaign described in this study were relatively small, they were 
significant when remembered that most past energy conservation campaigns have found 
such electricity savings difficult to achieve. It has to be remembered, however, that the 
project was undertaken under an atmosphere of heightened concern over environmental 
issues. While the impacts on electricty use were similar in the short-term for both types 
of prompt, however, the prompt to save energy based on self-interest had a more 
durable effect. This differential impact may have been related to the differences in the 
types of energy conservation measures undertaken by householders in response to the 
pamphlets. 
The differences in the impacts of the pamphlets on gas use and electricty use were not 
surprising. Earlier research noted the tendancy for conservation pamphlets to have a 
greater impact on gas use than electricity use where the former is used for space heating 
purposes. The explanation offered for this was that significant changes in space 
heating energy use can be achieved without replacing equipment, whereas the same is 
not true of most non-heating electricity end-uses (Ester 1985: 143). The differences in 
the longevity of the two prompts on gas use, however, are less readily explained. 
Again, the explanation may be that the prompts led to differences in the nature of the 
energy conservation measures adopted by the two groups. Those prompted to reduce 
energy use in order to protect the environment, for example, may have tended to reduce 
energy use through behavioural adjustments such as lowering thermostats, while those 
urged to use energy more efficiently in order to save money may have tended to invest 
in more permanent energy efficiency measures, such as thermal insulation. If so, the 
implication for the design of future energy conservation information material would be 
to emphasise more permanent energy conservation measures, especially in relation to 
space heating. Further research would be required to assess the accuracy of this 
explanation. 
The lower durability of gas savings prompted by the appeal to conserve energy in order 
to protect the environment, compared to the prompt based on the money saving potential 
of energy conservation, lent support to the common contention that saving money is the 
most powerful motivator of energy conservation behaviour. But while early research 
concluded that it was not possible to encourage individuals to conserve for the public 
good (Milstein 1976: 9), the results of the study did not support the view that encouraging 
individuals to conserve energy in the name of the public interest has no role within 
information strategies. The similarity in the effects of the two prompts, saving money 
and protecting the environment, on both electricity use and on the effects on gas use in 
the period immediately after the dissemination of the information, suggest that prompts 
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to conserve energy for the public good can be of similar effectiveness as prompts to 
save energy to save money. A possible reason for the difference between the findings of 
earlier research and those of the Brunswick study in this regard may be related to 
disparate definitions of the public interest. When it is remembered that the attempt to 
encourage individuals to reduce energy use in order to conserve resources or avoid 
potential future shortages runs up against the uncertainty over technological change and 
discovery of new resources, the limited success of these efforts is less of a mystery. The 
fact that environmental problems such as the greenhouse warming are proximate also 
has an important bearing on the issue. It also needs to be remembered that it is not 
possible to separate out genuinely moral issues from self-interest. In the case of the 
greenhouse issues, this is exacerbated as the greenhouse issue has been confused in 
public mind with ozone depletion which has immediate implications for the current 
generation. 
The results of this Brunswick project are nonetheless supported by those of Ester 
(1985) who monitored the effects of comprehensive and carefully prepared energy 
conservation booklets on 400 Netherland households and followed the experiment up 
with in-depth surveys. One of his conclusions was that his initial hypothesis that a 
belief in the personal consequences of energy conservation would influence energy 
conservation behaviour to a greater extent than would beliefs about the social consequences 
of energy use had to be rejected. The two beliefs, Ester found, contributed about 
equally to the intentions to save energy. 
It is necessary to temper the above discussion, however, by acknowledging some of the 
more important limitations of the Brunswick conservation study. Apart from the 
coarseness of the aggregated energy use data and the lack of feedback from individual 
householders as to which of the conservation measures they adopted, one of the important 
limitations of the study was the restricted six-month period over which household 
energy use was monitored subsequent to the distribution of the pamphlets due to 
restrictions on available funds. An extended period of post-experiment monitoring 
would have enabled more definitive conclusions about the longevity of the impact of 
the pamphlets to be reached, and on gas use in particular. A second limitation of the 
study, as pointed out by Thomas et al. (1993: 17), was the inability to control information 
received by households. Because of the close proximity of households in the three 
groups to each other, householders may have shared information, particularly via word 
of mouth, and this could have diluted the effects of the pamphlets. It is possible that 
the Control group was influenced by the pamphlet in this manner. All households, 
furthermore, were likely to come into contact with other energy conservation material 
over the six month period following distribution of the leaflet and this would have had 
a further dilution effect on the impacts of the leaflets. In designing the leaflets, it was 
considered important for credible material to refer householders to further sources of 
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information and contact addresses were supplied on the leaflet. It is known that at 
least some householders acted on this advice and contacted the BESD requesting 
further information. Secondary material obtained from either the BESD or other sources 
may have been based on a prompt different to that of the leaflet received by householders 
and this may have had a further dilution of the differential impacts of the two pamphlets. 
Bearing in mind the above limitations of the study, two conclusions of relevance to 
policy makers can be drawn from this chapter. The first is that while the motivation to 
save money is likely to remain an important motive behind the take-up of energy 
conservation under normal circumstances, the importance of monetary savings relative 
to other considerations may decline at other times. The desire to protect the environment 
is one such motive. The results of the empirical study discussed in this chapter have 
not lent unqualified support to the Olsonsian (1965) thesis that individuals tend to 
base their decisions on short-term self-interest at the expense of the longer-term collective 
good. The significance of this for those assigned the task of designing energy conservation 
information material is that it will be important to recognise such shifts in public 
attitudes when they occur. 
The second, and more significant, conclusion that can be drawn from the study is that 
even a relatively low-level energy conservation campaign can have an effect on household 
energy use, especially on space heating energy use. This finding is inconsistent with 
that of Ester (1985) who found that a well-designed but far more comprehensive energy 
conservation information booklet than used in the Brunswick study resulted in only a 
relatively small, albeit relatively persistent, reduction in household energy use. This 
difference is likely to be related to the shift in both the nature of public concerns over 
energy-related issues and the level of those concerns in the Netherlands in 1984 and in 
Victoria in 1990. Nonetheless, it is also clear that both the Brunswick project and 
Ester's study, information campaigns were less effective and less permanent when it 
came to electricity use. In all, it can be concluded that while such information strategies 
offer utilities and governments a relatively cheap means of encouraging reductions in 
energy use, it is clear that the dissemination of public education material will be able to 
serve at best as a complement to rather than an alternative to more effective and less 
palatable measures. On their own, the value of such strategies to policy makers is 
likely to remain largely symbolic. Any serious attempt to reduce the negative social 
consequences of energy use or to reduce the growth of energy use for strategic planning 
purposes will need to rely predominantly on other, more effective, strategies. 
Not surprisingly, more sophisticated information strategies have been found to be more 
effective than the broad dissemination of public information on how and why to 
conserve. As discussed in Section 7.2, there is considerable debate over the effectiveness 
of mandated appliance energy performance labelling. Household energy audits, on the 
other hand, have been found to result in greater energy savings, although the proportion 
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of householders interested in energy audits has been found to be low even where 
generous financial assistance has been offered to carry out the recommended retrofits 
(Seligman 1985: 143). Similarly, while the provision of information on building energy 
performance has been found to be effective in inducing home buyers to pay more for a 
house with energy saving features (Horawitz & Haeri 1990, Brown 1993), it is likely 
that stronger measures will be required to significantly reduce energy household sector 
energy use. Although a low conservation strategy, the dissemination of information has 
been used by governments and energy supply organisations in the past and in the 
absence of a regulated energy market in which energy suppliers are required to pursue 
energy conservation as part of a Least Cost Planning strategy, it is likely that this 
strategy will continue to be relied on in the future. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Performance of Energy Efficient Equipment 
As in manufacturing so in science - retooling is an extravagance to 
be reserved for the occasion that demands it. The significance of 
crises is the indication they provide that an occasion for retooling 
has arrived. 
	Thomas Kuhn (1970) The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, 2nd edn. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, Illinois: 76. 
We have assumed very moderate targets for increased appliance 
efficiency in Tasmania ... We believe that the economic case for 
these targets is so strong that they should be mandatory. 
— Harwood & Hartley (1980) An Energy Efficient Future for 
Tasmania. Tasmanian Conservation Trust, Hobart, 
Tasmania: 28. 
8.1 Introduction 
The third case study examined in this study shifts from the behaviour of individuals to 
the performance of energy-using equipment. As discussed in Chapter 4, it has long 
been recognised that there exists significant theoretical technical scope for improving 
the efficiency of energy-using equipment. Such improvements in the technical efficiency 
of energy use are commonly hailed by many as the unproblematic cure for a host of 
risks associated with energy production, transmission and use (Hinchliffe 1995: 93). 
These gains in efficiency are regarded by such individuals as either so cost-effective or 
so socially desirable, or both, that policy instruments which mandate increased efficiency 
are warranted. Demands for government intervention in the form of mandated minimum 
energy performance standards (MEPS) are likely to increase in the absence of regulations 
requiring the energy supply industry to adopt Least-Cost Planning methods and to 
engage in demand management programmes as the industry moves towards a competitive 
energy market. It has been advanced as a low cost (Clinton et al. 1986: 137) and highly 
effective means of achieving significant and enduring energy efficiency improvements in 
the residential sector as it bypasses the complexities of individual and market behaviour 
and simply outlaws the inefficient use of energy (SECV & DITR 1989b: 5, Meyers 1994: 
86). Environmental organisations such as the Australian Conservation Foundation 
have therefore urged the federal government to introduce mandated minimum energy 
performance standards, especially in the lead-up to the Berlin round of international 
negotiations on global climate change in March 1995 (Kinrade 1995b). 
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Mandated energy efficiency standards are regarded by some as a logical extension of 
the energy labelling (SECV & DITR 1989a: 9) and demands for their introduction have 
been based on several arguments. First, individuals do not have the incentives to 
reduce energy use to socially optimal levels while the costs of energy to the individual 
are less than the social costs of energy use. Regulation is regarded as the most effective 
means of addressing this discrepancy (Hamblin & Vineyard 1985: 75). 
Secondly, it has been argued that if the mandated standards are set at levels which are 
cost-effective from the perspective of the individual, it is then difficult to mount an 
ethical case against their introduction (Harwood & Hartley 1980: 28, Griffin 1986: 228, 
Wright & Baines 1986: 172). If minimum energy efficiency standards are set at the 
cost-effective level, the imposition of minimum energy efficiency standards then represent 
a socially costless, or a 'no regrets', environmental policy as it is able to meet environmental 
goals whilst producing a net economic benefit, or at least resulting in no net economic 
costs (Pugsley & Olejniczak 1994). One of the first attempts at estimating the benefits 
of increasing the efficiency of household appliances in Australia estimated that by 
increasing the energy efficiency of appliances, the average household in Victoria could 
save between $80 and $120 p.a. by the mid 1990s and that the SECV could save 
approximately $80 million by deferring the need to expand supply capacity (DITR 
1986). The Ecological Sustainable Development Working Groups subsequently 
maintained that the introduction of MEPS for all major domestic appliances was 
clearly justified on social, environmental and economic grounds (Lowe 1994: 201). A 
more recent report commissioned by federal and state government departments in 
Australia recommended that conservative national performance standards be set for 
refrigerators, freezers, clothes dryers and electric water heaters and estimated that the 
imposition of these standards in 1996 would reduce national greenhouse gas emissions 
by 12% and save Australian consumers $575 million by the year 2007 (George Wilkenfield 
& Associates 1993: 232). 
A third argument, and one considered the most potent by many, is that MEPS are the 
only effective means of overcoming the market failure caused by the common split 
between the purchaser and the user of energy-using equipment (Gilchrist 1994: 234). 
Without such a policy instrument, it is argued, landlords have little incentive to take 
payback criteria into account when purchasing hot water systems, refrigerators, or 
other energy-using durables since their tenants will reap the benefits. Those responsible 
for purchasing energy-using equipment but who do not have the responsibility for 
paying the running costs, therefore, will tend to base their purchase decisions on first 
costs rather than energy efficiency. The welfare of renters and others who have are 
unable to control the efficiency of the energy-using equipment they use and are hence 
frequently forced to use inefficient appliances and equipment is therefore put forward 
as a strong argument for the imposition of minimum standards (Gilchrist 1994: 236). 
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Proposals to introduce MEPS have been opposed and criticised on a number of grounds. 
While voluntary standards have already been introduced in Australia, compared to 
labelling, the use of mandated energy performance standards is considered to be a 
more effective (Schipper & Meyers 1992: 211) but more contentious (Wright & Baines 
19986: 179) strategy for reducing energy use. The Australian appliance manufacturing 
industry has been vehemently opposed to the introduction of MEPS and a proposal 
involving the joint introduction of MEPS by all states was abandoned at the eleventh 
hour when the Victorian Liberal government unexpectedly withdrew its support (Lowe 
1994: 43). The Federal government also decided against unilateral introduction of 
regulations, persuaded by industry to accept instead voluntary standards by which 
industry agreed to meet self-imposed energy performance. Such set-backs are seen by 
some commentators as temporary and the introduction of MEPS in Australia as ultimately 
inevitable (Walsh & Kerby 1990: 397, Walsh 1992: 621). This view appears to be 
based largely on the fact that mandated standards have been introduced in the USA 
and a small number of other countries, and on the growing push for MEPS within other 
countries, or regions such as the European Economic Community, for the introduction 
of mandated energy performance standards (Schipper & Meyers 1992: 272). 
Appliance manufacturers justify their more a cautious approach on the grounds that it 
is essential that technological innovations be introduced in a strategic, step-by-step 
process since the ramifications of product failure are immense (Kanis et al. 1982: 13), a 
point that technical energy efficiency advocates commonly fail to understand. To put 
products onto the market before being thoroughly tested represents an unacceptable 
risk to the manufacturer (Weizeorick 1991). Evacuated panels, for example, have 
frequently been cited by energy efficiency experts as an innovation that is already 
available and which could be used to substantially increase the energy efficiency of 
refrigerators. The industry, however, maintains that refrigeration manufacturers have 
been slow to incorporate these into commercial refrigerator designs until more is known 
about their long-term performance (McMahon 1991: 530, Weizeorick 1991: 526) and 
that a panel that holds its vacuum for the life of the refrigerators has not yet been 
developed (Toone 1991: 4). The process of product planning from concept design to 
commercialisation, furthermore, typically involves long lead times and having seen 
energy prices increase sharply, only to decline again. Many manufacturers are therefore 
reluctant to place too much focus on designs which increase energy efficiency at the 
expense of other features. Manufacturers may also adopt the strategy of holding back 
the inclusion of some ready to be commercialised energy efficient design features until 
the market is judged to be ripe (Schipper & Meyers 1992: 309). 
The introduction of mandated energy efficiency standards is also opposed on the 
grounds that the concomitant testing programmes are likely to be costly, and because 
they ignore community preferences and are therefore unethical (Industry Commission 
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1991b: 198). Opposition to mandated standards is more qualified by those who 
consider them unethical only if imposed without prior adequate establishment of their 
cost-effectiveness (Burton 1980: 155). Treadwell (1993: 90), however, has avoided the 
ethical arguments but has pointed out the many potential practical problems associated 
with setting standards. These include the fact that energy-using equipment is subject to 
differing levels and patterns of use under various circumstances, the variation in climatic 
conditions under which it operates, and the fact that inefficient energy-using equipment 
may be the most economically efficient option for low use applications so that their 
removal from the market may in fact be economically inappropriate in some cases. 
A major cause of resistance to such proposals has therefore been the lack of reliable 
information over the impacts that such a measure would have on levels of energy use. 
Accurate information on the energy consumption of energy-using equipment is therefore 
a prerequisite for the policies of both labelling and MEPS. This chapter therefore 
presents a case study of the capacity of technical energy efficiency improvements in 
one appliance. It is used to assess the degree to which those technical improvements 
are likely to lead to actual reductions in energy use by measuring the energy consumption 
of an appliance under laboratory conditions. In this way it allows discussion of the 
degree to which the uncertainties surrounding aggressive energy efficiency proposals as 
discussed in Chapter Four are real and a fundamental reason for the rejection of those 
energy efficiency proposals as a planning option. As Jochem & Hohmeyer (1992: 219) 
have noted, uncertainty over the economic benefits of energy conservation measures in 
particular leads to resistance to the adoption of these measures. This was supported 
in the case study in Chapter Five where it was shown that uncertainty over the energy 
saving potential of both moderate and aggressive energy efficiency proposals was used 
as an argument for rejecting those options in Tasmania. This chapter takes the argument 
further by actually measuring the energy consumption of one commonly advanced 
technical energy efficiency measure in order to assess the accuracy of the estimates of 
the energy savings potential associated with that measure as a further means of supporting 
the argument that this uncertainty is real and is the underlying cause of much of the 
resistance to energy conservation proposals. 
The appliance chosen for testing in this project was the domestic refrigerator. There 
were a number of reasons for selecting this appliance. First, the refrigerator is often 
cited as a prime example of a technology for which the energy efficiency can be increased 
dramatically using available, simple and cost-effective technological changes. The 
theoretical technical opportunities for reducing the energy requirements of electric 
compression household refrigerators have been well-documented. The coefficient of 
performance (COP) of a refrigerator is the ratio of the cooling load or heat removed, Q, 
to the electricity used, E. Another way of stating this is that the COP is the carnot 
efficiency, Ti c multiplied by the theoretical maximum value of the COP, e max, which is 
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defined by the second law of thermodynamics. Expressed algebraically, 
COP = Tl c X Emax  
where Emax = To AT I -To) and To is the evaporator temperature (Kelvin) and T 1 is the 
condenser temperature (Kelvin). The electricity consumption, E, is therefore given by 
E = Q/(ri c x emax) = Q/[ri c x T0 /(T1 -T0)] 
This means that the electricity consumption of a refrigerator can be reduced in one of 
three basic ways: 
(i) by reducing the cooling load, Q (by reducing the heat transmission through 
walls, doors and seals, by increasing the insulation thickness, or by using 
better insulation materials); 
(ii) increasing the carnot efficiency, l c (by increasing the efficiency of components 
such as electric motors, fans and compressors); and 
(iii) increasing the carnot factor (T1 -T0) (by increasing the heat transfer surface 
areas of the evaporator and condenser). 
Engineering estimates of the energy savings to be gained from these, and other technical 
changes such as dual compressors for refrigerator/freezer models are now common 
(A.D. Little Inc. 1977, Hoskins & Hirst 1977, Craig 1981, Guldbrandsen & Norgard 
1986, Pedersen 1987, Turiel & Levine 1989). It has been claimed, for example, that by 
increasing the efficiency of refrigerator fan motors and compressors, and by adding 
extra insulation and a second condenser, refrigeration energy consumption could be 
reduced by 80% at a cost of less than (US1989)2 c/kWh of saved electricity (Katz 
1989). An implication drawn from of this is that if developing countries built highly 
efficient refrigerators based on these improvements rather than inefficient refrigerators 
based on current technology, the avoided energy supply would amount to 42 GW and 
the avoided costs of investment in fossil fuel plants would be $77 billion, or $189 
billion in nuclear plant. The cost of increasing the energy efficiency of refrigerators, by 
comparison, would be between $5.5 billion to $12.5 billion and would also avoid 23 
million tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions p.a. at a displacement cost one tenth of the 
cost of doing the same with nuclear power and in a shorter time. 
Refrigerators have also been at the centre of debate because the rate at which manufacturers 
have increased the energy efficiency of refrigerators has varied between countries by a 
factor of up to three (IEA 1991b: 115). Denmark, Germany and Japan have been the 
leaders in this regard (Herring 1992). As a consequence, the average specific energy 
consumption of refrigerators now often varies between countries by substantial margins. 
The low correlation between the cost and energy efficiency of various models of 
refrigerators has also led to particular interest on this appliance (Patterson 1991: 104). 
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Refrigerators are also considered to be the main household appliance for which mandated 
energy performance standards are applicable, along with freezers and hot water cylinders, 
the reason being that the performance of these appliances is largely independent of 
consumer behaviour (Wright & Baines 1986: 179). During the recent unsuccessful bid to 
introduce national MEPS in Australia, the four appliances initially considered suitable 
for inclusion in the programme were refrigerators, freezers, clothes dryers and hot water 
storage systems. Clothes dryers were eventually deleted from the list on the grounds 
that the overall energy savings achieved by increasing energy efficiency of these appliances 
would be relatively small. Manufacturers of hot water systems argued successfully for 
the deletion of these from the list to which MEPS would apply on the grounds that the 
enforcement of increased energy efficiency would increase the price of the units and 
damage the export of Australian manufactured hot water storage systems. This left 
only refrigerators and freezers as the only appliances for which MEPS were seriously 
considered an option in Australia. A further reason for focusing on refrigerators is that 
the technical potential to increase the energy efficiency of refrigerators and freezers is 
considered to be inordinately large compared to most other appliances (Kanis et al. 
1982: 12, Aldershot & Kanis 1984: iii, National Institute of Economic and Industry 
Research 1990: 12) and because this increase in energy efficiency can be achieved using 
simple and tried-and-tested technologies that could be repaid in less than two years 
(Kanis et al. 1982: 12, Pedersen & Lawtz 1989). But while refrigerators represent a 
technology for which there exists significant technical scope for increasing energy efficiency 
and for which the setting of standards is considered to be particularly applicable, 
devising accurate standard performance and energy consumption tests for refrigerators 
is not straight forward (Hellmann-Tuitert & Kanis 1983: 242). Selecting standard test 
conditions which represent those under which the average refrigerator is used is also 
difficult, since owners have considerable latitude in terms of refrigerator thermostat 
settings, the ambient temperatures of the environment in which the refrigerator is located, 
the food loading behaviours, and door opening schedules. For these reasons, the 
research programme described in the following sections of this chapter attempted to 
measure the performance and energy consumption of refrigerators in order to comment 
on the appropriateness and the accuracy of this information and the implications in 
terms of appliance labelling and the introduction of MEPS. 
8.2 Methodology 
The tests -followed the requirements of the Australian test standard as set out in AS 
1430-1986 (Standards Association of Australia 1986) and more recently in AS-2575.2- 
1989 /NZS 6205.2-1989 (Standards Australia and Standards Association of New 























test requirements refer to these two documents. The size and design of the constant 
temperature room followed that used by Stockwell (1987). The room had external 
dimensions of 3200 x 1900 x 2500 mm and was constructed in a small annex (dimensions 
= 3690 x 3990 x 3220 mm) to the Environmental Studies Laboratory in the basement of 
the Chemistry Department's building at the University of Tasmania's Sandy Bay campus 
and the layout of the room is shown in Figure 8.1. These dimensions were designed to 
permit simultaneous testing of three refrigerators. Construction used a frame (20 x 50 
mm softwood) to which 3 mm ply was glued and nailed on the walls and roof and 17 
mm ply used on the floor. Polystyrene foam (25 mm thick) was glued to the entire 
outer surface and all gaps were sealed to ensure that the room was airtight. A constant 
temperature was achieved by connecting a 1500 W oil-filled electric column heater 
controlled by an Omron ESC5 temperature-controlled relay switch which turned the 
heater on when the room temperature fell to a preset level, and off again once the 
temperature reached 10 C above that preset level. An initial test run in which the 
temperature of the constant temperature room was maintained at 32 °C for over 200 
hours showed that heat was lost from the constant temperature room at a rate of 
approximately 40 W/ °C temperature difference between the temperature of the constant 
temperature room and the temperature of the small annex in which it was housed. 
Top elevation 	 Side elevation 
Figure 8.1 Layout of constant temperature room. 
To maintain an even temperature within the constant temperature room and a vertical 
temperature gradient below 1 °C /m as required by the Australian Standard test 
methodology as set out in Appendix B of AS 1430-1986 (Standards Association of 
Australia 1986) and AS-2575.2-1989 /NZS 6205.2-1989 (Standards Australia and 
Standards Association of New Zealand 1989), air within the room was circulated using 
an electric Mistral fan to force air over the heater. Two small variable speed Muffin 
electric fans built into the ends of 760 mm lengths of 100 mm diameter tubing were also 
used to circulate air in the room. The intakes of these tubes were placed 125 mm from 
the ceiling in the corners of the constant temperature room opposite the refrigerators 
and their speeds controlled by rheostat switches. To prevent radiant heat from affecting 
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the refrigerators, and to reduce the velocity of air in the vicinity of the refrigerators to 
less than 0.25 m/sec as required by the AS-1430 standard, the heater and fan heater 
was shielded from the refrigerators. To ensure that the conditions in the room met the 
test criteria specified in AS-1430, a series of tests recorded temperatures at various 
heights and at various positions within the room over a 24 hour period whilst maintaining 
air temperature in the test room at 32 °C. Air velocities were measured using an 
Airflow LCA 6000 anemometer. From this series of tests it was found that to minimise 
temperature fluctuations in the constant temperature room, only one refrigerator could 
be tested at a time. The results indicated that the maximum temperature difference 
between ceiling and floor temperatures was 2.77 °C, giving a maximum vertical 
temperature gradient of 1.1 °C/m, slightly greater than the 1 °C/m maximum temperature 
gradient permitted under standard test conditions. 
Temperatures were measured at 5 second intervals using T-type thermocouples and 
recorded using a Datataker DT 100 datalogger which was down-loaded in situ onto a 
PC using PC-Talk software so that temperatures could be read directly on the PC 
monitor during the course of the tests. Temperature data was subsequently converted 
to the Excel spreadsheet programme to plot the changes in temperature over the course 
of the test and carry out the calculations. Thermocouples used to measure air temperatures 
were shielded by inserting them into 15 mm diameter PVC T-Junctions painted matt 
black to reduce the effects of radiation. Thermocouples used to measure the temperatures 
inside refrigerators were soldered into 50 min lengths of 19 mm diameter solid copper 
rod with a thermal capacity equivalent to approximately 11.7 g of water (the Australian 
Standard test method specifies that thermal masses should be between the equivalent 
of 10 g and 20 g of water). The copper rods served as heat sinks and were designed to 
simulate the temperature changes in food stored in the refrigerator compartment. 
Attaching the thermocouples to the rods smoothed the fluctuation in recorded 
temperatures inside the refrigerator compartments. The 12 copper rods used in the 
tests varied in weight by less than 0.5 g and subsequent calibration tests showed this 
difference to have a negligible effect on temperature measurements. 
Electricity use was measured using Sangamo HMT watthour meters 1 . These were 
calibrated by connecting them to a precisely known load, drawing approximately 1 kW 
for 24 hours. The results indicated that the meters readings were accurate to ± 0.5%. 
Since the voltage of the electricity supply was stable to only within 1%, however, the 
accuracy of energy consumption readings was ±1.5%. 
The accuracy of visual readings from the watthour meters was ±16.5 Wh. To improve 
the accuracy of electricity use measurements, a second PC in conjunction with equipment 
1 These are the standard meters used by the HEC to measure retail electricity use. 
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and software developed by the Fijian Electricity Supply Unit to monitor and record 
diurnal changes in household electricity use, was used. This equipment consisted of a 
camera lens which focused light reflected off the rim of the watthour meter wheel onto 
a photo-sensitive transducer. The circuit was broken once per revolution of the wheel 
by a thin black mark on the rim of the wheel and in this way the software programme 
recorded the cumulative energy use (number of revolutions) and the time at which the 
watthour meter stopped and started. As the watthour meter wheels revolved at a rate 
of 600 revolutions per kWh, this system allowed electricity consumption to be read to 
within ±1.67 watthours. In calculating the potential errors of electricity consumption 
readings, this was added to the ±1.5% accuracy of the watthour meters. 
Thermocouples were used as the temperature measuring devices due to their low cost 
and robustness, and because the Datataker used had been pre-wired to use thermocouples 
for an earlier research project. A further attribute of thermocouples is their capacity to 
retain calibration as this is purely a characteristic of the metals used. Australian 
Standards (AS-1430 1986, Appendix II, p. 26), furthermore, specifically indicated 
that thermocouples were an appropriate device. T-type thermocouples were used on 
the basis of their response curves over the temperature range - 20 °C to 50 °C. A 
number of temperature measurement problems, however, were encountered. The cause 
of an initial temperature reading error was found to be moisture condensing on the 
copper rods inside the refrigerator cabinets during off-phases of the refrigeration cycle. 
The moisture created a grounding loop and led to an error in the Datataker calibration. 
To overcome this problem, the copper rods were sealed in prophylactics and the test 
programme restarted. A second, and more subtle and erratic temperature measuring 
error was subsequently discovered once the testing programme had been restarted. 
Refrigerator compartment temperatures as measured by the Datataker occasionally 
appeared to be lower than expected and were therefore checked using an independent 
KM 3012 battery operated, nonrecording temperature measuring device with a K-type 
thermocouple. The results indicated that refrigerator compartment temperatures recorded 
by the Datataker drifted intermittently and erratically from true temperatures by from 
one to four Celsius during the 'on' cycle, returning to true temperature during the 'off' 
cycles. Attempting to eliminate the problem by running both the Datataker and PC on 
batteries to avoid grounding loops, and by replacing the T-type thermocouples with 
K-type thermocouples failed to correct the problem. It was subsequently discovered 
that electromagnetic interference with electronic equipment was a perennial problem in 
the Chemistry building due to a variety of very large sources of electromagnetic radiation. 
Shielding of both leads and the Datataker to reduce electromagnetic interference reduced, 
but failed to completely overcome, the problem. 
As measurement of temperature using thermocouples relied on the fact that the voltage 
created at the thermocouple's bimetallic junction was proportional to its temperature, 
270 
and this voltage was susceptible to electromagnetic interference, the attempt to use 
thermocouples was finally abandoned. Stockwell (1988) had reported using ther-mistors  
to measure refrigeration temperatures and as these devices relied on temperature-induced 
changes in resistance rather than voltage they would not be affected by the electomagnetic 
fields. Using thermistors in conjunction with a Campbells datalogger, a series of 
temperatures recording trials was carried out. The Campbells dataloggers operated off 
a 12 volt battery and recorded onto audiocassettes which were then down-loaded onto 
a PC and converted into ASCI II and then reconverted to the Excel programme. While 
this was found to provide more reliable temperature measurements, the recording process 
proved cumbersome and had the disadvantage of not allowing temperatures to be read 
during the course of the test. A convenient solution to the problem was found by a 
colleague, Mr Chris Ashworth, from the Department of Physics at the University of 
Tasmania. Temperature recording equipment constructed for the Physics Department's 
upper atmospheric physics programme used AD590s as the temperature measuring 
device. These integrated circuit temperature transducers produced a current proportional 
to temperature and therefore gave temperature readings unaffected by electromagnetic 
radiation. A series of temperature measurements were run using the Physics Department's 
equipment and found to be accurate and reliable. The Datataker was therefore rewired 
to use AD590 semiconductors. For convenience, the AD590s were connected to trim 
pots so that the temperatures recorded could be zeroed by calibrating them in a water 
bath. The AD590s, however, could not be soldered into the copper blocks and another 
method had to be found of ensuring good thermal contact with the copper blocks. The 
method similar to that described by Unwin (1980: 15) was used in which the AD590s 
and the end 100 mm of the leads were sealed using heat-shrink tubing and then 
inserted into 0.635 mm diameter and 20 mm deep holes drilled in the top of the copper 
rods. Heat-conducting putty was used to ensure good thermal conductivity between 
the copper and the AD590 and the holes were sealed using silicon. 
The AS 1430-1986 standard test procedure required that temperature measuring devices 
have an accuracy of at least ±0.5 °C. The AD590s had a nominal accuracy given by the 
manufacturer of ±1 °C and a linearity of ±0.5 °C over the temperature range. Using a 
Haake D8 waterbath with a capacity to maintain a constant temperature to within 
±0.1 °C together with a submerged mercury in glass thermometer with a NATA certified 
accuracy of ±0.15 °C and with the ability to be read to 0.01 °C, the AD590s were 
calibrated over the temperature range 0 °C to 50 °C and found to be accurate to within 
±0.15 °C. Trim pots were used to adjust the temperatures measured by all AD590s in 
a distilled water-ice bath in a thermos flask to 0.00 °C. Periodic recalibration during 
the refrigerator performance testing programme indicated that the devices held their 
accuracy to within ±0.14 °C. This meant that measurements of the difference in 
temperature between the test room and the refrigeration cabinets were accurate to 
within 0.28 °C. 
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In order to achieve an ambient test temperature of 10 °C, a 5 kW Misibushi room 
air-conditioner was used to reduce the room air temperature of the annex in which the 
constant temperature room was housed. Windows in the annex were covered with 25 
mm thick sheets of polystyrene foam to reduce heat transfer from the windows. The 
room air conditioner was able to reduce the air temperature in the annex by a maximum 
of five degrees below the temperature of the surrounding environment, so that refrigerator 
performance tests at an ambient temperature of 10 °C could not be carried out during 
warm weather and had to be deferred until later in the year. As the room temperature 
in the Environmental Studies Laboratory to which the annex was connected was 
maintained close to 23 °C during the day by the building's central heating system, it 
was not possible to maintain a constant temperature of 10 °C during the day and tests 
had to be carried out overnight when the central heating system was switched off. This 
meant that the duration these tests at an ambient temperature of 10 °C was limited to 
less than 12 hours rather than the minimum of 16 hours as required by AS-1430 
standards. For this reason the results of the tests carried out at an ambient temperature 
of 10 °C are less reliable than those carried out at higher ambient temperatures. 
The above discussion of the methodology serves as a warning that measuring refrigeration 
cabinet temperatures can be difficult and that without careful attention the accuracy of 
these measurements may be doubtful. The difficulty of controlling the test room 
temperature is also an issue that needs to be taken into account in discussion of the 
accuracy of refrigeration energy consumption and performance tests. 
8.3 Results and Discussion 
Three refrigerators were tested over the course of the research project. Because one of 
the aims of the project was to assess the accuracy of technical assessments of the 
capacity to reduce energy use with available technology and equipment, the first 
refrigerator chosen for testing was a highly efficient one. A small energy efficient 
refrigerator designed at the Physics III Laboratory of the Technical University of Denmark 
in Lund was produced by the Danish appliance manufacturer, Brdr. Gram A/S, beginning 
in late 1988 (Pedersen & Lawtz 1989: 5). The Gram LER 200 is a small, 200 litre 
Class 1 refrigerator 2 and with a reported annual energy consumption, based on both 
laboratory testing and in field measurements of about 90 kWh p.a., reputed to.be  one 
third that of the average consumption of similar models of refrigerators on the market 
2 The Australian Standard AS 1430 sets out a system for classifying refrigerators. Class 1 
refrigerators are those which have no freezing compartment so that the entire storage 
volume comprises a fresh food compartment. Refrigerators are also categorised according to 
storage volume. 
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in Denmark at the time (Nergard 1989: 135). Common reference in the Australian 
literature to an energy efficient European refrigerator that used 90 kWh p.a. (Greene 
1990: 28) suggested that the LER was the most efficient conventional Class 1 refrigerator 
on the international market and this was supported by reference in the international 
literature that the world's most efficient refrigerator used 90 kWh p.a. (IEA 1991: 113). 
The design of the LER involved two major changes. The first was an increase in 
thickness of the polyurethane insulation level of insulation to 7 cm, which allowed 
down-sizing of the compressor and motor. The second was an improved cooling 
system by increasing the surface areas of the condenser and evaporator, and by improving 
compressor efficiency. These design changes are discussed at length by Heebeill et al. 
(1985). Most other low energy refrigerators available on the international market, such 
as the US made 420 litre Sunfrost, estimated to use 200 kWh p.a. (Mills 1991b: 8), were 
not cost-effective options in Australia and were therefore not considered 3 . As Gram 
Bdr did not market refrigerators in Australia, a Gram LER 200 was imported from 
Denmark for this research project. 
For comparative purposes, the most efficient Class 1 refrigerator on the Australian 
market was also obtained for testing. Based on SECV information, this was the 
Australian manufactured 330 litre Kelvinator CS 334. Attempting to accurately compare 
the energy efficiency of different models of refrigerators is problematical because each 
model varies in terms of features and utilities. To overcome this the energy intensity of 
the refrigerator is used. The specific energy consumption [SEC], defined as the energy 
use per unit of volume of refrigeration storage space, is often used as proxy of comparative 
energy efficiency (Herring 1992: 72). Energy efficiency, however, is volume dependant 
since the ratio of a refrigerator's surface area to internal volume decreases as volume 
increases. Because the volume of the Kelvinator CS 334 was two thirds again that of 
Gram LER 200, their specific energy consumptions were not directly comparable. For 
this reason, a popular but less efficient Class 1 refrigerator sold on the Australian 
market with a volume as close as possible to that of the LER was also selected for 
testing in this study. This was the 190 litre New Zealand manufactured Fisher & 
Paykel 190 C. The relevant details of the three refrigerators tested are given in Table 
8.1 below. 
3 The 12 volt DC Sunfrost retailed by Real Goods Inc. (USA) is reputed to be the most 
efficienct electric refrigerator in the world and was used in the University of Sydney's 
Applied Physics Department's demonstration programme of the technical potential to 
minimise household reticulated energy requirements (Mills 1991b). Because of the thick 
insulation used, however, they are relatively large refrigerators. Theyare also relatively 
expensive, a Sunfrost with the same internal dimensions as the Gram LER retailing for about 





Table 8.1 Details of refrigerators used in study 
Kelvinator CS 334 Fisher & Paykel C190 Gram LER 200 
Storage volume (litres) 330 192 200 
Energy consumption 
indiacted on label 
(kWh/year) 
490 460 90 
(no label) 
Star rating 5 3 n/a 
8.4 Performance and Energy Consumption Tests 
As well as the measurement of refrigerator energy consumption, the standard test 
involves two performance tests. To meet the Australian standards and receive an 
energy performance label, refrigerators need to perform adequately over the temperature 
range 10 °C to 43 °C, and meet the requirements of the 'pull down' test which measures 
the capacity of the refrigerator to reduce its internal temperature from a set ambient 
temperature within a specified time interval. 
The refrigerators tested were of a similar design with a front crisper at the bottom of 
the fresh-food compartment. Temperature measurements were made at positions 
conforming as closely as possible to positions given in Appendix C of the AS 1430 
(Standards Association of Australia 1986). The three measurment positions were on 
the central axis of the fresh-food compartment as shown in Figure 8. 2. The average 
temperature at each position was calculated as the mean temperature at that point 
over a number of complete operating cycles. Average compartment temperature, Tav, 
was then calculated as the average of these temperatures, Tav = I(T 1 + T2 + T3)/3. 
Figure 8.2 Air temperature measuring points of fresh-food compartments 
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For refrigerators to meet the Australian AS 1430 test standard requirements and carry 
an approved energy performance label they need to be able to perform adequately 
under Australian conditions. The two stipulated performance criteria are (i) the capacity 
to pull the compartment temperature down from 43 ° C to 8 °C within six hours, and (ii) 
the ability to keep food cool while operating within a range of temperatures. Class 1 
refrigerators are required to be able to maintain the temperature of stored food between 
0.5 °C and 6.0 °C at ambient temperatures of 10 °C, 21 °C, 32 °C and 43 °C. The first of 
these tests was carried out as a separate test and the results are given in Section 8.4.1 
below. The set of second performance tests was conducted simultaneously with energy 
consumption measurements and the results are discussed in Section 8.4.2. 
8.4.1 Pull-Down Test 
The 'pull-down' test is a simple test which involves leaving the door of the refrigerator 
open at an ambient temperature of 43 °C until its internal temperature has reached 
equilibrium with that ambient temperature. With the thermostat of the refrigerator set 
at its coldest setting, the door of the refrigerator is then closed and the unit switched on 
and the time taken for the average internal temperature to reach 8 ° C is measured. To 
meet Australian standards, the pull-down time must be no longer than six hours. The 
pull-down test is therefore essentially a test of the compressor capacity. The results of 
the tests conducted on the three refrigerators are shown in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.2 Pull-down times 
."----■.,..,...,.......s..., Kelvinator 
CS 334 




Time for refrigerator 
to pull down cabinet 
temperature from 43 
to 8 degrees Celsius 
3.83 hours 3.17 hours > 6 hours 
The results of the pull-down test indicated that while the Kelvinator CS 334 and Fisher 
& Paykel C 190 were able to cool the average compartment temperature from 43 ° C to 
8 ° C in a time well within the limit set by the Australian standard, the Gram LER 200 
was unable to meet this condition. After 3.87 hours, the average compartment temperature 
of the Gram stabilised at 10.1 °C with the compressor on almost all of the time. 
As down-sizing of the compressor was a deliberate energy efficient design feature of 
the Gram LER 200, and the pull-down test is primarily a measure of the refrigerator's 
compressor capacity, this energy efficiency design feature of the Gram militate's against 
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that refrigerator's performance as measured by the pull-down test. The purpose of the 
rapid pull-down requirement is to ensure that refrigerators sold in Australia have the 
capacity to cool quickly, since refrigerators in many parts of Australia operate at high 
ambient temperatures. Toone (1991: 4) put it in a way that most Australians would 
understand in stating that a refrigerator that did not cool down beer quickly on a hot 
day wouldn't last long in the average Australian household. The initial temperature of 
43 °C in the pull-down test, however, has little relevance for temperate areas of Australia 
and indicates the problems associated with using a single standard over a very wide 
range of climatic conditions such as occur in Australia. The choice of a lower pull-down 
temperature of 8 °C and the maximum pull-down period of six hours, furthermore, 
appear to have been arbitrarily set. The draw-down temperature of 8 °C as the internal 
temperature, for example, contrasts with the 6 °C maximum average internal temperature 
stipulated for other refrigerator performance tests. There also appears to be little basis 
for choosing a six-hour maximum pull-down time rather than, say a 4 hour or 8 hour 
pull-down period. For these reasons, the pull-down test was repeated using an ambient 
temperature of 32 °C, which is closer to the maximum temperatures in more temperature 
regions of Australia, and an internal temperature of 6 °C, which is consistent with the 
maximum average internal temperature used in other Australian standard refrigerator 
performance tests. Under these conditions, the Gram LER 200 pulled the average 
cabinet temperature down to 6 °C in 2.37 hours. The Kelvinator CS 334 and the Fisher 
& Paykel C 190 reduced their compartment temperatures by the required increment in 
2.125 hours and 1.75 hours respectively. It is interesting to note the similarity in the 
pull-down times of the Kelvinator and the Gram under these altered requirements. 
Apart from the arbitrary nature of the parameters of the pull-down test set in the 
Australian standard and the suitability of a single standard based on the harshest 
climatic conditions, there is reason to question its relevance relative to other measures 
not required by the standard. A more important measure of refrigerator performance 
than the time it took a new refrigerator to cool down to 8 °C when first switched on, for 
example, would appear to be its capacity to keep food cool during interruptions to the 
electricity supply. Because this appeared to be a more sensible performance measure, 
the time it took for the average compartment temperature to increase from 3.0 to 21 °C 
at an ambient temperature of 32 °C4 was therefore measured. This test of the reverse 
measure of performance could be termed the 'drift-up' test and is essentially a measure 
of the performance of the refrigerator's thermal insulation. As expected, the results 
indicated that when this reverse performance measure was used, the Gram, due to its 
greater thermal insulation, outperformed the Kelvinator and the Fisher & Paykel by a 
An upper temperature of 21 °C rather than 32 °C was chosen as the basis for the test because 
of the length of time that would be required to reach equilibrium with the ambient 
temperature. 
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substantial margin. It took almost twice as long for the Gram's compartment temperature 
to increase to 20 °C (4 hours) as it did those of the Kelvinator (2.6 hours) and the 
Fisher Paykel (2.65 hours). The Gram was therefore better equipped to be able to 
maintain food at a cooler temperature during brief interruptions to the electricity supply 
- assuming refrigerator doors were not opened. 
A second point that needs to be made is that all three refrigerators were able to 
maintain an average compartment temperature between 0.5 °C and 6.0 °C and therefore 
satisfied the Australian standard test requirements. This came as a surprise as the 
Gram LER 200 had not been able to meet the criteria stipulated in the pull-down test 
but had stabilised its average compartment temperature at just over 10 °C after 2.5 
hours with the compressor on virtually all the time. It was therefore expected that the 
Gram would not be able to achieve a stable average compartment temperature lower 
than 6 °C at an ambient temperature of 43 °C. It was found, however, that if the Gram 
LER was operated continuously on its coldest thermostat setting for a long period, its 
compartment temperature was gradually lowered and that after approximately 72 
hours it stabilised at around 2.4 °C as shown in Figure 8.3. 
50 - 
Average ambient temperature = 42-3 °C 
(Thermostat setting 7) 
10 




80 	85 	90 	95 	100 
Urn. ChOurs) 
Average compartment temperature of Gram LER 200 after 
80 hours at an ambient test temperature of 43 °C. 
8.4.2 Energy Consumption Measurements 
The most updated method for determining the energy consumption of refrigerators 
under standard test conditions is given in Appendix B of AS 257.2-1989 (Standards 
Australia & Standards Association of New Zealand 1989: 12-13). The standard test 
procedure is similar to that used in the USA which uses a closed-door test (an unloaded 
fresh food compartment and no door openings) at an ambient temperature of 32 ° C 
and an average temperature of the fresh food compartment of 3 °C. This method is 
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assumed to simulate energy consumption under normal operating conditions (an average 
ambient temperature of 21.5 °C) using a higher ambient temperature to compensate for 
the lack of door openings. As a matter of interest, refrigerator energy consumption was 
also measured at all ambient temperatures of 43 °C, 32 ° C, 21 °C and 10 °C during the 
course of the performance tests. 
Recording of electricity use began once refrigerators reached thermal equilibrium, defined 
as the position reached when the average internal temperature fluctuated by no more 
than 0.5 °C over a cycle for a period of at least two cycles. Energy use was recorded 
over an even number of 'on' and 'off' cycles, the starting and ending points for recording 
taken as either the 'on' or 'off' points in the cycle. In the standard test procedure, 
energy consumption per 24 hours is determined by recording energy consumption for 
the lesser of either 16 hours or until at least 1 kWh of electricity had been used. To 
increase the accuracy of the energy consumption data in the present study, wherever 
possible energy consumption was recorded over a minimum period of 72 hours. 
Energy consumption per 24 hours for an average refrigeration compartment temperature 
of 3 °C was found at each ambient temperature by setting the refrigerator's thermostat 
at its mid-point, measuring the energy consumed and calculating the average compartment 
temperature. The thermostat setting was then adjusted up or down depending on 
whether the calculated average compartment temperature in the first test was higher or 
lower than 3 °C and energy consumption and average compartment temperature re-
determined. This process was continued so that energy consumption per 24 hours was 
found for a range of average compartment temperatures at a particular ambient 
temperature. The two average compartment temperatures closest to 3 °C were then 
used to interpolate (or extrapolate if one of the average temperature readings was 
sufficiently close to 3 ° C) from this data to find the energy consumption at an average 
compartment temperature of 3 °C at the particular ambient setting. The calculation of 
energy consumption at an average compartment temperature of 3 °C for each of the 
ambient test temperatures by this means is shown in Appendix II. This information 
was condensed and annual energy consumption and annual standard energy consumption 
(using energy consumption per 200 litres of storage space) for each of the four ambient 
temperatures are shown in Figures 8.4 and 8.5 respectively. Errors in energy consumption 
resulting from the 0.28 °C temperature reading accuracy of the AD590s were also 
calculated from the graphs in Appendix II and added to errors in kWh readings. 
The results of measurements the refrigerator energy consumption tests undertaken in 
this study indicate that there exists genuine scope for increasing the energy efficiency of 
refrigerators in Australia using available, tried-and tested design changes. As shown in 
Figures 8.4 and 8.5, the Gram LER 200 used approximately 200 kWh p.a. less electricity 
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Figure 8.4 	Refrigeration electricity use per year at four ambient 
test room temperatures. 
degrees Celsius 
Figure 8.5 	Refrigeration electricity use per 200 litres storage volume 
per year at four ambient test room temperatures. 
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& Paykel is the same size and class as the LER 200 and is in the middle of the range in 
terms of efficiency of refrigerators of its size and class on the Australian market, it 
suggests that potential for increasing the energy efficiency of refrigeration in Australia is 
significant. Furthermore, as the purchase costs of the two refrigerators were comparable 5 , 
these improvements would appear to be cost-effective. 
Since the measurements of refrigeration energy consumption for labelling purposes in 
Australia are taken as those measured at an ambient test temperature of 32 °C, the 
results of the energy consumption tests carried out at that ambient test temperature are 
summarised in Table 8.3. The information in Table 8.3 indicates a number of things, 
the most evident of which is that the annual energy consumption of the Gram LER as 
measured under standard test conditions in Australia is double that reported in the 
literature. This difference is attributable to the differences in the European and Australian 
standard test methodologies, the former using an ambient temperature of 25 °C and an 
average refrigerator compartment temperature of 5 °C (Pedersen & Lawtz 1989: 11, 
Norgard 1989: 131, Toone 1991: 5, Crothers 1991: 5). From Figure 8.4 it can be seen 
that the European standard test conditions would appear to be equivalent to an 
ambient test temperature of 21 °C and a refrigeration compartment temperature of 3 °C 
since the annual energy consumption of the Gram LER at that point is very close to that 
given in the literature. The difference between the energy consumption of the LER 
under Australian and European standard test conditions supports the argument that 
caution is needed in basing estimates of the energy saving potential of energy efficient 
technologies from information given in the literature untested under local conditions. 
Table 8.3 Energy consumption with an ambient temperature of 32 °C 
and an average compartment temperature of 3 °C. 
Kelvinator 
CS 334 




Energy consumption per 
24 hour (kWh/24 hr) 1.359 1.17 0.5565 
Energy consumption per 
year (kWh/year) 496 427 203 
Energy consumption per 
200 litres per year 
(kWh/200 1/year) 
301 401 203 
The second point that emerges from Table 8.3 is that whilst the energy consumption of 
the Kelvinator CS 334 measured in this study was very close to the energy consumption 
5 The purchase cost of the Gram LER 200 excluding freight from Denmark was very similar to 
the costs of the Fisher & Paykel C 190. 
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figure given on its label (490 kWh p.a.), the energy consumption of the Fisher & Paykel 
C 190 was 7% below that shown on its label. This difference was outside the error 
range of the energy consumption measurements in this study and suggest that the 
information on the labels is not always accurate. This is supported by the results of 
energy consumption tests carried out by the Australian Consumers' Association [ACA] 
(1992: 16) in which it was found that the annual energy consumption of some refrigerators 
measured under Australian standard test conditions deviated substantially from that 
claimed by their manufacturers. The annual energy consumption as determined by 
ACA's test was usually found to be lower than that given by the manufacturer. Of the 
refrigerators tested by the ACA, the one for which the variance between the manufacturer's 
estimate of energy consumption and the ACA's own estimate was greatest was the 
Fisher & Paykel P 120J, a 120 litre bar refrigerator. This refrigerator was found by 
ACA to have an annual energy consumption as determined by the standard test of 235 
kWh, 27% less than the 320 kWh p.a. energy given by the manufacturer and indicated 
on its label. From the point of view of the labelling programme, it could be argued that 
if labels are to be used to provide consumers with information relating to energy use 
then it is of vital importance that this information be accurate. It is clear from this test 
and those of the ACA that currently this is not always the case. 
The issue of the accuracy of the information contained on energy performance labels 
runs into a greater problem, however, in terms the validity of tests results carried out 
under Australian standard test conditions for many locations. Comprehensive energy 
consumption measurements of over two hundred Gram LER 200s in households in 
Denmark established that the energy consumption of the Gram LER as measured by the 
European standard test was very close to actual average annual energy consumption in 
households in that country (Pedersen & Lawaetz 1989: 25). Refrigeration energy 
consumption in Australia is obviously likely to be higher, all other things being equal, 
than in northern Europe due to the hotter climate in Australia and it is possible that the 
Australian standard test simulates relatively accurately refrigeration energy consumption 
in the average Australian home, although there appears to be limited research data 
available with which to support this contention. The Australian standard test is 
similar to that used in the USA and Stewart (1985: 3) did find on the basis of limited 
field testing that actual refrigeration energy, as measured in households in Missouri, 
was relatively close to the estimates obtained in the laboratory under US standard test 
conditions. It is nonetheless apparent that the accuracy of estimates of annual refrigeration 
energy consumption based on this method will decrease as one moves away from an 
'average' Australian climate. The information on energy consumption borne on appliance 
energy labels in Australia, for example, would appear to have little meaning in Tasmania 
which may well more closely approximate conditions in northern Europe than those in 
New South Wales. Thermal comfort levels in Tasmanian homes have long been noted 
to be low relative to their mainland counterparts (Larson 1968: 34) and although this 
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difference is likely to have been reduced since Larson made his study, the proportion of 
households in Tasmania that are centrally heated remains relatively small (Chandler et 
al. 1983b: 3). Many householders in Tasmania, furthermore, heat living areas and close 
off unheated areas of the house (Coldicutt et al. 1986: 9). For this reason, the average 
ambient temperature in the typical Tasmanian household in areas where refrigerators 
are installed is likely to be well below the 21.5 °C assumed by the Australian standard 
test. As one colleague quipped, in Tasmania you go to the kitchen on a cold winter's 
morning, open the refrigerator door and let the warm air out. 
The present method of dealing with this variation in annual energy consumption of the 
same equipment over a range of climates and different household environments, is that 
energy labels carried by appliances in Australia bear a caveat, writ small, which advises 
consumers that the appliance's actual energy consumption is dependant upon where 
they live and how they use the appliance. This means that in many situations energy 
labels serve purely as a guide to relative energy efficiency and are of little assistance in 
terms of informing buyers of absolute cost-effectiveness. This problem becomes even 
more thorny, however, in the case of national mandated energy performance standards 
[MEPS] should these be introduced. In setting a standard on the basis of cost-
effectiveness, the difficult question will be that of 'cost-effective for whom?'. Setting a 
standard that is cost-effective for an average household in Sydney may eliminate 
cost-effective options for households in colder climates such as Tasmania. 
A further issue concerning the applicability of refrigeration energy consumption as 
determined by the current Australian standard test method is the degree to which this 
closed door test which uses an elevated ambient test temperature to compensate for 
the lack of door openings will become less accurate as the efficiency of refrigerators 
increases over time. As the energy efficiency of refrigerator is raised by increasing 
insulation in the panels, the impact of door openings on energy use increases relative to 
other losses. It has been suggested by a number of writers that the validity of the 
closed-door test method will decrease over time as a result of the increasing relative 
importance of door openings on energy use (Stewart 1985: 5, Norgard 1989: 331). 
8.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The conclusions drawn from the results of the refrigeration tests discussed in this 
chapter need to be qualified in terms of the limitations of the research. The fact that 
the refrigerators studied were Class 1 refrigerators with no freezer compartment means 
that the results cannot be extended to refrigerators or refrigeration energy use in general 
as the portion of Australian households which currently use such refrigerators is relatively 
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small, although increasing over recent years as the market share of twin refrigerator/freezer 
sets has grown. A second limitation of the research is the fact that only one refrigerator 
of each model was tested. It is known that individual refrigerators of same brand and 
model can vary in electricity consumption under standard test conditions (Stockwell 
1988: 26). The inability to maintain an ambient test room temperature constant to 
within ±0.5 °C with the heating control equipment available also added to the potential 
error of the results6 . 
The two conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. The first is that this scope is real, 
although not as significant as often assumed. The Gram used less than half of the 
energy of the Fisher & Paykel C 190 when tested under Australian standard conditions, 
and the Kelvinator CS 334 used about 50% more than the Gram when corrected for 
size. It would therefore be possible to build a well-designed refrigerator the same size 
as the Kelvinator CS 334 which used approximately two-thirds the energy. As the 
absolute differences in standard energy consumption (energy use per 200 litres p.a.) 
were the same whether tested at an ambient temperature of 32 °C or 21 °C, this 
conclusion remains valid over a relatively wide range of climatic conditions. This 
demonstrates that there exists significant technical capacity to reduce household 
refrigeration energy requirements in Australia by inclusion of the features of the Gram 
LER into their design. The major constraint is the inability of such energy efficient 
refrigerators to meet the requirements of the existing pull down test criteria based on 
the harshest climatic conditions experienced in many parts of Australia. The inability 
of energy efficient refrigerators such as the Gram LER to meet such performance criteria 
and the assumption that energy consumption is the only criterion of importance have 
been cited as the fundamental flaws in the common assertion that there exists significant 
scope for increasing the efficiency of Australian refrigerators. The Executive Director of 
Australia's largest appliance manufacturer, EMAIL Australia Ltd, R.C. Toone, has 
argued that an energy efficient refrigerator that cannot rapidly cool down beer on a hot 
day is about as marketable in Australia as a fuel efficient car that can not go up steep 
hills. When performance is factored into the equation, according to Mr Toone, Australian 
made refrigerators are already highly efficient (Toone 1991: 5). It needs to be remembered, 
however, that appliance manufacturers in the USA protested against the introduction 
of mandated efficiency standards in that country using similar arguments, yet managed 
to meet the stringent standards imposed by the US Department of Energy (Weizeorick 
1991). 
6 A means of reducing the fluctuation in ambient temperature was devised during the 
course of the testing programme using a two-circuit, 240 volt Moeller 22E relay to 
switch on a small electric heat source equivalent to the heat output of the refrigerator 
during its 'off' cycles and to switch it off again during the 'refrigerator's on' cycles to 
achieve a relatively even heat output. Unfortunately, the switching device was not 
constructed in time for the tests included in this study. 
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The second conclusion that can be drawn from the chapter is that although the harsh 
climate over much of Australia militates against the argument that refrigerators can be 
designed to reduce energy use by very substantial amounts, the technical scope for 
reducing refrigeration energy use in temperate regions of Australia, and in Tasmanian in 
particular, remain real. The potential savings to the individual represented by the 
Gram compared to the Fisher & Paykel are of the order of $20 p.a. (in 1996 dollars), 
assuming an electricity tariff of 10c/kWh. This compares well with the assumption 
made by the first assessment of the scope for energy efficiency in Tasmania that 
electricity consumption of refrigerators could be decreased by 37% to 40% at an extra 
capital cost of $20 to $30 (in 1980 dollars) (Harwood & Hartley 1980: 27). It is a 
claim that rests, however, on the argument that refrigerators retailed in temperate 
regions of Australia should not have to perform under the harshest climatic conditions 
in the country. The proposal to reduce the refrigeration energy requirements in temperate 
regions of Australia therefore rests on the feasibility of producing energy efficient 
refrigerators suited only to that region. In this regard, the perspective of the Australian 
whitegoods manufacturing industry is critical. 
The Australian whitegoods industry has been described as economically undersized, 
production rates being well below the 500,000 units p.a. considered by overseas experience 
as a minimum efficient scale (Linge 1979: 194). These small production runs are the 
primary reason for the lack of experimentation and why Australian manufacturers 
piggy-back off the innovations by their parent companies in other countries (Harries 
1965: 125). This problem has been compounded by the highly competitive nature of 
the industry which has led to the production of a wider range of products available to 
Australian consumers than in comparable countries (Department of Industry and 
Commerce 1978: 10). Saturation in the market for many whitegoods after the mid to 
late 1970s led manufacturers in Australia to increase replacement rates by introducing 
new models with labour saving features, improved performance and reduced running 
costs (Bureau of Industry Economics 1983: 35). This had the double effect of further 
lowering production runs and delaying retooling as the longevity of manufacturing 
equipment used to produce these whitegoods is determined predominantly by total 
production. For economic reasons, the Australian whitegoods industry is unlikely to 
favour yet greater diversity of products such as separate models for different climatic 
zones that would further reduce production runs. The prospects for such low energy 
refrigerators becoming available in temperate regions of Australia will depend therefore 
on either the emergence of new companies producing refrigerators specifically for this 
region, or on the import of low energy refrigerators from overseas. However, caution 
over the likely success of any such venture under existing conditions is warranted. 
Australian import tariffs for overseas manufactured refrigerators has decreased over 
the past two decades from over 25% to around 7%, and will decline further in the 
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future. One of the greatest constraints faced by importers, however, is the need to 
comply with Australian standards in order to receive an accredited label. Unless these 
standards are altered, low energy refrigerators that cannot meet these performance 
criteria will find it difficult to gain entry into the Australian market. An interesting 
case study can be used here to make the point. Toshiba refrigerators have been noted 
for their energy efficiency relative to other models, the most efficient Toshiba refrigerator 
retailed on the USA market using one third as much energy as the average refrigerator 
of the same class and size (Lovins 1985: 24). Toshiba, however, withdrew its refrigerators 
from the Australian market in the late 1980s. The reason given to this author was that 
the company considered the Australian standard to be unrealistic as it meant redesigning 
their refrigerators to perform over the whole range of climatic conditions in the country 
(General Manager, Toshiba Australia Ltd, personal communication, Oct. 1991). The 
introduction of labelling in this instance removed energy efficient refrigerators from the 
Australian market by forcing out models which operated efficiently in temperate climates 
but which did not perform to Australian standards in hotter climates and thus served 
to eliminate a competitor to local manufacturers. The small number of local firms 
controlling the Australian market renders it easier to agree to standards which advantage 
local industry at the expense of potential competitors since consensus among local 
manufacturers is more likely when the number of players is small. Massive rationalisation 
of the Australian whitegoods industry in the period after the second world war allowed 
producers to increase production rates and decrease unit prices, but resulted in an 
industry structure described as a tightly differentiated oligopoly (Harries 1965: 138). 
The number of firms which control the industry has steadily declined and today four 
firms account for an 80% share of the Australian market. These firms have a considerable 
input into the setting of standards as they are well-represented on the committees 
which set the relevant standards. Unlike representatives from other organisations on 
these committees, moreover, representatives from appliance manufacturing industries 
regularly attend committee meetings. It is possible that the standards introduced have 
tended to deliberately favour locally manufactured products and discriminate against 
import rivals. The apparent arbitrariness and limited relevance of some of the criteria 
of performance standards, such as those used as the basis of the pull-down test, and 
the absence of some apparently sensible performance measures, such as the ability to 
keep food cool for longer periods during interruptions to the power supply or to allow 
refrigerators to be used with off-peak electricity, lend support to such a hypothesis. 
Even if the Australian standards were altered to approve refrigerators that performed 
adequately in temperate regions but not hot climates, the ability of new firms to gain 
significant market is questionable. Past attempts to break into the Australian refrigerator 
market by even large companies such as Hoover, which already dominate other areas 
of the Australian whitegoods market such as washing machines, failed (Harries 1965: 
123). While this has been attributed to brand loyalty, in reality it is more complex than 
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simply a question of gaining public acceptance. In most countries, a small number of 
distributors account for a very large proportion of total sales of whitegoods and new 
brands have to first gain the confidence of these distributors (Mesdag 1983: 52). The 
New Zealand firm, Fisher & Paykel, has managed to capture a 14% share of the 
Australian refrigerator market and an 18% share of the Australian freezer market in 
five years (The Australian Financial Review 1 January 1995: 13) and this indicates that 
the capacity to gain entry to the Australian refrigeration market as import tariffs have 
been has increased. The failure of European firms to retail energy efficient refrigerators 
on the Australian market on two separate occasions to date (Mr Bob Adams, personal 
communication, Executive Director, AEEMA, October 1991), however, suggests that 
it nonetheless remains difficult. 
In conclusion, although the refrigerator testing programme discussed in this chapter 
confirmed the existence of significant technical scope for reducing refrigeration energy 
requirements in temperate regions of Australia with available and cost-effective 
technology. Until there is a sufficient increase in either the public concern over the 
social costs of energy use or the importance of running costs among Australian consumers, 
however, it is likely that manufacturers will move to produce climate-specific models 
and it is likely that refrigerators sold on the Australian market will continue to be 
designed to perform under the full range of climatic conditions. It is therefore unlikely 
that the demonstrated cost-effective technical potential to increase the efficiency of 
refrigeration energy use in temperate regions will be rapidly translated into reality and 
the efficiency of refrigerators sold in such regions is likely to continue to be determined 
instead by those factors which determine the rate at which the refrigeration energy 
efficiency increases in Australia as a whole, whether this be competition from overseas 
products, changes in consumer preferences, or the introduction of national mandated 
energy performance standards. 
As to the impact of national MEPS on household sector energy requirements, if and 
when these are introduced in Australia, it can be concluded from the above discussion 
that this will obviously depend on the level at which they are set. To the extent that 
the function of MEPS is to remove the most inefficient products from the market, it 
would appear that to be effective they would need to be set at more than a minimum 
since many one-star products have already disappeared from the market, a phenomenon 
that has been ascribed by some to a consequence of the labelling programme. The 
function of MEPS, therefore, would be to rapidly force up the energy efficiencies of 
products sold on the market by progressively raising the minimum standards. What 
emerges from this research, however, is that unless these minimum standards are set 
differentially for different regions of the country they will fail to capture much of the 




Someone, somewhere, sometime, ended a book with a conclusion. 
This idea has its drawbacks, but it became a custom, and as 
Plutarch remarked, we are more sensible of what is done against 
custom than against nature'. 
— Fairfield Osbom (1953) Our Plundered Planet: 
Little & Brown, London: 151. 
9.1 Introduction 
In attempting to write a concluding chapter, the study comes full circle as it confronts 
the same problem that was encountered in the introduction and which was the reason 
why the study began with what may have appeared to some as a circuitous account of 
the origin of the study. That account was necessary because a truly interdisciplinary 
study confronts the very real problem of the considerable gulfs between the ways in 
which different people interpret the world. This entire study has rotated around the 
considerable discrepancies over both the perceived causes of the frequent low priority 
assigned to energy conservation in energy planning and how policy reliance on energy 
conservation can be increased. In attempting to conclude this study, those differences 
in paradigms resurface because they are also associated with expectations as to how 
such a study should conclude. At one end of the spectrum, those who operate from a 
technically optimistic paradigm will regard a study such as this to have no value unless 
it offers practical solutions to the problem at hand, namely the low emphasis of energy 
conservation in energy policy and planning. They will therefore expect nothing less 
than a set of firm recommendations typical of technical reports, together with a set of 
concrete guidelines as to how such practical recommendation can be put into effect. It 
may be possible to conclude from this study, for example, that to increase planning 
emphasis on energy conservation it is necessary to improve communication between 
different experts by adopting a multidisciplinary approach to energy planning with 
social scientists, technical experts, political scientists, economists and engineers working 
together. Such recommendations, however, have now been reiterated on so many 
occasions that to do so once more is unwarranted. In some cases, furthermore, the 
various policies and policy instruments potentially useful in accelerating the uptake of 
energy conservation have been so thoroughly canvassed that to repeat them would risk 
mere pastiche l . The point that this study has attempted to make is that such 
See, for example, Schipper & Meyers (1992), Chapter 11 (pp. 305-27) and Chapter 12 (pp. 
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recommendations ahve been advanced repeatedly but have more often than not been 
disregarded by policy makers. While Chapters Five and Six were used to illustrate 
how these recommendations or proposals have been routinely ignored in a particular 
case, this has been the common experience in most other situations. The intent of this 
study, therefore, has not been on reaching the end to once again reiterate those 
recommendations. Instead, its aim has been to reach a better understanding of why 
those recommendations have not been heeded by policy makers, what must happen 
before policy makers start to listen to such advice, and what role scientific research 
can, and cannot, play in this endeavour. The attempt reach such an understanding has 
required an eclectic approach involving a variety of arguments. The purpose of this 
final chapter, therefore, is nring those arguments together to present a more coherent 
summary and to discuss their implications for scientific energy conservation research. 
It begins by first examining more closely the causes of the frustration and repetition so 
evident within the literature on energy conservation because such an understanding 
goes a long way toward understanding the reasons for the low policy emphasis on 
energy conservation. 
9.2 The Causes of Perplexity and Frustration 
An assumption of this research has been that the root cause of the perplexity of 
scientific energy conservation researchers and environmentalists is that they inadequately 
take into account the economic, social and political contexts in which their energy 
conservation proposals would be implemented. That they fail to do so is not altogether 
surprising as the question of why there is not more energy conservation is a riddle with 
no single answer, and attempting to find the answers leads into a complex conceptual 
maze involving interconnected political, legal, economic, socio-psychological, and 
technical themes, many of which seem to lead to dead-ends. At the heart of the issue, 
furthermore, is the need to understand why policy makers continue to rely on supply 
expansion and it has been shown in this study that understanding why policy makers 
make the decisions that they do is not easy. 
Superimposed on this complexity is the fact that the degree to which policy makers 
rely on energy conservation is not uniform in either place or time. A contributing factor 
to the failure to understand why energy conservation is adopted in some regions or 
countries while it happens in others is a bias within the energy conservation literature 
which focuses to a very high degree on those case studies where policy emphasis on 
energy conservation is comparatively high. The explanation for this, according to two 
energy analysts, is that those cases where energy conservation is assigned low priority 
328-52). 
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as a policy option, or where energy conservation programmes are tried but to little 
avail, are not written up or published in the energy conservation literature as there is 
considered to be nothing to write about (Gadgil & Sastry 1994: 151). This bias, the 
argument goes, leads to the misconception that energy conservation has been an important 
component of energy policy in most countries and regions of the world. 
Another contributing factor to the failure to understand why energy conservation is not 
adopted to a greater degree is the tendency to overlook the differences between countries. 
Kellow (1996: 170) has argued that overgrowth of public electricity supply based on 
the provision of large blocks of subsidised electricity to industrial clients (reverse 
adaption), can be explained in terms of strong support for distributive politics favouring 
development. This provides one explanation for lack of interest in energy conservation 
in particular situations. Other differences between countries and regions also exist and 
account for variation in policy emphasis on energy conservation. Differences in the 
costs of energy, the perceived need at the policy making level for reductions in energy 
use as strategic or economic national goals have been important determinants of the 
level of policy emphasis on energy conservation. Differences in the scale of local 
opposition to supply expansion proposals and in the political, administrative and 
legal ability of individuals and community pressure groups to question energy planning 
decisions also account for differences in the degree of policy reliance on energy 
conservation. But these differences alone cannot explain which governments do and 
which do not place importance on energy conservation. Nigel Lucas (1985) has written 
a comparative account of national energy conservation policies in Western Europe and 
found that many of the differences in the degree to which governments intervened to 
reduce energy use had to be explained in terms of political culture. There was no easy 
way, Lucas suggested, to explain Italian energy or energy conservation policies. 
Variations in the degree to which energy conservation is adopted as a policy option at 
the regional and local levels cannot be explained purely in terms of the level of public 
opposition to supply expansion proposals. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, for 
example, Victoria was the sole Australian state to make a sustained and serious policy 
and research commitment to reducing the demand for electricity. While that policy 
commitment was initiated by a state government with a traditional leaning towards the 
Left, this difference in policy interest in conserving energy between the Australian 
states could not be explained in terms of differences in the political philosophy of the 
major parties since Labor governments in other states were as lax in their commitment 
to energy conservation as their conservative counterparts. Rather, it appears that 
differences in policy commitment to energy conservation at the state level also needs to 
be explained in part in terms of the social context and the unpredictable arrival on the 
political scene of dominant individuals willing and able to push through energy policy 
reforms within those contexts. Policy reform, however, is a two-way process and 
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policy interest in energy conservation often appears to be fickle. Energy policy is 
characterised by long periods of sole reliance on supply expansion strategies punctuated 
by brief periods of increased attention to energy conservation. 
The ultimate cause of the frustration of those who advocate energy conservation, 
however, has to do with both a clash of values and paradigms, with differences in 
rationalities or in the way that individuals think. Environmentalists interpret what is 
rational in terms of what appears to be ecologically sensible and socially important but 
operate in a world where rationality has come to mean instrumentally rational, and 
instrumentally rational has largely come to mean that which is economically rational. 
In an instrumentally rational world, environmentalists are doomed to being frustrated 
because they are forced to be instrumentally rational in the pursuit of their ends, but as 
a result must fail to reach those ends most crucial to them (Poole 1991: 143). 
Scientifically trained energy efficiency analysts, on the other hand, base their demands 
for reducing energy use on instrumentally and economically rational arguments and 
therefore perceive these proposals to be 'spherically sensible' (Socolow 1991: 573). 
They and their supporters are therefore doubly frustrated and perplexed when these 
apparently 'rational' demands are also resisted. This perplexity has been due in part 
to professional modes of thinking (Nader & Milleron 1979: 957-8) and to the mistaken 
belief that cost-effective technical energy efficiency and economic efficiency are the 
same thing. As a result, much contemporary debate over energy policy has consisted 
of an ongoing squabble between technical energy efficiency analysts and conservative 
economists (Hinchliffe 1995). But this perplexity has also been caused by the fact that 
physical scientists are first and foremost 'problem solvers' who look for elegantly 
simple solutions and explanations (Maslow 1966: 122). They are trained to think 
logically and assume that all others do likewise. They look for the 'correct' answers 
and find it difficult to engage in debate characterised by contradictory views and 
opinions (Ruedisili & Firebaugh 1975: i). Physicists in particular are trained to think in 
such a way (Barrow 1992: 12) and, as shown in Chapter Four, it has been physicists 
who have spearheaded the demands for aggressive energy efficiency policies. Such 
analysts overlook the fact that energy use is not purely a technical issue and that 
problems are therefore rarely simple and solutions rarely elegant. 
The real cause of frustration of both energy efficiency experts, however, is their failure 
to understand the nature and scale of the resistance to their proposals and the fact 
that policy decision making is often governed not by what is economically rational but 
by what is in the political interests of influential individuals, organisations and groups 
rather than by what is in the public interest - however that is defined. It is the 
separation between the political analysis of energy policy on the one hand, and the 
economic and technical analysis on the other, that is most apparent within the literature. 
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For while the energy literati boldly elevates the status of energy policy to that of a new 
discipline (Huntington et al. 1994: 795), their conception of what constitutes energy 
policy analysis is often extremely narrow. One group of energy efficiency experts, for 
example, has asserted that this new discipline amounts to simple techno-economic 
energy efficiency analyses (Lovins et al. 1989: 12). As a result, debate over energy 
policy is conducted by different groups with their own, separate bodies of literature. 
Journals such as Energy Policy have been set up for one audience, and the pages of such 
journals are dominated by the analysis of past trends in energy use, estimates of the 
potential of various energy options to meet future energy needs, assessments of the 
ability of energy efficiency or nuclear energy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or 
reliance on imported fuels, and so on. Political analyses offering explanations of why 
certain policies are, or are not, adopted, attract another audience and are written up in 
political journals. This schism within the literature between these two schools has 
contributed greatly towards the sense of frustration that pervades the energy conservation 
literature because it reflects in part a failure to understand why energy conservation is 
not relied on as a policy option to a greater degree than it is and the apparent limited 
capacity of scientific energy conservation research to change this. 
9.3 The Failure of Energy Conservation Research to Influence Policy 
To explain the low priority given to energy conservation, this study has used a three-tiered 
approach. Briefly reviewing each of these is a useful first step in explaining the limited 
impact of scientific energy conservation on energy policy and decision making. 
The explanation for the low priority given to energy conservation in this study began 
with the most potent arguments for energy conservation, those associated with the 
demand for radical reductions in energy use to halt growth in energy use or reduce 
energy use in absolute terms. The arguments upon which these demands have been 
based were shown to be routinely dismissed by policy makers as unrealistic, unproven 
or irrational. They are often interpreted as ruses used to prod governments into action 
in the form of more modest energy conservation policies as a means of ameliorating 
more immediate and local energy-related problems, problems which policy makers 
generally consider best resolved through the use of technological fixes. 
Environmental writers commonly explain the rejection of these demands in terms of 
psychological denial on the part of policy makers, a denial induced by an unwillingness 
to abandon economic growth. The fact remains that resistance to abandoning economic 
growth is near-universal While economic growth remains a dominant social and political 
objective, the capacity to reduce energy use is limited. For energy use to be dramatically 
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reduced, energy prices would need to increased sharply or draconian regulation imposed, 
or both. While it has been argued in Chapter Four of this study that the capacity for 
political decision making by which unpopular decisions are foisted onto an unwilling 
public is real, it was also argued in Chapter Two that there are limits to the degree to 
which democratically elected governments are able to introduce unpopular policies 
such as those which would substantial increase in the price of energy. This means that 
reductions in energy use which involve a reduction of economic growth would require 
resolution of a difficult chicken-and-egg problem: as democratically elected governments 
are constrained in many areas by what their electorates permit, policies such as major 
increases in the price of energy would have to await a major change from below in the 
form of a spontaneous shift in societal values and a reduction in wants and material 
standard of living. 
Although mathematical simulation based on game theory has lent theoretical support 
to the notion that such abrupt and unexpected social change is possible (Glance & 
Huberman 1994), most policy makers and commentators curtly dismiss the idea that 
people will voluntarily choose a lower material standard of living as a remote possibility 
(Rooke 1995: ii). A number of proponents of energy conservation, however, insist that 
a reduction in material wants and standard of living is not only desirable or necessary, 
but maintain that social values are constantly evolving and that changes in social 
values which result in a shift to acceptance of a lower material standard of living is not 
altogether out of the question (Pears 1990: 448). Social theorists have gone further in 
arguing that a change in societal values to reduced material wants is entirely feasible 
(Hueting 1980: 187). More optimistic commentators interpret changes in public attitudes 
toward smoking and harsher penalties for drink drivers as signs that such shift in 
social attitudes may be possible (Fells & Horlock 1995:213), while the most optimistic 
interpret such signs as evidence that a fundamental shift in social values is already 
under way (Lowe 1990b: 224). In a similar vein, it has been suggested that there are 
hopeful signs that the transport systems of Australian cities are about to 'flip' into a 
radically more energy efficient mode (Newman 1994: 101). 
It needs to be remembered, however, that suggestions that a spontaneous shift in 
societal attitudes is just around the corner is part of an optimistic paradigm and have 
consistently been made over the past two and a half decades. The oil crises of the 
1970s and early 1980s led to a belief that such 'a Kuhnian paradigm shift' (Kuhn 1970) 
in societal attitudes towards energy had in fact occurred (Crossley 1980a: 452). This 
led subsequently to a search for 'barriers to energy conservation' to explain the low 
evidence of any substantial change in energy-using behaviour, the hypothesis being that 
while attitudes had changed, something prevented this shift in attitudes from being 
translated into action (Crossley 1983). In-depth qualitative social research, however, 
found little empirical support for the original supposition that there had been any shift 
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of substance in public attitudes towards energy (Kerby & Phillips 1983). More recent 
observers have also debunked suggestions that there exists evidence that a fundamental 
shift in values may be occurring, and insist that there is as yet no evidence that people 
are willing to forego their high material standards of living (Luke 1993: 141, Mittra et 
al. 1995: 45). In this view, growth in energy use is not a separate issue, but a part of 
the total growth ethic. 
The argument that alteration of social values is difficult is supported by those who 
consider social values and attitudes to be shaped within the framework of very hefty 
social and economic influences. Such observers are therefore dubious about the prospects 
for major changes in social values occurring in the absence of prior institutional change. 
Our current institutions, and the values they shape, are seen by such observers, moreover, 
to be the root cause of the frustration and repetition that pervades not only energy 
conservation research and other attempts at environmental policy reform, but society 
in general. To such writers, what this system of values has achieved: 
... is not satisfaction, but frustration; not creativity and repose, but endless 
repetition, punctuated with occasional satiation. (Poole 1991: 142) 
Energy efficiency experts and disciples of the 'new economics', such as Michael Jacobs 
(1991) and Victor Anderson (1993), have attempted to get around the dominance of 
economic growth as a social objective by arguing that it is possible to substantially 
reduce energy use without reducing material standards of living. Rapid increases in the 
technical efficiency of energy use and an overhaul of the economy to shift to less 
energy-intensive modes of production, are seen as the means of having our cake and 
eating it as energy use can be massively reduced without damaging economic growth. 
Most advocates of aggressive energy efficiency nonetheless concede that radical 
restructuring of the economy and the implementation of all energy efficiency measures 
are likely to be insufficient to reduce energy use to sustainable levels whilst the global 
human population and material standards of living in developing countries continue to 
increase. Increased technological efficiency may also be inadequate because of a strong 
tendency for increased energy efficiency to be offset by increased output in market 
economies while social attitudes remain unchanged (Jacobs 1991: 56, Holdren 1992a: 
45, 1992b: 167, Anderson 1993: 20). 
It was shown in Chapter Four, however, that the structural relationship between business 
and government makes adoption of such aggressive energy efficiency proposals difficult. 
By encouraging the perception that the costs of industrial closure will be very high, in 
terms of both reduced employment opportunities and the state's revenue base, and 
therefore the popularity of governments, business is able to put up strong resistance to 
policies and policy changes potentially damaging to its profits. Although environmental 
issues are now commonly perceived to be permanently on the policy agenda and less 
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radical environmental groups are perceived as having acquired insider status and 
greater access to policy makers (Papadakis 1994, Papadakis & Moore 1994), a number 
of policy analysts point to this strong structural relationship between government and 
business to warn against interpreting increased environmental concern at the policy 
level as a harbinger of radical or permanent change (Miller 1989: 330, Janike 1990: 4, 
Beck 1992: 25, Dryzek 1995: 298). 
There are, therefore, good reasons for being sceptical about the environmentalist claim 
that energy use can be substantially and rapidly reduced by either altering individual 
values or by dramatically increasing the technical efficiency of energy use and overhauling 
the economy. Such claims need to be considered in the light of Sandbach's (1980: 169), 
question: 'What good does it do to recommend a remedy when the cause of the 
problem is our social and economic structures themselves?'. When this rhetorical 
question is borne in mind, the repetitious nature of environmentalist demands for very 
substantial reductions in energy use that impinge on levels of growth is more 
understandable. In an economic system structurally dependant on growth, a political 
system structurally dependent on the health of the economy, and individual values 
shaped by the social and economic systems, environmentalists are doomed to repeating 
themselves (Beck 1995: 1). Scientific researchers, furthermore, repeat themselves because 
while they attempt to contribute towards the resolution of environmental problems 
with a single-mindedness and passion, their efforts have been to little avail because 
those efforts have ignored sociological and political realities. But without consideration 
of the distribution and structure of power and prevailing norms, such debates are 
'either meaningless or absurd, and probably both' (Beck 1992: 25). 
Energy conservationists therefore retreat to moderate energy conservation proposals on 
the grounds that although a compromise, they are still capable of achieving important 
environmental and social goals, such as reducing pollution levels from what they otherwise 
would have been. The rejection of these moderate proposals by polcy makers, however, 
needs to be explained in a number of ways. First, if they cannot resolve the problems 
raised in the high energy conservation discourse, then they immediately loses much of 
their appeal. If conservation is not able to permanently halt construction of energy 
supply construction programmes, then while it may be economically rational and may 
contribute to important environmental and social goals, it can only defer the need for 
further construction but does not provide an alternative vision. The gains achieved by 
these moderate energy conservation strategies, moreover, are eventually offset by growth 
in demand (Jacobs 1991: 56, Anderson 1993: 20). From an environmental perspective, 
they are temporary measures only. This inability of moderate energy conservation to 
provide either a complete or permanent solution to energy related problems reduces the 
political salience of moderate energy conservation demands and the economic rationale 
for moderate energy conservation becomes more important. 
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Secondly, explaining why scientific research which points to the scope for moderate 
and economically rational reductions in energy use has been ignored requires looking at 
the assumptions underlying that research about why energy conservation policies are 
not adopted. A number of possible assumptions can be canvassed. One possible 
implicit assumption is that policy makers have a latent interest in placing greater 
reliance on demand reduction strategies but are prevented from translating this into 
action because they suffer from an information deficit. Under this assumption, energy 
conservation research would be seen as one vehicle able to fill this information gap. 
The assumption that policy makers are interested in energy conservation and are 
actively seeking practical information on how it can be put into place has been shown 
in this study, however, to be clearly contestable in many situations. In such situations, 
the demand for 'rational' reductions in energy demand has been actively resisted by 
organisations with a vested interest in continued expansion of rates which suit 
organisational interests. These organisations, furthermore, have been aided in this 
stratagem both by governments keen to maintain control over energy policy in order to 
ensure security of energy supply and to advance statist development policies of a scale 
that was not possible at the time under private ownership of electricity supply. They 
have also been supported by large industrial users of energy which reap the benefits in 
terms of cheap, and often subsidised, energy. Under this strategy, economically rational 
energy policy has been overridden by political goals. 
A second possible implicit assumption of scientific energy conservation research that 
could be put forward is that even if planners are uninterested in learning about 
economically rational demand reduction options in the strategic interests of the energy 
supplier, research which points to substantial scope for saving energy at a cost below 
the marginal cost of supply would be difficult to ignore. The perceived role of scientific 
energy conservation research then becomes to either inform policy makers actively 
seeking information on how to reduce energy use, or to embarrass more recalcitrant 
policy makers into placing greater reliance on energy conservation. This argument is 
not easily refuted and, if accepted, suggests that the explanation for the failure of 
scientific research to alter policy must therefore rest with the research itself. Two 
possible shortcomings of this research can be suggested. 
The first has to do with the strategic nature of policy making and the requirements of 
planners. Due to the strategic nature of policy making, policy makers require unambiguous 
and precise information before committing themselves to policy reforms. In the case of 
energy conservation, this means that research is perceived as useful by policy makers 
only if it offers accurate information about the amount of energy that could be saved, 
the cost of saved energy, and the permanence of those energy savings, and so on. 
What many scientific researchers have failed to understand is that they are not competing 
with supply side options on an equal footing but, because of the perceived asymmetry 
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in risks associated with supply side and demand side strategies, they need to provide 
particularly accurate and unequivocal information about the potential for saving energy. 
These requirements for precision are amplified by the fact that those interest groups 
which resist proposals to slow down the supply construction programme are able to 
use uncertainties regarding both demand and the scope for conservation strategies to 
great effect. While scientific energy conservation research has sought the type of 
information required by planners, the information it has actually provided has been too 
ambiguous and imprecise to be of use to planners. 
The second possible shortcoming of the research is that while it has attempted to 
assess the 'real scope for energy conservation' (Lewis et al. 1987: 1), the methodologies 
employed have provided information of little value to planners. Quantitative survey 
instruments have been used on numerous occasions to collect reams of 'hard' factual 
data on physical dwelling characteristics and socioeconomic, demographic and 
attitudinal variables which are then used to calculate correlates of household sector 
energy use or to construct models of household energy use. The value of this information 
to policy makers and planners interested in finding effective ways of reducing the 
demand for energy has been variable. As discussed in Chapter Seven, the attempts to 
explain energy use in terms of attitudinal variables has been uninspiring, a result which 
does not surprise many social theorists. The large surveys that employ extensive, as 
opposed to intensive 2, methodologies suffer many other problems. The considerable 
requirements involved in ensuring that the sample is random and representative, and in 
ensuring that the survey instrument is reliable and valid, are so substantial that the 
mechanistic aspects of these surveys tend to quickly dominate the research process 
with the result that getting the survey done becomes the end goal and researchers 
quickly loose sight of the original research question (Adams 1990: 25). Worse, many 
costly social surveys have been rendered of little value because they have failed to ask 
the right questions (Hardin 1991: 48). Although the funding for the large household 
energy conservation survey undertaken in Tasmania in the early 1980s (Challen et al. 
1983), was provided largely for political reasons rather than as part of a serious effort 
to reduce electricity use, it was nonetheless a potentially useful piece of research. It 
was abandoned once the political relevance of energy conservation dissipated and the 
funding for the research began to dry up. This loss of political interest, in turn, 
probably led to the failure to collect data on oil use for space heating that would have 
been desirable in terms of the construction of an econometric model of household sector 
2 Extensive survey methodologies rely on statistical sampling techniques and survey 
instruments which require respondents to answer predetermined questions, often by selecting 
from a narrow range of given response options. Intensive survey methodologies, on the other 
hand, use in-depth techniques which are less structured and allow the respondent to answer 
in their own terms and which permit the researcher to probe more deeply as the interview 
unfolds. 
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demand for energy and the termination of the project before an econometric model was 
produced. 
At the epistemological level, many commentators question the ability of social research 
based on positivist methodologies to cope with the messy vitality of social systems 
(Sayer 1992: 32). Critics of these approaches maintain that they are borrowed from 
the natural sciences and while they are able to point to correlations and attempt to 
predict behaviour, they are ill-equipped to determine the causal factors of that behaviour 
or deal with the task of understanding human behaviour such as why individuals do, 
or do not, invest time, money and effort in energy conserving activities. Without such 
understanding, such writers argue, we are unlikely to be develop effective ways of 
altering their behaviour (Sawhill & Cotton 1986: 16). The dilemma for social scientists 
is that while intensive survey methodologies provide a more powerful tool for 
understanding the behaviour of energy users, the conclusions reached by such research 
often has little immediate policy relevance. Good examples of such research were the 
content analysis of group discussions by Kerby & Phillips (1983) and the non-random, 
small-scale, in-depth surveys carried out David Crossley in Australia in the early 
1980s. Crossly's research stands as one of the few attempts at empirical identification 
of 'barriers' to energy conservation but reached the conclusion that not only did there 
appear to exist a large number of types of barriers to individual energy conservation, 
but that many of these barriers appeared likely to be highly resistant to removal 
(Crossley 1983: 545). 
The policy relevance of much social research has been relatively weak. It has been used 
to suggest, for example, that the use of all policy levers - exhortation, education, 
enticement and enforcement - would probably avhieve meaningful reductions in household 
energy conservation measures (Crossley 1980: 299, Lewis et al. 1987: 109). Social 
research has also been used to point out that a combination of information campaigns 
and minimum insulation standards could increase the number of households with 
thermal insulation (Foster & Holmes 1994: 135). While these conclusion may be valid, 
they are relatively self-evident and do little to render policy makers more informed in 
terms of how much energy will be saved, at what cost, or how permanent these savings 
are likely to be, and so on. 
This criticism that scientific energy conservation research aimed at advancing moderate 
energy conservation as an option has failed to deliver information useful to policy 
makers and planners has been lent tacit support from one prominent Australian energy 
supply organisation. The Gas and Fuel Corporation of Victoria (GFCV) has stated 
that despite massive research effort on household sector energy conservation undertaken 
over the past two decades, energy planners still have little to go by when attempting to 
assess the practical worth of energy conservation proposals (GFCV 1990b: 2). On a 
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less formal level, the argument that scientific energy conservation research has failed to 
inform planners has been supported by the expressed opinion of one energy planner 
attending a workshop on household sector energy conservation in Victoria. This individual 
maintained that in his opinion, the only useful piece of research on household sector 
energy conservation undertaken in Australia to date was the Brunswick research project 
as described and discussed in Chapter Seven of this study 3 . This criticism of scientific 
energy conservation research suggests that even where policy makers have been open 
to the idea of increasing reliance on demand reduction strategies, the scientific research 
has to a very real extent not provided the requisite information to allow them to do so. 
The rejection of moderate energy conservation proposals can therefore be explained in 
terms of political resistance to such strategies and the strategic nature of policy making. 
The limited impact of scientific research to alter policy in this regard can be explained 
by asking, 'What good does it do to recommend well-documented policies and policy 
instruments potentially useful in reducing energy use without addressing the uncertainties 
associated with these policies and policy instruments when it is precisely those 
uncertainties that prevent their adoption?' 
From the above, it is clear that to a very real degree, technical and social energy 
conservation researchers repeat themselves because they tend to define 'the problem' in 
terms of what their disciplinary tools are capable of solving. In this regard, they have 
behaved not so very differently from the energy supply organisations at which they 
have levelled Maslow's famous aphorism, that if all you have is a hammer then it is 
amazing how everything begins to look like a nail (Harwood & Hartley 1980, Lovins & 
Lovins 1981). Those who advocate energy conservation explain the propensity of 
energy supply organisations to rely on continued construction of favoured technologies 
as a consequence of professional myopia. Scientific energy conservation researchers, 
however, have also tended to define the problem - low policy emphasis on energy 
conservation - in terms of what their technical analyses and social surveying skills can 
manage. 
This leaves the question of why, when it is known that at least some scope for energy 
conservation exists, though of uncertain or limited extent, low-cost instruments such as 
prompts and information strategies are not more often employed to encourage energy 
conservation. The Brunswick energy conservation project discussed in Chapter Seven 
of this study (Thomas et al. 1993), as well as other research, has shown that even 
relatively simple strategies, if well designed, are capable of reducing household sector 
demand energy use by a measurable extent. 
3 This information was relayed to the author by his supervisor, Dr John Todd, who attended 
that workshop. 
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Much energy conservation research that has pointed to relatively small reductions in 
energy use has been based on the vague notion that energy conservation is an uncontentious 
goal and that any reduction in energy use is therefore worthwhile. This view appears 
to have been particularly strong during periods of high concern over energy issues and 
the crisis mentality that something must be done and almost anything will be useful has 
been prevalent. An implicit assumption appears to have been that although more 
meaningful energy conservation strategies are resisted, low conservation strategies are 
likely to meet with low resistance so that these, at least, ought to be achievable. 
It has been shown in this study that when the scope for energy conservation is uncertain, 
energy conservation tends to be overlooked as a planning option and that this is due to 
the fact that energy supply expansion is lumpy and that this is particularly acute in the 
case of reticulated electricity supply. Once the gap between supply and demand has 
been reduced, planners have a brief period in which to decide whether to quickly 
commit themselves to a new supply expansion project or to defer the need for investment 
in capacity expansion by reducing demand. It has been seen that planners are concerned 
primarily with avoiding shortages and so dismiss the latter option if the scope for 
energy conservation is uncertain. Other levers, such as deceleration or acceleration of 
the current supply construction programme are likely to be used instead as the primary 
means for balancing supply and demand. If the scope for energy conservation is 
uncertain and low, then obviously it will be even less likely to be relied on as a planning 
option in such situations. 
Where the scope for energy conservation is relatively certain but is also relatively small, 
energy conservation is rejected because of the planning bias for load forecasts to err on 
the side of oversupply rather than undersupply. In this case, energy conservation is 
rejected because of a threshold effect and the uncertainties associated with projected 
growth in total demand. Low potential for energy conservation provides an ability to 
defer the need for capacity expansion by a short period only, the length of this period 
being determined by the projected load growth. Where the projected rate of growth in 
demand is high, energy conservation will be able to defer the need for capacity expansion 
by a very brief period and the advantages of doings so are swamped by the large 
uncertainties over total load growth. Low but certain scope for conserving energy is 
therefore overlooked in the rush to ensure that the next supply expansion programme is 
started in time to avoid possible shortages. Where energy suppliers are keen to commit 
decision makers to an early start of the next construction project in order to ensure 
continuity of the construction programme, the scope for using low energy conservation 
strategies to defer the start to further capacity expansion is even more likely to be 
overlooked. 
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The case study of electricity planning in Tasmania discussed in Chapter Six showed 
that this threshold is not necessarily very small. In the early 1990s, the HEC's own 
demand management unit identified 20 MW of potential energy savings achievable at a 
cost below the marginal cost of supply (Energy Council of Tasmania 1994: 32). While 
20 MW is a small amount of electricity in a large system, in the case of Tasmania where 
the projected increase in demand was estimated to be of the order of 200 MW over ten 
years it amounted to approximately one year's growth in demand and, therefore, the 
capacity to defer the construction of supply augmentation projects by approximately 
one year. This scope for conserving energy looked set to be ignored, however, in the 
rush to develop a new increment in generating capacity in order to encourage industrial 
expansion. 
Where the scope for energy conservation is limited and uncertain it is therefore relied 
on merely as a last resort strategy to assist planners balancing supply and demand in 
times of hardship or stress induced by drought or other problems. It is also relied on 
during periods of heightened concern over energy issues when low energy conservation 
strategies are often employed for public consumption, are used as a first resort strategy 
by providing policy makers with symbolic gestures to imply that something is being 
done about the problem. Politicians, furthermore, are quick to seize on energy conservation 
strategies that focus on the individual and the household as these provide the means 
for displacing the perceived locus of the energy-related problem and relieving politicians 
of the need to rely on less popular strategies. Such strategies portray the problem as 
the personal use of energy and the solution, therefore, to rest with the individual. 
The non-adoption of low energy conservation strategies therefore has to be explained 
in terms of both the uncertainty associated with the scope for energy conservation and 
its limited scope. While the failure of much energy conservation research to reduce the 
uncertainty associated with energy conservation programmes has already been noted, 
the reasons why this research has tended to point to only limited scope for reducing 
energy use have not been addressed. One reason appears to have been that researchers 
have focused inordinately on the personal level and on the scope for household sector 
energy conservation in particular rather than on the transport, commercial and industrial 
sectors (Anderson & McDougall 1980, Crossley et al. 1986: 1). 
Numerous reasons have been used by writers and researchers to justify their selection 
of the household sector as the focus of their research, some of which are convincing, 
many less so. It has been claimed for example that the household sector is important 
because household sector energy use is particularly inefficient (Crossley etal. 1986: 1) 
and that this is due to the fact that householders are less informed and less rational 
than firms (Savitz & Hirst 1986: 98). This claim has been contested by those who have 
studied the reasons for the non-adoption of energy conservation within the commercial 
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sector (de Camio 1993). Others have cited the relatively large portion of total household 
expenditure comprised by energy bills as the reason why the household sector is 
important (Department of Minerals and Energy 1984: 4). The problem with this argument 
is that those for whom the costs of energy are a burden do not have the access to 
capital to increase the efficiency of their energy-using equipment and have relatively 
little discretionary ability to reduce energy use by curtailing energy services (Joerges 
1979, Bradshaw & Harris 1983, Bradshaw and Hutton 1983). Yet others have argued 
that since all energy is ultimately used by individuals, encouraging individuals to 
conserve energy plays an important role in changing values (Pears 1990: 447). The 
household sector has been as the easiest place to attempt to alter individual attitudes 
(Monnier 1983: 197, Crossley 1983: 533). 
More pragmatic arguments used to justify a focus on the household sector have included 
the argument that household sector energy conservation is important because if household 
sector energy use is reduced there will be more energy available for other uses (Lewis et 
al. 1987: 6), and the costs of supplying and distributing energy to the household sector 
are inordinately high (Lewis et al. 1987: 1, DPIE 1990a: 10). Yet others have maintained 
that other sectors are equally or more important but are more difficult to target (Becker 
& Seligman 1981: 2, Crossley et al. 1986: 6) and that more is known about energy use 
and energy-using equipment in the household sector than in other sectors (Pears and 
Versluis 1993, Section 8: 43). Yet others critics of this inordinate research focus on the 
household sector have suggested that the reasons for it have more to do with the 
symbolic importance of the household sector (Weizeorick 1991: 257), a sentiment 
echoed by those who perceive the disproportionately high focus on household sector in 
recycling programmes as serving the same purpose (Horton 1995: 16). 
However valid or invalid these reasons, the point is that the household sector is not the 
only important sector in which to look for reducing the demand for energy. The author 
concurs with the argument that while all sectors are important, the household sector is 
only one sector and in some cases may be relatively less important than other sectors 
(Aldershot & Kanis 1984: 1). Encouraging responsible individual energy use is only 
useful as part of an overall effort involving governments, industry, commerce and 
individuals. Both researchers and governments, however, have tended in the past to 
focus primarily on individuals and the household sector (Crossley 1979a: 57, Tonn & 
Berry 1985: 1243). Those pushing government initiatives to encourage or enforce 
household sector energy conservation claim that they expected these programmes to be 
subsequently extended to other sectors of the economy and were disappointed when 
this did not occur (Hirst 1986: 235). This emphasis on the household sector has 
contributed to the perception that the scope for energy conservation is limited. 
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In summary, low energy conservation strategies are ignored because they are easy to 
ignore. They do little to resolve energy-related problems at hand and are dismissed as 
tinkering. In normal circumstances, furthermore, planners find it easier to rely on other 
strategies to balance supply and demand and overlook low energy conservation strategies. 
The rejection of low energy conservation strategies can therefore be explained by asking 
simply, 'What good does it do?' 
The relevant question arising from this critique of energy conservation research is what 
constitutes useful scientific energy conservation research? To answer this, it is necessary 
to ask what information planners require before energy conservation is relied on as a 
rational demand reduction strategy and the discussion now turns to that question. 
9.4 Energy Conservation Research and Strategic Planning 
From the above discussion it is clear that a serious commitment to energy conservation 
as a strategic planning tool requires two things. First, political resistance to a slow-down 
of the supply expansion programme needs to be overcome so that electricity planning 
is based on what is economically rational from the social perspective rather than on 
what is in the political interests of individual politicians, bureaucracies and bulk energy 
users. Secondly, it has been shown that even energy planning based on an economically 
rational footing continues to be biased towards oversupply rather than undersupply, 
and energy conservation is ignored unless the uncertainties associated with energy 
conservation option are reduced. What is also required to achieve economically rational 
reductions in energy use that are in the strategic interests of the energy supplier and the 
energy uses - the much touted 'win-win solution' - is research that demonstrates accurately 
and unambiguously the amount of energy savings available and the costs of achieving 
those savings in a specific place at a specific time. Research is therefore needed which 
allows planners to accurately predict the outcome of various energy conservation options 
and programmes. 
A variety of research is potentially useful. Technical research which assesses the 
performance of energy saving equipment, both in the laboratory and in situ and research 
which provides detailed base-line data, and especially longitudinal data, of sectorial 
energy end-uses, are both useful. Both improve the capacity of planners to model the 
likely impacts of energy conservation policies on demand. Most required of all is pilot 
testing of energy conservation programmes that permit the effectiveness of these 
programmes to be gauged in terms of their capacity to reduce demand in a particular 
place and at a particular time. 
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But in pointing to these types of research activities that are required, a serious dilemma 
emerges. Large pilot programmes, laboratory and in situ testing of equipment on a 
large scale, and the collection of accurate and disaggregated end-use data all require 
substantial resources. While the research undertaken in Chapter Eight of this study 
was used, in part, to point to a type of research that may be useful, the resources 
required for useful research are generally of an order or two larger than what that 
project involved. Independent institutions can, and occasionally do, undertake research 
of this scale. The School of Architecture from the University of Melbourne undertook a 
monitoring programme of the energy use in public housing in Tasmania in the mid 1980s 
(Coldicutt et al. 1986). A team of researchers from the University of Tasmania surveyed 
a representative sample (1.2%) of Tasmanian households in the early 1980s with a 
view to obtaining sufficiently detailed data to permit accurate econometric modelling 
of household sector energy use (Challen et al. 1983). The Department of Industry, 
Technology and Resources was instrumental in pushing for greater reliance on demand 
management strategies in Victoria and undertook a very large survey of households in 
that state with a view to modelling household energy use and energy conservation 
behaviour (Lewis et al. 1987). The RMIT and the University of Tasmania combined to 
monitor the impacts of an energy conservation information programme (Thomas et al. 
1993), and the Applied Physics Department of the University of Sydney has been 
actively demonstrating the capacity of non-grid solar energy supply systems in 
combination with energy efficiency household equipment to reduce household sector 
reticulated energy requirements (Mills 1991a). For a variety of reasons, however, not 
all of these research efforts have provided planners with information that render 
reliance on demand reduction strategies more feasible or likely. The research by the 
Applied Physics Department examined the technical rather than the economic potential 
for reducing energy use. The monitoring of energy use in public houses in Tasmania 
was undertaken at a time that the State government and the HEC were actively seeking 
to expand the supply of electricity. The large survey of Tasmanian households was 
abandoned once political interest in energy conservation evaporated and as the research 
funds dried up. 
The dilemma, therefore, is that the organisations in the best position to undertake the 
research necessary for reducing the uncertainty associated with the impacts of various 
demand reduction strategies are the energy supply organisations themselves. These 
organisations have access to the necessary resources, are better placed to collect base-line 
end-use data, and are more aware of what information is actually required. Energy 
supply organisations such as the HEC have periodically engaged in collection of end-use 
base-line data for marketing purposes. In the early 1990s, for example, the HEC's 
Marketing Division, used data loggers to record the instantaneous load of a random 
sample of 200 all-electric households at the half hourly intervals over a period of one 
year. The information was collected, however, mainly for marketing purposes and did 
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not disaggregate the various end-uses within households. Such information, furthermore, 
tends not to be publicly released. The HEC also briefly undertook limited pilot testing 
of energy conservation measures in the early 1990s during a brief period of heightened 
concern over the social costs of energy use and the economic costs of hydro-electric 
shortages. The impacts on electricity use of a programme of replacing incandescent 
lights with compact fluorescent lamps on King Island, and of installing insulation in 
100 households in Launceston, were both monitored. The temporary nature of those 
pilot testing programmes, and their small scale compared to what is actually required 
in order to ascertain the true scope for reducing demand, however, can be gleaned by 
comparing them to the $50 million demand side management (DSM) programme initiated 
by the Kirner Labor government in Victoria in the late 1980s (SECV 1992). 
There are a number of conclusions that can therefore be reached at this stage concerning 
waht has to happen before policy makers and planners are persuaded to increase 
reliance on energy conservation. The first is that planning needs to be open and 
accountable, and removed from the control of those experts or politicians whose interests 
are served by rapid growth in energy supply. Secondly, the information supplied by 
research needs to be unequivocal, it needs to point to worthwhile levels of energy 
savings, and it needs to be precise and accurate. As the agancies most capable of 
undertaking this research are the energy suppliers themselves, this means that for 
energy supply organisations to undertake the necessary research, these institutions 
either have to arrive at the conclusion that DSM is in their strategic interests, or be 
required to adopt DSM strategies. The history of DSM to date, however, has shown 
that the latter tends to be the case and that adoption of DSM strategies therefore 
requires a priori change at the political level. Such political change, where it has 
occurred, has tended to be driven by either economic imperatives or the political need 
to avoid public dissent over energy policy and planning from spilling over into the 
political arena with damaging consequences. As the current restructuring of the energy 
supply industry towards a market-led energy sector has been driven predominantly by 
rising costs energy as a result of past planning failure and the political need to find an 
alternative to raising energy prices further (Orchison 1996: 38), the relevant question at 
this stage is to what degree this restructuring is congruent with the changes discussed 
above that are required before energy conservation is adopted as a policy option. 
9.5 Energy Conservation in a Competitive Market 
Many writers have maintained that economic rationalism and environmental goals can, 
and do sometimes overlap. For this reason, most environmentalists have embraced the 
competitive energy market reforms in Australia and elsewhere as a step in the right 
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direction. The assumption has been that in a more competitive electricity market will 
mean an end to the technocratic style of planning that has led to the overgrowth of 
electricity supply and planning failure in the form of massive overcapacities. There 
are, the argument goes, two reasons why this should be so. 
First, historic overgrowth of electricity supply relied on a policy of supplying subsidised 
electricity to large industrial clients. In a truly market-driven electricity supply industry 
there are likely to remain incentives to subsidise large energy-intensive industries, but 
the rate of growth in demand for electricity should be reduced if the market supports 
increased prices and if the process of 'reverse adaption' is abandoned. Moreover, an 
interconnected transmission system, which is seen as essential to the creation of a 
competitive electricity market, would allow more efficient use of the entire system. To 
this extent, competitive market reforms should result in energy being conserved since a 
few power stations that would have otherwise been built would not be. It is interesting 
to note that local environmental opposition to the proposed interconnection of the 
Queensland and New South Wales' grids led to the announcement by the incoming 
conservative state government in Queensland that a new coal-fired power station 
would be built as an alternative to interconnection. 
The second assumption behind the push toward a more competitive electricity supply 
industry is that energy suppliers operating in a competitive market are more risk averse 
than are vertically integrated energy generators and suppliers operating under 
monopolistic conditions, and more risk averse than public monopolies protected by 
government guarantees. A major advantage of competitive market reforms, from the 
environmentalists' perspective, is that such risk averse energy suppliers are less likely 
to rely on large, capital-intensive electricity supply technologies, such as nuclear power 
plants and large hydro-electric schemes, but are more likely to minimise financial risks 
by relying on lower cost and smaller scale technologies with shorter lead-times. 
Deregulation and the competitive market reforms have therefore led to a 'dash to gas' 
and rapid deployment of gas turbine electricity generation systems (Fells & Horlock 
1995: 206). Resorting to smaller scale and lower capital cost expansion options, 
Puiseux (1987) pointed out, permits a closer matching of the lead times of industrial 
and electricity supply expansion and should, in theory, reduce the risks of very large 
overcapacities and the search for a market for the spare capacity which has so often 
rendered the construction of electricity supply a virtual end in itself rather than a 
means to an end. It was with understandable concern, therefore, that Kellow (1996: 
177) recently pointed out that the two most notable examples of privatisation of 
power stations in Australia over recent years (the Queensland governments sale of its 
Gladstone Power station and the Victorian government's sale of Loy Yang B power 
station) have both relied on government guaranteed purchase of electricity. The 
Tasmanian case study in Chapter Six indicated that developers of Bass Strait gas 
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reserves also wanted such guarantees from the Tasmanian government. Government 
willingness to go down the competitive market road has therefore been checked by the 
political desire to protect energy-intensive industries perceived to be critical to economic 
growth. 
While truly competitive market reforms have been interpreted by many environmentalists 
as positive change, these reforms also have the capacity to drive up energy use. These 
reforms have been driven primarily by the desire to reduce the costs of electricity to 
manufacturers as a means of increasing their capacity to compete with their competitors 
overseas and basic economics suggests that reductions in the price of electricity leads 
to an increase in the demand for electricity. For this reason, a small number of 
environmentalists have adopted a more ambivalent stance in regard to these reforms 
(Diesendorf 1994, 1996). 
The shift from public to private control of energy planning also has implications for the 
degree to which energy suppliers rely on DSM to meet future requirements in energy. 
Under a market-led system, reliance on DSM could be reduced. The reason for this is 
that while the risk averse nature of markets leads to reduced reliance on capital 
intensive energy generation technologies, high risk aversion also reduces planning horizons 
but without reducing planning margins (Lucas & Papaconstantinou 1982). Private 
energy supply industry, or publicly owned energy suppliers asked to behave as private 
companies, have shorter planning horizons than do governments or public energy supply 
monopolies. But in order to reduce the rate of growth of the supply expansion programme, 
pilot testing of demand management programmes on a large scale is necessary. This 
pilot testing needs to be carried out well before the gap between supply and demand is 
narrowed and pressure mounts to quickly expand supply to avoid future shortages. It 
therefore needs to be undertaken at a time when there still exists considerable surplus 
capacity and when it is in the short-term strategic interests of the electricity supplier to 
pursue load growth rather than engage in demand reduction. This clash between 
long-term requirements for planning and short-term interests of businesses means that 
competitive commercial energy suppliers are less likely than public energy authorities to 
engage in the long-range planning necessary for DSM. An indication of the weaker 
emphasis on DSM with the move to a competitive market was the premature termination 
of the $50 million Victorian demand management programme and the scuttling of the 
Demand Management Unit in that state in the early 1990s. The Victoria Liberal 
government has pursued competitive market reforms and privatisation of the electricity 
supply industry more aggressively than have other state governments in Australia. In 
doing so, it made the abrupt transition from the state with the most ambitious DSM 
programme in place to the state with one of the lowest priorities on DSM and Victorian 
generators have begun aggressive marketing of electricity within Victoria and neighbouring 
states. 
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The shift towards a competitive market model may have a further downside from the 
environmental perspective. The shorter planning horizons of competitive suppliers 
means that DSM programmes adopted may tend to focus primarily on those measures 
which can produce short-term reductions in energy use. Measures such as the replacement 
of incandescent light globes with compact fluorescent lamps and retrofitting that involves 
stuffing insulation into the ceilings of the existing stock of houses have been common 
DSM approaches, while measures aimed at increasing the efficiency of more durable 
energy-using equipment such as the design of housing have tended to fall outside the 
ambit of DSM. This represents a serious shortcoming to those who consider that the 
most potent argument for increasing the efficiency of energy use is the moral need to 
ensure that we do not lumber the next generation with inefficient equipment which they 
cannot change in a hurry should they encounter energy problems (Rosenfeld 1991: 459). 
The shorter planning horizons of competitive energy suppliers may also have implications 
for the adoption of renewable energy technologies as shorter planning horizons does 
not foster experimentation with less tried and tested technologies. Although renewable 
energy has been subsidised within the framework of a market-led energy supply industry 
in Britain (Fells & Horlock 1995: 212), this has been an inadvertent consequence of the 
need to protect the nuclear energy industry by introduction of a Non Fossil Fuel 
Obligation levy. As renewable energy technologies (RETs) are also alternatives to fossil 
fuel, investors in renewable technologies were able to demand similar subsidies funded 
from the levy. The levy, however, is due to be phased out in the near future (Jackson 
1996: 125). There are two reasons why greater experimentation with renewable 
technologies is important. One is the ability of renewable energy technologies to reduce 
the environmental impacts of conventional energy systems, such as reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions and other pollutants. The other is that it is in our strategic interests to 
do so. History has shown that without such subsidisation of less tried and tested 
technologies, lock-in quickly occurs and produces robust rather than resilient energy 
systems. Robust systems have little ability to cope with unexpected problems. The are 
built on uniformity and, like the Titanic, are built to withstand known problems but 
have little capacity to deal with the unexpected. Resilience, on the other hand, is the 
capacity to bounce back, to cope with unanticipated problems, and is built on flexibility 
and diversity. The virtues of resilient energy systems based on diversity and flexibility, 
compared to robust energy systems based on a narrow range of large and centralised 
technologies, have been well debated (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983: 196-7, Janike 1990: 
60-2). Dryzek (1987: 53-4) has similarly expounded the ecological and social virtues 
of resilient as opposed to robust political systems. Industrial society has built its 
energy systems to a very high degree on fossil fuel technologies and is now confronted 
with the dilemma of how to reduce reliance on these fuels. Collingridge (1980) saw 
technological lock-in to be the result of the rational planning which focused only on 
minimising the risks of supply shortages which could damage economic growth, but 
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which was blind to the economic risks of oversupply. His explanation was limited 
both because it failed to acknowledge the other risks attendant upon continued reliance 
on a single energy conversion technology and because it failed to see that technological 
lock-in was largely the result of political rather than rational decision making. If 
reliance on renewable energy technology systems is to be significantly increased, economic 
rationalism will have to be abandoned and renewable energy technologies will need to 
be subsidised. 
Another serious downside to the shift to a competitive market, from the social perspective, 
is that it has been associated in many instances with a reduced public input into 
electricity planning and policy formulation. It is well known that policy and planning 
are more likely to result in socially desirable outcomes when public involvement in the 
those processes is increased (Crossley 1983: 545) and has been increasingly applied in 
the USA and Canada (Ducsik 1986, Henderson 1986). Although limited, the mechanisms 
for public consultation in electricity planning in Victoria put in place by the Cain Labor 
government in the early 1980s, and which were subsequently extended by the Kirner 
administration (SECV & DITR 1989c), were hailed as instrumental in bringing about 
electricity planning reform in that state during the 1980s (Pears 1990: 449-50). Those 
mechanisms for public consultation, however, were dissolved along with the demand 
management programmes and the Demand Management Unit by the incoming Kennett 
Liberal administration. Public participation in electricity planning and energy policy in 
Tasmania has remained extremely limited. In 1990, the HEC briefly adopted a type of 
'Glastnost', offering an open invitation to the public to attend its only annual public 
general meeting, but reversed its decision in the following year. The public symposia on 
electricity planning held in Tasmania in 1994 appear to have been designed for public 
consumption rather than as a bone fide attempt to consult with the public on the 
direction and detail of policy reform. At the global level, it has been argued that 
competitive electricity market reforms may have dashed the anti-nuclear lobby's hopes 
for an early phase out of nuclear power in countries such as Sweden. Politically 
imposed moratoria on further construction of nuclear power in such countries are now 
likely to be abandoned and the decisions as to how to meet future energy requirements 
left to private investors rather than the government (Midtunn 1996: 63). 
The above arguments, and the history of DSM in the United States of America and 
other countries, suggests that DSM tends not to be adopted in a market-led energy 
supply industry unless energy suppliers are regulated to ensure that energy conservation 
programmes are deployed and that energy users are encouraged to conserve energy. 
But this history has also shown that DSM programmes on their own are unlikely to 
result in significant reductions in energy use. The spread of DSM in Canada and 
Western over recent years has been described by energy conservation proponents as a 
revolution (Flavin & Lenssen 1994). Ironically, just as this has occurred, interest on the 
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part of both utilities and regulators in the USA has rapidly ebbed (Sioshansi 1996: 
284). The declining interest in DSM in the USA has been the result of sustained 
criticism by economists of the economic benefits of those programmes (Joskow & Marron 
1992), the equity of mandated DSM programmes (Sioshansi 1991), and of the overall 
economic efficiency of these programmes (Sutherland 1991, 1994). Most of all, it has 
been a consequence of increasing utility disdain for DSM programmes and the shift 
towards a market-led energy supply industry (Gellings 1996: 288). The common 
perception among energy utilities in the USA is that DSM programmes marginally 
increase the costs of supply, and are therefore no longer in the interest of the energy 
suppliers. The DSM programmes undertaken in the USA, furthermore, have for the 
most part involved shifting time of use as a means of reducing peak loads, or increasing 
off peak loads, and have been beneficial from the utility's perspective but had relatively 
little impact on overall demand for electricity (Clinton et al. 1986: 126). DSM programmes 
undertaken in Australia to date have predominantly served the same purpose (Saddler 
1994: 54). Despite the large expenditures on DSM in the United States of America and 
the large number of utilities involved, the largest slice of this effort has been undertaken 
by a very small number of utilities which account for the bulk of total expenditure on 
DSM programmes. 
One common approach to overcoming the shortcomings of DSM programmes has been 
to require energy suppliers to use Least-Cost planning (LCP) or integrated resource 
planning (IRP) methodologies. Even this regulation, however, is not a panacea as there 
is no elegant and totally effective regulatory system and many demand reduction 
programmes adopted by utilities in the United States of America under the Least-Cost 
Planning approach have been poorly designed and implemented (Clinton et al. 1986: 
123). 
An alternative approach many analysts consider to hold considerable promise is to 
foster a healthy energy service industry to compete with the energy supply industry 
(Clinton et al. 1986: 137, Roberts et al. 1991:125-6, Keating 1996: 321, Chamberlin & 
Herman 1996: 328-9). This solution has recently been adopted by the Australian 
National Grid Management Council (1995) as its preferred means of encouraging DSM 
and energy efficiency within the context of a market-led energy supply industry in 
Australia. The degree to which a small and fragmented embryonic energy service 
industry dealing in the sale, installation and financing of energy efficiency equipment, 
would be able to effectively compete against the already established energy supply 
industry with massive capital assets and cash flows, and with significant market 
power, remains unanswered. 
There exists, therefore, a large body of opinion which suggests that significant reductions 
in energy use are unlikely to result from a simple shift to simple market-led strategies. 
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Diesendorf (1996), for example, has argued that these reforms will not result in reductions 
in energy use. In doing so he has put advanced his own proposals for 'reforming the 
reforms', but notes that these proposals are resisted by many of the most powerful 
stakeholders in the process. The argument that the introduction of competititive market 
reforms alone will not result in reductions in energy use is also supported by the recent 
experience in the United Kingdom where light-handed regulation of a competitive 
market has not only failed to reduce energy use but has produced considerable surplus 
capacity (Mittra et al. 1994: 45, Lees 1995: 196, Fells & Horlock 1995: 213). In 
summing up his historical treatise on the Electricte de France, historian Robert Frost 
(1991: 252) has written that nationalisation of the industry following the second world 
war overturned an entire trajectory of political thought because the behaviour of the 
new publicly owned bureaucracy was so little different from the behaviour of the 
private firms that it replaced. Those who now see 'liberalisation' of the market as a 
revolution (Patterson 1992: 188, Flavin & Lenssen 1994: 1042) tend to overlook his 
point. Without regulation that makes the pursuit of energy conservation profitable for 
the electricity supply industry and expanding sales of electricity unprofitable (Moskovitz 
1992: 399), this change is likely to be, to a very real degree, revisionist rather than 
reformist in character. 
It is too early to tell what is likely to happen within the Australian context in relation 
to energy conservation. There are signs that energy supply industry is moving closer to 
embracing demand side management and Least-Cost Planning philosophies. The 
National Grid Management Council (1995: 11) has cautiously accepted in principle a 
number of regulatory measures. These include cost reflective pricing, mandated energy 
performance standards of energy-using equipment, the decoupling of profits from volume 
of electricity sales by price capping, the use of integrated resource planning, mandatory 
DSM programmes, and the demand bidding in wholesale electricity. Whether the 
measures will be introduced by Australian governments in the near to mid-term, however, 
appears doubtful. Both the new federal government and a number of state governments 
are evangelists of the free market and are keen to 'sell off the family silver' (Davis 1995: 
256) and pass on to the private sector as much policy decision making as possible. 
Within this context, meaningful regulation of the Australian electricity supply industry 
does not appear likely in the short-term. 
This inability of even a regulated market to result in substantial reductions in energy 
use has led many environmental writers conclude that measures beyond regulation of 
the energy supply industry which mandate DSM and Least-Cost Planning will be 
necessary to reduce energy use to sustainable levels. These individuals look for 
discontinuities that will allow us, or force us, to break with the patterns of the past. 
They look hopefully to international concern over energy-related environmental problems, 
and climatic change in particular, as an issue that will force government action on this 
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front. Many see the greenhouse issue as having the clear potential to turn the slow 
pace of reform around and force rapid change from above. How likely, and how soon, 
international agreement can be reached on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, 
however, is unclear. On the optimistic side, through the incrementally slow process of 
increased scientific assessment of the risks, the onus of proof has shifted away from 
those who consider the enhanced greenhouse effect to be a risk that requires immediate 
and concerted action, to those who hold that it may not be and advise waiting for the 
elusive scientific proof (Anonymous 1995: 198). Even those scientists who consider 
that reductions in greenhouse gases are required, however, continue to disagree over 
what constitutes the most rational greenhouse gas stabilization strategy. One member 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), climatologist Tom Wigley, 
together with two economists, has recently advocated refraining from active intervention 
to reduce emissions for approximately three decades. The argument advanced by 
these authors is that new energy technologies will be commercialised over the next 
thirty years and that by waiting until these technologies are available and then rapidly 
putting these in place, it will be possible to substantially reduce emissions without 
damaging national economies (Wigley et al. 1996). Whilst unpopular amongst other 
members of the IPCC seeking to convince governments that drastic and immediate 
action is required, it is likely to be an argument popular with many governments. 
Within the Australian context at least, there appears room for pessimism on the 
question of how quickly governments are likely to act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Although Australia was embarrassed at the Berlin Framework Convention on climate 
change in March 1995 with figures which showed it to be the highest per capita 
greenhouse gas emitter in the world (Hamilton 1994, Steering Committee of the Climate 
Change Study 1995: 61-2), cheap energy continues to be seen as one of the few areas 
where Australia has a competitive advantage, and both federal and state governments 
continue to pursue a policy of attracting energy-intensive industry (ATSEC 1994: 15). 
The degree to which the Australian government will introduce measures to reduce 
energy use is therefore likely to depend on the ability of the international community 
agreement to reach agreement on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Despite 
environmentalist demands for a serious national commitment to greenhouse gas emission 
on moral grounds (Kinrade 1995b), the structural constraints on government suggest 
that moves in this direction are likely to continue at a snail's pace. While countries 
whose economies are highly dependent on fossil fuel use, such as Australia, are likely 
to come under increasing pressure from countries whose economies are less dependent 
on fossil fuel use, especially the Eurpoean countries, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
they are likely to continue insisting that reducing greenhouse gas emissions would 
disproportionately damage the their economies. They are also likely to argue that any 
efforts on their part to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would have a negligible impact 
on global greenhouse gas emissions while developing countries such as China are rapidly 
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increasing their greenhouse gas emissions and are exempt from greenhouse reduction 
targets. Not only is the electricity supply industry in such countries likely to resist 
moves for early retirement of fossil fuel-based generation infrastructure, but in Australia's 
case, coal is the nation's single greatest export income earner. This makes it even less 
likely that the Australian government will move quickly to support international efforts 
to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
The fragmented nature of political responsibility in federal political systems such as 
Australia further slows the pace of reform, with state governments likely to remain 
unwilling to adopt 'no regrets' policy measures until convinced that the costs of not 
adopting them are higher than the costs of doing so. While optimists maintain that the 
history of international agreements suggests that such agreement will eventually be 
reached (Christie 1990, Brenton 1994, Wensley 1994), less optimistic observers point 
out that the only truly international environmental treaty in place to date has been the 
phasing out of CFCs and that the motives behind the CFC treaty were radically 
different from those at play behind a treaty designed to stabilise atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases. To the extent that reaching international agreement 
on greenhouse gas reductions will involve agreement to reduce economic growth, these 
writers imply, reaching them will make the process behind the strategic arms limitations 
treaty (SALT) and the international treaty phasing out CFCs look like child's play (de 
Freitas 1991, Sinclair 1991, Wildavsky 1992). 
9.6 A Conclusion 
The gist of the above discussion is likely to displease many. To the technological 
optimists they will be too pessimistic. To such individuals, the purpose of research is 
to find solutions rather than to merely point to the reasons why change may be 
difficult. Admittedly, much is uncertain and, with a bit of luck, their optimism may 
yet prove to be justified. Governments may suddenly introduce regulations to significantly 
curb the rate of growth in energy use and to increase the efficiency of energy use. Those 
governments presently dragging their feet on the issue of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
may bow to pressure and introduce greenhouse gas reduction measures, regulations 
and laws. In the process, they may significantly reduce the rate of growth of energy 
use, increase the efficiency of energy use and reliance on renewable energy systems. 
The limited competitive market reforms put in place may prove to be more effective in 
reducing energy use than suggested above. The important point, however, is that it 
would be dangerous to assume that this will be the case. 
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Returning to the issue of the utility of scientific energy conservation research, from the 
preceding discussion, the only thing that appears relatively certain is that debate over 
the need to reduce energy will be ongoing. It will be ongoing because the fundamental 
frictions created by continued increase of energy use - the ecological health of the 
planet, moral issues, social values such as aesthetics, and debate about the sort of 
society we want to live in - will not go away. It will also be ongoing because of the 
structural impediments that retard the pace of social and environmental reforms. Because 
of this, technical and social energy conservation research will continue to be used in the 
attempt to inform policy makers about how energy can be conserved and by pointing 
to policies and policy instruments potentially useful in achieving that goal. What this 
study suggests is that throughout thats process it will be worth bearing in mind Herbert 
Spencer's (1879: vii) advice that 'only by varied reiteration can alien conceptions be 
forced on reluctant minds'. For it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the function of 
much technical and social energy conservation research undertaken to date has been 
the political one of raising the normative appeal of energy conservation as an option 
rather than as a genuine attempt to increase our understanding and knowledge. The 
major conclusion that can be drawn from this study, however, is that in order to serve 
a socially useful function, this energy conservation research needs to be coupled with a 
good sense of what really needs to be done. If the aim of the research is to influence 
policy, then it is axiomatic that political and sociological questions need to occupy a 
much more central position in these analyses. For this research to be effective, the 
rational, strategic and political dimensions of energy planning need to be understood. 
This means that the behaviour of energy institutions and the regulatory framework in 
which they operate, the policy making and planning processes, and the complexities of 
environmental problems, individual energy use and political systems all need to be 
comprehended. Until that is done, these efforts will continue to produce more repetition 
and frustration then they will useful policy guidance or reform. 
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Glossary 
An integrated temperature transducer produced by the 
Analogue Devices Inc. (USA) with a linear current output of 
1 uA/K over the temperature range -55 °C to +150 °C. 
The estimated average annual output of a scheme based on 
historical hyrdological data. There may be large fluctuations 
in actual annual output from one year to the next as a 
consequence of fluctuations in rainfall. 
A voluntary national standard code or specification prepared 
by means of a consensus process under the auspices of 
Standards Australia. 
Costs that can be avoided by investing in a particular option, 
e.g. investment in energy conservation can result in avoiding 
the cost of operating a supply plant. 
Energy which does not need to be supplied as a result of 
energy conservation or demand-side measures. 
the process whereby a manufacturer purchases some products 
manufactuered by another firm but applies its own brand 
name to the product. Two firms will often exchange products 
in this way, reducing the investment in manufaturing 
equipment of both. 
The co-production of electricity and heat in an industruial 
process. 
An option is cost-effective if it can achieve the same result at 
a lower cost. 
Requirements for energy. 
Meeting society's energy requirments by reducing the demand 
for energy. 
The systematic planning and implementation of energy utility 
services designed to influence customer use of energy in ways 
that will produce desired changes in the utility's load. 
The amount of energy avialable at the point of end use. 
Energy produced directly or indirectly by conversion processes 
from primary energy sources. 
The energy consumed by a particular market segment or 
company for a particular task (e.g. electricity for refrigeration, 
gas for space heating). 
The ratio of energy used to provide a service (e.g. lighting) 
compared with the level of service (e.g lumens of light).energy 



































An examination of an energy system to assess the most 
appropriate sources of energy to use and opportunities for 
efficiency improvements. 
The amount of energy used to produce a unit of economic 
output. Usually measured as the ratio of total primary energy 
requirements (Joules) to GNP (measured in constant dollars). 
Confusion associated with this term arises because it is 
sometimes defined as the change in energy use per change in 
GNP, a parameter which can be either positive or negative. 
A term used to in economic and industrial geography to 
describe industries which do not need to locate in close 
proximity to the source of raw materials and are therefore not 
tied to a specific geographical location. 
Naturally occurring, exhaustible and finite energy resources 
which are of fossil origon (e.g. crude oil, brown coal, black 
coal, natural gas). 
Originally 'material for the fireplace'. Material whose energy 
content can be mobilized where and when it is desired for use. 
(Note: Some commentators limit the concept of fuel to only 
those forms of energy which are commercially tradeable. 
Others include electricity in their definition of fuel although it 
cannot yet be commercially stored in bulk). 
Shortwave incoming solar radiation is absorbed by the Earth's 
surface and re-emitted as shortwave (infra red) radiation, 
some of which is absorbed by certain gases in the lower 
atmosphere. This cause the lower atmosphere to warm up 
relative to the upper atmosphere and is referred to as the 
(natural) greenhouse effect. The enhanced greenhouse effect 
refers the effects of anthropogenic increases in the 
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the lower atmosphere. 
Greenhouse gases are those chemicals in the lower atmosphere 
which absorb long wavelength radiation from radiated from 
the Earth's surface. The most important greenhouse gases are 
carbon dioxide, methane, CFCs, oxides of nitrogen, ozone and 
water vapour. 
An approach to electricity planning that involves integrating 
supply and demand curves to allow examination of the effects 
of supply costs on demand. 
The connection between two or more transmission grids. It is 
used to allow transfers of electricty sales from one regioon to 
another or to share reserve plant margin. 
An economic term meaning goods, such as steel or energy, 
which are used in the production of other goods rather than 
for final consumption. 
Electricity planning based on meeting increased requirements 
for energy by the lowest cost means of meeting energy 
requirements before more costly measures are adopted. 
the process of selling at a loss, often with fixed interest vendor 
finance, in the early stages of developing a new market or 
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load 	 Instantaneous demand for electric power. 
The ratio (percent) of the average load to peak load of an 
energy supply system. It can also be the ratio of the average 
load to the generating capacity of a system. In this study, the 
former meaning is used. 
In Tasmania, major industries are those firms supplied by the 
HEC with electricty through long-term negotiated bulk 
contracts rather than through standard electricty tariffs. 
The additional cost that a producer incurs by producing an 
additional unit of output (e.g. the cost of producing an 
additional kWh of electricity). Short run marginal costs and 
long run marginal costs will be different. 
A matrix which distinguishes between the mineral resources 
and reserves and their dynamic nature (see diagram below). 
The size of resource is a function of changes scientific and 






Increasing degree of 	  
geological assurance 
ozone 	 A molecule consisting of three atoms of oxygen. 
photovoltaic (PV) 	The technology which allows sunlight to be converted directly 
inbto electricity by means of a semiconductor which has been 
processed to form a solar cell. 
potline 	 A series of pots in which alumina is electrolytically reduced to 
produce metal aluminium 
power 	 The rate at which energy is supplied or work is performed. 
primary energy 	Energy obtained from a source which is in its "least refined", 
captured or useable form. 
radiative forcing 	Refers to the absorption of infra red radiation re-enited from 
the Earth by gases in the lower atmosphere, thereby increasing 
the temperature of the Earth's surface. 
renewable energy 	Energy obtained from sources which are naturally regenerated 
(includes hydro, solar, wind, tidal, wave, geothermal). 
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reserve plant 	An excess of electricty generating capacity designed to ensure 
the reliable supply in the event of a sudden breakdown of part 
of the generating system. It usually consists of spinning 
reserve and stationary reserve. 
reserve plant margin 	The ratio of excess generating capacity to actual demand. 
retail load 	The demand for electricty from all sectors other than the major 
industrial (MI) load in Tasmania (often also referred to as 
general load). 
retrofit 	 The modication of existing building shells, vehicles, appliances 
and other energy using equipment to render them more 
efficient in their use of energy (e.g. installation of insulation, 
weathersealing of doors and windows, and modification of 
vehicle engines.). 
ring-fencing 	Separation of a public energy authority into separate business 
units that independently 
social costs 	The costs to society rather than the individual, company or 
agency. The two can be different due to externalities (e.g. 
atmospheric or water polltion) and additional costs to 
government or other parts of society. 
specific energy 	The energy used by a refrigerator per unit volume of 
consumption refrigerated space over a given interval and under standard 
test conditions. 
spinning reserve 	Generating plant that is activated ready for rapid connection 
to the grid to meet sudden increase in demand or unexpected 
generating losses. 
stand-by 	 Generating plant designed to cover unexpected outages or 





Generating plant held in reserve, often with an output equal 
to the second largest unit in the operating, which can be 
brought into service in one to three minutes 
A contraction for thermally sensitive resistors. Semiconducting 
materials characterised by a high and temperature-dependent 
electrical resistance inversely related to absolute temperature. 
A temperature measuring device consisting of two different 
types of wire spot welded at the measuring tip. The volatge 
produced at the bimetallic junction is temperature dependent. 
T-type thermocouples consist of copper and constantan wires. 
K-type thermocouples consist of nickel-chromium and 
nickel-aluminium wires. 
A term used in the USA for those energy conservation 
measures involving changes to dwellings and used to reduce 
household space heating requirements. These include fitting of 
storm windows, draught-proofing, double glazing of windows 
and installation of thermal insulation. 
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Abbreviations 
ABARE 	Australian Bureauy of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 
ABC 	Australian Broadcasting Commission. 
ABS 	Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
ACA 	Australain Consumers Association. 
ACE 	Association of Consumers of Electricty. 
ACF 	Australian Conservation Foundation. 
ACT 	Australian Capital Territory. 
AD590 	An integrated temperature transducer produced by the Analogue 
Devices Inc. (USA) (see Glossary for technical details). 
AEC 	Atomic Energy Commission (USA). 
AEEMA 	Australian Electronics and Electrical Manufacturers' Association 
Ltd. 
AGPS 	Australian Government Publishing Service. 
AIP 	American Institue of Physics. 
ALP 	Australian Labor Party. 
ALTAEO 	assessed long-term average energy output. 
ANM 	Australian Newsprint Mills. 
ANZEC 	Australian and New Zealand Environment Council. 
ANZMEC Australian and New Zealand Minerals and Energy Council. 
ANZSES 	Australian and New Zealand Solar Energy Society. 
ATSEC 	Australian Science and Technology Council. 
BESD 	Brunswick Electricity Supply Department. 
BHP 	Broken Hill Proprietry Ltd. 
CFC 	chlorofluorocarbon 
CFL 	compact flourescent lamp 
COAG 	Commonwealth Heads of Australian Governments consisting of the 
Prim Minister and the state premiers. 
CPI 	Consumer Price Index. 
CAR 	Conzinc RoiTinto Australia Ltd. 
CREA 	Centre for Regional and Economic Analysis at the University of 
Tasmania. 
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CSO 	Community service obligation. The requiremet on energy authorities 
to subsidise classes of energy users such as rural customers or low 
income households through cross-subsidies. 
DNDE 	Department of National Development and Energy. 
DIDT 	Department of Industrial Development,Tasmania - the precursor 
to the Tasmanian Development Authority. 
DITR 	Department of Industry, Technology and Resources. 
DM 	Demand Management. 
DPIE 	Department of Primary Industries and Energy. 
DSM 	Demand Side Management. 
EdF 	Electricite de France. 
EEO 	Energy Efficiency Office. 
ESAA 	Electricty Supply Association of Australia. 
Ga0 	Gordon-above-Olga dam. 
GbF 	Gordon-below-Franklin dam. 
GFCV 	Gas and Fuel Corporation of Victoria. 
GNP 	Gross Natioinal Product. 
HEAT 	Hydro-Employees Action Team. 
HEC 	Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania. 
HED 	Hydro-Electric Department. 
IAC 	Industry Assistance Commission. 
IC 	Industry Commission. 
IEA 	International Energy Association. 
IEMC 	Integrated Energy Management Centre. 
IPCC 	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
IRP 	Integrated Resource Planning. 
IUCN 	International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources. 
LPAC 	Lake Pedder Action Committee. 
LCP 	least-cost planning. 
L DC 	less developed country. 
LEG 	low energy growth. 
LER 	low energy refrigerator. 
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LPG 	liquid petroleum gas. 
LULU 	locally-unwanted-land-uses. 
MEPS 	mandated energy performance standards. 
NATA 	National Association for Testing Authorities 
NIMBY 	not-in-my-backyard. 
NSW 	New South Wales. 
NZS 	New Zealand Standards. 
OECD 	Organisation for Economic Cooperative Development. 
OPEC 	Organisation of Petrolium Exporting Countries. 
PPAG 	Policy and Public Affairs Group (HEC). 
PUB 	Public Utilities Board. 
PV 	photovoltaic. 
PVC 	polyvinylchloride. 
RET 	renewable energy technologies. 
RMIT 	Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. 
SABH 	South Australian Breweries Holdings Ltd, a major Australian 
manufactuer of whitegoods. Recently underwent a name changes 
to Southcorp Holdings Ltd and took control of Hoover Australia. 
SALT 	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. 
SECV 	State Electricty Commission of Victoria. 
SEP 	soft energy path. 
SEECA 	Social Economic, Ecological and Cultral Alliance. 
TDA 	Tasmanian Development Authority. 
TDR 	Tasmania Devlopment and Resources - formerly the TDA. 
TWE 	Tasmanian Wind Enterprises. 
TWS 	Tasmanian Wilderness Society. 
UNESCO 	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. 
UTG 	United Tasmania Group. 
VAT 	valued added tax. 
WCED 	World Commission on Environment and Development. 
ZEG 	zero energy growth. 
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Units and Symbols 




The basic unit of energy in the metric and SI systems. 
Basic unit of power = a rate of energy supply or use of 
1 Joule per second 
The old Imperial unit of power (1h.p. = 746 W) 
kilowatthour (kWh) 	One thousand watthours, the unit of electrical energy 
used for retail billing purposes. It is the equivalent to the 
amount of electrical energy used by a 1 kW electric 
radiator for a period of one hour (1 kWh = 3.6 MJ) 
megawatt average 	The average power generated by a power station, load on 
(MWav) 	 the system, or the demand of a large consumer over a 
certain period. For example, a power station may have a 
maxiumum generating output of 1000 MW. If its expected 
average operational time over one year is 75%, then its 
expected average annual output is 750 MW. 
Larger Units and SI Prefixes 
Units such as the Exajoule, Gigawatt of kilojoule can be calculated form the table 
below which defines these prefixes 
Prefix SI Symbol Exponent form Multiplier 
E x a E 	10" 1 000 000 000 000 000 000 
Tera T 10 12 1 000 000 000 0000 
Giga G 109 1 000 000 000 
Mega M 106 1 000 000 
kilo k 103 1 000 
1 kilowatt (kW) = 1000 Watts 1 kilojoule (kJ) = 1000 Joules 
1 Megawatt (MW) = 1000 kilowatts 1 Megajoule(MJ) = 1000 kilojoules 
1 Gigawatt (GW) = 1000 Megawatts 1 Gigajoule (GJ) = 1000 Megajoule 
1 Terawatt (TW) = 1000 Gigawatts 1 Terajoule (TJ) = 1000 Gigjoule 
1 Exajoule (El) = 1000 Terajoule 
The typical modern nuclear power plant has an output of about 1.3 GW installed 
capacity. Modern coal-fired power stations consist of generating units of about 
600 MW output capacity each. 
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The Early History of Electricity Planning in Tasmania 
1. The Beginnings 
Tasmania, or Van Diemen's Land as it was called, was settled as a British penal 
colony in 1803 and the transportation of convicts continued until 1856 when the 
colony attained self-government. With the end of transportation, gold was discovered 
in Victoria and many Tasmanians migrated. Outmigration became a persistent problem 
for the State and was stemmed only briefly in the late nineteenth century with the 
discovery of gold and tin in the north west (Blainey 1954, du Cross 1994). Development 
of the State's resources thereafter was recognised as the one of the few means at the 
colony's disposal to achieve economic prosperity (Kellow 1996: 45). During the 
twentieth century, development of the State's hydro-electric resources became an integral 
part of that strategy. 
A self-governing British colony with a population of less than 150,000 at the turn of 
the century, Tasmania was an agrarian backwater. The colony was quick to adopt the 
steam-driven alternator technology only because promotion of the technology in the 
small island was seen by overseas electrical equipment manufacturing firms as a means 
of creating markets for their products in the larger Australian colonies. The German 
manufacturing firm, Siemens, established a London-based subsidiary, the Hobart 
Tramway Company, which included three prominent members of the Tasmanian 
parliament on its Board of Directors. In 1893, Hobart became the first town in the 
southern hemisphere to be serviced with an electric tramway, despite considerable 
local opposition. The 500 volt (DC) system was installed completely by the Siemens 
company (Allbut 1958: 72). The firm also installed its own electric arc lighting and this 
generated immediate interest in the use of electricity by local businesses, prompting the 
Hobart Gas Company to obtain a franchise to supply electricity and install three 
69.7h.p. (52 kW) Siemens generators driven by 200 h.p. (149.1 kW) steam engines 
(Read 1986: 13). In 1902 the Hobart Tramway Company followed by also acquired 
the rights to sell electricity (Allbut 1958: 72). 
It was the production of electricity from hydraulic source, however, that created most 
interest. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Germany and the USA rapidly 
electrified and became world industrial leaders. Most other countries attempted to 
follow. When hydro-electric technology was developed as a cheap source of energy in 
the early 1870s, it provided a number of peripheral economies previously unable to 
compete with the western European or North American market with a new means of 
1 
attracting capital and industrialising. Countries with large hydro-electric resources 
such as Norway (Oystein 1986) and Finland (Myllyntaus 1991, Hueding 1992) quickly 
seized on this new technology. 
Tasmania at the time was a small, remote British outpost of capitalism. Word of 
hydro-electricity quickly reached Tasmania's shores and generated immediate interest 
among entrepreneurial circles. First to adopt the technology were the isolated mining 
ventures in the remote western region of the island (Dallas 1960: 87). A tin mining 
company at Mt Bischoff constructed its own scheme in 1881 (Kayser 1892: 349) and a 
syndicate of directors of the large mining and mineral processing firm, Broken Hill 
Proprietary (BHP) Ltd, floated a company with a view to harnessing the waters of the 
Pieman River and selling the electricity to mining operations on the west coast). 
2. Municipal Investment in Electricity Supply 
Industry in urban centres followed the lead of the remote the mining ventures and in 
1888 a woollen mill in Launceston became the first manufacturing plant in the Southern 
Hemisphere to be provided with electric lighting (Green 1959: 3). Entrepreneurs were 
quick to recognise the potential for profitable investment in hydro-electric development 
and a consortium of Launceston businessmen floated a proposal to construct a hydro-
electric scheme on the South Esk River with the intention of selling the electricity to the 
local council. The fact that the gas used for public street lighting in Hobart was run by 
a business for private profit was greatly resented (Read 1986: 21) and the proposal for 
to develop hydro-electric resources as a private venture in Launceston met with 
considerable public opposition (Dallas 1960: 84). To fend off the private proposal, 
the local municipality lobbied parliament to hand over the water rights to the municipality. 
Once these rights were acquired, the Launceston Council tendered out the construction 
a 579 h.p. scheme at Duck Reach on the South Esk River, 2 km from its junction with 
the Tamar River. Much of the materials required were supplied by Knight's engineering 
foundry, a newly established firm in the State. On the 10th of December 1895, 
Launceston became the first town in the world to be provided with electric public 
street lighting (Dallas 1960: 86). The output of the scheme was subsequently increased 
and Launceston became the first city in Australia to provide households with electricity 
from a publicly owned hydro-electric system (Allbut 1958: 73). The station continued 
to operate until 1955 when it was replaced by the Larger Trevallyn scheme (Knight et 
al. 1962: 5). The public development of the hydro-electric resources in Launceston 
re-ignited tension over the private ownership of the electricity supply in Hobart and in 
1913, the Hobart City Council purchased the Hobart Tramway Company and its 
electricity generation and distribution operations (Allbut 1958: 72). 
2 
Map 1 Tasmania showing location of places mentioned in text and hydro-
electric schemes completed before 1935. 
3 
3. State Entry into the Electricity Supply Industry 
The success of the Launceston venture germinated the seeds of a grander vision within 
sections of the Tasmanian community. One of the countries was rapidly harnessing its 
hydro-electric resources at the time in order to industrialise was Switzerland, a small 
mountainous country in Europe, and many believed that by utilising the water resources 
of the Central Plateau, Tasmania could become the 'Switzerland of the South' (Green 
1959: 4). Soon after federation in 1901, the outline of a hydro-electric scheme on the 
Shannon River draining the Great Lake on the Central Plateau was mooted and the 
Government came under increasing pressure to develop this option. Deterred by the 
high risks of large public investment in development of hydro-electric resources in the 
absence of a proven market, the government demurred and was criticised by proponents 
of the scheme for lacking both courage and conviction (Jetson 1989: 67). A market for 
electricity materialised in the form of James Gillies. 
Gillies, a metallurgist from New South Wales, had managed to develop a means of 
refining complex Broken Hill zinc-lead sulphate ores using an electrolytic process. Due 
to the high costs of electricity on the mainland - £55 per h.p. per year in Victoria and 
£75 per h.p. per year in Broken Hill (Campbell 1916) - his new refining process was 
prohibitively expensive without access to a large source of cheap electricity. Gillies 
therefore travelled to Tasmania to investigate the island's hydro-electric resources, and 
having inspected these, put two alternative proposals to the government. His company's 
preferred option was that the government develop the Great Lake scheme and sell 
electricity to his Complex Ores Company. The second option was to grant his company 
concessionary rights to develop the hydro-electric resources of the Central Plateau and 
the rights to sell electricity surplus to its own requirements on the market. 
Gillies' proposals generated both excitement and dispute. Parochial infighting broke 
out over whether the electricity from the scheme should be taken north to Launceston 
or South to the island's capital, Hobart (Jetson 1989: 66). Although the scheme was 
closer to Launceston, Hobart was chosen as the site for the zinc refinery due to its 
better port facilities (Allbut 1958: 74). Gillies' proposal also met with considerable 
mistrust over the true intentions of the company and divisive argument over whether 
development of the State's water resources should be a public or private venture 
(Jetson 1989: 67). The government preferred to retain control of electricity generation in 
public hands but was opposed by a business community that was ideologically opposed 
to government investment in areas that could be undertaken by private business, and 
by a conservative Legislative Council concerned over the high risks of the venture. The 
latter view prevailed and in 1909 Gillies company was granted concessionary rights to 
use the waters of the Central Plateau to generate electricity. Work began in the 
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following year on a dam to raise the level of the Great Lake and divert water from the 
Shannon River to the Ouse River and on the Waddamana A power station, consisting 
of two 4900 h.p (3.65 MW) turbines (see Map 2). The plan was to eventually increase 
the number of generators to nine with a total output of 65,800 h.p. (49.1 MW). 
Gillies floated a private London-based company, the Hydro-Electric and Metallurgical 
(HEPM) Co., to raise the necessary capital for construction of the scheme. The firm 
entered into an agreement to supply the privately owned Hobart Gas Company and 
the Hobart City Council-owned Hobart Tramway Co. with electricity at $3 per kW per 
annum plus 0.5 pence per unit of electricity consumed. The HEPM Co. also began to 
construct its own distribution system that outstripped that of the Hobart Tramway 
Co. (Read 1986: 23). To prevent the firm from using its concession as a means of 
profiting purely by selling electricity, however, the firm was required to consume a 
certain amount of the generated electricity in its own manufacturing process or forfeit 
its rights. The Bill also included a provision for public acquisition of the hydro-electric 
scheme at cost after 20 years (Kellow 1996: 46). 
Construction of the Waddamana A scheme began in 1910 but work under difficult 
conditions was slow. The weather was harsh and lack of access forced the company to 
construct a wooden tramway to haul equipment with horses. Chaff for horses became 
an unanticipated large expenditure that amounted to a considerable portion of total 
capital costs of the scheme (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1967: 319). The difficulty 
of raising the finance on the London market to build the scheme, moreover, was 
compounded by the manoeuvring of a group of Hobart-based businessmen and politicians 
keen to take over the company (Gillies 1984: 24). These difficulties and the slow pace 
of construction contrasted with a simultaneous, but successful, story of hydro-electric 
construction being played out by a mining company in the western region of the State. 
The west coast region was one of the most expensive places in the world from which to 
export bulk, unrefined ores due to the lack of infrastructure such as roads, railways or 
ports. The alternative, refining the ores on site, was also prohibitively as the same lack 
of infrastructure substantially increased the costs of importing coal or coke. The Mt 
Lye11 Mining Co. had therefore resorted to the use of local timber as the energy source 
for its smelters. In 1911, the company decided to follow the lead of a small number of 
mining companies, such as the Mt Bischoff Tin Mining Company', and began work on 
the 12,000 h.p. Lake Margaret scheme on the Yolande River (Allbut 1958: 74). The 
construction workforce consisted of Maltese immigrants and when the scheme was 
commissioned in 1913, both the Maltese construction workforce and the large number 
timber cutters employed by the mining company were retrenched. Their plight was 
overshadowed by the fact that Tasmania could now boast the largest hydro-electric 
scheme in Australia, a fact that inspired the Minister for Mines to suggest that the 
















Map 2 	The Great Lake hydro-electric scheme in Tasmania 
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larger schemes. One historian has suggested that the avid support for large hydro-electric 
projects by West Coast politicians over the following half century was attributable in 
part to this early success of the Lake Margaret scheme (Blarney 1954: 233). 
With the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in 1914, material shortages and the reduced 
ability to raise capital on the London market forced the Hydro-Electric and Metallurgical 
Company to approach the State government with a request that the government take 
over construction. The government saw it as a means of rescuing not only a hydro-electric 
project but also as a chance to develop a zinc processing industry (Tighe 1992: 128). 
The assets of the company were acquired by the state for £624,000. The Government 
also acquired the electricity distribution rights of the Hobart Gas Co. and the Hobart 
Tramway Company, investing the functions of both of these firms in its new Hydro-
Electric Department (HED). This direct recruitment of the management of the newly 
created electricity department from the nationalised companies, according to historian 
Peter Read (1986: 24), gave the HED the outlook and ethos of a business enterprise 
from its very start. 
The HED entered into a take-or-pay twenty-one year contract to supply the Complex 
Ores Co. with 3,500 h.p. (2.61 MW) per annum at a price of £3/10/- per h.p. per 
annum, with further rights up to a total of 10,000 h.p. (7.46 MW) per annum at a price 
of £21101- per horse power per annum (Parliament of Tasmania 1914: 6).. Bulk 
electricity contract prices from hydro-electric schemes in the USA at the time were 
between $8 and $10 per h.p. per annum (Dallas 1960: 92). The reason for the cheap 
contract price offered by the HED was three-fold. One was the view that large-scale 
contracts would result in high load factors and reduce the unit cost of electricity. The 
second was that decision to operate the HED on a non-profit basis, while the third 
was the belief that encouraging energy intensive industries would generate secondary 
growth in the economy and provide spin-off community benefits such as electrified rail 
system (Tasmanian Parliament 1914: 6). The HED defended the cheap bulk tariffs on 
the basis that only those industries for which electricity presented a substantial portion 
of total costs could be attracted to the State, since the transport and market obstacles 
meant that small industries would not be attracted even if electricity were made 
available for free (HED 1916: 7-8). 
With the outbreak of war, Broken Hill Pty Ltd had lost its major market for zinc ore, 
Germany. A new company, the Amalgamated Zinc Co. (subsequently the Electrolytic 
Zinc Co.) to refine the zinc ore. In 1917 the HEC entered into a contract with Amalgamated 
Zinc to supply 2.98 MW at the same contract price but with further rights up to 38.78 
MW at £2 per h.p. per annum. The HED also indicated to the company that a site at 
Risdon on the Derwent River, 6 km upstream from Hobart would be made available. 
The generous electricity price and the siting of the plant created an uproar when the 
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contract was tabled in Parliament. The State Health Officer refused to approve the 
site on the grounds that it was too close to urban areas but was overridden by the 
Government which approved the HED's contract (Gillies 1984: 145). The HED's 
contractual commitment to supply Amalgamated Zinc with much of the electricity from 
the planned schemes, at low prices, gave the company a virtual monopoly on future 
zinc production in the State as it ensured that little electricity would be available to 
prospective competitors. The decision to support Amalgamated Zinc in this effective 
monopoly was justified on the basis of the strategic need for zinc as a part of the war 
effort. No zinc was produced before the end of the war. Gillies' plans to use his new 
electrolytic method to produce zinc were therefore thwarted in this manner. His 
Complex Ores Company was persuaded, however, to establish a carbide manufacturing 
plant at Northwest Bay, 20 km south of Hobart, as a means of providing employment 
for returning soldiers. 
The Government immediately instructed its Agent General in London to advertise the 
State on the basis of its cheap bulk electricity rates (Tighe 1992: 128-9) and directed 
the HED to investigate the island's total hydro-electric resource (Dallas 1960: 92). 
Almost $210,000 was spent on a 34.5 MW King River scheme before it was abandoned 
when the Mt. Lye11 Co. objected that it would inundate part of its railway line which 
could not be rerouted (Blainey 1954: 253). In the same year, 1917, the Scenery Preservation 
Board was established, becoming the first bureaucracy in Australia vested with the 
responsibility for natural heritage protection (Lowe 1984: 12). 
This early history of hydro-industrialisation in Tasmania illustrates two points. First, 
that the adoption of this new technology did not occur automatically. In Reads 
historic interpretation (1986: 7), the development of an electricity generation and supply 
organisation in Tasmania required both a need and the preconditions. The necessary 
preconditions were finance, technical expertise, resources (physical and labour) and 
vision. Read's account, however, lacked the detail of the more personal account 
written by James Gillies' son and published by his granddaughter (Gillies 1984). This 
latter account described the events that led to the formation of the electric supply 
bureaucracy in the State as a long, difficult and unrewarding struggle that was dogged 
by political feuds and treachery. It could perhaps best serve as a warning for 
contemporary proponents of technological innovation that the adoption of any energy 
technology, be it gas fired thermal generation, wind generators or energy efficiency, is 
not necessarily straight forward, no matter how simple the technology or how great the 
need. Change occurs neither effortlessly, nor overnight. The second point which this 
early history makes clear is the close association that developed between industry and 
the energy bureaucracy in Tasmania from the very beginnings, and the rapidity with 
which the Government saw in hydro-electric development a potential means of solving 
what were perceived to be the island's particularly acute economic problems. 
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4. Water Conservation and the Rationalisation of Electricity Supply 
The early involvement of the State government in electricity supply and the creation of 
an hydro-electric engineering bureaucracy in Tasmania coincided with the rise of the 
Progressive Conservation Movement in the USA under the leadership of the forester 
Guilford Pinchot. The dominant idea embodied in the movement was that through the 
rational management of resources by experts using scientific principles, a shared vision 
of an affluent and humane society could be achieved by using resources efficiently. The 
engineer, more than any other expert group, symbolised this rational manager (Nye 
1990: 167). In Tasmania, the new corps of hydro-engineers set about 'conserving' the 
State's water resources (HED 1925: 7) by diverting the Upper Ouse River into the 
Great Lake with the construction of the 8 km long Liawenee Canal to maximise the use 
of the waters from the Great Lake before being used in the Waddamana scheme. 
The relatively slow pace of this construction programme was a consequence of the fact 
that it used manual labour and because construction was matched to the slow growth 
in the demand for electricity. The HED described this as a 'just-in-time' policy which 
entailed keeping in hand a surplus sufficient only to meet growth in demand during 
construction of the next project (HED 1925: 64). Although the HED had indicated to 
Parliament that many energy-intensive industries had expressed an interest in locating 
in Tasmania (HED 1915: 2), by the end of the 1920s no new firms had arrived. The 
only substantial increase in projected load occurred in 1923 when the Electrolytic Zinc 
Co. exercised its rights to take up its full 38.78 MW quota. 
The development of the electricity supply industry throughout the Australian states 
during this early phase was rapid and chaotic, with many small independent producers 
and distribution systems using different voltages. Eventual state control of the production 
and supply was seen as inevitable in order to rationalise the large numbers of producers 
and establish an efficient system. In other states, this was made easier by the war and 
depression which forced production and supply into the hands of municipal, county 
and state public bodies. This process was most advanced in Victoria where the State 
Electricity Commission was formed in 1921 and given responsibility for the production, 
transmission and distribution of electricity throughout that state (Murray 1974: 31). In 
Tasmania's case, the failure of the private sector led to even earlier public involvement 
in the production of electricity. The Chief Engineer of the HED, moreover, argued from 
the very start that hydro-electric development and electrification of the island would 
be best served if his Department was given freedom to get on with the business of 
hydro-electric development by removing it from the day-to-day dealings with the 
government. To this end, he recommended that his Department be abolished and a 
semi-autonomous Commission created in its place. In 1925, a Bill establishing a 
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Hydro-Electric Commission passed both houses of Parliament, but was jettisoned 
amidst constitutional conflict between the two Houses without being presented for 
Royal approval (Read 1986: 57). The HED recommended the change again in 1929 on 
the basis of the growing need to organise and regulate the haphazard growth of the 
State's various municipal electricity generation and supply systems. If the State was to 
have an efficient electrical system, it was argued, it needed to be coordinated and 
managed in an integrated manner. The Hydro-Electric Commission (HEC) Act was 
passed in that year and in 1930 the new Commission with monopoly powers over the 
planning, generation, distribution and sale of electricity throughout the State was 
established. The Bill, however, referred awkwardly to a 'commission-headed department' 
(McKenry 1972: 9). The Commission's first project was the 14,500 h.p (10.5 MW) 
Shannon power station, completed in 1935 (Knight et al. 1962). 
Over the following years the HEC gradually took control of the various municipal and 
private generators and distributors, one of the last to concede to the HEC being the 
Municipality of Launceston in 1944. The Commission's distribution system was also 
greatly expanded under the Government's policies of rural electrification and uniform 
tariffs. This programme emulated Roosvelt's grand social experiment in the USA, in 
which the Rural Electricification Authority was created to spearhead the country's 
development programme (Nye 1990: 175), the purpose of that rural electrification in 
the USA being described as making the home 'a more spiritual environment for all 
members of the family' (Sporn 1950: ii) and a means of advancing democracy (Lilienthal 
1944: 5). In Tasmania, urban electricity rate payers subsidised their rural counterparts 
in one of most generous schemes in the world (Townsley 1994: 51). Under the scheme, 
the Government paid up to 75% of the costs of connection and by 1964/65, 98% of 
Tasmanian households were connected to the grid. A cheap continuous hot water 
tariff was also introduced as a social policy to make hot water universally available 
(Read 1986: 65). It was a policy initially opposed by the HEC as it strained its 
resources and increased the overall household tariffs and tariffs in other sectors. 
5. Hydro-Electric Construction as a Job Creation Scheme, 1934-1944. 
Planned expansion by the Electrolytic Zinc Co. and a proposal to build a pulp and 
paper manufacturing plant in the north of the State by Australian Pulp and Paper 
Manufacturers (APPM) led to the decision in the early 1930s to proceed with a new 
hydro-electric project, the Tarraleah scheme, which harnessed the headwaters of the 
Derwent River (Allbut 1958: 76) 1 . There was, however, an added motive behind the 
Allbut (1958: 74) acknowledged that his notes on hydro-electric development in Tasmania 
by the HEC after 1930 were written by the HEC's Chief Commissioner, Allan Knight. 
10 
decision. In 1934, hydro-electric development took on a new function. In that year 
Albert Ogilvie was elected as Premier, beginning thirty five years of uninterrupted 
Labor government in the State. Ogilvie was elected largely on a policy of accelerating 
hydro-electric construction to create jobs, thereby pulling Tasmania out of the doldrums 
of the Depression. Elsewhere, governments of diverse political persuasions had 
undertaken massive public capital works projects for the same purpose. By 1933, 
Germany's fascist government had achieved full employment (Stewart 1991: 23), while 
the Roosvelt Republican administration in the USA had launched a massive public 
spending programme under the New Deal (Marcus 1986: 49). 
Under Ogilvie's leadership, work on the Waddamana B station commenced, the 9 km 
Liawenee Canal was constructed to divert the upper Ouse River to the Great Lake, and 
a new dam on the Great Lake was built to further raise the level and increase the 
storage capacity of the lake. The Upper Derwent scheme was also started as the last 
of the 'pick and shovel' schemes, recruiting the workforce from the army of unemployed. 
While the scheme was began in the faith that demand for the electricty would materialize, 
it was pushed ahead as an employment relief programme with for long-term economic 
benefit (Rackham 1981: 5). Funding for the scheme was facilitated by new financing 
arrangement between the federal and the states. Ogilvie's Labor predecessor, Premier 
Joseph Lyons, had attempted to set Tasmania on a course that would enable it to 
control its own destiny throughout the 1920s. A popular view of the day was that 
Tasmania's economic problems were a consequence of its joining the federation. The 
State's poor economic position had seen it become, in the eyes of its leaders, a 'vassal 
state' used to supply cheap labour and resources to foreign companies. This low 
status, together with an economy dependent upon the Commonwealth, was deeply felt 
by Tasmania's political leaders and Lyons desperately wanted to find a means of 
regaining dignity and economic independence (Townsley 1994: 4). He was assisted in 
this task by his economic advisor, Lyndhurst Faulkner Giblin, an eccentric but brilliant 
Professor of Economics at the University of Tasmania with no formal training in 
economics (Hytten 1960: 153). Giblin espoused the highly unpopular view that 
Tasmania's economic problems were not a consequence of federation but that Tasmania 
was a naturally poor state that counted for little within the Commonwealth. The 
State's Achilles' heel, according to Giblin, was its dependence on shipping, and because 
it was a poor state, the Tasmanian government could afford to borrow for only income-
producing public projects such as railway infrastructure and hydro-electric construction. 
In 1927 Lyons and Giblin persuaded the Commonwealth to set up a Loans Council, an 
intergovernment body through which the states could coordinate the raising of low 
interest loans by using the Commonwealth's borrowing power. Giblin and Lyons were 
also instrumental in the establishment of the Commonwealth Grants Commission with 
the function determining the distribution of Commonwealth funding to the various 
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states (Brown 1960, Hytten 1960: 158-9). The formula for funding used by the Grants 
Commission was designed specifically to assist development in the smaller states 
(Townsley 1994: 6). In the 1930s, hydro-electric development became an election issue 
and Ogilvie turned to these instruments to finance his hydro-electric construction 
programme in order to create further jobs (Rackham 1981: 51). He was greatly assisted 
by the fact the Tasmania's former Premier, Joseph Lyons, was elected Prime Minister of 
Australia and had retained the services of L. F. Giblin as his economic advisor. 
Ogilvie's hydro-electric construction programme did not see further energy-intensive 
industries establishing in the State and the firms which located in the State throughout 
the 1930s did so primarily for reasons other than cheap electricity. Two pulp and 
paper manufacturing firms, Australian Pulp and Paper Manufacturers (APPM) and 
Australian Newsprint Mills (ANM), were attracted in the main by generous concessions 
to public forests. A British chocolate manufacturing firm set up in the south of the 
State and although local folklore would have it that the firm's decision to locate was 
based on Tasmania's temperate climate (Read 1986: 69), a more likely reason according 
to industrial geographer, Dr Peter Wilde, was the reputation of the State's workforce as 
nonmilitant (Dr Peter Wilde, personal communication, November 1995). A cement 
manufacturer, Goliath, set up at Rai1ton in the north of the State. No energy-intensive 
electro-metallurgical companies arrived during the period. 
6. The Myth of Hydro-Industrialisation, 1944-1954 
Hydro-industrialisation was increasingly employed as an engine of economic growth in 
the island under the premiership of Ogilvie's successor, Robert Cosgrove. Cessation of 
war-time production had led to a downturn in economic activity and governments 
everywhere feared a relapse into Depression. A number of governments nationalised 
their electricity and other industries. Saddler (1981: 51) has interpreted this 
nationalisation as a means of assisting capital by passing onto the state the high risk, 
low return task of electricity supply expansion and thereby leaving private enterprise 
free to invest in more lucrative ventures. The lack of opposition from business community, 
Saddler suggests, provides the evidence to support his argument. This explanation is 
incomplete, however, as it overlooks the fact that government stepped in and took over 
many task associated with economic development when the efforts of private business 
appeared ineffective or faltered. Harris (1993), for example, has described the way in 
which the Tasmanian government was persuaded in 1914 to take on the task of 
promoting tourism in the State. Saddler's interpretation also ignores the pervading 
attitudes of the day. The nationalisation of the electricity supply industry by many 
governments after the second world war has to be understood in terms of the perception 
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that capitalism had failed to avoid the Depression. As a consequence, governments of 
all ideological persuasions in the post-war period put aside their doctrines, embraced 
Keynesian economics, and adopted pragmatic policies to create employment and generate 
growth (Field & Higley 1980: 7-10). Governments did what they did primarily to 
improve the lot of the common person rather than from adherence to ideology. Both 
private enterprise and conservative governments supported this policy, and due to its 
popular appeal, any business leaders opposed to it would have remained silent. In 
Tasmania, increased public expenditure on hydro-electric construction was neither a 
purely socialist nor capitalist policy but amounted to state-led development to attract 
capital. The Labor Party in Tasmania may have been nominally socialist, but none of 
its parliamentary members knew anything about socialism (Townsley 1994: 52). 
Cosgrove inherited an HEC torn by internal division, personality clashes and accussations 
of administrative irregularities, engineering incompetence and conflicts of interest (Read 
1986: 71). The HEC was also beset by other problems and construction of work on the 
Upper Derwent Scheme had slowed due to army recruitment for the war, strikes over 
conditions (Rackham 1982: 12). A Board of Inquiry into the HEC in 1940 recommended 
sweeping reforms. The HEC Act was amended in 1944 to improve the efficiency of 
hydro-electric construction programme by further removing the Commission from the 
day-to-day workings of Government. The ambiguity over whether it was a department 
or commission was removed (McKenry 1972: 9). Under this new act the HEC was 
master of its own affairs with the ability to raise semi-government loans independently 
from the Loans Council. Furthermore, while the Minister administering the Act was 
answerable to Parliament for the activities of the Commission, the Commission was 
answerable only to Parliament and was neither answerable to nor directed by the 
Minister (ABS 1967: 373). The legislation gave the Commission powers unequalled by 
those of its mainland counterparts. In the Launceston vs HEC case, however, theHigh 
Court ruled in 1959 that under the HEC Act of 1944, the HEC was not concerned 
soley with the provision of hydro-electricity, was accountable for its actions just as 
any other person or corporation, and had none of the immunities of the Crown (McKenry 
1972: 9). Two years after the HEC Act was introduced, Cosgrove moved his Head of 
Public Works, Allan Knight, to the position of Chief Commissioner of the HEC. Knight 
served as Chief Commissioner for thirty-one years, out surviving the reigns of five 
Premiers. He was noted for his technical achievements and was, in the words of 
political theorist, Bruce Davis (1995: 3) 'elusive, cool and almost diffident in manner', 
and a person with persuasive powers 'well beyond those of other civil service heads'. 
In Read's view (1986: 71), with Knight's appointment it was as if Cosgrove was 
working to a plan. 
At the time, growth in industrial demand for electricity was still gradual, and by 1949 
the total generating capacity of the system was only 107.9 MW. An opportunity to 
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rapidly expand the demand for electricity in the State arose as a consequence of a 
Commonwealth initiative. During the second world war, aluminium was seen as a 
strategic material and the Federal government announced its intention to undertake a 
public aluminium smelting venture (Fagan 1971: 191). Cosgrove persuaded the Prime 
Minister that Tasmania was the most suitable site for the smelter. The Australian 
Aluminium Production Commission (AAPC) was established under the Aluminium 
Industry Act 1944 as a joint venture project, the Commonwealth and Tasmanian 
governments agreeing to contribute $3 million each. Selection of the eventual site for 
the alumina refinery and aluminium smelter at Bell Bay on the mouth of the Tamar 
River north of Launceston took three years. By time construction of the smelter began, 
the initial strategic purpose of the operation was irrelevant (Fagan 1971: 191). Under 
the Aluminium Industry Act of 1944, the Tasmanian government was required to 'make 
provision as it thinks necessary to enable the Hydro-Electric Commission to provide 
electricity at a price satisfactory to the AAPC. The State agreed to construct both the 
Trevallyn hydro-electric station in the Tamar Valley and houses for the smelter's workers. 
Discussions over the price the AAPC would pay for the electricity were protracted, the 
AAPC demanding rates as low as possible so that it could compete with the large 
North American producers. In 1948 the AAPC, under protest, entered into a 25-year 
contract for 26 MW at a price calculated according to the estimated non-amortised 
construction costs of the dam and associated transmission lines (Male 1993). 
Cosgrove's vision of rapid expansion of hydro-electric construction lacked but one 
ingredient, a large construction workforce. In 1946 Cosgrove approached the Prime 
Minister and requested 1,000 migrants under assisted passage to be bonded to the 
HEC. The conditions under which these migrant workers laboured have been described 
as harsh and not much better than those which existed during the first half of the 
nineteenth century when the State served as penal colony (O'Brien 1994). It was the 
beginnings of a wave of such assisted migration, and between 1947 and 1954 a third of 
the increase in the State's population was the direct result of the immigration programme. 
Hydro-electric development therefore became the lynch-pin for expansion of the 
manufacturing sector and the Government's attempts to increase the island's population. 
Between 1950 and the mid 1960s, hydro-industrialisation in Tasmania reached its 
zenith. In the late 1940s, industry's planned expansions accelerated and industry 
leaders became critical of the HEC's inability to keep pace. The introduction of a 40 
hour week in 1948 added further to construction costs (Rackham 1982: 12). Growing 
concern over whether the HEC could meet the contractual obligations it had entered 
into with a number of large industries led to the establishment of a Select Committee of 
the House Assembly in 1951 (Lowe 1984: 9). Taking evidence in camera from 
representatives of industry and the Commission only, the Committee recommended 
that the HEC form a closer working relationship with its industrial clients and that its 
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construction programme be accelerated (Tighe 1992: 133). In the same year, the HEC 
began to capitalise interests during construction so that interest on loans were added 
to construction costs until commissioning, thereby keeping electricity prices low by 
reducing the need to rely on internal funding for construction (Kellow 1996: 49). 
7. Hydro-Industrialisation as Political Dogma, 1954-1964 
In the mid 1950s, the benefits of the policy of hydro-industrialisation were perceived to 
be increasingly questionable and the policy came under increasing public and political 
criticism. The HEC's construction programme was based on the forecasting assumption 
of a doubling in demand every eight years (Allbut 1958: 81). The costs of the schemes 
was beginning to increase, however, as the supply of cheap migrant labour force began 
to dry up. The State was also beset by drought which lead in 1954 to the introduction 
of the Water Act that handed over to the HEC total control of all State water resources, 
thus alienating those landowners whose irrigation rights were retracted. The Lower 
Derwent scheme, then under construction ,was also the first scheme to inundate significant 
tracts of farming land, further raising the ire of affected landowners. To this was 
added general public disaffection over a 25% increase in electricity tariffs and the 
combination created a wave of questioning of the hydro-industrialisation policy 
(Townsley 1994: 51). In Parliament, the HEC was described by the Liberal Opposition 
as a 'state within a state' and Parliament was accused of abrogating too much 
responsibility to the Commission (The Mercury 1 April 1954: 5). Premier Cosgrove did 
not so much defend the decision to increase the HEC's power as suggest that the 
decision was irreversible. To reduce the Commission's power, the Premier warned, was 
risky for the State since it would be interpreted by the financial world as a loss of 
Government confidence in the HEC, which would in turn undermine the Commission's 
ability to borrow on the international market (The Mercury 31 March 1954: 18). The 
proportion of Treasury loans devoted to hydro-electric construction and the lack of 
Government control over the electricity planning were also raised as issues (Lowe 1984: 
16). Brendon Lyons, son of the former Premier and Prime Minister, Joseph Lyons, and 
the only Parliamentary member of the Centre Party, described Parliament as a mere 
rubber stamp for HEC proposals and the HEC as a potential 'Frankenstein' (Lowe 
1984: 17). Even government members, and Dr Turnbull in particular, publicly questioned 
the portion of public loans spent on hydro-electric construction (Lowe 1984: 18). 
Dissent from within the Government's ranks was quashed, however, when the last of 
the avidly pro-hydro Labor Premiers, 'Electric Eric' Reece, gained office in 1959. Dr 
Turnbull, an adversary of Reece, was sacked for disloyalty and sat in Parliament as an 
independent before moving into Federal politics. Reece, a West Coast politician recruited 
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from the trade union movement, was doggedly pro-development, and a clever political 
tactician. He demanded absolute loyalty from his Labor colleagues on the floor of the 
House and confined any debate over policy to the Party room. The policy of hydro-
industrialisation became an unchallenged dogma steered by a powerful cabal: Premier, 
Eric Reece, his deputy, Roy Fagan, the Under Treasurer, Kenneth Binns, and the HEC 
Chief Commissioner, Allan Knight. The four formed a powerful pro-hydro bloc, 
represented on almost every Board and Committee of any import in the State (Lowe 
1984: 27). The HEC Chief Commissioner, for example, served amongst his many other 
capacities as a member of the Scenery Preservation Board (McKenry 1972: 10, Castles 
1986: 88). The HEC itself had become the prima donna and envy of State government 
bureaucracies, with the Commissioner earning a higher salary than the Premier. To 
fulfil its obligations to the public, the Commission began to produce booklets describing 
its past engineering feats (Garvie 1962). The Commission maintained a policy of 
minimising idle capacity by keeping just ahead of demand, stating that: 
Prudent economic policy dictates that an authority should try to keep just 
ahead of demand, and not have uriremunerative investment in a large block 
of idle generating capacity; the margin in hand at any one time is therefore 
comparatively small. (ABS 1967: 330) 
The Commission added, however, that although its policy was to continue a rolling 
construction programme to keep just ahead of demand while avoiding restrictions in 
supply, its aim was to encourage expansion of continuous industrial sector load and to 
promote off-peak retail electricity tariffs in order to increase load factor. In the 
1961/62 financial year, the HEC increased its comprehensive sales promotion and 
began to distribute public relations material with its quarterly accounts. Two years 
later, the Commission created its Consumer Advisory Service and began to make 
extensive use of the printed and electronic media to promote electricity (HEC 1968: 5). 
Although many writers have suggested that throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the policy 
of hydro-industrialisation was a hegemonic vision, this appears to overstate the case. 
By the early 1960s the Liberal opposition is said by Townsley (1994: 176), to have 
become obsessed with matters relating to hydro-electric development. There is little 
question, however, that Reece was undeterred by this criticism and under his leadership 
hydro-industrialisation remained an unchallenged policy (Davis 1972: 47). Steering the 
State down this policy road was a small group of influential individuals. For the 
Government, the policy provided a means of retaining electoral popularity by promising 
economic prosperity and visible jobs in economically depressed regions of the State, a 
policy readily sold to a relatively unsophisticated electorate. For the HEC, it provided 
both continuity and increased load factors. The political needs of government and the 
vision of a rapidly expanding manufacturing sector which would then stimulate the 
other sectors of the State's economy both dovetailed perfectly with the needs of the 
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Commission. The Government's and the Commission's needs dovetailed also with the 
needs of industry and so created a three-way symbiotic relationship. Neither the 
Government nor the HEC were coy about their support for the policy of supplying large 
industries with subsidised electricity. In a circular to his employees in 1961, the Chief 
Commissioner wrote: 
If the whole of industrial power were given away free it would cost the 
consumer an additional £15 per annum. Would this appear an unduly high 
price to pay for the presence of such large and important industries to the 
State? (Cited in Bound 1961: 6) 
The HEC defended the sale of cheap electricity to industry in the following manner: 
The householder may be tempted to ask why industry should not pay more 
and the residential sale price be reduced. The answer is simple: to diversify 
the Tasmanian economy and to give employment to an increasing work 
force, industry has to be attracted to the island; cheap bulk power has 
been, and will continue to be, a major attraction. (ABS 1967: 332) 
The industry that was to benefit most from this policy was aluminium smelting venture 
at Bell Bay. Production of aluminium at Bell Bay began in 1955 and at the opening of 
the smelter the Federal Minister for Supply stated that the 'sole and only justification 
for establishing the smelter in Tasmania was the promise and expectation of cheap and 
plentiful electrical power' (The Mercury 12 March 1991: 8). The unit electricity price 
paid by the AAPC was around 0.14 c/kWh (Male 1993). It was soon found that its 
production level of 13,200 tonnes per annum was uneconomic and that tariff protection 
was necessary to protect the AAPC from cheaper aluminium produced in the USA and 
Canada (Male 1993). To increase production, the Commonwealth invested a further 
$8.5 million in the venture, taking its equity holding to two-thirds. 
In the same year that the Bell Bay aluminium smelter began production, the British 
transnational, Consolidated Zinc, acquired rights to the massive bauxite deposits which 
had been discovered at Wiepa on Cape York Peninsula in Queensland and began to 
seek entry into the production of alumina and aluminium. In 1961, the smelter was 
privatised, the Commonwealth selling its share to the Consolidated Zinc Corporation 
which set up a subsidiary company, Comalco Aluminium Ltd. The Tasmanian government 
gradually reduced its equity to its current 17.4% preferential share holding. To make 
the company more economically viable, Comalco sought tariff protection which it 
received in the form of quantity restrictions on aluminium imports. The company also 
planned to increase production to 28,000 tonnes p.a. and the HEC began construction 
of the 250 MW Poatina scheme to supply the electricity. In 1962 the HEC's industrial 
clients announced plans to expand production and increase load by a total of 122 
MW. The 308 MW Mersey-Forth scheme was started in the following year. Another 
footloose firm, Temco, constructed a ferro-manganese smelter at Bell Bay adjacent to 
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Comalco's aluminium smelter and began production in 1965. Kellow (1996: 49) states 
that there was some evidence that Temco, a subsidiary of steel making giant BHP, 
relocated from Newcastle in NSW due in part to Tasmania's lax environmental regulations. 
Industrial electrical load had doubled over the decade and the HEC anticipated that 
this rate of expansion would to continue. By 1967, Tasmania, with only 3% of the 
nation's population, accounted for 15% of the electricity used in the country. 
Proponents of hydro-electric development at the time traditionally argued that the 
indirect benefits of hydro-electric development other than the provision of electricity 
needed to be included in the decision over whether to proceed with a hydro-electric 
development. Common among the side-benefits mentioned were flood control, navigation 
channels, increased income to communities, job creation and increased irrigation capacity 
(Lilientathal 1944: 39, Datta 1973: 8). While the HEC's projects tended to be single 
purpose schemes, a major spin-off of hydro-electric development in Tasmania, the 
HEC argued, was the opening up of remote areas with excellent roads built by the 
Commission (ABS 1967: 318). Over time, however, the converse argument, that the 
indirect costs of hydro-electric development also ought to be included in the decision as 
to whether to proceed with development proposals, began to be argued more forcefully. 
Accompanying this construction programme had been costs in the form of the loss of 
both valued natural and man-made assets. Elsewhere, the construction of dams had 
often led to conflict because of such costs. In New Zealand, for example, hydro-electric 
development had already been an episodic political issue for a considerable period 
(Farrell 1957: 208). As early as the mid 1940s, the Chairman of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority had warned that planning of hydro-electric developments needed to ensure 
that the total benefits outweighed the costs, including environmental costs, and had 
expressed the opinion that rather than a task left soley to experts, the public need to 
be involved in the planning of such developments (Lilienthal 1944: 6). In Tasmania, 
construction of a three-metre weir on Lake St Clair at the head of the Derwent River in 
the late 1930s had inundated the Lake's natural foreshore and beaches and was 
strongly opposed and resented by naturalists and bushwalkers at the time. The raising 
of the Great Lake to construct the Poatina scheme for aluminium production stopped 
water flowing down the Shannon River in 1962 and destroyed the world renowned 
trout fishing phenomenon, the Shannon Rise, that had been created with the Hydro-Electric 
Department's first hydro-electric scheme (Taylor 1993). To the Government, these 
represented small prices to pay for economic growth and although both losses were 
deeply felt by the respective interest groups, overall, the Tasmanian community was 
resigned to the fact that nothing stood in the way of hydro-electric development. With 
this rapid expansion of hydro-electric construction, all available large economic hydro-
electric sites had been developed or were under construction and the HEC began to 
turn its attention in the late 1950s to the island's more rugged and remote south west. 
The Chief Commissioner, writing in 1956, tentatively outlined the future projects, including 
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schemes using the King and Franklin Rivers, the Pieman River, and the Gordon River. 
The Commissioner claimed that due to the rough terrain, little investigation work had 
been carried out on those schemes, although preliminary cost estimates had been 
calculated (Allbut 1958: 82-3, 86). By the early 1960s, the HEC planning of a scheme 
on the Gordon River was rapidly accelerated. No one anticipated the furore that the 
decision would create. 
8. The Lake Pedder Controversy 
The Scenery Preservation Board had been informed as early as 1954 by the HEC Chief 
Commissioner that a dam would probably be constructed near the confluence of the 
Gordon and Serpentine Rivers in the rugged South West (Lowe 1984: 25). It was an 
area recognised for its high wilderness values by the increasing popularity of bushwalking 
in the post-war period and its perceived status began to shift from wasteland to 
valued wilderness. Among its many natural features, one in particular stood out. 
Lake Pedder, a 2.5 km 2 glacial lake in the Serpentine River catchment with an extensive 
quartzite beach, was considered the 'jewel' of the South West wilderness and in 1955 
the Lake Pedder National Park was declared. 
Concern over development and rumours of planned hydro-electric construction in the 
South West led in 1962 to the formation of the South West Committee made up of 
representatives from various bushwalking and other organisations (Grant 1978: 251). 
This Committee lobbied for a comprehensive management plan for the region and an 
InterDepartmental Committee was established to advise the Government on the desirable 
balance between development and exploitation in the area. In the following year, 
construction of a road from the township of Maydena to the Gordon River began using 
a $5 million grant from the Commonwealth (Green 1984: 23). Although the government 
of the day claimed that no definitive plans had been developed and that the purpose 
of the road was purely to facilitate HEC investigations, it was revealed years later that 
the road had been carefully surveyed to avoid inundation when the dams were 
constructed, indicating that the HEC's plans had been already well advanced at the 
time (Wilde 1978: 210). 
In mid 1965, Reece announced that there would be some need to 'modify the Lake 
Pedder National Park to accommodate the new hydro-electric scheme (Smith & Handmer 
1991: 50). One year later the Commonwealth agreed to provide the State with a $47 
million ad hoc special purpose loan towards construction of the Middle Gordon River 
Scheme (also referred to as the Gordon River Power Development Stage 1). The 
information was withheld from the public until early 1967 when the Inter-Departmental 
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Committee on South West Tasmania tabled its report which recommended that the 
Lake Pedder National Park be enlarged as a South West National Park. To fend off 
the demand for an increased Lake Pedder National Park, the Premier revealed that 
Commonwealth money had already been made available for construction of a scheme, 
thus sparking intense debate. The silence of the Scenery Preservation Board throughout 
that debate was considered by Davis (1980: 153) to be 'strange'. Also silent was the 
Liberal Opposition, in contrast to its earlier outbursts of criticism of the HEC and the 
continuation of hydro-industrialization. 
Environmentalists responded by immediately forming the Save Lake Pedder National 
Park Committee. On the 25th May the HEC tabled its report in Parliament, which 
recommended construction of a dam on the 288 MW Middle Gordon and three smaller 
dams to flood the Serpentine catchment as supplementary storage for the Middle 
Gordon dam. It became clear that 'modification' of Lake Pedder meant total inundation 
of the Lake Pedder National Park under the largest man-made freshwater impoundment 
in the Southern Hemisphere, over 600 km2 in area. 
Without support in the House of Assembly, environmentalists turned to the Legislative 
Council which established a Select Committee of Inquiry in early June of 1967. Reece 
meanwhile introduced a Bill in the Lower House to approve construction of the scheme. 
Apart from a question from a Liberal backbencher as to why the South West Committee 
had not been allowed to put its case for saving Lake Pedder National Park to the 
Scenery Preservation Board, the Bill was passed with almost no debate (Lowe 1984: 
27). 
The reason for the lack of dissent from within the Government's own ranks is likely to 
have been Reece's demand for party unity. The Opposition's sudden relapse into 
uncritical acceptance of HEC proposals, however, is more difficult to explain. One 
explanation is the drought which had led to the use of cloud seeding, beginning in 1964. 
This problem was exacerbated by catastrophic bushfires which swept through the 
southern half of the State in February 1967. Drought worsened throughout that year 
and HEC storages fell to a record low of 14%. A 10 MW oil-fired electricity generating 
vessel, the George H. Evans, was purchased from New Zealand and anchored off Bell 
Bay. In terms of the HEC's attempts to persuade politicians of the need for the 
scheme, the drought was timely. As the fact that as a storage rather than a run-of-river 
scheme, the HEC was able to advance the Middle Gordon scheme as a drought-proofing 
measure, since the only other storage scheme in the State was the Great Lake (Poatina) 
scheme. The HEC simultaneously recommended to Parliament that a 120 MW oil-fired 
emergency power station be built adjacent Comalco's smelter at Bell Bay at a capital 
cost of $20.75 million. These are likely to have been highly significant factors behind 
the opposition's sudden reversal on the issue of continued hydro-electric construction, 
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as an election was drawing close and the Liberal opposition could ill-afford to risk 
alienating the public. The fact that the opposition had never challenged a specific 
proposal before, however, meant that the opposition's silence may have also been a 
result of its inability to critically question the technical expertise of the Commission. 
This inability was a major factor in determining the outcome of the Legislative Council 
Select Committee of Inquiry. Neither the small group of politically naïve environmentalists 
nor the Legislative Counsellors proved a match for the HEC. The Commission's 
representatives bamboozled the members of the Committee with technical details while 
remaining silent on critical issues (Davis 1972: 34). The Commission persuaded the 
Committee that the Gordon Catchment without the additional storage of the Serpentine 
Impoundment would not produce electricity at a sufficiently low cost and that the 
Serpentine impoundment represented, furthermore, an additional drought-proofing 
measure. Late in the day the HEC indicated that it would be feasible to avoid flooding 
Lake Pedder by lowering the level of the Serpentine impoundment and pumping water 
into the Gordon catchment, at an estimated capital cost of $15 million. The HEC, 
however, convinced the members of the Select Committee that the pumping option was 
not only expensive but would be futile as it would not preserve Lake Pedder in a 
natural form (Lowe 1984: 38). With no independent expert advice, the Select Committee 
reported on the 22nd of August that it had reluctantly accepted the HEC's view that 
there was no satisfactory alternative to flooding Lake Pedder. Two days later the 
Legislative Council passed the Bill. As a compromise, the South West National Park 
was enlarged, but with many areas of strategic importance to mining and timber 
extraction omitted. 
The drought, meanwhile, had worsened, and in September the HEC (Emergency Powers) 
Bill was passed giving the Commission legal power to introduce rationing. Daylight 
saving was introduced, 33% of public street lights were turned off and electric bus 
services were curtailed while residential load fell 20% below demand level of the same 
period in the previous year. Major industries were asked to reduce output by 25%. By 
December of that year, industries were asked to reduce output by 35% relative to the 
same period in the previous year. 
The Lake Pedder affair and the shortages were damaging for the Reece government and 
in the 1969 State election Bethune's Liberal Party skilfully exploited anti-government 
sentiments, blaming the Labor government for the electricity shortages and loss of 
employment, promising voters that under a Liberal government there would never again 
be an electricity shortage in the State, and that all electricity supply options, including 
nuclear energy, would be investigated. To appease environmentalists, Bethune promised 
to set up a National Parks and Wildlife Service governed by' an Advisory Board, with 
representatives from community interest groups (Lowe 1984: 30). At the election, the 
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Liberal and Labor Parties both won seventeen seats each, with the crucial thirty-fifth 
seat being won by the Centre Party's Brendon Lyons. Bethune and Lyons formed a 
coalition government and for the first time in 35 years, the Labor Party moved to the 
Opposition benches. 
The Coalition government introduced a number of major reforms. These included the 
establishment of a State Planning Authority, despite strong opposition from the HEC 
(Lowe 1984: 30). The 120 MW oil-fired emergency power station was constructed 
and, at the insistence of industry, construction of a second 120 MW unit began. The 
drought eased, and the sense of urgency dissipated. The HEC requested that emergency 
measures such as daylight saving be lifted. Daylight saving, however, had proved 
popular, and was not only retained but was extended from four to six months of every 
year. The electric bus service, with much of its infrastructure damaged by the 1967 
bushfires, was phased out (Cooper 1979: 19). 
By 1971, the HEC was predicting an 80% to 100% increase in demand for electricity 
over the next decade and in mid 1971 tabled its report on the 390 MW Pieman River 
Scheme, estimated to cost $134 million. The HEC recommended an immediate start to 
construction, warning that failure to do so was likely to 'lead to power restrictions of 
some form' (HEC 1971: 7). The now beknighted HEC Commissioner and his senior 
officers set about persuading politicians of the need for the scheme. Their argument 
was the need to maintain a rolling construction programme to hold together its 2,000 
strong construction workforce. Politicians were also reminded of the political 
ramifications of shedding this workforce during a period of high unemployment. 
The dilemma for the Government was that although the HEC proposals were becoming 
costly, to openly question the policy risked undermining the credibility of its own major 
economic strategy (Davis 1981: 180). For the HEC, the difficulty was forecasting the 
increase in load of a relatively small system in which the industrial load was prone to 
rapid fluctuations. This in turn impacted on the rate of economic growth and, therefore, 
the rate of growth of general load. Superimposed on this was the dependence of the 
system on unpredictable rainfall. The HEC and the Government had to weigh up the 
risks of undersupply in terms of reduced employment, industrial output and HEC 
revenue. The most damaging impacts of shortages were considered to be the undermining 
of industrial growth. Unless further schemes were constructed Tasmania's reputation 
as an industrial investment risk could damage the chances of growth. Some feared that 
existing industries would decamp. Against this had to be balanced the risks of 
overcapacity which would not generate income to pay off construction loans and result 
in unpopular tariff increases. The HEC was able to persuade the Government that the 
risk of electricity shortages was potentially far more damaging than the risks of 
overcapacity. 
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One of the effects of the long lead time of the Gordon Scheme was that it allowed the 
environmentalists' campaign to build up momentum. The degree to which this occurred 
was totally unpredicted by both the Liberal and Labor parties. While a few members 
of both the Legislative Council and the Labor Party began to have a change of heart, 
senior members of the Labour Party insisted that it would it be extremely difficult to 
abandon hydro-electric construction as this would jeopardise the Government's ability 
to create jobs. Even if the Government attempted to abandon the policy, it was 
argued, it had little ability to control the HEC since past attempts to bring the HEC 
under ministerial control had been thwarted by the Legislative Council (Batt 1972: 57). 
Criticism of the large portion of the State's capital works budget absorbed by the HEC 
was dismissed as a red herring, since the only projects for which the State could raise 
money through the Loans Council, it was maintained, were income-producing projects. 
As one of the few income-producing projects available to the State government, hydro-
electric construction automatically received the largest share of State capital borrowings 
(Batt 1972: 56). 
The environmentalists' attack on hydro-industrialisation over the flooding of Lake 
Pedder opened the door for questioning the economics of the policy. The contradiction 
between a dramatic rise in the manufacturing sector's electricity demand and slowing 
growth of manufacturing sector employment was becoming more apparent (Hean 1972: 
102). Independent economists began to suggest that if the economic costs of drought 
and drought-protection measures were factored into electricity cost-benefit analyses, 
thermal power stations had already become competitive with hydro-electric construction 
in the State (Davidson 1972, McColl 1976). As an alternative to further hydro-electric 
development, many environmentalists supported the thermal option, justifying this on 
the grounds that a coal-fired power station would not pose a pollution problem since 
the emissions from coal-fired stations all occurred naturally in the atmosphere in large 
quantities and were therefore innocuous (Johnson 1972: 76). The HEC ridiculed the 
environmentalist support for a coal-fired plant by adopting the slogan "HEC: Power 
without Pollution". Environmentalists parried with their own "HEC: Power without 
Purpose". 
The increasing questioning of hydro-industrialisation and growing support for saving 
Lake Pedder led to a call in Parliament for the fate of Lake Pedder to be decided by 
referendum. The call was defeated. Environmentalists, however, refused to surrender 
and adopted other tactics. The first of these was to form a political party. In early 
1972 Bethune and Lyons fell out. Lyons resigned from Parliament and moved to the 
mainland, taking with him $25,000 as payment for the publication rights to his unwritten 
memoirs by a firm which had been involved in a scandal over its purchase of large 
tracts of public land (Sanders 1980: 56). The government collapsed and went to the 
polls. To contest the election, environmentalists, led by an ecologist from the University 
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of Tasmania, Dr Richard Jones, formed the United Tasmania Group (UTG). It was the 
first formal green political party in the world, predating the New Zealand Values party 
by two months. The enthusiasm and grass-roots campaigning skills caught its 'Laborial' 
opponents by surprise. Compared to their lack lustre efforts, the UTG ran a slick and 
professional campaign on a shoe-string budget (Green 1984: 54). The HEC responded 
by entering into the election campaign, using media statements and advertisements to 
denigrate environmentalists as irresponsible, warning voters that if the environmentalist 
attempt to alter the scheme succeeded electricity tariffs would be raised. The Labor 
Party under Reece won a land slide victory. At the election, the UTG's candidate in 
the inner Hobart electorate of Denison missed out on winning a seat by a mere 150 
votes. Outraged, the UTG claimed that it was a travesty of the democratic process, 
and called for a Royal Commission into the role played by the HEC in the election 
(Green 1984: 56). Its demands were ignored by the government (Sanders 1980: 57). 
The second tactic employed by environmentalists was to launch a legal challenge. A 
new group, the Lake Pedder Action Committee (LPAC) was formed in 1971 to lobby 
Tasmanian politicians. In July 1972 the LPAC challenged the legality of the construction 
of the scheme as it contravened the 1968 proclamation of the enlarged South West 
National Park. The LPAC's application for a fiat from the Attorney-General to allow 
litigation was blocked when Reece indicated that irrespective of the litigation, 
retrospective legislation would be passed to validate construction. The Attorney-General 
resigned on principle, Reece took over his portfolio and introduced The Removal of 
Doubts Bill 1972 (Lowe 1984: 42). 
The third tactic taken by the environmentalists proved more successful. Tasmanian 
members of the national conservation body, the Australian Conservation Foundation 
(ACF) had been unable to convince the national body to lobby the federal government 
to intervene and therefore orchestrated a 'palace coup' (Green 1984: 61). With more 
militant environmentalists at the helm, the ACF lobbied the Federal government to 
intervene. Gough Whitlam's Labor Party won office in December 1972 and although 
the new Prime Minister was personally against intervention, his Minister for the 
Environment, Moss Cass, visited the Lake and met with the Premier. Reece threatened 
to lead Tasmania out of the Commonwealth if the Federal government meddled in the 
State's internal affairs. The Federal government set up a House of Representatives 
Select Committee of Inquiry to investigate the matter. The Tasmanian Premier was 
furious and instructed his departments to adopt a policy of non-cooperation (Green 
1984 24). In its final report, the Senate Committee was extremely critical of both the 
secrecy with which the destruction of Lake Pedder had been planned and of the HEC's 
planning methodology, and recommended the use of standard project appraisal methods 
in future (Lake Pedder Committee of Enquiry 1974: 250-1). The Committee considered 
that Lake Pedder ought to be saved, called for a moratorium on construction while an 
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agreement was reached, and recommended that the Commonwealth meet the costs of 
altering the scheme to save the Lake. The HEC reassessed the costs of altering the 
scheme to $55 million and the Commonwealth offered the Tasmanian government up 
to $47 million. Reece rejected the offer out of hand (Lowe 1984: 44) and environmentalists 
could do nothing but watch and lament as their 'temple was ransacked' (Kiernan 
1990). 
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APPENDIX II 
The Calculation of Refrigerator Energy Consumption at an 
Average Compartment Temperature of 3 °C. 
Energy consumption per 24 hours for an average refrigeration compartment temperature 
of 3 °C was found at each ambient temperature by setting the refrigerator's thermostat 
at its mid-point, measuring the energy consumed and calculating the average compartment 
temperature. The thermostat setting was then adjusted up or down depending on 
whether the calculated average compartment temperature in the first test was higher or 
lower than 3 °C and energy consumption and average compartment temperature re-
determined. This was process was continued so that energy consumption per 24 hours 
was found for a range of average compartment temperatures at a particular ambient 
temperature. The two average compartment temperatures closest to 3 °C were then 
used to interpolate (or extrapolate if one of the average temperature readings was 
sufficiently close to 3 °C) from this data to find the energy consumption at an average 
compartment temperature of 3 °C at the particular ambient setting. This information 
is presented in Figures 1 to 4 for the Kelvinator CS 334, the Fisher & Paykel C 190 and 
the Gram LER 200. 
1 














































-2 	0 	2 	4 6 
degrees Celsius 
Figure 1 Average refrigerator compartment temparature and energy consumption 
at two settings of the refrigerator thermostat and an ambient test 
temperature of 43 °C used to calculate energy consumption at an average 
compartment temperature of 3 °C. 
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Average refrigerator compartment temparature and energy 
consumption at two settings of the refrigerator thermostat and an 
ambient test temperature of 21 °C used to calculate energy 
consumption at an average compartment temperature of 3 °C. 
Figure 3 
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.11 
Figure 4 Average refrigerator compartment temparature and energy 
consumption at two settings of the refrigerator thermostat and an 
ambient test temperature of 10 °C used to calculate energy 
consumption at an average compartment temperature of 3 °C. 
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Questo volantino tratta di come risparmiare 
soldi riducendo ii consumo dell'energia (elettri-
cita, gas) che si adopera in casa. Meno elettrici-
ta e gas si consuma, piii basse saranno le bollet-
te da pagare e pia saranno i soldi da poter spen-
dere in altre cose. Questo non significa dover ri-
nunciare a qualcosa. 11 volantino mostra come 
una tipica famiglia pia) ridurre ii consumo del-
l'energia (fino ad un terzo) usando elettrodo-
mestici pii efficienti, soffitti isolati, ecc. Sul 
rovescio vi e una lista di controllo di simili 
provvedimenti per il risparmio dell'energia. 
To ipukXaoto auto avaipepetat ow nco; LotopoLige vu crag 
13ori9ilooge vu npoota -retiere TO TreptOakkov, XPI1otgo-
11°16v -rag Xtyorepri evepyeta (T0..eicrptKO pei4La, nem) a tu 
ortitta oac. Av xpriatgoitototige XITO -reprt evEpyeta °11nat-
VE1 Ott TO IteptIRLA,Xov gag keprnvetat XtyOrepo. AuTO Sev 
orgictivet Ott XpElacETat vu 8LaKOwere o,ttStirtote. To Lpt.04.- 
kti8to 8eixvet ncnc gta ouv/Otogevi oucoyeveln gnopei vu 
geunciet Triv itoaerrita Tic evepyclac /Lou Katavaknwet (Lit-
XPI '<Cad TO Eva Tpito) xPrialgOISOIthVtac RIO artoLSottice; 
ouoKeutc, artogovciwovrac °Kerte; EXit.ETO ;Limo gepoc 
exoge Eva itivaka Tetotow getpaw not, ekomovogotiv 
evepyeta. 
Li 	 .:LA 
209-213 Stewart 111_,.,..,11.11 	o_p_y 
.St., East Brunswick 
Quyen sach nh6 nay nOi ve mei truang va lam cach 
nao chung ta CO the giiip bao v no bang cach sir 
dung it nang lung trong nha. Hay nhd mOt nguti ban 
giai thich ne cho quY vi, hay lien lac Scfr Din Lu-c 
Brunswick (Brunswick Electricity), 209-213 Stewart 
St., East Brunswick. 
Bu brostir cevremizle ilgili olup evlerimizde daha ez 
enerji kullanarak onu korumakta nasil yardimci olabi-
lecegimizle ilgilidir. Bunu size bir arkadasinizin anlat-
masini isteyiniz veya 209-213 Stewart St., East 
Brunswick adresindeki Brunswick Elektrik ldaresine 
basvurunuz. 
Further information 
For further information on reducing your energy 
bills, contact one of the following officers: 
City of Brunswick Electricity 
Supply Department 
Main Office 
209-213 Stewart Street, 
East Brunswick 3057 
Phone: 389 4100 
Branch Office 
386-370 Sydney Road, 
Brunswick 3056 
Energy Information Centre 
139 Flinders Street, 
Melbourne 3000 
Phone: 650 1195 
Gas and Fuel Corporation 
171 Flinders Street, 
MELBOURNE 3000 
Phone: 652 5122 
Home Energy Advisory Service 
27 Ellingworth Parade, 
Box Hill 3128 
Phone: 890 1771 
(Available to low income households on a 
once-only basis) 
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High energy saving measures 
STAGE 3 
Very high energy saving measures 
o Wear warmer clothing instead of extra heating. 
O Keep doors to unused rooms closed. 
CI Close off unused fireplaces. 
O Build pelmets over windows to enclose curtains. 
0 Make sure curtains are close fitting. 
0 Install ceiling fan(s). 
0 Turn down heater thermostat (to between 
1 8°G and 22°C). 
O lnsulate your ceiling - particularly above 
living areas. 
O Invest in new, efficient heating system 
efficient gas or wood heaters 
efficient heat pumps 






O lnsulate exposed hot water pipes. 
Olf no one is going to be in the house for over 
three days, turn off the hot water system. 
OTake 3 minute showers instead of baths. 
OFix dripping hot water taps. 
OReplace shower head with "flow control" head. 
0 Add extra insulation around your hot water 
tank. 
OTurn down the thermostat on your hot 
water cylinder (55 to 65°C).. 
0Connect solar panel to hot water system. 
OReplace your old hot water system with a 












0Ensure that there is at least an 8 mm gap 
between the condensor coils and the wall. 
OLocate the fridge/freezer in a position that 
is not too hot. 
OD° not overfill or underfill fridge. 
DEnsure liquids kept in fridge/freezer are 
covered. 
0 Allow warm foods to cool before refrigerating 
0 Clean the condensor coils at least once every 
two months. 
0 For manual defrost, defrost before ice build 
up exceeds 6 mm. 
OTurn off the garage/bar fridge until you 
really need it. 
OTrade in your old fridge/freezer on a new, 
highly efficient model. 
• If buying a new fridge/freezer: 
do not buy one larger than you need. 
look for the energy efficient label. The 
more stars, the more efficient it is and 
the less power it uses. 
0When using the oven, cook several dishes 
at once. 
00pen the oven door as little as possible. 
OThaw frozen foods completely before cooking. 
0 Only preheat oven if absolutely necessary. 
0 Simmer food instead of continuously boiling. 
OUse small, efficient appliances (such as 
electric frying pans, pressure cookers, 
O Buy twin/triple saucepan sets with tight 
fitting lids. 
0 Use minimum water in saucepans. 
0Ensure the size of the saucepan matches the 
size of the hot plate. 
o Consider buying a microwave oven. They 
can cook a meal using much less energy. 
If buying a new electric or gas oven, look for 
the energy rating label. Efficient, fan-forced 
ovens use up to 35% less energy. 





OTurn lights off if the room is unoccupied [for 
fluorescent lights it is worth turning off if 
no one is in the room for more than 10 mins.). 
OReplace high wattage globes with lower 
wattage globes unless bright lighting is needed. 
OTurn off flood lighting/security lighting unless 
it is needed. 
OInvest in compact fluorescent globes which 
fit normal bayonet light sockets. They use 









D Use the dishwasher only when full. 0When buying a new dishwasher, look for the 
energy rating label. 
OUse only cold water if possible. 
OUse "economy" cycle. 
0 Do not overload the machine. 
ODo not underload the machine - wait until 
you have a full load. 
Off purchasing a new washing machine, look for 
the most efficient model. Machines that do not 
heat their own water and are front loading, 
use less energy. 
OUse cold water washes and rinses with a 
detergent suited to cold water. 










If drying more than one load, use in quick 
succession to save heat. 
0 Keep the lint filter of clothes dryer clean. 
OPre-spin clothes in the washing machine. 
OUse the clothes line - solar energy is 
non-polluting. 
o Use clothes dryers only if absolutely 
necessary. 
o Use windows and doors to ventilate rather 
than the air conditioner whenever possible. 
0 Raise the thermostat setting of your air- 
conditioner (24° C - 27°C). 
Olnsulate your ceiling. 






0 Use appliances such as dishwashers in the 
morning rather than during the day on hot days. 
Olf buying an air ccnditioner, look for the energy 
rating label. Do not buy a unit larger than you 
need. 
0Heaters for fish aquariums use a lot of energy 
- about as much as small refrigerator. 
OThink twice before installing/using a spa bath 
- they can use very large amounts of energy! 
Olnstall solar heating if you have a swimming 
pool. 
OWatching 5 hours of TV/video per night uses 
half as much power as your refrigerator. 
Elf you have an "instant on" TV set, turn it off 
at the wall otherwise it continues to use power 
warming the tube. 
O Water beds can use as much energy as your 
hot water system. 
O Heated towel rails use about as much energy 
as a refrigerator. Only use if you have to. 
OTurn off the timer on the swimming pool 






Significant energy saving measures 
THREE STAGES TO SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT BY SAVING ENERGY 
By following the steps below, the typical household can reduce its impact on our environment by minimising its energy consumption. 
KEEP THIS CHECKLIST ON YOUR WALL - TICK OFF ENERGY SAVING MEASURES AS YOU COMPLETE THEM. 
0 rtto iravw rtivakac SEixvEt uEptko0c arc' Too; SicupopErtkoUg rpO 
7E014 /WU u7ropot:41E VU 1£16)00f.LE TT1V 1tOOOT11Ta tric Evtpymag (Tike- 
KTplK00 peOuctroc, a.Epiou) TIOU xpnatuoiroto0uE GTO G7titl taç. '000 
kty6repri EvEpyEta xpricituomoto0uE thoo rcEptcioOrEpo Pon0o0uE va 
7MOCITCLTEDOEi TO itEptPakkov gag. Tct utrpa aura Starnpricric IOU mg- 
ptikkkoviog 8tcaptpouv avatpopixd iE T11V 7COGOTTITa tic  EvEpyEtac 
7T011 E4011COV01.1,00V Kat KaIdt TO ETtiltE80 utrpcov mot) xpEtaccrat vct Ab.- 
13ETE. Av tXETE Kia7t01.0 (piko mot) propei vot Ga.; p.Ercappaciet TOV ittva-
KU, ciiTEiGTE-TOU VC1. Gag TOV ETly1)061. H Maki, cliTEiGTE ta pukkdotot 
ytct 6icap0A.ctri Evtpycictc, ypauutvct OTOt EXA.rivika, arc' TO ruijuct 
FIX,Exrptap,o0, 209-213 Stewart St, East Brunswick. 
La lista di controllo di cui sopra illustra alcuni dei diversi modi di 
ridurre ii consumo dell'energia (elettricita, gas) che si adopera a 
casa. Meno energia noi consumiano, pin contribuiamo alla prote-
none del nostro ambiente. Queste misure per la conservazione del-
la energia variano a seconda della quantita di energia che esse pos-
sono risparmiare e del livello dell'impegno che esse richiedono. Se 
hai un amico in grado di tradurre la lista di controllo, chiedi a lui 
di spiegartela. Oppure procurati l'opuscolo per la conservazione 
della energia scritto in italiano dal Brunswick Electricity, 209-213 
Stewart St., East Brunswick. 
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Questo volantino tratta di come possiamo aiu-
tare a proteggere ii nostro ambiente consuman-
do meno energia (elettricita, gas) nelle nostre 
case. Usare meno energia significa inquinare di 
meno l'ambiente. E tanto non significa dover 
rinunciare a qualcosa! II volantino mostra co-
me una tipica famiglia mid ridurre ii consumo 
della energia (fino ad un terzo) usando elettro-
domestici piCi efficienti, soffitti isolati, ecc. Sul 
rovescio vi e una lista di controllo di simili 
provvedimenti per il risparmio dell'energia. 
To tpukka8to auto avaq:itpetat at tpOnoug vu ekotKovoull- 
xpfwata, pticiwovrac tnv n000tnrct tic evtpyttac 
(IkeKtptouoti, aeptou) 710U xplataortoteite OTO 011ttl act;. 
'Oao ktyOttpo tlXeKtptKO petipa Kat atpto xpriatportottite 
tea° nto xamiXot EiVal ot Xoyaptaapoi an; Kat nto noXkci 
ta xPfata nou unoptite vu kootwen: a (Aka npityaata. 
AutO Sty attactivet Ott xpetacttat vu SICIK011lETE 0,T181)110- 
TE. To 6uAktt810 Seixvet n; no ouvrietagtvn otKoytveta 
anopct vu uelcimet tiv noatitnta ttic evtpyetac 1100 Kato-
vakciwtt (P•XPI KUTO TO tVia tpito), XPnatponotthvtac nto 
an000ttxt; ClUOKEIJtc, 0710110VcoVOVT0c OKEnt; K)4111. to 
niacu atpo; txoue tva nivaKCI TtTO1C0V 11tTpCOV 1100 Ek01110- 
V01.100V evtpytta. 
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209-213 Stewart St., East 	 4 
.Brunswick 
Quyen sach nh6 nay giai thich nhCrng cach fiat kiem 
tier' bac bang cach sti dung it nang WI:mg trong nha 
cua quY vi. Hay nha mOt ngutri ban giai thich n6 cho 
quY vi, hay lien lac So DiOn Luc Brunswick (Brunswick 
Electricity), 209-213 Stewart St., East Brunswick. 
Bu bro§Or evinizde daha az enerji kullanarak paradan 
tesarruf yollarini anlatmaktadir. Bunu size bir arka-
da§inizin izah etmesini isteyiniz veya 209-213 Stewart 
St., East Brunswick adresindeki Brunswick Elektrik 
ldaresine ba§vurunuz. 
Further information 
For further information on saying energy in your 
home contact one of the following 
City of Brunswick Electricity 
Supply Department 
Main Office 
209 -213 Stewart Street, 
East Brunswick 3057 
Phone: 389 4100 
Branch Office 
386-370 Sydney Road, 
Brunswick 3056 
Energy Information Centre 
139 Flinders Street, 
Melbourne 3000 
Phone: 650 1195 
Gas and Fuel Corporation 
171 Flinders Street, 
MELBOURNE 3000 
Phone: 652 5122 
Home Energy Advisory Service 
27 Ellingworth Parade, 
Box Hill 3128 
Phone: 890 1771 

















$$ THREE STAGES TO SAVING DOLLARS BY SAVING ENERGY $$ 







Minimal 	Investment 	- 	Minimal 	effort 
(investments 	repaid 	within 	one 	year) 
STAGE 2 
Moderate Investment 	- moderate 	effort 
(investments 	repaid after more than one year) 
STAGE 3 
Higher 	Investment 




$ 1 9 0 
III Seal draughts around doors and windows • Build pelmets over windows to enclose. IIII Insulate 	your 	ceiling 	- 	particularly 	over 
curtains living 	areas. • Close off unused fireplaces 
• Turn down heater thermostat (between MI Make sure curtains are close fitting. M Invest in a new efficient heating system 
18° C and 22°C). Ell Install 	ceiling 	fan(s). - efficient gas orwood heaters 
- efficient heat pumps 
- efficient 	off-peak 	heaters 
• Wear warmer clothing instead of extra heating. 
• Keep doors to unused rooms closed. 
( B ) 
Hot 
Water 
$ 1 1 0 
IN Turn down thermostat on hot water IIII Replace shower head with "flow control" head. IM Replace your hot water system with a new 
cylinder (55 to 65° C). • Insulate exposed hot water pipes. efficient, 	gas,"off-peak" 	or "New Dimension" 
electric 	hot water system. MI Take 3 min. showers instead of baths. • Add extra insulation around hot water tank. 
• Fix dripping hot water taps. M Connect solar panel to hot water system. 
• If no one is going to be in the house for over 
three days, turn off the hot water system 





$ 1 2 0 
M Ensure there is at least an 8 mm gap IIII Clean condensor coils (on back) at least • Trade in your old fridge/freezer on a new 
between rear of fridge/freezer and the wall. once every two months. highly efficient model. 
*If buying a new fridge or freezer: 
- 	do not buy one bigger than you need; 
- 	look for the energy rating label. 	The 
more stars the less it will cost you to run. 
III Locate fridge/freezer in position that is not • For manual defrost fridges, do not let ice 
too hot. build up to more than 6 mm before 
defrosting. . Do not overfill 	or underfill fridge. • E nsure liquids kept in fridge/freezer are II Turn off the bar/garage fridge until you 
covered. really 	need 	it. 
IN Let warm foods cool before refrigerating. 
( D ) 
Cooking 
food 
$ 7 5 
IN When using the oven, cook several dishes at • Use small, efficient appliances (such as electric MI Consider buying a microwave oven. 	They can 
once. frying pans, pressure cookers, toasters) 
instead of stoves. 
be a very cheap way of cooking meals. 
• Open the oven door as little as possible. INI If buying a new electric or gas oven, look for 1111 Thaw frozen foods completely before cooking. 11111Buy twin or triple saucepan sets. the energy 	rating 	label. 	Efficient, 	fan-forced 
ovens can cut your cooking costs by 35%. . Only preheat oven if absolutely necessary. • Use saucepans with tight fitting lids. 
11111Simmer food instead of continuously boiling. • Match the size of the saucepan to the hot plate. 
NI Eat more salads and less cooked foods 




• Turn lights off if the room is unoccupied. • Replace high wattage globes with lower wattage • Invest in compact fluorescent globes which  fit 
[For fluorescent lights 	it is worth turning off 
if no-one is in the room for more than 
10 	minutes.] 
globes unless bright lighting is needed. normal bayonet tight sockets. 	They cost more 
to buy but cost less to operate and last longer.. • Turn 	off flood 	lighting/security 	lighting 	unless 




$ 7 5 
• Only use the dishwasher when it is full. • Use only cold water if the hot water service is • When buying a new dishwasher look for the 




$ 2 2 
III Do not overload washing machine. • Use cold water washes and rinses with a • If purchasing a new washing machine look for 
• Do not underload - wait until you have a full detergent suited to cold water. the most efficient model. 	Machines that do not 
heat their own water and are front loading are load. III Use hot water only when necessary. 





III Use the clothes line and free solar energy. IN Keep the clothes dryer lint filter clean. 
IN Use clothes dryers only when absolutely • If drying more than one load, use in quick 
necessary. succession. 





IN Use windows and doors to ventilate instead of MI Shade northern windows and walls on hot days. • Insulate your ceiling. 
using 	air conditioner. 111 Use appliances such as dishwashers in the • If buying an air conditioner - look for the 
U Raise the thermostat setting of the air- morning rather than during the day. energy rating label, and do not buy a larger 





111 Water beds can cost you as much to run as your • Heated towel rails cost as much to run as a M If you have an "instant-on" TV set, turn it off 
hot water system. 	Leaving water beds 
uncovered can double their running costs. 
refrigerator. 	Do not use heated towel rails 
unless they are absolutely necessary. 
at the wall switch or else it continues to use 
power warming the tube. 
111 Watching 5 hrs of TV/radio per day can cost M Turn off the timer on the swimming pool filter M Aquarium heaters can cost as much to run as 
you $60 per year in winter and filter only as necessary. a 	small 	refrigerator. 
M Think twice before installing a spa bath - they 
can cost you over $5 per week. 
KEEP THIS $ SAVING CHECKLIST ON YOUR WALL - TICK OFF $ SAVING MEASURES AS YOU COMPLETE THEM. 
0 MO 7taVCO ITiVGKac SEiXVEL 1.1EpIK011c an' Toug StcupopeTtKobc Tpalitoug moo 
totopeiTe vct Rettbaere Try nonoriTct Tric evEnyEtac (11A,EKTpIK011 peil.taroc, 
aEpiou), moo XV1101.1.1.07COLEiTE GTO (mitt actg. 'Ono ktyOTER Evtpycla xpTica-
i.LOTCOLEiTE, thao 7teptdoOTEpat xptjpcurct coticovo4E1re. Meptkd aTC TG tierpct 
ctuTa ytct otkovoptict civai. altka Kai 8cv xpEtacoviat onotct&nnore Eirev8uni. 
•AX2ta. itakt °uncut -436v oanavEc xportp.drcov, aura (54coc KEp8icovTat ne 
EKTEA.TIKTI.Ka ypilyopo Staarn4a., xctunA,covovTctc mug koyctptacil.tobc actg. 
Av Exere minoto (piko mot) LOTOpEi vaCloic I.LETCUppaGel TOV 7CiVGKG, cTrrEiGTE-
Too va Gag TOV Enytjaet. 'H itC(Xt cTITEiGTE Ta tpuUdiSta ytct Sta(pactit evtp-
yEtac, ypo(44Evct aTia EXA.rivtica an' TO rgijp.a HkexTptattoO T011 Mnpdv-
nyoutic, 209-213 Stewart Street, East Brunswick. 
La lista di controllo di cui sopra illustra alcuni modi diversi di 
ridurre ii consumo dell'energia (elettricita, gas) che si adopera a 
casa. Meno energia si consuma, piü soldi si risparmiano. Alcuni 
di questi provvedimenti per risparmiare energia sono semplici e 
non richiedono alcun investimento. Altri implicano spendere 
soldi, che perO sono sorprendentemente recuperati con rapidita 
riducendo le bollette. Se hai un amico in grado di tradurre la 
lista di controllo, chiedi a lui di spiegartela. 
